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ABSTRACT
In United States v. Fordice (1992), the Supreme Court 
Court declared that racially nondiscriminatory admissions and 
hiring policies alone failed to satisfy the state of 
Mississippi's "affirmative duty" to dismantle a previously de 
jure system of segregated higher education. However, the 
justices declined to define precisely what the state must do 
to satisfy its constitutional obligations, leaving in its 
wake a host of unresolved questions. Of particular concern to 
many African Americans is the fact that the future status of 
public black universities was left in the balance.
Using a case study approach, this dissertation argues 
that higher education desegregation cannot be understood 
apart from the Brown decision and the larger struggle of 
African Americans to achieve the full rights of American 
citizenship. It was found that: (1) though African Americans 
have a unique history of slavery and racial segregation, they 
have adhered to, and used, the same principles from the 
Declaration of Independence and the Constitution in their 
struggles for equality; (2) the legal struggles for dese­
gregation represent a classic case study of the faith of 
blacks in the liberal tradition; (3) though both whites and 
blacks share the same liberal creed, they have come to their 
faith through very different historical paths. These very 
different historical experiences create fundamental 
ideological disputes between whites and blacks over the
viii
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legitimate role of the federal government in race policy; (4) 
these different historical perspectives complicate the issue 
of desegregation in higher education, and particularly the 
question of whether black colleges should be publicly 
supported or discontinued; (5) because the Creed purportedly 
embodies universal, transcendent truths, it tends to dele- 
gitimize arguments rooted in history or culture - the very 
justifications most often relied upon by African Americans 
for the continuation of black colleges (as well as other 
race-based public policies). Consequently, historical and 
cultural differences between blacks and whites raise basic 
questions about whether the American Creed is an adequate 
prism with which to view political problems associated with 
race.
ix
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INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court in United States v. Fordice (505 U.S. 
717 [1992]) concluded that the state of Mississippi's policy 
of nondiscriminatory admissions policies on the basis of race 
was insufficient to meet its "affirmative duty"1 to dese­
gregate a previously de jure system of segregated higher 
education. The case marked the Supreme Court's first ruling 
regarding the remedial policies that states are required to 
adopt in order to desegregate systems of higher education; 
previous Supreme Court rulings in higher education 
desegregation focused on the rights of black Americans to 
attend previously all-white, public universities.2 Yet, 
the Court failed to articulate clearly an equitable remedy in 
the Mississippi case, leaving the parties involved, as well 
as other states in similar straits, wrangling over exactly 
what a state's "affirmative duty" to desegregate in higher 
education actually means.
•The language "affirmative duty" to desegregate is 
derived from the Supreme Court's landmark decision in Green 
v. School Board of New Kent County (391 U.S. 430 [1968]).
2These include Missouri ex. rel. Gaines v. Canada. 305 
U.S. 337 (1938), Sipuel v. Board of Regents. 332 U.S. 631
(1948), Sweatt v. Painter. 339 U.S. 629 (1950), McLaurin v. 
Oklahoma Board of Regents. 339 U.S. 637 (1950), Frasier v. 
Board of Trustees. 134 F. Supp. 589 (M.D. N.C. [1955]), aff'd 
per curiam, 350 U.S. 975 (1956), Lucy v. Adams. 134 F. Supp. 
235 (N.D. Ala. [1955]), aff'd, 228 F. 2d. 619 (5th Cir.
[1955]), cert, denied, 351 U.S. 931 (1955), Florida ex. rel. 
Hawkins v. Board of Control. 350 U.S. 413 (1956), Booker v. 
Tennessee Board of Education. 240 F. 2d. 689 (6th Cir.) cert, 
denied, 353 U.S. 965 (1957), and Meredith v. Fair. 305 F. 2d. 
343 (5th Cir.), cert, denied, 371 U.S. 828 (1962).
1
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The Fordice case represents one more manifestation of 
the continuing effort to implement the mandate first 
articulated in Brown v. Board of Education (347 U.S. 483 
[1954]). The Supreme Court determined that separate 
educational facilities for white and black Americans denied 
blacks the equal protection guarantees of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. The decision represented the the climax of a two- 
decade long legal campaign by the National Association for 
the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) which commenced at 
the level of graduate and professional education. The NAACP's 
objective was to overturn the "separate but equal" doctrine 
announced in Plessv v. Ferguson (163 U.S. 537 [1896]) which 
provided the constitutional, as well as legal, bedrock for 
the entire system of segregation in the South. The NAACP's 
attorneys argued that racial segregation was unconstitutio­
nal because it allowed Southern state governments to classify 
African Americans as a separate class that received different 
and unequal treatment under the law. This principle violated 
the basic tenets of American democracy - that every indivi­
dual, regardless of race, religion, or national origin, is 
entitled to equal protection uner the law. Brown is now 
considered a heroic moment in American history when the 
nation (through its Supreme Court) reaffirmed its commitment 
to its first principles by acting to remedy the most egre­
gious violation of them - the treatment of African Americans
Reproduced  with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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(Myrdal, 1944; Tocqueville, 1988; Kluger, 1975; Wilkinson, 
1979; Gerwitz, 1997; Peller, 1997).
Though Brown now enjoys broad ideological consensus, the 
specific measures necessary to fulfill its mandate have 
always been the subject of intense controversy. In Brown II. 
the Supreme Court ordered that the federal district courts to 
enter decrees and orders that would eliminate segregated 
schooling "with all deliberate speed" (Brown v. Board of 
Education. 349 U.S. 294 [1955]). The vague nature of the
mandate coupled with stubborn resistance to integration 
forced the Court to revisit on many occasions the question of 
precisely what Brown required -local school districts and 
state governments to do. Brown has raised fundamental issues 
about the power of federal court judges to craft remedies to 
address constitutional violations, particularly in the face 
of intense public opposition; in essence, it has often placed 
unelected federal judges against the power of elected public 
officials and popular majorities.
The attempt to apply Brown to higher education has been 
particularly troublesome, particularly in light of the 
Supreme Court's conspicuous silence prior to Fordice on the 
requirements states must meet in order to dismantle segre­
gation in higher education. Lacking precedent from the 
nation's highest court, the task has fallen into the hands of 
lower federal court judges. Consequently, different courts 
often came to radically divergent conclusions of law and
Reproduced  with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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proposed conflicting remedies, making the entire enterprise 
a rather confusing area of constitutional law. In attempting 
to resolve this dilemma, federal judges have tended to look 
to precedents set in elementary and secondary school 
desegregation cases for guidance in the higher education 
area.
The existence of state-supported, historically black 
colleges and universities further complicates the problem of 
defining the remedial measures necessary to eliminate de jure 
and de facto segregation in higher education. The question 
for courts to resolve is whether, in light of the historical 
experience of African Americans, the maintenance of these 
institutions is a necessary requirement for equal educational 
opportunity for black Americans to exist, or if they are 
merely the remnants of an unconstitutional system of segre­
gated higher education (Miller, 1982). At issue is whether 
these institutions will be continued to be allowed to exist, 
or if they must be sacrificed as the necessary price for an 
"integrated society" Thus, the fate of historically black 
universities further politicizes the inherently troubling 
dilemma of how to craft remedial measures to desegregate in 
higher education.
The three principal aims of this dissertation are (1) to 
show that the struggle of black Americans for equal educa­
tional opportunity represents a central component of the 
overall struggle of African Americans to achieve full
Reproduced  with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
equality in American society more broadly and (2) desegre­
gation in education is a classic case study in the fidelity 
of African Americans to the American Creed (Myrdal, 1944), 
and (3) while the Creed has provided the ideological basis 
for the current consensus that racially discriminatory laws 
violate fundamental American principles of fairness, it has 
been less successful at forging a consensus around the best 
means to remedy the effects of centuries of racist practice. 
Rather, it will be shown that though American blacks and 
whites share the same American Creed, different historical 
experiences color their perspective on what its policy con­
sequences are with respect to the legitimate role of the 
state in remedying racial discrimination.
To accomplish this, I want to place Brown into a broader 
historical context of the struggle of black Americans to 
achieve full equality in all arenas of American life. 
Secondly, I plan to revisit the ruling in Brown with par­
ticular attention to how the ruling shaped the debate on 
desegregation in general and higher education in particular. 
Thirdly, Fordice will be analyzed as a case study in view of 
the principles laid down by Brown and its progeny. I will 
concentrate especially on the question of the relevancy of 
precedents set in public school cases to the higher education 
context. Fourthly, the political, economic, and social 
implications of the Fordice ruling will be examined. Finally, 
this dissertation will reflect on the Supreme Court's trek
R eproduced  with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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from Brown to Fordice and assess how core American ideals - 
which undergird American constitutional law in general and 
the Brown decision in particular - help and/or hinder the 
debate on how best to improve race relations in the United 
States.
Conceptual Framework
It will be argued in this dissertation that the struggle 
of black Americans to achieve the full rights of American 
citizenship in general and the school desegregation battles 
in particular cannot be properly understood apart from what 
Louis Hartz (1955) calls the "liberal tradition in America." 
In a nutshell, Hartz persuasively argues that what 
distinguishes America from Europe is that it lacked a true 
feudal and aristocratic past based on notions of rigid class 
distinctions and the belief in the inherent right of some to 
rule others (Tocqueville, 1988) . While European liberals 
spoke of the "state of nature" in a theoretical sense, 
America, with its virgin forests and bountiful natural 
wealth, seemed to be the practical fulfillment of Locke. This 
reality contributed to the American sense of mission - the 
idea that America represented a chance to "make the world 
over again" (Hartz, 1955; Davis, 1966; Peterson, 1976).
Thus, American democracy assumes the atomistic indi­
vidual as the basis for society, and furthermore assume that 
a political system is just to the extent that it assures the 
maximum degree of freedom and equality to individuals (Myr-
R eproduced  with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
7
dal, 1944; Hartz, 1955; Downs, 1957; Rossiter, 1962; Bellah, 
1985; McCullogh, 1991). All of the aforementioned values are 
by-products of what is referred to as "The Age of Reason" or 
the Enlightenment - the period starting from the late 1600's 
when Western man came to view science, technology, and human 
reason as essential - and to some degree, identical - with 
human progress (Allen, 1989; McCullough, 1991).
Individualism assumes that people are intellectually and 
morally competent to make choices about their religion, 
occupation, politics, and other lifestyle choices apart from 
the influences of class, family heritage, church, guild, 
and/or community (McCullough, 1991). Much of what is 
generally accepted as democratic theory predicates itself on 
the belief that all of the aforementioned institutions 
represent "vices" from the Old World which were to be done 
away with in the New. Thus, democracy assumes a measure of 
"enlightenment" within the population, but also sees an 
informed citizenry as essential to its survival (Neuman, 
1986) . Public schools, thus, have come to be seen as 
foundational for perpetuating democratic values (Dewey, 
1966); Cremin, 1989; Purpel, 1989; McCullom v. Board of 
Education. 333 U.S. 203 [1948]). The university, according to 
Bloom (1987), embodies the concept of the "free market of 
ideas" in the same way as the marketplace symbolizes laissez- 
faire capitalism.
Reproduced  with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Moreover, the Supreme Court's ruling in Brown explicitly 
acknowledges the central role that education plays in 
determining the life chances of citizens living in a modern 
capitalist economy. Access to educational opportunity, thus, 
becomes an intricate foundational stone to the realization of 
the Lockian birthright. Thus, Chief Justice Warren writes, 
"Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to 
provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on 
equal terms" (347 U.S. at 493). Much has been written in 
recent years about the transition of the U.S. economy to a 
"knowledge economy" in an increasingly competitive global 
market; thus, as this transformation accelerates, the 
importance of education, as it relates to creating a highly- 
skilled labor force, rises exponentially (Johnston and 
Packer, 1987; Wilson, 1978; 1987; Reich, 1991). These
economic transformations are occurring alongside a major 
debate about the roles, design, and pedagogy of public 
education (Chubb and Moe, 1990; Fiske, 1991; Purpel, 1989; 
Reitman, 1992) . One of the central thrusts of this debate is 
the question of how best to "fix the schools" in order to 
better prepare tomorrow's work force.
Thus, the struggle for racial equality in America cannot 
be properly understood apart from the larger American 
political cosmos. As Berlin (1975) shows in his history of 
free Negroes, the implications of the beliefs of the American 
Revolution - specifically the claim that "all men are created
Reproduced  with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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equal" - were not lost on black Americans. Viewed in this 
light, black protest in America derives not from a rejection 
of what Gumnar Myrdal (1944) calls "the American Creed;" 
rather, it reflects the sense that the high ideals of the 
Enlightenment were being denied to blacks on an equal basis. 
Even when one looks at the more "radical blacks" - men 
ranging from David Walker to Malcolm X - the basis for their 
rage was not a rejection of the American ideal itself. 
Rather, the source of their rage stemmed from their sense 
that America had not lived up to her principles. Most black 
political leaders, activists, and intellectuals operate 
within the "liberal tradition;" it is the rare soul who would 
raise fundamental questions about the American experiment 
itself.
Against this backdrop, the Supreme Court decision in 
Brown v. Board of Education in 1954, comes to be seen as a 
personification of the American Creed. It is more than simply 
the culmination of a two-decade old assault by the National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) on 
separate and unequal education for blacks. Rather, the choice 
by black Americans to pursue their agenda through the courts 
presupposes a belief in the correctness of core American 
political values and institutions while simultaneously 
pleading for the extension of rights to those who had been 
historically disadvantaged. Furthermore, this basic reality 
locates subsequent desegregation battles, whether they
Reproduced  with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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involve public schools or colleges and universities, within 
this broader context of black Americans struggling to enter 
the mainstream of American political life and culture. 
Literature Review
A search through the database of Dissertation Abstracts 
revealed that no dissertation has been written since the 
rendering of the Fordice decision which attempts to analyze 
this case in light of the principles set forth in Brown and 
the subsequent public school precedents. In fact, a broader 
review of the scholarly literature on desegregation issues 
showed that there has been very little scholarly attention to 
the question of the relevance of principles set in elementary 
and secondary school cases for higher education. The 
overwhelming majority of scholarly literature in this field, 
whether it focuses on the public schools or colleges and 
universities, has consisted of case studies of desegregation 
efforts in particular locales, attitudinal surveys of persons 
and interest groups involved in the process, and analyses of 
specific court decisions as well as speculations about what 
these rulings might mean for similarly-situated parties in 
the future.
David J. Armor's Forced Justice: School Desegregation 
and the Law (199 5) is the most comprehensive work written in 
the field to date. Armor's book takes us from Brown up 
through the 1992 Supreme Court ruling in Freeman v. Pitts 
(involving the necessary requirements for a school system to
Reproduced  with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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be declared "unitary") and all the efforts to apply the Brown 
mandate in between. Armor's study raises serious questions 
about the basic thrust of desegregation efforts; mainly, he 
concludes that desegregation has not produced appreciable 
educational gains, while its social and political costs have 
been considerable. However, Armor's study is confined to 
public school desegregation. He does not include the efforts 
to apply the Brown mandate to colleges and universities, 
which is what my dissertation proposes to do.
More and more of the scholarly literature is "chipping 
away" at the basic holding in Brown - that "separate is 
inherently unequal." Armor's book specifically argues that 
this contention, based on Dr. Kenneth Clark's famous doll 
study, is sociologically unsound. Other authors chisel away 
at other aspects of Brown. Steele (1993) makes the case for 
race separate schools in Detroit to combat the ills of crime, 
unemployment, poverty, and hopelessness that seem to 
predestine many inner-city school children to failure. 
Washburn (1994) argues, in defense of historically black 
colleges, that Brown need not be interpreted in the higher 
education context in such a way as to equate "racial balance" 
with inequality. Scott-Brown (1994) attacks conventional 
integrationist thinking, embodied in Brown. as "mythology" 
and "unworkable" in higher education, and makes a case for 
the use of race consciousness in the making of educational 
policy. Williams (1991) argues that the concept of "color­
R eproduced  with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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blindness" (a term used by both liberals and conservatives) 
as presently defined in American jurisprudence lacks the 
conceptual tools to deal with the dilemmas caused by racial 
discrimination. This literature captures a growing sense that 
the nation's forty-year experiment with desegregation has 
failed, and the time is ripe to reassess some of its basic 
assumptions.
The one book that comes closest to what my dissertation 
proposes to do is J. Harvie Wilkinson's From Brown to Bakke: 
The Supreme Court and School Integration (1954-1978'I (1979) . 
Wilkinson's work, written on the twenty-fifth anniversary of 
Brown. is a thoughtful examination of the tenets of the 
decision, as well as its implications on the civil rights 
movement which followed. Wilkinson clearly raises basic 
questions about the Court's holding in Brown and shows that 
the Court's failure to explain why separate is inherently 
unequal provides the precursor for future problems in trying 
to implement the ruling.
However, Wilkinson is more interested in how Brown set 
the table for the problems associated with its implementation 
in the public school context as well as other issues coming 
out of the civil rights movement - specifically, affirmative 
action. My dissertation will focus on how the principles set 
forth in Brown laid the foundation for subsequent battles to 
desegregate higher education. Moreover, when penned, Wilkin­
son writes, "now is yet too soon to render an accounting of
Reproduced  with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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all the achievements of the modern Civil Rights Movement. .
. (1979:6). Seventeen years later, we can afford to be
more retrospective about the successes and failures of Brown. 
its impact on the civil rights movement, and the current 
debate about race in America.
Lastly, what the literature cited above does not attempt 
to do is to link Brown to the basic tenets of the Enlighten­
ment itself - democracy, the belief in the power of human 
reason and/or science to solve social problems, and the 
critical role of education in a democracy as well as in 
facilitating economic and social mobility. Much of the 
literature on desegregation assumes Brown. thereby leaving it 
in somewhat of an historical vaccum. Thus, the struggle of 
black Americans to obtain equal educational opportunities is 
not seen as part of the larger "liberal tradition" of America 
that Hartz describes. What my dissertation argues is that 
core American political values (particularly Thomas Jeffer­
son's bold statement: "We hold these truths to be self-
evident that all men are created equal. . .") provided the
reference point for the struggles of black Americans for 
inclusion in general and for school desegregation in 
particular.
Scope and Methodology
The heart of this dissertation will employ a case study 
approach of the Fordice decision in Mississippi. The Fordice 
case represents the Supreme Court's first full opinion
R eproduced  with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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regarding the question of the remedial measures states must 
enact in order to eliminate the vestiges of a former de jure 
system of segregated higher education. Theoretically, the 
Mississippi case is also illustrative for two other reasons. 
First of all, of the former Confederate states, Mississippi's 
history of race relations has had a unique viciousness; this 
history still remains a "black eye" on the state's national 
reputation (Williams, 1987). Thus, the struggle of black 
Mississippians for equal educational opportunities occurs in 
a particularly hostile environment. Secondly, unlike other 
states involved in similar legal battles, Mississippi did not 
agree to any consent decrees, nor did it make any systematic 
efforts to enhance historically black colleges or require 
targets for the hiring of minority faculty and staff. In 
fact, the state stubbornly refused to enact "race-conscious" 
policies; instead, it based its defense on the fact that its 
admissions and hiring policies were no longer discriminatory. 
Thus, Mississippi is a classic case study in whether facially 
neutral policies are sufficient to end racial discrimination 
in higher education.
This dissertation will draw on historical evidence, the 
political science literature on American political culture, 
legal scholarship, and constitutional law precedents to put 
the Fordice case in context. In the opening chapter, I will 
rely heavily on Tocqueville, Hartz, Myrdal and others to 
paint a portrait of American political culture and
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institutions. Secondly, I will survey the writings of several 
prominent black political leaders, with the eye toward 
locating their political ideas within the American political 
tradition. Chapter Two traces the NAACP's twenty-year 
campaign to overturn Plessv which culminated in Brown. This 
chapter includes a survey of the debates which ensued among 
legal academics following the Brown decision. This literature 
will be particularly helpful in pointing out the premises of 
Brown as well as the hints for future difficulty in 
clarifying what the decision actually required states to do. 
Chapter Three explores significant public school desegre­
gation cases since Brown as well- as discuss how courts have 
attempted to apply those principles to the higher education 
context.
Chapter Four discusses the historical development of 
higher education in Mississippi to document the creation of 
a dual system for blacks and whites. Then, I will turn to the 
genesis of the lawsuit itself and the circumstances which 
motivated the black plaintiffs to act in the first place. I 
will follow the journey of the Mississippi litigation 
through the Court, concluding with the Supreme Court's 
decision in Fordice. I plan to use legal briefs and other 
court documents in order to understand the specific legal 
arguments made by the parties involved in the litigation. 
Finally, the chapter concludes with a discussion of the 
Supreme Court's decision in Fordice and its potential rami­
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fications for state-supported black colleges and universi­
ties. The plethora of law review articles that were written 
following the Fordice ruling shall form an instrumental part 
of the analysis and the conclusions on the significance of 
this case.
Chapter Five attempts to demonstrate how the basic 
tenets of American political culture inform the debate about 
race in general and effect the strategies used by blacks to 
pursue equality in particular.
Expectations
I expect to find that the goals and aspirations of the 
black plaintiffs who initiated this litigation were very much 
in line with one of the most basic ideals of the American 
Creed - that of equality. I would expect the original 
plaintiffs to have defined equality as meaning obligating the 
state of Mississippi to provide the same educational 
opportunities to black Mississippians as it had always 
provided for whites. However, they would interpret Brown as 
requiring the state to enhance black colleges to remedy the 
effects of past underfunding. Moreover, they would not see 
this position as inconsistent with the spirit of Brown.
I also expect there to be a divergence between this 
particular view of equality and the interests of black 
colleges in Mississippi to continue to exist. I particularly 
expect the United States Justice Department to define 
educational equality differently than black educators in
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Mississippi. I anticipate that United States would be more 
interested in racial balance in state universities than in 
preserving and strengthening the role of historically black 
universities in the state. I also expect the state of Missis­
sippi to not challenge the moral and constitutional legiti­
macy of Brown: instead, the state would interpret it as
requiring only "colorblind" policies - meaning that measures 
to significantly enhance black universities for past state 
misconduct are not only unnecessary, they are unconstitu­
tional.
It is expected that the trek from Brown to Fordice will 
prove to be a classic case study in the limitations of 
American political culture and institutions to cope with the 
problems associated with race. Such a finding would be 
consistent with the work of other scholars who have 
documented the limitations of American individualism 
(Tocqueville [1835]:1988; Huntington, 1968; Bellah, 1985; 
Fiorina, 1988; McCullough, 1991)).
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CHAPTER 1. THE AMERICAN CREED AND BLACK PROTEST
The American Political Consensus
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all 
men are created equal, that they are endowed by their 
Creator with certain inalienable Rights, that among 
these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.
(Declaration of Independence: 1776)
Swedish sociologist Gunnar Myrdal noted that America 
"has the most explicitly expressed system of general ideals 
in reference to human interrelations" of any other country in 
the Western world (1944, 3). Indeed, Thomas Jefferson's words 
rank among the most familiar lines penned in the history of 
the modern world. The values expressed in the Declaration of 
Independence succinctly represent what Myrdal calls the 
"American Creed." This Creed, embodied in the political 
ideals of liberty, justice, equality, and opportunity for 
all, forges a common national identity out of a vastly 
heteorogenous citizenry.
Despite the fact that the United States is a nation of 
unbelievable heterogeneity and diversity of cultures, many 
scholars have observed a common political culture in America 
(Tocqueville, [1835]:1988; Myrdal, 1944; Hartz, 1955;
Rossiter, 1962; Hoftstadter, 1971; Devine, 1972; Merriman and 
Parent, 1983; McCloskey and Zaller, 1984; Parent, 1985). This 
unity is remarkable when contrasted with political alter­
natives such as fascism and communism which, despite inten­
tional, government-sponsored attempts to impose ideological 
consensus, have yielded far less impressive results. All of
18
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America's institutions, ranging from the Supreme Court to 
mass media to churches and schools expound upon the basic 
value premises of "the American way of life." As Myrdal 
writes:
These ideals of the essential dignity of the 
individual human being, of the fundamental equality of 
all men, and of certain inalienable rights to freedom, 
justice, and a fair opportunity represent to the 
American people the essential meaning of the nation's 
early struggle for independence. In the clarity and 
intellectual boldness of the Enlightenment period these 
tenets were written into the Declaration of 
Independence, the Preamble of the Constitution, the Bill 
of Rights and into the constitutions of the several 
states. The ideals of the American Creed have thus 
become the highest law of the land. The Supreme Court 
pays its reverence to these general principles when it 
declares what is constitutional and what is not. They 
have been elaborated upon by all national leaders, 
thinkers, and statesmen. America has had, throughout its 
history, a continuous discussion of the principles and 
implications of democracy, a discussion which, in every 
epoch, measured by any standard, remained high, not only 
quantitatively but also qualitatively. The flow of 
learned treatises and popular tracts on the subject have 
not ebbed, nor is it likely to do so. In all wars, 
including the present one [World War II], the American 
Creed has been the ideological foundation of national 
morale (1944, 4-5).
This does not mean that the United States has been free 
of ideological disagreement. In fact, different conceptions 
of the practical implications of the American Creed for 
public policy lie at the heart of ideological disputes in 
American politics (Myrdal, 1944; Hartz, 1955; Huntington, 
1968; Peterson, 1976; McCloskey and Zaller, 1984; McCollough,
1991). This chapter concentrates on perhaps the greatest 
evidence for the unifying force of the American Creed: the 
fact that African Americans, despite their unique history of
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racial oppression and prejudice in America, have historically 
adhered to the principles endorsed by the national ethos. The 
same Thomas Jefferson who boldly declared the fundamental 
equality of all men openly questioned whether blacks were the 
moral and intellectual equals of whites; his trepidations 
implied that blacks could be justly excluded from the Lockian 
dispensation without violating the nation7s basic creed. 
Nevertheless, blacks have often coopted the American values 
of liberty and equality to advance political agendas aimed at 
securing political, social, and economic rights that they 
felt were unjustly denied them. Consequently, African 
Americans partake in the national religion of Locke, but for 
different reasons.
The fact that blacks and whites share the same social 
ideals but for different reasons serves as the fountainhead 
for political conflict and cultural misunderstandings between 
the two groups. Higher education desegregation provides an 
excellent case study of this "clash of cultures" because of 
the existence of state-supported historically black 
universities. Beyond the issue of whether these institutions 
can be constitutionally permitted to exist without violating 
the imperative of Brown is a deeper question: can the
apparent contradiction between the ideal of a "color-blind 
society" and "race-conscious" politics be reconciled under 
the umbrella of Lockian individualism?
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The historical roots for America's political consensus 
are not hard to find. "The storybook truth," writes Louis 
Hartz, is "that America was settled by men who fled from the 
feudal and clerical oppressions of the Old World" (1955, 3) . 
In a nutshell, Louis Hartz persuasively argues that what 
distinguishes America from Europe is that it lacked a true 
feudal and aristocratic past based on notions of rigid class 
distinctions among men. For Hartz, the key to understanding 
what America is lies with understanding what America never 
had to he. Unlike Europe, the colonists did not find a deeply 
entrenched landed aristocracy and a large peasant class 
"under the thumb" of a ruling class. Instead, in a country 
where land was plentiful and seemingly "for the taking," 
America seemed to be the practical fulfillment of the "state 
of nature" as conceptualized by Hobbes and Locke.
The American Revolution for Hartz was more a "mopping 
up" campaign to destroy "Old World relics" than it is the 
creation of an entirely new social order on the ruins of an 
older one. To the extent that many of its early settlers saw 
America as a safe haven from Europe's vices, the revolution 
had already occurred, as John Adams put it, "in the hearts of 
men," long before the first shots were fired at Concord 
(Peterson, 1976). Hartz observes that only in eighteenth 
century America could Jefferson proclaim the "self-evident 
truths" of the fundamental equality of all men and get away 
with it; in contrast, European liberals faced the dilemma "of
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explaining how principles could be 'self-evident7 when there 
were obviously so many people who did not believe them" 
(1955, 58) . Thus, Americans have the luxury of living in a 
democratic society "without having to endure a democratic 
revolution" (Tocqueville, [1835]:1988).
Similarly, McCloskey and Zaller argue that capitalism 
and democracy provide the foundation for what they call the 
"American ethos" because both evolved "side by side as part 
of a common protest against the petty tyrannies of Old World 
monarchism, mercantilism, and the remnants of feudalism" 
(1984, 2). Indeed, both traditions share common beliefs,
chiefly "a commitment to freedom and individualism, limited 
government, equality before the law, and rational - as 
opposed to feudal or merely traditional - modes of decision­
making" (Ibid, 2-3). Democracy assumes that all citizens have 
equal worth and thus have a right to share in their own 
governance, either by holding office themselves or by elec­
ting others to rule them. It also aims to protect citizens 
from arbitrary use of state power and obligates rulers to 
observe "due process" of law. All citizens - the rulers and 
the ruled - are equal before the law, and specific liberties, 
such as freedom of speech, religion, press, assembly, and the 
right to petition the government are essential to ensuring 
the accountability of the rulers to the ruled (Tocqueville, 
[1835]: 1988; Myrdal, 1944; Hartz, 1955; Huntington, 1968;
McCloskey and Zaller, 1984; McCullouch, 1991).
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The values of the capitalist creed are equally familiar 
to Americans: they include private ownership of the means of 
production, profit-seeking by self-interested entrepreneurs, 
and the right to unlimited wealth through economic effort 
(McCloskey and Zaller, 1984, 2). In its purest form, capi­
talism emphasizes competition among different manufacturers, 
a minimum degree of government regulation (or "laissez- 
faire") , market determination of both the production and 
distribution of goods. This encourages what Tocqueville 
(1988, 506) calls "individualism" by attaching wealth to the 
efforts of individuals, as opposed to family heritage or 
class origin. Certain values derived from the so-called 
"Protestant work ethic," which places a premium on achieve­
ment and hard work, are also thought to constitute an 
intregal component of the capitalist creed (Weber, 1976; 
Bell, 1976; McCloskey and Zaller, 1984; McCullough, 1991).
The philosophical legacy of Locke coupled with the 
material abundance of the American continent breathed life 
into the "Horatio Alger myth," the idea that any American of 
humble beginnings could become materially wealthy and 
socially prominent provided he worked hard enough. It is the 
interplay between the specifics of America's historical 
development and the politics it gives rise to that Hartz 
calls the "liberal tradition." Furthermore, because of 
America's basic liberal consensus, socialism has never 
enjoyed a strong following in the United States. Part of the
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appeal of Marxism relies on the sense in which an ancient
social contract has been violated - namely, the peasants'
rights to "common use" of the land (Greene, 1971; Piven and
Cloward, 1982). However, in a land where even the poorest
American could realistically dream of becoming a capitalist,
where Jefferson's ideal for democracy is "a nation of small
farmers," where is the attraction in socialism? What is more,
America's Lockian mentality has remained rather resilient in
spite of macroeconomic changes. As Hartz observes:
And even when factory industrialism gained sway after 
the Civil War, and the old artisan and cottage-and-mill 
mentality was definitely gone, it was still a Lockian 
idea fortified by material resources which inspired the 
triumph of the job mentality of Gompers rather than the 
class mentality of the European worker. The "petit- 
bourgeois" giant of America, though ultimately a triumph 
for the liberal idea, could hardly have chosen a better 
material setting in which to flourish (1955, 18).
This reality has tended to shape the character of
social protest movements by the poor in America; thus,
America produces a Daniel Shays instead of a Karl Marx, or
the Populist Party of the 1890's rather than European
socialism or Bolshevikism (Hartz, 1955; Rossiter, 1962) .
Shays' followers were petty capitalist farmers enduring
economic hard times rather than proletarian radicals bent on
revolutionary change. Similarly, Rossiter argues that the
populist insurgencies of the 1890's, despite the fear they
inspired among Eastern business interests, were actually
"latter-day Jeffersonians without Jefferson to lead them"
(1962, 90). Never, he argues, did the Grangers, Populists,
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Greenbackers, or Silver Democrats directly challenge the 
legitimacy of capitalist economic arrangements; instead, 
these groups represented small agrarian capitalists who were 
being marginalized by the encroachment of post-Civil War 
industrial capitalism. In fact, socialism is so thoroughly 
"un-American" that it has frequently been used in American 
history by powerful interests to delegitimize movements 
deemed to pose a threat to the status quo. Even in 1932, the 
darkest days of the Great Depression, American voters gave 38 
million votes to the Democrats and the Republicans; by 
comparison, the Socialists garnered less than 1 million and 
exactly 102,991 votes went to the Communists (Rossiter, 1962, 
92) .
The American attachment to capitalism is so profound 
that political liberals, while they tend to favor more 
government involvement and regulation of business activity, 
will rarely propose remedies fundamentally at odds with 
capitalist economic arrangements. Rather, liberals maintain 
that the government's role in the economy is to create "a 
more level playing field" in order to allow more individuals 
to compete in the marketplace.
At the same time, the American Creed embodies strong 
biases against undemocratic institutions. Tocqueville 
observed that democracy teaches men to love equality of 
condition and to consider it the normal state of affairs. 
Therefore, "amid general uniformity, the slightest
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dissimilarity seems shocking, and the completer the uni­
formity, the more unbearable it seems" (1988, 673). "The
American political mind," Rossiter writes, "has refused to 
think in terms of class, order, aristocracy, expertise." 
Every man is presumed to be the equal, or potential equal, of 
all other men. The egalitarian dimension of the American 
Creed houses the fuel for social and political movements that 
challenge the status quo.
For this reason, the property restrictions on voting and 
holding office were swept aside by Jacksonian democracy, 
despite the opposition of old-time luminaries from the 
Revolutionary era (notably, John Adams, James Madison, James 
Monroe, and John Randolph). As will be discussed later, 
democratic traditions launched the common school movement in 
direct opposition to the established bias that education 
constituted the sovereign promise of a leisure class. 
Egalitarian impulses provided much of the motive force of the 
drive to abolish slavery; during the Progressive era, it 
inspired the political reforms such as the initiative and 
split-ticket voting to counteract abuses in the political 
system. Thus, while political conservatives in America have 
from time to time feared "too much democracy," they have 
nonetheless endorsed most of the principles of the democratic 
tradition.
The turbulent politics of the 1960's, according to 
McCloskey and Zaller, provide further evidence of the
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presence of a basic American political consensus. Various 
kinds of social and political movements during this period 
challenged traditional American political practices and 
attitudes. The extent to which these movements made lasting 
change, however, turned on whether their causes could be 
supported by - or harmonized with - traditional American 
values. With regard to the efforts of activists to change the 
status quo during that period, McCloskey and Zaller observe 
the following:
Their demands for the popular control of 
large corporations, for example, made little head­
way in the face of traditional American attachment 
to capitalism. Their unruly modes of protest - 
mass confrontation, urban guerrilla tactics, and 
occasional violence - were often counterproductive 
in a society accustomed to the democratic princi­
ples of free elections, peaceful debate, and 
orderly opposition. To the extent, however, that 
the causes championed by the protesters of the 
1960s and 1970s were consonant with the values of 
the ethos, they helped bring about important 
changes. One can argue, in fact, that some of the 
"new issues" of the 1960s represented, in reality, 
efforts to extend certain values of the tradi­
tional ethos to new groups in new contexts. These 
issues included a concern for greater equality 
(women's rights and racial discrimination), poli­
tical dissent (protests against the nation's 
participation in war), personal freedom (abortion 
and homosexual rights), and opposition to tradi­
tional forms of social control (the countercul­
ture) . Long after the atmosphere of confrontation 
had dissipated and the era of militancy had subsi­
ded, concern for these issues - a concern anchored 
in the values of the ethos - remained strong (1984,
5) .
Thus, the Lockian settlement places powerful constraints 
on the nature of political discourse in America by granting
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legitimacy to some issues and/or groups while delegitimizing
others. When ideological conflicts do arise in America, they
nevertheless reflect a society in agreement on the
essentials: (1) the belief in the right to property, (2) the
philosophy of economic individualism and the acceptance of
the economic virtues of capitalist culture as necessary
qualities of man, (3) the political equality of all men,
often operationalized as the "one man, one vote" principle,
and (4) the necessity of ensuring basic political rights
(freedom of speech, religion, the press, the right to
petition, right to a fair trial, etc.), and (5) the
legitimacy of resolving political disputes through
competitive, democratic institutions (Hartz, 1955; Rossiter,
1962; Hofstadter, 1972; Piven and Cloward, 1971; McCloskey
and Zaller, 1984; McCullough, 1991). Instead, political
questions turn on concrete differences in approach, policy,
and strategies of implementation.
Merriman and Parent (1983) maintain that the American
nexus of democratic and capitalist values produces a "market
mentality" and go on to describe how the national ideology
concretely manifests itself:
The market view sees society as an arena in which 
individual competitors vie for things they want.
The things individuals want vary greatly, potenti­
ally ranging through the whole range of human 
tastes and preferences. The characteristic common 
to all these desires and aspirations is the 
expectation that a that a proper mixture of skills 
and effort will, in a properly functioning market, 
lead to their fulfillment. The market does not 
guarantee that the individual will get what he or
R eproduced  with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
2 9
she wants, but rather that the individual will 
get, and hold, what he or she can earn, given the 
talents and energy each possesses and employs. The 
expectation that the social marketplace will func­
tion predictably and fairly sustains, as nothing 
else can, the competitiveness that is so much a 
facet of American life (33-34).
By glorifying individual effort, the market mentality not 
only allows the individual to take pride in one's own 
successes, but it provides a ready explanation for failure. 
Those who fail in what Hartz calls the "Lockian race" (1955, 
219) are assumed to be at fault, due to personal deficiencies 
within themselves. The result of failure is guilt (Hartz, 
1955, 224) . This legacy of the liberal tradition is
particularly relevant to the question of how scholars and 
ordinary citizens explain the continuing unequal economic and 
social status of blacks in America.
This dissertation concerns itself with one of the most 
powerful deductions from the Lockian settlement: American 
faith in the centrality of education. This abiding faith 
consists of two major dimensions which are noteworthy:
(1) democratic capitalism requires education in order to 
foster the values of citizenship consistent with self-govern­
ment, and (2) education plays an indispensable role in 
equipping citizens with the life skills essential for success 
in a market economy. Chief Justice Earl Warren, author of the 
Supreme Court's opinion in Brown v. Board of Education, 
articulates this view:
Today, education is perhaps the most important fun­
ction of state and local governments. Compulsory school
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attendance laws and the great expenditures for education 
both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of 
education to our democratic society. It is required in 
the performance of our most basic responsibilities, even 
service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation 
of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument 
in awakening a child to cultural values, in preparing 
him for later professional training, and in helping 
him to adjust normally to his environment. In these 
days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be 
expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportu­
nity of an education [italics added]. Such an oppor­
tunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, 
is a right which must be made available to all on 
equal terms.
(347 U.S. 483, 494)
Not only do Warren's words point to the centrality of 
education in American life, they also illustrate one critical 
reality: with respect to African Americans, the values of the 
American Creed have historically not been extended on an 
equal basis. Alexis de Tocqueville considered American 
slavery to be the most obvious contradiction of the nation's 
concept of liberty and the "most formidable evil threatening 
the future of the United States" (1988, 340). Writing more 
than a century later in the context of Jim Crow segregation 
in the South and less visible, but very real racial discrim­
ination in the North, Myrdal (1944) comes to a similar 
conclusion. The "American dilemma," as he sees it, is 
essentially a moral one; it is a conflict between the 
American ideals of liberty, justice, equality, and equal 
opportunity for all and its actual treatment of blacks. The 
nation's failure to adhere to its principles with respect to 
the treatment of African Americans has often produced 
feelings of guilt among white Americans as well as active
Reproduced  with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
3 1
efforts to change practices deemed inconsistent with American 
values (Myrdal, 1944; McCloskey and Zaller, 1984; Hacker,
1992) .
Not only do these feelings of guilt make whites more 
susceptible to appeals for reform than they otherwise might 
be, but the the American Creed rationalizes the tradition of 
black protest. In fact, there is perhaps no greater testament 
to the power of the American Creed than the fact that African 
American political discourse has been profoundly shaped by 
it. No other group, with the possible exception of native 
Americans, would be more likely to reject outright the 
national synthesis of democratic and capitalist values that 
embodies the heart of the American ethos. African Americans 
could easily point to the complicity of Lockian individualism 
in the defense of slavery, racism, and economic inequality 
(Oakes, 1992) . Thus, African Americans theoretically have the 
greatest interest in a revolutionary critique on the order of 
Marx's critique of European capitalism and in constructing a 
social alternative to democratic capitalism.
Yet, with rare exceptions, black political thought fits 
squarely within the liberal tradition. This is true despite 
the often bitter denunciations of the nation's treatment of 
African Americans by black leaders. Foner (1984) contends 
that nineteenth-century black political thought, and indeed, 
modern black political thought and activism are rooted in 
"the republican traditions of the eighteenth century,
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particularly as expressed in the Declaration of Independence 
and the Constitution" (60). Greenstone (1993) locates 
Frederick Douglass within the same liberal reform tradition 
as John Adams and Daniel Webster.
This interpretation, of course, does not enjoy universal 
acceptance. Dawson (1995) vehemently disagrees with this 
conclusion, suggesting that efforts to locate black political 
thought within the broad stream of American liberalism are 
simplistic, at best, and, at worst, self-serving by white 
Americans. He emphasizes the historical examples of black 
nationalism and black Marxism as well as specific cultural 
differences between blacks and whites to make the point that 
African American political discourse is not easily 
assimilated within America's "melting pot" of political 
ideas. Specific attention will be drawn to his case in a 
later section of this chapter. This dissertation does not 
deny the existence of significant differences in the 
historical experiences and political culture of black and 
white Americans; in fact, it will be argued that these very 
differences lie at the heart of the racial chasm in American 
politics. However, as I will show, the evidence for the 
conclusion that African Americans have enlisted the American 
Creed in their pursuit of the goal of full inclusion in 
American society is simply too overwhelming to be denied. 
Moreover, I will further demonstrate that even black 
nationalism, deemed by Dawson to support the view that black
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political thought defies the boundaries of the liberal 
tradition, in fact owes a significant debt to Lockianism.
With respect to education, its political significance 
has always been readily apparent to black Americans because 
of their peculiar history of racial discrimination in the 
United States. To a people enduring the humiliation of 
slavery and racial segregation, education symbolized a "door 
to freedom." To the slave masters, on the other hand, their 
security rested with keeping the slaves in ignorance. As 
slavery gave way to a system of racial segregation, the 
denial of equal educational opportunities to the newly freed 
slaves and their descendants formed the bedrock of white 
racial hegemony. Thus, education becomes politicized in black 
America in a way that distinguishes it profoundly from the 
dominant culture. It is intimately intertwined with the 
history of black protest. Black Americans view education as 
essential to their hope of full realization of the ideals 
enshrined in the American Creed.
In summary, many scholars agree that there exists a 
definite American Creed that unites Americans across class, 
regional, religious, ethnic, and racial lines. It provides 
the United States with a sense of national mission and is the 
rallying cry for all wars. This dissertation argues that the 
fact that black political discourse has been largely informed 
by the values of the liberal tradition supplies compelling 
evidence for the power of the American Creed. African
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Americans, from the times of the American Revolution to the 
present day, have repeatedly appealed to liberal values in 
their efforts to realize their "Lockian birthrights." The 
next section discusses how African Americans have histo­
rically applied individualism in their political protest 
movements and how it leads to political conflict and cultural 
misunderstandings with whites. The third section focuses the 
historical roots of America's deep faith in public education 
as well as the critical role education has played in African 
American protest movements. The fact that both white and 
black Americans have a deep faith in the power of education 
provides a compelling case study of how both groups embrace 
identical social ideals but for different historical reasons. 
Finally, this chapter closes by addressing the counterargu­
ments to the thesis that black political discourse has 
remained largely confined to the borders of the liberal 
tradition.
Black Political Protest within the Liberal Tradition
Berlin (1975) points out that the implications of the 
American Revolution were readily apparent to blacks, who were 
then referred to as Negroes. By the time of the Revolution, 
blacks had been living in America for over 150 years. This 
fact enabled them to seize an historic opportunity to appro­
priate the language of Lockian individualism in order to 
obtain their own freedom. As Berlin explains:
By the end of the eighteenth century, the trans­
formation of Africans to Afro-Americans was largely
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complete. Just as the colonial debate with Britain 
pushed ideas of natural rights and universal liberty to 
the fore, a century of cultural change enabled blacks 
to listen in on that debate and turn it to their advan­
tage. If transplanted Englishmen were prepared to assert 
their independence, transplanted Africans were ready to 
take their liberty (1975, 10, 11).
Thus, the spirit of independence which inspired the 
colonists in the 1770's to seriously contemplate dissolving 
their union with Great Britain emboldened blacks to challenge 
slavery. In 1773, four free Negroes petitioned the Massachu­
setts colonial legislature to abolish slavery within the 
colony (Aptheker, 1951). It is worth noting that their words 
echoed the identical Lockian rhetoric that the colonists 
themselves employed to justify their grievances with King 
George III and the British Parliament. They spoke of the 
"divine spirit of freedom,” reflecting the idea that freedom, 
not inherent class or race distinctions, represented the 
natural condition of men and the divine will of God. The 
petitioners showed not only that they understood the nature 
of the colonists' struggle with the British government; 
moreover, the petitioners argue that the same natural rights 
which forbade "taxation without representation" entitled 
Negroes to live as free men. The petition, in effect, 
challenged the legislature to be politically and morally 
consistent.
This pattern repeats itself over and over again 
throughout the Revolutionary period. When the British Crown 
placed Massachusetts under martial law in retaliation for the
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famous "Boston Tea Party," Negroes seized the opportunity to 
petition the military government for their freedom. They 
declared that they "have in common with all other men a 
naturel right to [their] freedoms without Being depriv'd of 
them" (Grant, 1968, 30) . For other blacks, the political
climate motivated their attempts to escape from bondage 
(Berlin, 1975). Once hostilities commenced, manpower 
shortages forced both sides to rely on black soilders by 
promising them freedom in exchange for service. Though the 
Revolution itself did not uproot the institution of slavery, 
a significant number of blacks gained their freedom as a 
result of the war (Quarles, 1961; 1986; Berlin, 1975;
Franklin and Moss, 1987; Johnson and Roark, 1984). After 
hostilities ceased, blacks continued to capitalize on the 
political climate to petition against slavery, initiate 
freedom suits, protest racially discriminatory laws, or to 
take their freedom by running away (Grant, 1968; Berlin, 
1975).
Without question, Frederick Douglass stands out as the 
best nineteenth century example of a black political leader 
who consistently invoked the liberal tradition to promote the 
goal of racial equality. Throughout his public career, 
Douglass vehemently opposed colonization schemes that 
principally proposed transporting blacks back to Africa 
(though sometimes other places were suggested) , as a solution 
to the race problem. All such proposals, he argued, premised
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themselves on the notion that blacks and whites could not 
possibly live together in a racial democracy. For Douglass, 
it mattered not whether such efforts were supported by blacks 
or by whites. Rather, Douglass boldly declared that not only 
could the Negro be peaceably assimilated into the American 
body politic, but the very moral integrity of the republic 
rested on the Negro's full incorporation into the mainstream 
of American life:
I shall advocate for the Negro, his most full and 
complete adoption into the great national family of 
America. I shall demand for him the most perfect civil 
and political equality, and that he shall enjoy all the 
rights, privileges, and immunities enjoyed by any other 
members of the body politic. I weigh my words and I 
mean all I say, when I contend as I do contend, that 
this is the only solid, and final solution of the pro­
blem before us. It is demanded not less by the terrible 
exigencies of the nation, than by the Negro himself for 
the Negro and the nation are to rise or fall, be killed 
or cured, saved or lost together. Save the Negro and 
you save the nation, destroy the Negro and you destroy 
the nation, and to save both you must have one great 
law of Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity for all Ameri­
cans without respect to color (Douglass, 1966, 7).
One century later, Martin Luther King echoed these same
sentiments. In King's famous "I Have a Dream" speech, he
begins by invoking patriotic authority - the Declaration of
Independence, the Gettsyburg Address, and the Emancipation
Proclamation. However, "the architects of our republic"
offered a "promissory note" that pledged liberty. But for
blacks, that note had proved to be "a bad check," one "marked
insufficient funds" (King, 1986, 217) . His dream of racial
equality, King continues, did not fundamentally depart from
America's Holy Writ:
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. . . . It is a dream deeply rooted in the American
dream that one day this nation will rise up and live 
out the true meaning of its creed - we hold these 
truths to be self-evident, that all men are created 
equal (Ibid, 219).
Thus, King marshalls the core principles of the repu­
blic in service to the cause of black equality. Moreover, by 
mixing Biblical prophecies with patriotic references, King's 
speech affirmed America's natural law tradition in a dual 
sense - by placing the nation's secular laws under the scru­
tiny of divine law and appealing to America's historic sense 
of mission and Divine Providence (Myrdal, 1944; Hartz, 1955; 
Peterson, 1976; Sandoz, 1990; Miller, 1992) . Finally, King's 
dream that his children would one day be judged by their 
character and not their skin color affirmed the Lockian 
birthright to equality of opportunity rather than equality of 
outcome. He seemed to be saying that black Americans were 
only asking for the right to fairly compete in the Lockian 
race like every other American.
As a result of the civil rights struggles of the 1950's 
and 1960's, new legislation sought to eliminate legal 
barriers to blacks participating freely in the marketplace. 
With the legal barriers gone, black failure, according to 
indivi-dualism, is the fault of blacks themselves. Parent 
(1985) found that the market mentality produces a tendency 
within a significant segment of the black community to blame 
themselves for their unequal status in American society. 
Roughly the same proportion of blacks and whites believed
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that black inequality could be attributed to less in-born 
ability in blacks to learn: slightly more blacks (23.3%) than 
whites (21.0%) agreed with the statement. Forty-six percent 
of blacks attribute lack of will or motivation as the cause 
of black problems, whereas 59 percent of white respondents 
agreed with that statement. Slightly more than half of black 
respondents (54.2%) believe that if blacks would try harder, 
they could be just as well off as whites; roughly the same 
number of blacks (53.7%) maintain that many of blacks' 
problems are brought on by blacks themselves. Finally, 22.6% 
of blacks think that blacks would rather accept welfare than 
work for a living (Parent, 1985,- 7-8) .
These conclusions have been corroborated by Sigleman and 
Welch (1991) who found that 24% of blacks think that African 
Americans have less in-born ability than whites and 44% of 
blacks think that blacks lack sufficient will and motivation 
to pull themselves out of poverty. Barker and Jones (1994) 
cite a Joint Center of Political Studies-Gallup Poll which 
reports that 80% of blacks believe that well-off African 
Americans do not do enough to help other blacks get ahead 
(44). Taken together, these findings seem to indicate that 
key aspects of the liberal tradition - namely the tendency to 
attach responsibility for success or failure in life
Reproduced  with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
4 0
primarily to the efforts of individuals - inform African 
American political attitudes.3
To say that the American Creed informs African-American 
political attitudes and strategies is not the same as saying 
that blacks and whites see the same reality. Parent (1985) 
shows that whites are more likely to interpret the black 
situation in terms of individualistic thinking than blacks. 
Sixty-nine percent of whites believe blacks could be just as 
well off as whites if they worked harder; even more whites 
(78.1%) believe that though racial discrimination has held 
down blacks, many of the problems faced by blacks are brought 
on by blacks themselves; finally, 34.1% of whites maintain 
that blacks would rather receive welfare than work for a 
living. Sigleman and Welch (1991) found that 69 percent of 
blacks explained racial inequality results primarily from 
discrimination; the comparable figure among whites was 46 
percent. Even more revealing, seventy-five percent of black 
respondents maintained that whites do not want them to get 
ahead, while only 43 percent of whites held this view. Thus,
3It is not the purpose of this dissertation to deny 
either the existence of, or the autonomy of, a separate black 
political culture distinct from dominant American norms. In 
fact, this chapter devotes an entire section to the 
discussion of black cultural autonomy and to objections to 
the thesis that the liberal tradition has deep roots in black 
America. It will be argued that not only does an autonomous 
black political culture exist, but the failure of the 
majority culture to understand this basic fact has grave 
social, political, and economic consequences. Nevertheless, 
the acknowledgement of black cultural autonomy does not 
overturn the profound impact of the American Creed on black 
culture.
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though the black population subscribes to key aspects of the 
liberal tradition, African Americans tend to interpret 
political reality very differently from whites. The autonomy 
of black political culture (including some of its nonliberal 
traits), as well as the counterargument to the influence of 
liberalism on black America, is the subject of a later 
section in this chapter.
Not only do blacks and whites interpret reality with 
"different pairs of lenses," they often come to radically 
different conclusions even when they apply individualistic 
thinking. While many white Americans have been deeply 
troubled by the inherent conflicts between the nation's 
commitment to human equality and its treatment of blacks, 
others have appealed to the values of liberty to justify the 
racial status quo. Appeals to various "states' rights" and 
"limited government" theories have been used to justify 
slavery and to defend Jim Crow segregation (Hartz, 1955; 
McGarrick, 1964; Wilkinson, 1979).
Often, these rationalizations were little more than 
direct appeals (or thinly-veiled ones) to overt racism. After 
the legislative victories of the civil rights movement in the 
1960's, political conflicts concerning racial policy revolve 
primarily around the question of the best means to achieve 
racial justice. Many black civil rights groups and their 
liberal allies argue that policies aimed at promoting 
equality of opportunity solely by outlawing discriminatory
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policies do not address the cumulative effects of centuries 
of discrimination against blacks (Carmichael and Hamilton, 
1967; Wilson, 1978; 1987; Merriman and Parent, 1983; Bell, 
1987; Brown, 1992; Orfield, 1996). This view of the American 
Creed would require the government to not only outlaw racial 
discrimination, but to intervene proactively in the 
marketplace to help blacks "catch up" with whites in the 
Lockian race. Opponents of policies such as busing, affirm­
ative action, minority set-aside programs, and racial 
redistricting contend that race-conscious policies unfairly 
violate the rights of white Americans and defeat the laudable 
goal of the civil rights struggle to have blacks judged "not 
by the color of their skin but by the content of their 
character" (Wilkinson, 1979; Sowell, 1981; Murray, 1984; 
Steele, 1986; Jones, 1987; Edsall and Edsall, 1991; Armor, 
1995).
In spite of the fact that black civil rights groups and 
their allies routinely question the motives of their 
opponents, political conservatives, for the most part, 
stubbornly insist that they believe in the goal of racial 
justice. For conservatives, any use of race in the 
determination of government policy is illegitimate; after 
all, Americans should be judged as individuals. Thus, the 
language of individualism, when applied to race-related 
policies, not only leads to different policy preferences, but 
it serves as a fault line for ideological divides in America
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concerning the role of government (Merriman and Parent, 1983;
Carmines and Stinson, 1989; Edsall and Edsall, 1991).
The fact that the American commitment to Lockian values
often leads to polarizing ideological positions on issues of
race is one of the central focuses of this dissertation.
Bellah and associates (1985) illustrate this point when they
report that Americans, steeped in a culture of individualism,
often lack the conceptual tools to deal with genuine social
and cultural differences. Americans operate from the
political assumption of a consensual community of autonomous,
but essentially, similar individuals; but as Bellah writes,
this definition often has little room for those who do not
meet that criteria:
For all the lip service given to respect for cultural 
differences, Americans seem to lack the resources to 
think about the relationship between groups that are 
culturally, socially, or economically quite different. 
Writing from the context of a very different culture, 
Octavio Paz, the Mexican poet, has pointed out that 
hierarchial societies often do better than egalitarian 
ones at including culturally different groups in a 
common moral order because they accept and give moral 
meaning to different levels and degrees of wealth and 
power. Some groups are poor and weak, but all are in­
cluded in a common social body where the strong and 
the rich have special obligations to look out for the 
others. Of course, this view has often been used to 
rationalize exploitation and oppression. But the radi­
cal egalitarianism of an individualist society has its 
own problems. For such a society is really constituted 
only of autonomous middle-class individuals. Those who 
for whatever reason do not meet the criteria for full 
membership are left outside in a way unknown in a 
hierarchial society. The very existence of groups who 
do not meet the criteria for full social participation 
is anomalous. There should be no such groups. Their 
existence must be someone's fault, either their own 
- perhaps their culture is defective and they lack a 
"work ethic" or there is something wrong with their
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family system - or someone else's: economic or political 
elites perhaps oppress them and prevent their full 
participation. Whatever explanation is accepted, it is 
difficult to give moral meaning to differences that are 
considered fundamentally illegitimate (206-207).
Bellah7s findings do not bode well for black political 
movements. African Americans have had a radically different 
historical experience than other Americans; therefore, the 
inability of Americans to make moral sense out of real 
cultural, social, and economic differences has the effect of 
delegitimizing black protest in the first place. Moreover, it 
avails powerful ideological firepower to those opposed to 
specific policies that blacks may favor. The Protestant work 
ethic, the Horatio Alger myth, and other cultural symbols 
collaborate to buttress the claim that what African Americans 
want is not "equal rights," but "special rights," a view 
succinctly represented by Republican presidential candidate 
Pat Buchanan's slogan: "Equal rights for all, special privi­
lege for none." Blacks who favor affirmative action, more 
majority black legislative districts, or support the 
existence and the enhancement of historically black colleges 
are accused of advocating a double standard - that is, 
opponents charge them with preaching a rhetoric of equality 
for all while fighting for special rights for African 
Americans. Furthermore, since politics is the "art of the 
possible," America's liberal consensus invariably influences 
the kinds of policy solutions that can be proposed to solve 
problems associated with black inequality and also stand a
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reasonable chance of being enacted (Merriman and Parent, 
1983; McCloskey and Zaller, 1984).
One of the more commonly hailed solutions to social 
problems in America (particularly those which involve race) 
is education (Jefferson, 1904; Cubberly, 1919; Rush, 1947; 
Arendt, 1958; Dewey, 1966; Alexander and Alexander, 1985; 
Reitman, 1992) . Indeed, belief in the transforming power of 
education to improve human well-being represents one of the 
most powerful deductions from Locke. This legacy is directly 
traceable to the cultural imprint of the Enlightenment in 
America. For African Americans, access to greater educational 
opportunity (or, in many cases, education at all) has 
historically been at the heart of black protest movements. 
The centrality of education in America and its specific 
importance for African Americans will be discussed in the 
next section.
"In School We Trust"
Justice Felix Frankfurther, a participant in the 
adjudication of the Brown cases, described the public school 
as "the symbol of our democracy and the most pervasive means 
for promoting our common destiny" ('McCullom v. Board of 
Education, 333 U.S. 203 [1948]). Indeed, Brown v. Board of
Education testifies to the deep faith that Americans have in 
the power of education. The great majority of Americans 
conceptualize education in rather utilitarian terms as if it 
were a commodity in the marketplace; education must be useful
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both to the individual and the larger society (Reitman, 1992, 
4). Moreover, Americans consider the provision of education 
to be a legitimate government responsibility. This 
responsibility rests primarily at the state and municipal 
levels of government, as opposed to the federal government.
The popularization of American schools and colleges 
since the end of World War II provide ample evidence for the 
centrality of education in American life. In 1950, 34 percent 
of the American population twenty-five years of age or older 
had completed at least four years of high school while 6 per­
cent of that population had completed at least four years of 
college. By 1985, 74 percent of Americans twenty-five years 
old or older had completed at least four years of high 
school, whereas the comparable figures for completion of at 
least four years of college stood at 19 percent (Cremin, 
1989, 1) . Education is considered part of the Lockian
birthright. Many ordinary Americans today expect to obtain a 
college education, an expectation which for much of our 
nation's history was beyond the reach of most families.
The focus of this section is twofold: (1) to discuss the 
historical basis for the preeminence of education in American 
culture, and (2) to demonstrate how African Americans have 
viewed access to education as an indispensable tool in their 
battles for full equality.
Government involvement in education has a long history 
in America. For example, in 1642 the colonial legislature of
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the Massachusetts Bay Colony passed a law requiring all 
parents to see to the education of their children; five years 
later, the legislature required all towns to appoint a 
teacher and permitted taxes for education. In 1643, the 
Virginia assembly passed a resolution granting legislative 
encouragement to wealthy benefactors who bequeathed money, 
land, or other materials in support of the establishment of 
schools (Cremin, 1970, 177-181; Butts, 1960, 34). Never­
theless, despite these early efforts, colonial legislatures 
generally ignored education. The colonies during the early 
years duplicated the class-oriented English educational 
system in which the idea of a free, universal education for 
all made little sense. Only those wealthy enough to afford it 
received an education, whereas poorer families either 
received no education at all or had to settle for learning 
various trades and/or manual skills (Cubberley, 1919, 21;
Butts, 1960, 34; Genovese, 1967; Cremin, 1970; 1980; K.
Alexander and M.D. Alexander, 1985, 21).
What efforts did exist reflected values inherited from 
the mother country. For example, the "pauper school laws" 
provided that indigent parents who declared themselves 
paupers would have their children sent to specified private 
or pay schools for a free education (Cubberley, 1919, 15). 
The 1647 law in Massachusetts was promulgated in order to 
teach all to read the Scriptures and thus avoid falling prey 
to "that old deluder, Satan" (Cremin, 1970, 181). This law
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reflected the Protestant belief that any man should at least 
be literate enough to read the Bible for himself (Butts, 
1960, 36). Another vestige of the English system, the "rate 
bill," required parents to pay an amount for each child to 
supplement inadequate school revenues (K. Alexander and M. D. 
Alexander, 1985, 21). The amount assessed was collected from 
the parents through ordinary tax bills. This requirement 
remained in place in New York State until 1868 (Cubberley, 
1919, 149).
The colonists7 Revolutionary struggle with Great Britain 
gave significant legitimacy to the philosophy of education as 
essential for the welfare of the state. America's Declaration 
of Independence boldly asserted the Enlightenment belief in 
the superiority of science and reason as the basis for the 
"social contract;" moreover, the philosophy of the Enlighten­
ment tended to equate knowledge with human freedom. Education 
came to be seen as a primary vehicle for trans- mitting the 
values essential for a free, democratic society and would 
serve as the "first line of defense" against the threat of 
tyrannical government (Butts, 1960; Cremin, 1970; 1980; K. 
Alexander and M. D. Alexander, 1985; Bloom, 1987). Prominent 
Americans who held this particular view of education include 
James Madison, Benjamin Rush, George Washington, and Thomas 
Jefferson (Cubberley, 1919, 57; Jefferson, 1904; 1942, 89; 
Butts, 1960, 37-38; Rush, 1947; K. Alexander and M. D.
Alexander, 1985) .
R eproduced  with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
4 9
However, perhaps no single individual more embodied the 
spirit of the public or common school movement than Thomas 
Jefferson. He initiated a bill for universal education in the 
Virginia legislature in 1779. Though the measure was 
defeated, he provided the inspiration for a later generation 
of reformers (Jefferson, 1904). Writing to his old professor 
George Wythe from Paris in 1786, Jefferson said:
I think by far the most important bill in our whole 
code is that for the diffusion of knowledge among the 
people. No other sure foundation can be devised for the 
preservation of freedom and happiness. . . . Preach, my 
dear sir, a crusade against ignorance; establish and 
improve the law for educating common people. Let our 
countrymen know. . . that the tax which will be paid 
for this purpose is not more than the thousandth part 
of what will be paid to kings, priests, and nobles 
who will rise up among us if we leave the people in 
ignorance (1942, 89).
Despite having prominent advocates, the emergence of a 
consensus on the role of government in education proceeded 
slowly. The United States Constitution spelled out no 
specific role for education; with the exception of the land 
grants for schools provided under the Northwest Ordinance of 
1787, the federal role in education was nonexistent (K. 
Alexander and M. D. Alexander, 1985, 55). In fact, a search 
of the debates at the Constitutional Convention reveals that 
only once was anything related to education discussed; it 
related to whether the new government would be empowered to 
establish a national university. While the chair answered in 
the affirmative, the issue was not explored any further 
(Cubberley, 1919; 52). Considering the Founding Fathers'
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preoccupation with limiting the arbitrary use of power by the 
central government and the common belief that education was 
a private matter, their failure to authorize a clear role for 
the national government in education is not surprising. Thus, 
the battle for public, tax-supported education would be 
located at the state level. The lack of a clearly specified 
role for the federal government in educational matters gave 
rise to a uniquely American concept - the idea of "local 
control" of public schools.
The journey from sporadic early school laws to uniform 
state systems of free public education would be an arduous 
one, with battles over tax support and sectarianism along the 
way. By 1825, it had been generally accepted that a state 
system of education would necessitate general and direct 
taxation of a major source of revenue such as real property 
(Ibid, 131). Therefore, in order to achieve their objective, 
public school advocates had to overcome a variety of obsta­
cles: (1) the long-held belief that education constituted the 
sovereign province of only those who could afford it, (2) the 
fear that making education available to all would make it 
"too common," thus educating people "out of their proper 
position in society," (3) the conviction of many that it was 
immoral to tax one man's property for the education of 
another man's child or to require those with no children at 
all to be taxed in order to support public schools, (4) 
opposition from religious groups who viewed nonsectarian,
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public schools as a threat to religious liberty, (5) the 
suspicion that the crusade for public schools was merely a 
ruse designed to unite Church and State, and (6) public 
indifference to the benefits of public education (Cubberley, 
1919; 1920; K. Alexander and M. D. Alexander, 1985; Cremin, 
1989) .
This period saw the rise of an extraordinary group of 
leaders such as Horace Mann of Massachusetts and Henry 
Barnard of Connecticut who championed the cause of public 
schools, which were also referred to as "common schools." 
They argued against tuition in any shape or form, maintaining 
that a "free school" should no longer mean one where the poor 
received a free education whereas all others paid tuition. 
The pauper schools, they contended, unjustly injured the 
poor, many of whom chose not to enroll their children at all 
because of the stigma attached to attending such schools 
(Cubberley, 1919, 121; Butts, 1960, 39; K. Alexander and M. 
D. Alexander, 1985, 23). Moreover, they argued that free and 
general education was a "natural right of all children in a 
Republic." They pointed to the influx of European immigration 
(which accelerated after 1825) as evidence for the need of an 
institutional mechanism to assimilate these new arrivals into 
a democratic culture (Cubberley, 1919, 121). This argument 
meshed well with a political climate in which property 
restrictions that prevented many poor whites from voting and 
holding office were tumbling under the weight of "Jacksonian
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democracy" (Rossiter, 19 62). Finally, they insisted that 
such schools should be nonsectarian and secular; religious 
education in the schools should convey a respect for freedom 
of conscience rather than teach the doctrines of a particular 
church. Furthermore, they believed it violated the principle 
of separation of church and state to compel a man to pay 
taxes to support religiously-based instruction in public 
schools regardless of whether he believed in what was being 
taught or not (Butts, 1960, 40; K. Alexander and M. D.
Alexander, 1985, 139) .
In addition to the alleged efficacy of the common school 
in instilling democratic virtues, universal education as an 
instrument for the social and economic advancement of the 
poorer classes was central to the value its most ardent 
advocates attached to it. Not surprisingly, they often 
encountered their most stubborn resistance from the 
wealthiest members of society who were more interested in 
preserving aristocratic privilege. Moreover, with the growth 
of cities and the industrialization that accompanied it, 
advocates of free schools saw education as the means of 
empowering more Americans to take advantage of the new 
economy (Cubberley, 1919, 101-115). Horace Mann represented 
one of the most powerful advocates of education as a tool for 
social uplift of the poor and the leveling of class 
distinctions. He argued that ignorance lay at the heart of 
feudal rule in Europe, but the emergence of a capitalist
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economy had created a "more adject condition of servitude" 
than the Middle Ages ever had. Education, he continued, could 
counteract the tendency toward the concentration of wealth 
and power into the hands of the very few. Mann maintained 
that the continued prosperity of a capitalist economy 
depended on a general diffusion of knowledge among the 
masses. "Education, then," Mann declared, "beyond all other 
devices of human origins, is the great equalizer of the 
conditions of men" (1849, 59). In his view, education lacked 
the power to transform men morally so that they would "abhor 
the oppression of their fellow-men;" rather, it provided men 
with the necessary means to resist the selfishness of other 
men (Ibid, 60).
Curiously, the enemies of common schools also used the 
rhetoric of individualistic values in the hope of defeating 
the movement. They openly questioned the desirability of the 
expansion of education to the masses, and thought democracy 
was better protected by an enlightened, leisure class. Some 
doubted government's ability to carry out such an endeavor at 
all; others felt that taxation for public education amounted 
to the confiscation of the property of one class to educate 
another, thereby violating individual freedom. Still others 
believed that religious liberty was at stake; the specter of 
free, nonsectarian schools symbolized, in their eyes, a 
threat to their right to worship God as they pleased (Ibid,
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121-122). Thus, the rhetoric utilized on both sides of the 
public school debate testifies to America's distinct fidelity 
to Lockian values.
Cubberley captures vividly the intense and polarizing 
character of the political battle over free, public, 
nonsectarian, tax-supported education:
Excepting the battle for the abolition of slavery, 
perhaps no question has ever been before the American 
people for settlement which caused so much feeling or 
aroused such bitter antagonisms. Old friends and 
business associates parted company over the question, 
lodges were forced to taboo the subject to avoid 
disruption, ministers and their congregations often 
quarreled over the question of free schools, and 
politicians avoided the issue. The friends of free 
schools were at first commonly regarded as fanatics, 
dangerous to the State, and the opponents of free 
schools were considered by them as old-time 
conservatives or as selfish members of society. . . .
Often those in favor of taxation were bitterly assailed, 
and even at times were threatened with personal vio­
lence. Henry Barnard, who rendered such useful service 
in awakening Connecticut and Rhode Island, between 1837 
and 1845, to the need for better schools, tells us that 
a member of the Rhode Island legislature told him that 
a bill providing a small state tax for the schools, 
while he was then advocating, even if passed by the 
legislature could not be enforced in Rhode Island at 
the point of the bayonet. A Rhode Island farmer threa­
tened to shoot him if he ever caught him on his property 
advocating "such heresy as the partial confiscation of 
one man's property to educate another man's child." A 
member of the Indiana legislature, of 1837, declared 
that when he died he wanted engraved on his tombstone, 
"Here lies an enemy to free schools" (1919, 119, 133).
Gradually, the advocates for free, common schools for 
all won the day. State legislatures accepted the idea and 
began to recognize that they must require local school dis­
tricts to tax themselves to provide for public schools rather 
than simply encourage it. As a result, state constitutions
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and legislative statutes began to limit local discretion over 
the schools; the idea that a degree of centralized planning 
to achieve uniformity in a state system of education was 
preferable to completely decentralized local control (Butts, 
I960, 39) .
By the time Massachusetts passed the first compulsory 
attendance law in 1852, responsibility for education was 
firmly entrenched at the state level (K. Alexander and M. D. 
Alexander, 1985, 25). A series of subsequent court decisions 
further strengthened the preeminence of the state in 
educational policymaking.4 The period between 1870 and 1900 
saw the expansion of the concept of public education to 
include the high school and the flowering of state-supported 
universities (Stuart v. School No. 1 of Kalamazoo. 30 Mich. 
69 (1874); Butts, 1960; Lucio, 1963).
However, these reforms did not completely eliminate 
local control over the schools. Rather, what emerged was a 
system whereby state agencies set minimal standards for the 
school districts while day-to-day management of the schools 
remained with locally elected school boards, local super­
intendents, principals and teachers. This arrangement 
represents an approach to the governance of education that is 
uniquely American (Butts, 1960, 39). It mirrors, in some
4These include Railroad Co. v. Husen 95 U.S. 465 (1877) ; 
Leeper v. State, 103 Tenn. 500 (1899) ; Fogg v. Board of
Education. 76 N.H. 296, (1912); Scown v. Czarnecki. 264 111.
305 (1914); Moore v. Board of Education. 212 N.C. 499 (1937).
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ways, the relationship of divided sovereignty between the 
national government and the states. In a nation with such a 
deep-seated mistrust of centralized authority, it is 
difficult to imagine how any other political outcome could 
have emerged.
In summary, the American public school marries both 
abstract fidelity to Lockian idealism and the institutional 
embodiment of Horatio Alger pragmatism. Americans expect the 
public school to transmit democratic values to each 
succeeding generation; it is one of the primary institutions 
charged with the task of assimilating immigrants into 
American culture. Moreover, education represents the hope of 
a better society. It is thereby enlisted in the cause of 
social reform. Thus, social reform advocates, regardless of 
their ideological leanings, appeal to education in some form 
or fashion in order to bring about in reality their vision of 
the American Creed. Their faith flows directly from the creed 
of the Enlightenment which sees reason as a progressive 
stream flowing throughout history that is slowly, but 
inevitably, eroding the barriers to human progress. Thus, 
education, or more "enlightenment," becomes the hailed 
solution for an infinite number of social ills, ranging from 
poverty and racism to environmental degradation to the crisis 
of teenage pregnancy and AIDS (Dewey, 1966; Allen, 1989; 
Cremin, 1989; Purpel, 1989; Reitman, 1992; Walters, 1992). 
Knowledge, in the American psyche, is the key to more
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rational and humane social policy. This orientation often 
turns the public school into a political and cultural 
battleground of competing interest groups who war over issues 
as diverse as curriculum design or content to disciplinary 
issues to desegregation (Cremin, 1989; Reitman, 1992).
In addition to its cultural functions, education, as the 
Warren Court recognized in Brown. is essential for economic 
and social mobility of individuals in American society. With 
the rapid expansion of technology and "knowledge-based 
industries," as well as stiffer global competition, the 
importance of education in preparing a highly-skilled labor 
force multiplies (Johnston and Packer, 1987; Wilson, 1978; 
1987; Reich, 1991). No wonder national reports such as the 
U.S. Education Department's A Nation At Risk (1983) which 
allege that academic achievement among American students lags 
significantly behind that of their counterparts in the 
industrial world generate such panic (Chubb and Moe, 1990; 
Fiske, 1991). Regardless of how "education reform" manifests 
itself, the highly political nature of any proposal to change 
the schools testifies in part to the importance Americans 
attach to their role in preparing the work force.
Blacks, like other Americans, have historically had a 
high regard for the value of education, but for a very 
different reason: for most of their history in America, the 
opportunity to acquire learning was routinely denied them. 
The struggle for equal educational opportunities, long a
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central theme of black political agitation, provides further 
evidence of black acceptance of the Lockian creed. Before the 
Civil War, access to an education constituted a luxury beyond 
the reach of most Southerners, regardless of race. Usually, 
the well-to-do in the South provided private tutors for their 
children or sent them to Europe for their college education 
(Harris, 1924; Vincent, 1981). The planter class deemed the 
provision of education to their slaves as a mortal threat to 
their hegemony; thus, it is not surprising that they 
generally opposed tax-supported universal education for the 
masses (Butts, 1960; Genovese, 1967; Anderson, 1981, 1988). 
Slaves states passed laws prohibiting instruction to blacks, 
and those who violated the law were commonly subjected to 
fines, imprisonment, or whippings if apprehended (Vincent, 
1981) .
Therefore, the existence of slavery, from the outset, 
politicized the importance of education for black Americans. 
Black political leaders, from various ideological stripes, 
have consistently viewed education as foundational to impro­
ving the lot of African Americans. Their perspective has been 
powerfully conditioned by the knowledge of their unequal 
social, economic, and political status vis-a-vis white 
Americans. Blacks, like other Americans shaped by the 
thinking of the Enlightenment, tend to equate knowledge with 
human freedom. The Enlightenment's attachment to science and 
learning, coupled with the reality of slavery and racial
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discrimination combined to place access to educational 
opportunity at the forefront of black political movements in 
America (Brotz, 1966; Bullock, 1967; Dann, 1971; Vincent, 
1981; Quarles, 1986; Franklin and Moss, 1987; Anderson, 1988; 
Sansing, 1990).
Douglass, for example, recognized the liberating poten­
tial of learning at a young age. In his autobiography, he 
recalls his mistress who first instructed him in the rudi­
ments of the alphabet. Excited with her pupil's progress, she 
went on to tell her husband what she was doing. Upon hearing 
the news, the master lectured his wife on the evils of 
teaching slaves to read. Not only was it unlawful, he said, 
but it was also unsafe. Douglass happened to overhear the 
conversation:
. . . . if you give a nigger an inch he will take an 
ell. Learning will spoil the best nigger in the world. 
If he learns to read the Bible it will forever unfit 
him to be a slave. He should know nothing but the will 
of his master, and learn to obey it. As to himself, 
learning will do him no good, but a great deal of harm, 
making him disconsolate and unhappy. If you teach him 
how to read, he'll want to know how to write, and this 
accomplished, he'll be running away with himself (Doug­
lass, 1962, 79).
This incident, Douglass recalls, inspired in him a spirit of
rebellion. The very fact that his master desired that he be
kept in ignorance motivated him to acquire as much knowledge
as he could. Douglass never forgot the words, "Knowledge
unfits a child to be a slave" (Ibid, 79).
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In an article Douglass he later wrote for The North Star
entitled, "What Are the Colored People Doing for Themselves?"
he further spells out his views on education:
. . . . Let us educate our children, even though it
should us subject to a coarser and scantier diet, and 
disrobe us of our few fine garments. "For the want of 
knowledge we are killed all the day." Get wisdom - get 
understanding, is a peculiarly valuable exhortation to 
us, and the compliance with it is our only hope in this 
land [my emphasis]. - It is idle, a hollow mockery, 
for us to pray to God to break the oppressor's power, 
while we neglect the means of knowledge which will give 
us the ability to break this power - God will help us 
when we help ourselves (Douglass, 1966, 208).
Douglass' vision of education was widely shared among 
blacks. Free Negroes, though they often found themselves in 
an economically precarious state, often formed self-help 
associations to finance schools for their children; at other 
times, they received assistance from sympathetic whites 
(Porter, 1942; Woodson, 1968). Once the social stigma of 
attending "free schools" was removed by the public school 
movement, Negroes sought admission to these schools on an 
equal basis; more will be said about this in the next chapter 
(Woodson, 1968; Grant, 1968). Despite laws which outlawed 
such activity, some white Southerners taught Negroes to read; 
it proved impossible for the state to completely regulate the 
practice out of existence (Woodson, 1968). When the Freed­
man's Bureau came to the South following the Civil War, they 
found preexisting black schools, many supported by blacks'
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own efforts. Some of these schools predated the Civil War, 
despite local opposition to their existence (Porter, 1942; 
Woodson, 1968; Anderson, 1988).
The end of slavery further intensified the thirst within 
black Americans for education. It is most clearly manifested 
in their efforts to secure schooling for themselves and their 
children. Booker T. Washington, himself part of this mass 
movement, described the period this way: "It was a whole race 
trying to go to school. Few were too young, and none too old, 
to make the attempt to learn" (Anderson, 1988, 5).
Historians have generally underemphasized the indis­
pensable role that blacks played in making educational 
opportunity a reality for themselves. While they readily 
accepted aid from Northern philanthropists, missionary 
societies, white Republicans and sympathetic Southern whites, 
the values of self-help and self-determination - values 
nurtured indigenously within the black community - formed the 
bedrock of the ex-slaves' educational movement (Anderson, 
1988, 5). African Americans demonstrated a commitment to the 
Protestant work ethic and Lockian individualism that 
equalled, if not surpassed, that of whites. Black politicians 
in the Reconstruction state legislatures provided the impetus 
for instituting universal education in the former Confederate 
states (Bullock, 1967; Vincent, 1976; 1981; Jenkins, 1983; 
Anderson, 1988; Sansing, 1990). As W.E.B. DuBois would later 
remark, "Public education for all at public expense was, in
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the South, a Negro idea" (Anderson, 1988, 6) . When
controversy flared at the turn of the century over whether 
liberal education or vocational training was best suited for 
the Negro (personified by the differences between Booker T. 
Washington and W.E.B. DuBois), the debate was not (at least 
among black Americans) , whether black Americans needed 
schooling or had the capacity to grasp "higher culture"; 
rather, the debate, in part, turned on which model held the 
most promise for social uplift of the race (Washington, 1901; 
DuBois, 1903; Brotz, 1966; Aptheker, 1971; Anderson, 1978; 
1988).
Finally, black appreciation for the value of education
has tended to extend beyond its potential to better equip
them to earn livings or to empower them to fight for social
and political rights. Rather, African Americans view
education as a fundamental tool in the battle to reduce
racial prejudice. The fact that the belief in the
intellectual and moral inferiority of blacks provided part of
the rationale for slavery is beyond debate (Davis, 1966;
Botz, 1966; Dann, 1970; Blassingame, 1972; Tocqueville, 1988;
Higgins, 1990). Thomas Jefferson, though claiming his
conclusions to be speculative, nevertheless expressed a
commonly held view of blacks:
. . . . I advance it, therefore, as a suspicion only,
that the blacks, whether originally a distinct race, 
or made distinct by time and circumstances, are inferior 
to whites in the endowments both of body and mind. It 
is not against experience to suppose that different 
species of the same genus, or varieties of the same
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species, may possess different qualifications. Will not 
a lover of natural history then, one who views the 
gradations in all the races of animals with the eye 
of philosophy, excuse an effort to keep those in the 
department as man as distinct as nature has formed 
them? This unfortunate difference of color, and perhaps 
of faculty, is a powerful obstacle to the emancipation 
of these people (Jefferson, 1955, 143).
However, when Tocqueville visited America in the 1830's,
he found little evidence that public opinion toward blacks
had significantly improved. In fact, he observed that racial
prejudice appeared to be most prevalent in Northern states
where the institution of slavery had been abolished than in
the South (1988, 343) . Indeed, he noted that the widespread
belief in the moral and intellectual inferiority of blacks,
not the legal institution of slavery, posed the greatest
obstacle to social progress for the Negro. For this reason,
Tocqueville doubted that the two races could live together in
a racial democracy. A social climate such as this, however,
only served to inflame the passions of African Americans for
education all the more. Through learning, it was hoped, they
would prove their detractors wrong. Samuel Cornish, editor of
the black newspaper The Rights of All, was an early advocate
of a system of education for blacks. In an 1827 editoral, he
wrote:
. . . .  Let us sacrifice or rather consecrate, the means 
of these unnecessary, and sometimes sinful indulgences, 
to the lid of a sealed box, for the purpose of educa­
tion. It is truly said that knowledge is power, and let 
our coloured population once become as learned, as 
refined, and as wealthy as other classes of community, 
and prejudice will hide her face - the tyrants spell 
will be broken. To talk about prejudice against color 
is nonsense; but raise up sons learned and enterprising
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with offsets of 2 0 to 3 0 thousand dollars - but rear 
daughters intelligent and polished heiresses to their 
tens and hundreds of thousands, and the fair sons and 
daughters of Columbia will forget the law of lights and 
shades - it will be expunged from our system of philo­
sophy. And as should be, merit will form the estimate 
of character and respectability (Dann, 1971, 301).
In this passage, Cornish calls upon his people to 
establish schools of their own, not simply to learn skills 
and attain knowledge (though they have intrinsic value in and 
of themselves), but also to silence the prejudices of white 
Americans. His perspective views color prejudice - and not 
simply legal, political, and economic barriers - as barriers 
to black progress. Through education, Cornish hopes, African 
Americans can develop enlightened, enterprising, and 
respectable communities which will disprove racial theories 
of black inferiority. In other words, rather than produce 
elaborate philosophical treatises refuting theories of inhe­
rent differences between the races, blacks should turn their 
attention toward practical action; after all, results are 
more difficult to argue against. His words reveal his degree 
of dedication to the Protestant work ethic and Lockian 
individualism. Blacks should be pragmatic, not philosophical 
- consistent with the manner in which Lockianism manifests 
itself in America (Hartz, 1955). Through hard work, sweat, 
and perseverance, African Americans would show that they 
merit first-class citizenship, values consistent with the 
Protestant work ethic (Weber, 1976). Cornish's remarks imply 
an acceptance of the American concept of merit.
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He certainly was not alone in his beliefs. Frederick 
Douglass emphatically argued that what blacks needed from 
whites was not sympathy, but rather the freedom to either 
rise or fall based on their own efforts. Unhindered access to 
education, for this reason, was one of the essential precon­
ditions to make this ideal a reality (Brotz, 1966, 283).
Industrial education in the mind of Booker T., Washington 
afforded blacks with the opportunity to acquire skills and 
training necessary to "prove" that they could be effective 
partners in the building of a new southern economy, and 
therefore could not rightfully be denied political and social 
rights (Washington, 1901; Brotz, 1966; Anderson, 1978; 1988; 
While rejecting Washington's belief that blacks needed to 
"prove themselves worthy" of political and social equality, 
DuBois nevertheless did not depart from American individu­
alism (at least until late in his life) . In advocating 
liberal education for a "talented tenth," DuBois set out in 
part to counter the objections of those who said that college 
was inappropriate for the Negro; the ideological climate of 
Social Darwinism at the turn of the century had reinforced 
longstanding racial stereotypes (DuBois, 1903; Brotz, 1966; 
Aptheker, 1971; Anderson, 1978; 1988). Thus, DuBois affirmed 
the "inalienable rights" of African Americans while pushing 
for liberal education as a means of discrediting the doubters 
of black ability. Black academics have traditionally accepted
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the role of countering racist propoganda directed against 
African Americans (Kujovich, 1987, 158).
Therefore, black and white Americans come to attribute 
similar intrinsic value to education, but they arrive at the 
same social ideeil through the tunnels of profoundly different 
historical experiences. White Americans more closely identify 
with education as part of their Lockian birthright, though 
this sentiment is rarely articulated. Blacks value education 
precisely because it, like other political and economic 
rights, was specifically denied them; rather than being 
treated as free men, interpretations of the Declaration of 
Independence and the Constitution treated them as if they 
were disinherited children rather than free sons. The NAACP's 
protracted campaign against "separate but equal" in the 
public schools, which began in the 1930's, constitutes one 
chapter in the history of black efforts at attaining equal 
educational opportunity in America. From the perspective of 
blacks, the cause of educational opportunity and political 
freedom were intimately linked. The fact that whites and 
African Americans bring different historical experiences to 
the political dilemma of desegregation contributes, in no 
small way, to the divisive character of such debates.
Aristotle reminds us in The Politics that it is simply 
not possible to speak of education apart from some considera­
tion of the good life and the question of the best regime. 
Since it is inevitable that people will disagree over matters
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concerning education, the topic is thus inherently political 
(1984, 229-230) . Certainly, Americans did not invent the idea 
of education as essential to the health of the republic, nor 
are they the first to quarrel about its specific role in 
society. However, the American assertion in the superiority 
of reason over other bases for authority elevates the signi- 
cance of education more so than it has in other countries 
(Arendt, 1958). Hence, education in America is more readily 
politicized. Political battles over proposed curriculum 
changes, religious values, academic standards, education 
reforms and other issues illustrate the politically explosive 
potential of education in America. Desegregation in education 
must be seen as a powerful example of this phenomenon.
Thus far, I have argued that blacks have from the days 
of the Revolution down through the civil rights era invoked 
the themes of the liberal tradition to press their claims for 
liberty. It has also been contended that the importance that 
African Americans, though peering through a different pair of 
historical lenses, nevertheless attach virtues to education 
consistent with the legacy of the Enlightenment. Moreover, 
the efforts that blacks have expended historically to acquire 
the means to education reflect an acceptance of critical 
aspects of the Protestant work ethic and Lockian 
individualism. This interpretation of the history of black 
political protest, of course, is not universally shared. 
Before further developing the thesis that black political
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discourse, and specifically, desegregation litigation, 
demonstrates the fidelity of African Americans with the 
American Creed, it is necessary to consider the counter­
argument to this assertion. That is the subject of the next 
section.
African Americans: True Disciples of Locke?
With respect to the African American protest tradition,
Oakes (1995) writes:
. . . .  The fact that black political leaders consis­
tently claimed the liberal tradition as their own 
therefore constitutes a major problem in the history 
of American political culture. . . . black political 
thought. . . has never been divorced from the liberal 
tradition. From the late eighteenth century to the 
late twentieth, blacks have successfully harnessed 
the themes of liberalism to the struggles against 
various forms of inequality (205-206) .
Dawson (1995) offers black nationalism and black Marxism 
as counterexamples for his view that black political 
discourse cannot be confined within the boundaries of the 
liberal tradition. He argues that scholars who study black 
political thought err because, on one hand, they tend to 
overemphasize the importance of a few prominent individuals. 
Furthermore, he contends that black nationalist intellectuals 
like David Walker, Martin Delaney, Marcus Garvey, and 
organizations such as the Nation of Islam are systematically 
underrepresented in their analyses of black political 
thought. He also points to examples of blacks such as W.E.B. 
DuBois and Martin Luther King who, in the course of their
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philosophical journeys, either dissented in part, or rejected 
entirely, fundamental tenets of liberalism (see DuBois, 1940; 
1945; King, 1967).
Finally, Dawson points out the consistent demand in 
black politics that their individual leaders take political 
stands that are perceived by the community as not harmful to 
the black community, an auspiciously nonliberal trait; in 
fact, some would call it antiliberal. This tradition of a 
public community censoring and sanctioning those seen as 
attacking the black community manifests, for example, in the 
general disdain for black conservatives and black Republi­
cans. White politicians, by and-large, are not expected (at 
least not explicitly) to articulate the "white perspective" 
when they go to City Hall, the state legislature or Congress. 
In contrast, black political leaders bear the special burden 
of being seen not only as representatives of particular 
constituencies, but as spokesmen for the race. This repre­
sents a peculiar aspect of black political culture that 
clearly departs from dominant American political norms.
Dawson's critique carries considerable weight. He makes 
a powerful case for a "black counterpublic" as an ideological 
site for the criticism of American democratic theory and 
practice that is consistent with the work of other scholars. 
For example, Blassingame (1972) persuasively documented the 
existence of a "slave community" which synthesized African 
and American elements in a time when most scholars had
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seemingly concluded that the Middle Passage and the ordeal of 
American slavery had eradicated all aspects of African 
culture (see, for example, Stamp, 1956; Moynihan, 1965). That 
the slaves did not simply adopt the white master's culture 
(though they were influenced by it) , but maintained a cul­
tural integrity of their own has been shown by other scholars 
(Genovese, 1976; Levine, 1977; Sobel, 1979; Stuckey, 1987; 
Higgins, 1990). Pinderhughes (1987) objects to the use of the 
binary lenses of "assimilationism vs. black nationalism" to 
explain black political thought. This fallacy, she continues, 
not only understates the range of black political discourse, 
but also overstates the degree of unity among blacks. African 
Americans, she writes, "may agree on racial and economic 
matters; they might disagree on racial or economic or agree 
on the economic or racial goals; or they may disagree on 
both" (1987, 127).
Acknowledging the existence of a separate black 
political culture does not overturn the thesis that black 
political discourse has remained predominately within the 
borders of the liberal tradition. In fact, the reality of 
historical and cultural differences between blacks and whites 
explains how America's abstract commitment to Lockian values 
of equal rights and equal opportunity for all often leads to 
conflicting policy preferences with respect to debates on 
desegregation, affirmative action, racial redistricting. The 
focus of this section, however, is to demonstrate while black
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nationalism and black Marxism constitute significant streams 
of the history of black political thought, their existence 
does not contradict my main thesis. Moreover, even those 
critiques of American democracy which have attempted to go 
beyond the borders of the liberal tradition nevertheless 
maintained strong liberal elements.
What, after all, is black nationalism? Is it not rooted 
in the sense that the "common experience of discrimination, 
humiliation, and economic self-interest" unites blacks in a 
unique way in relation to white America and to each other? 
Because of the common experience of slavery and segregation, 
they were no longer Mandingo, Mandinka, Yoruba, Ibo, or Hausa 
- they had become "one nation," or a "nation within a nation" 
(Brotz, 1966; Berlin, 1975; Aptheker, 1971; Walker, 1993; 
DuBois, 1996). Similarly, the political crisis with Great 
Britain in the 1760's and 1770's forged within the colonists 
a sense of nationalism - no longer were they simply New 
Yorkers, Virginians, or Georgians; they were Americans. The 
colonial sense of having endured a common oppression is 
spelled out vividly in the specific "usurpations" which King 
George III is alleged to have committed in the Declaration of 
Independence. Therefore, by basing black nationalism on a 
sense of a common historical experience, are they not acting 
like Americans?
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Secondly, black nationalism tacitly accepts the doctrine 
of inalienable rights, a foundational stone of the American 
republic. Despite the stridency of David Walker's condem­
nation of American slavery and the Founders' complicity with 
it in his Appeal to the Coloured Citizens of the World, he 
leaves unscathed the doctrine of inalienable rights. His 
approach radically differs from that of Marx, who attacks 
capitalism on every point. One would think that one of the 
most radical treatises ever written condemning slavery and 
white racism would "leave no stone unturned;" seemingly, 
Walker would attack every pillar deemed responsible for the 
oppression of his people.
The reason he does not attack the concept of inalienable 
rights is obvious: he supports it. "Are we MEN!" Walker asks, 
(1992, 3 6) a direct challenge to Jefferson's expressed doubts 
about the faculties of blacks. An affirmative answer to this 
question, Walker argues, undermines all the justifications 
for slavery. In asserting black manhood, Walker claimed that 
African Americans could not be rightfully denied the benefits 
of the same inalienable rights that applied to every other 
American.
So fervently does Walker accept this concept that any 
means were justified to end slavery. The violation of the 
rights of African Americans represents such a grievous evil 
that any means to eliminate it were justified, including
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violeOnt revolution. Walker's call sounds very much like 
Jefferson's call for revolution: because the king had vio­
lated the inalienable rights of the colonists as Englishmen, 
he had forfeited his right to rule. As a consequence, the 
colonists were justified in dissolving their political ties 
with the British crown. Walker, in effect, vindicates 
Jefferson and, by extension, Locke.
This pattern repeats itself consistently throughout the 
history of black nationalism. All nationalist movements from 
Martin Delaney to Elijah Muhammad aimed at establishing a 
separate black nation premise themselves on the inalienable 
right of self-determination (Brotz, 1966; Aptheker, 1971; 
Wintz, 1996). African American oppression is deemed to be so 
violative of the concept of inalienable rights and/or higher 
moral law that blacks may justifiably sever their ties with 
the United States and establish their own nation. In reality, 
black nationalism does not fundamentally challenge the 
liberal concept of rights; indeed, it vindicates it.
A survey of the rhetoric of Malcolm X produces even more 
evidence for the compatability of black nationalism with the 
liberal tradition. Perhaps more explicitly than any other 
black nationalist thinker, Malcolm ventures to great lengths 
to sever his ties with the American political consensus. In 
a speech in 19 64, Malcolm uttered these words:
I am not a politician. I'm not even a student of 
politics. I'm not a Democrat. I'm not a Republican. I 
don't even consider myself an American. . . .  I don't 
come here tonight to speak to you as a Democrat or a
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Republican or an American or anything you want me to 
be. I'm speaking as what I am: one of twenty-two mil­
lion black people in this country who are victims of 
your democratic system. They're victims of the Demo­
cratic politicians, the victims of the Republican 
politicians. They're actually the victims of what you 
call democracy. So I stand here tonight speaking as 
a victim of what you call democracy (X, 1968, 134).
On the surface, it appears that Malcolm X rejects the 
entire American democratic experiment. A cursory examination 
of his speeches seems to indicate that that is his precise 
intent (Haley, 1992; Breitman, 1967). He sees himself not as 
an American, but rather as a victim of America: after all, 
the mere fact that a man sits at a table does not make him a 
diner. Malcolm dismissed King's strategy of civil disobe­
dience in order to appeal to the nation's conscience as a 
waste of time, countering that if America really had a soul 
it would not have enslaved and mistreated African Americans. 
The Nation of Islam, of which he was a minister, expoused the 
belief that the black race were the "chosen people of God" 
(Lincoln, 1984), a direct challenge to America's own sense of 
Divine Providence (Hartz, 1955; Peterson, 1976; Gebhardt, 
1993).
However, not even Malcolm can escape his Americanism. By 
pronouncing the judgement of Allah on sinful America, Malcolm 
invoked America's higher law tradition. In subjecting the 
nation's practices to a Higher Judge, how was he different 
from David Walker, William Lloyd Garrison, Nat Turner, John 
Brown, and Martin Luther King? In proposing to bring human 
rights charges before the United Nations against the United
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States for its treatment of African Americans (Breitman, 
1970) , Malcolm behaves like an American. The very idea of 
charging the United States with human rights violations 
assumes these rights exist in the first place; moreover, if 
these rights are violated, those victimized by such actions 
have the right to self-defense and self-determination. His 
journey toward Pan-Africanism in the last year of his life (a 
logical extension of his black nationalism) , rests on key 
aspects of the liberal creed - namely, the idea that a common 
historical experience (particularly a common oppression) 
forms the basis for national identity. For Malcolm, the Ame­
rican ideal proved to be so powerful that not even he, in 
spite his best efforts, could successfully think beyond it. 
America ironically provided Malcolm with the analytical tools 
with which to interrogate herself.
With black nationalism eliminated as a fundamental chal­
lenger to the liberal tradition, I now turn to Marxism. Du­
Bois and many black intellectuals before and after him became 
members of the Communist Party (Marable, 1982; Stuckey, 1987; 
Pinderhughes, 1987; Dawson, 1995). Yet, socialism has never 
been able to attract a large share of the black masses, in 
spite of the fact that historical discrimination against 
African Americans have deprived them of a significant share 
of the benefits of capitalist democracy. Logically, they 
would seemingly have little stake in the preservation of the 
status quo.
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Several ideas have been advanced to explain this rather 
curious fact. Organizational deficiencies, such as severe 
pressure to integrate into the economy (which also crippled 
institutions among white ethnic immigrants), were parti­
cularly more pronounced among blacks; they tended be in more 
marginal economic straits than their white counterparts 
(Garner, 1977). Marable (1982) attributes the demise of black 
left radicalism partly to government sponsored efforts to 
eradicate the left as well as crackdowns within the labor 
union establishment during the McCarthy era through the black 
power revolt. It has also been charged that communist 
organizations often succumbed to the same racism toward 
blacks that African Americans had united with them to fight 
against. Quoting Shawna Maglangbayan, Marable, himself a 
Marxist, writes: "Marxism-Leninism [is] a reactionary and
white supremacist ideology whose chief aim is to maintain 
Aryan world hegemony once capitalism is overthrown" (1980, 
85) . Pinderhughes (1987) points to the Communist Party's 
failure to resolve the ideological contradictions between 
internationalism and black nationalism. The party's inability 
to manipulate racial issues, she concludes, renders them an 
unattractive option for the black population. Finally, black 
intellectuals would have been faced the same dilemmas in the 
post-World War II era as white members of the left; in par­
ticular, (1) they had to explain the postwar economic expan- 
pansion, considering their confident predictions during the
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Depression years that the "death of capitalism" was near and 
(2) in light of the revealed brutality of Stalin's regime, 
how could one still tout Marxist as the best hope for mankind 
(Diggins, 1990) .
While all of the aforementioned explanations carry a 
certain measure of validity, they miss a more fundamental 
problem for Marxism with respect to black Americans: the fact 
that they are Americans. Indeed, it was never necessary for 
African Americans to become revolutionaries because the idea 
of America is already revolutionary.
The American revolutionaries found willing allies in the 
New England church, thereby eliminating the necessity of 
making the Revolution also a war to overthrow established 
religion, unlike the situation in France (Hartz, 1955; 
Peterson, 1976). Religion in America, as Hartz put it, was 
already revolutionary (41) . The same is true with the 
nation's core principles. Why make war with principles which 
are so useful in justifying one's own cause? Moreover, not 
only does America assert the right to revolution to end 
unjust oppression, she goes further to declare this right to 
be "self-evident." America proclaims the fundamental equality 
of all men - certainly a radical thought in 177 6 in light of 
the history of the Western world. A nation that sees itself 
as "hopefully experimentalistic" in its societal arrangements 
(Myrdal, 1944, 7) keeps the door of reform - even of revo­
lution - constantly ajar.
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Thus, Walker did not need to build a new revolutionary 
theory; rather, he only needed to insist, "We [meaning 
African Americans] are men, too!" Whereas the European 
liberal felt the compulsion to produce elaborate treatises in 
order to rationalize the right to challenge secular and 
ecclesiastical authorities deemed to be "God-ordained" and 
immutable, African Americans live in a society where the 
right to rebel against perceived injustices is viewed as a 
birthright. Having inherited such a legacy, it is no wonder 
that black protest leaders, in the main, draw inspiration 
from the Declaration of Independence rather than The Commu­
nist Manifesto.
Moreover, since the Revolution did not declare the 
"death of God," He could still be enlisted, when necessary, 
to serve political ends. The fact that the Revolution did not 
engage in an all-out war against the church had the effect of 
maintaining religion as a significant player in American 
politics. As Tocqueville observed, the lack of a state church 
in America actually served to strengthen the role of religion 
in America (1988, 298-299). The fact that religion has not 
been "eliminated from the [political] game" (Anderson, 1964) 
injects a significant element of moralism into American poli­
tics. Moralism has been found at the core of reform movements 
throughout the nation's history, from the abolitionists to 
the temperance movements, to the present-day anti-abortio­
nists. Political reform movements in America often resemble
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"holy crusades" or Islamic jihads in character. The black
protest leader, as a consequence, never needed to become Marx
- he already had Moses and the Prophets.
In summary, the American Creed binds African Americans,
as well as other traditionally disadvantaged and despised
groups, into the American fold in a manner that is truly
extraordinary considering their historical circumstances.
Myrdal is right when he concludes:
The liberal Creed, even in its dynamic formulation by 
Jefferson, is adhered to by every American. The una­
nimity around, and the explicitness of, this Creed i s 
the great wonder of America. The "Old Americans," 
all those who have thoroughly come to identify 
themselves with the nation - which are many more 
than the Sons and the Daughters of the Revolution - 
adhere to the Creed as the faith of their ancestors. 
The others - the Negroes, the new immigrants, the Jews, 
and other disadvantaged and unpopular groups - could not 
possibly have invented a system of political ideals 
which better corresponded to their interests. So, iy He 
logic of the unique American history, it has developed 
that the rich and secure, out of pride and conservatism, 
and the poor and insecure, out of dire need, come to 
profess the identical social ideals. . . . Behind it all 
is the historical reality which makes it possible for 
the President to appeal to all in the nation in this 
way: "Let us not forget that we are all descendants from 
revolutionaries and immigrants" (1944, 13).
By proclaiming the self-evident truth of the fundamental
equality of all men, the Creed knits African Americans and
other historically disadvantaged and despised groups into the
American fold in a manner that is truly extraordinary.
Consequently, The Creed ideologically underwrites the
tradition of black protest in America. Blacks had to go no
further than to the words of the Declaration of Independence
and the Constitution to find a rationale for challenging the
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racial status quo in America. Thus, I expect that the history 
of the efforts to achieve desegregation, both at the public 
school and college level, would be consistent with this 
established historical pattern. I anticipate that the NAACP 
would appeal to the values of the Creed to buttress its legal 
challenge to segregated education. However, Lockian indivi­
dualism is a "doubled-edged sword" which supplies counter­
arguments to interests opposed to specific remedial policies 
favored by many black civil rights proponents and their 
liberal white allies. Many white Americans object to "race- 
consciousness" in the determination of public policy; they 
interpret the meaning of the civil rights struggle as a 
repudiation of race-consciousness and an affirmation of the 
equal worth of every individual. When applied to the issue of 
desegregation in higher education, the existence of publicly 
funded, historically black universities poses a troubling 
dilemma for an ostensibly "colorblind" society. Therefore, 
all the litigating parties, irrespective of the specific 
positions they hold, insist that they are being faithful to 
the American Creed.
Chapter Two shifts the focus of this dissertation from 
the macro-level of American political culture to the early 
history of the school desegregation movement. This chapter 
traces this phenomenon to the Supreme Court's landmark 
decision in Brown.
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CHAPTER 2. THE ROAD TO BROWN
A cursory examination of the Supreme Court's decision 
in United States v. Fordice demonstrates that the justices 
clearly viewed the case as another extension of the logic of 
Brown v. Board of Education. Relying on the reasoning of 
Brown as well as its successor cases (most notably, Green v. 
School Board of New Kent County), the Court declared that 
Mississippi's nondiscriminatory policies did not meet the 
state's burden "to eradicate policies and practices traceable 
to its prior de jure dual system that continue to foster 
segregation" (505 U.S. 717, 728 [1992]). Thus, the Supreme 
Court continued its tradition of applying principles derived 
from elementary and secondary desegregation cases to higher 
education.5 Therefore, in order to adequately assess the 
significance of the ruling in Fordice. it is important to 
revisit Brown.
This chapter concentrates on the school desegregation 
movement leading up to Brown. It will be shown that the 
NAACP's legal campaign to end racial segregation in education 
provides a compelling case study in the fidelity of black 
Americans to the liberal creed. Indeed, by appealing to the
50ther public school cases besides Brown and Green on 
which the Court relied on include Swann v. Charlotte- 
Mecklenbera Board of Education. 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Gilmore v 
City of Montgomery. 417 U.S. 556 (1974); Pasadena City Board 
of Education v. Spangler. 427 U.S. 424 (1976); Board of
Education of Oklahoma Citv Public Schools v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 
237 (1991); and Freeman v. Pitts. 503 U.S. 467 (1992).
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Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, they charge 
Plessv's "separate but equal" doctrine with violating the 
amendment's original intent - to safeguard the rights of the 
newly emancipated slaves from state laws that deprived them 
of their fundamental rights.
I begin by reviewing the original purpose of the Four­
teenth Amendment because one of the central questions 
addressed by the parties in the Brown cases was whether 
school segregation was permissible in light of the vision the 
framers had of the Fourteenth Amendment. This is followed by 
a discussion of how the civil rights of ex-slaves were, for 
all intent and purposes, effectively nullified through court 
decisions, Northern neglect, legislative fiat, and violence. 
The fact that the citizenship rights of blacks had been 
seriously "qualified" (Woodson, 1921) explains the rise of 
organizations such as the NAACP. Given the plight of blacks, 
I will present the range of alternatives that were available 
to the NAACP. It will be argued that the NAACP's choice to 
pursue a litigation strategy to overturn the "separate but 
equal" doctrine provides a strong case for the organiza­
tion's belief in the American creed. Indeed, the NAACP 
rejected an alternative characterization of the race problem 
in America - the idea that racism represented only one facet 
of class exploitation, and black liberation could not be 
achieved without a radical restructuring of the basic 
institutions of American capitalism. The NAACP's litigation
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strategy affirmed their belief in the basic goodness of 
American institutions while simultaneously fighting for the 
right of blacks to share equally in the bounty of America. 
Once the legal barriers to black participation in the main­
stream of American life were eliminated, the NAACP believed 
that blacks would be able to compete in the marketplace on a 
equal footing with other Americans. This vision played a 
powerful role in shaping the course of the desegregation 
campaign, and would have ramifications well into the post- 
Brown era.
Reconstruction and Reversal
The South's defeat in the Civil War ended slavery and 
permanently denied to the states the right to secede from the 
Union. As the Thirty-Ninth Congress convened in Washington in 
December of 1865, it confronted the task of determining the 
means by which the defeated Southern states would be restored 
to the Union. Under the existing Constitution, three-fifths 
of black slaves, discreetly described in the document as 
"other persons," were counted for the purposes of taxation 
and representation. With slavery abolished and African 
Americans declared free persons by the result of the war, it 
became necessary to define precisely what freedom meant. Did 
freedom entitle the newly freed slaves to all the rights, 
privileges and immunities enjoyed by free white persons, 
including the right to vote? Or could blacks justly be 
excluded from political participation or, as some argued, be
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required to demonstrate some minimal level of competence in 
order to qualify for voting privileges? Perhaps more impor­
tantly, which level of government - the national government 
or the states - had the power to define the specific rights 
of citizenship? Was there a difference between national 
citizenship and being a citizen of a particular state? In 
short, the task of restoring the defeated Southern states 
required Congress to address the status of the newly emanci­
pated slaves under the Constitution (Flack, 1908; Kendrick, 
1914; tenBroeck, 1951; Crosskey, 1953; James, 1956; Graham, 
1968; Baer, 1983; Kaczorowski, 1987).
Faced with the duty of defining the constitutional 
status of the Negro, the memory of Scott v. Sanford (60 U.S. 
393 [1857]) loomed large. The Court rejected the freedom suit 
of Dred Scott, a black slave, on the grounds that because of 
his African ancestry he was not, nor could he ever be, a 
citizen of the United States within the meaning of the 
Constitution. Even emancipation, in the eyes of the Court's 
majority, did not make blacks part of the political community 
(60 U.S. at 405 [1857]). Crosskey writes:
. . . .  the full purport of that case. . . .was that no 
"man of African descent, whether a slave or not," could 
enjoy, under the Constitution of the United States, any 
right or protection [my emphasis] whatsoever. All such 
men were left, by the principles of the Dred Scott case, 
to the absolute, unrestrained power of the separate 
states (1953, 1084).
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The ruling effectively left blacks at the mercy of the 
states. The Court's opinion, though clearly racist in tone, 
nevertheless reflected the settled constitutional doctrine of 
the times - that the fundamental rights of citizenship were 
secured by the states. The Founding Fathers believed that the 
greatest threat to liberty rested with the national govern­
ment; furthermore, pre-Civil War jurisprudence held that the 
Bill of Rights limited only the actions of the federal 
government.6 Therefore, when the Southern states enacted what 
came to be known as "The Black Codes," they did more than 
simply making it clear that their attitudes toward the ex­
slaves had not softened. In another sense, the newly formed 
Southern legislatures were exercising the authority state 
governments were assumed to have.
6The landmark case in this regard was Barron v. 
Baltimore (32 U.S. 243 [1833]) where the Supreme Court held 
that the Bill of Rights limited only the actions of the 
federal government and not those of the states. At the time 
of the adoption of The Bill of Rights, most states already 
had included protections of individual liberties within their 
state constitutions; presumably, the ordinary citizen had 
little reason to believe that the state governments would 
mount an assault on his inalienable rights. Thus, the 
original document inhered within it a fundamental defect with 
respect to the ability of African Americans to secure their 
rights against the actions of state governments. This was 
true precisely because it was the states that had legalized 
slavery as well as the supporting code of laws madde 
necessary by its existence. The notion of "state citizenship" 
would provide the rationale in part for later Supreme Court 
decisions justifying judicial nonenforcement of the civil 
rights of blacks. Not until the twentieth century when courts 
began to "incorporate the Fourteenth Amendment" did this 
doctrine began to crumble.
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Franklin and Moss (1987) describe the ramifications of
the Black Codes on the newly freed slaves:
. . . Several of them undertook to limit the areas in
in which Negroes could purchase and rent property. 
Vagrancy laws imposed heavy penalties that were designed 
to force all Negroes to work whether they wanted to or 
not. The control of blacks by white employers was about 
as great as that which slaveholders exercised. Negroes 
who quit their jobs could be arrested and imprisoned for 
breach of contract. Negroes were not allowed to testify 
in court except in cases involving members of their 
race. Numerous fines were imposed for seditious spee­
ches, insulting gestures or acts, absence from work, 
violating curfew, and the possession of firearms. There 
was, of course, no enfranchisement of blacks and no 
indication that in the future they could look forward 
to full citizenship and participation in a democracy 
(206).
By severely restricting the political, civil, and eco­
nomic liberties of the freedmen, these laws threatened to 
reduce African Americans to a condition not appreciably 
different from slavery. The Black Codes merely constituted 
but one manifestation of a Southern political climate 
characterized by increasing defiance of national authority.7 
Northerners interpreted these events as evidence that the 
South was in rebellion again. Thus, the need for national 
protection of the rights of citizens, whether they be white
7Other examples of Southern defiance include the 
following: Southerners continued to invoke states' rights
doctrine; the rights of Northern whites and federal officials 
in the region were routinely ignored. White Southerners 
sympathetic to the Union were branded "scalawags" and 
received similar treatment. Many former successionists were 
returned to political office while newspapers and periodicals 
had, by the spring of 18 66, succeeded in whipping up anti- 
Union sentiment to pre-Civil War levels (Kendrick, 1914; 
Graham, 1968; Kaczorowski, 1987).
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Unionists, military or federal personnel, or freedmen was 
widely acknowledged and urged upon members of Congress (Kac­
zorowski, 1987, 26-30).
In response to the Black Codes, Congress passed the 
Civil Rights Act of 1866. As originally proposed, the civil 
rights bill declared:
All persons born in the United States, and not 
subject to any foreign power, are hereby declared to be 
citizens of the United States, without distinction of 
color, and there shall be no discrimination in civil 
rights and immunities among the inhabitants of any state 
or territory of the United States on account of race, 
color, or previous condition of servitude (Kluger, 1975, 
627) .
Supporters of the legislation saw it as an extension of
the Thirteenth Amendment that secured the freedom of the
slaves. In their view, the white South's intransigence had
made it necessary for Congress to guarantee equality under
the law and to spell out the privileges and immunities that
the newly freed blacks were now entitled to. Under the new
law, ex-slaves would be entitled to the rights
to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and 
give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, 
and convey real and personal property, and to full and 
equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the 
security of person and property, as is enjoyed by white 
citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, 
pains, and penalties, and none other, any law, statute, 
ordinance, regulation, or custom, to the contrary 
withstanding (14 Stat. 27, quoted in Graham, 1968, 307- 
308; Kluger, 1975, 628).
However, did the proposed legislation only apply to the 
specifically enumerated rights listed in the bill? Or were 
the specifically named rights merely examples intended to
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communicate that the intent of the bill was to nullify the 
Black Codes? Had the Civil Rights Bill passed in its original 
form with the broad anti-discrimination language intact, 
Congress would have been empowered to strike down any future 
state laws that fostered segregation (Kluger, 1975, 628).
Democrats and conservative Republicans objected to the 
potentially broad scope of the bill, arguing that it would 
forbid the states from using race as a basis for any kind of 
statutory discrimination or classification. Interestingly, 
state laws requiring segregation in public schools were cited 
as examples of the kinds of state practices which the federal 
government would have the right to outlaw if the measure 
passed (Cowan in Avins, 1967, 127; Rogers in Avins, 1967,
166) . Opponents insisted that the bill represented an 
unconstitutional exercise of federal power against the 
states. The bill passed after the anti-discrimination clause 
was removed, only to be vetoed by President Andrew Johnson. 
In his veto message, the president accused Congress of 
unconstitutionally usurping the sovereignty of the states. 
Congress subsequently voted to override the president's veto 
and the Civil Rights Bill became law.
Nevertheless, doubts about the constitutionality of the 
new law remained. Thus, many in Congress saw the need for a 
constitutional amendment to lay the matter to rest. John 
Bingham, a Republican representative from Oregon, introduced 
the original draft of the Fourteenth Amendment. It began:
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The Congress shall have power to make all laws 
which shall be necessary and proper to secure to the 
citizens of each State all privileges and immunities 
of citizens of the United States [Article IV, Section 
2]; and to all persons in the several States equal 
protection in the rights of life, liberty, and 
property [Fifth Amendment] (Kluger, 1975, 630).
By bracketing references to other parts of the Constitution, 
Bingham attempted to reassure his colleagues that what he was 
proposing was not revolutionary; rather, the new amendment 
was based on powers which were in the Constitution already 
(Ibid, 630). The new amendment, Bingham and other supporters 
of the measure argued, would simply arm Congress with the 
express power to enforce the guarantee of equality. It did 
not transfer all sovereignty over civil rights to the federal 
government, as conservative opponents charged.
However, the language of the first draft generated oppo­
sition both from conservatives and Radical Republicans. 
Conservatives argued that the proposal would give Congress 
the right to define and secure the rights of citizens - and 
conceivably, the right to take away rights from citizens. 
Such a proposal, they maintained, constituted a broadside 
against the American concept of free government - the idea 
that governments exist to secure natural rights, not to 
define the rights of citizens (Flack, 1908; Avins, 1967). On 
the other hand, Radicals objected to the wording of the 
original proposal because it made Congress responsible for 
securing the civil rights protections of citizens. Congres­
sional majorities had a tendency to shift, they pointed out;
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thus, the original proposal did not place civil rights 
protections beyond the power of future Congresses to either 
repeal or to simply not enforce (Bickel, 1955; Graham, 1968; 
Kluger, 1975; Kaczorowski, 1987).
Therefore, the final draft of the amendment eliminated 
the offensive language. Section One of the Fourteenth Amend­
ment declared:
All persons born or naturalized in the United 
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are 
citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law 
which shall abridge the privileges and immunities of 
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor deny to any person 
the equal protection of the laws.
Supporters of the Amendment insisted that, by passing 
this legislation, the national government was not "granting 
rights" to the freedmen; instead, it was securing them. After 
all, governments existed to secure preexisting, inalienable 
rights according to the laws of nature; this new amendment 
merely declared that the former slaves, now freed, were 
entitled to those same rights. Furthermore, those on the 
Republican side who regarded the Fourteenth Amendment as the 
constitutional embodiment of the Civil Rights Act often 
coupled their arguments with appeals to abstract theories of 
justice and the natural rights of man (Bickel, 1955, 61) .
Thus, many of the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment 
regarded their task as consistent with the spirit of John 
Locke and the Founding Fathers (ten Broeck 1951; Avins, 1967;
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Graham, 1968, 295-335; Friedman, 1969, 184; Baer, 1983;
Kaczorowski, 1987). Graham observed:
At the outset, the Lockean philosophy of ante­
cedent and inalienable rights (which colonial leaders 
had employed so effectively in the Revolution) simply 
had been given a new twist. Americans, it was argued, 
had to live up to the Declaration. "All men" had to 
mean all men; "Governments. . . instituted to secure 
rights" of "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happi­
ness"; and governments "deriving their just powers 
from the consent of the governed" had to bestow 
protection, and to bestow it equally, irrespective of 
race and color, or the "self-evident truths" became 
self-evident mockery. . . Slavery was ethically
repugnant, not simply because it chattelized man, but 
because it repudiated the very purpose of government and 
arbitrarily denied to some humans its protections solely 
on the basis of color (1968, 278).
The most heated debates during the proceedings concerned 
the question of whether or not suffrage constituted a natural 
right which could not be abridged by government (and hence, 
could not be denied to blacks) or a political privilege 
subject to qualifications set by government (Kendrick, 1914; 
Frank and Munro, 1950; James, 1956; Avins, 1967; Kaczorowski, 
1987). Eventually, the Fifteenth Amendment specifically 
extended to black men the right to vote. The actions of 
racist organizations like the Ku Klux Klan motivated Congress 
to pass enabling legislation under the enforcement provisions 
of the Fifteenth Amendment to blunt efforts on the part of 
these groups to prevent blacks from exercising their consti­
tutional rights.8
8The Civil Rights Enforcement Act of 187 0 made it a 
federal crime for private individuals to conspire to injure 
or oppress persons exercising their constitutional rights. 
Because the Ku Klux Klan was a private organization, the Ku
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In 1875, Congress passed what would turn out to be the 
last national civil rights measure enacted until 1957. After 
a long, protracted legislative fight led by Senator Charles 
Sumner of Massachusetts, Congress passed a new law aimed at 
guaranteeing to all citizens irrespective of race "the full 
enjoyment of the accommodations. . . of inns, public convey­
ances on land and water, theatres and other places of public 
amusements" (Kluger, 1975, 50) . In addition, the Civil Rights 
Act of 1875 forbade states to disqualify citizens for jury 
service on the basis of race (Ibid, 50).
Therefore, the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth 
Amendments declared that African Americans were the political 
equals of whites. Many abolitionists saw these developments 
as the completion of the American Revolution (Graham, 1968; 
Kluger, 1975; Baer, 1983; Kaczorowski, 1987). At the time, 
many of the proponents of the civil rights measures of the 
Reconstruction period believed that the passage of these laws 
and constitutional amendments had permenantly settled any 
questions regarding the black man's constitutional status. 
Thus, many Northerners who had sympathized with the black 
man's cause now believed that the freedman had been handed 
all of the rights that it was within government's power to 
bestow.
Klux Klan Act of 1871 made it a federal offense for two or 
more persons to conspire to deprive persons of their equal 
protection and voting rights.
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As subsequent events would prove, this sentiment turned 
out to be tragically flawed. The Civil War had undeniably 
affirmed the permenance of the Union, the illegitimacy of the 
right to secession, and the freedom of the slaves. But the 
congressional debates did not resolve the question of whether 
state citizenship or national citizenship was primary. Many 
Americans who had consented to the expansion of the role of 
the federal government during the war now feared the loss of 
state sovereignty to a growing national behemoth. Moreover, 
the fact that many of the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment 
considered it the constitutional embodiment of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866, rather than simplifying matters, actually 
clouded the picture. This was true because the framers had 
stripped the Civil Rights Bill of the no-discrimination 
clause in order to secure passage. Because of this compro­
mise, it could be argued that while the Civil Rights Act of 
1866 and the Fourteenth Amendment granted blacks equal rights 
under the law, that did not necessarily guarantee them access 
to the same public accommodations and services as whites.9 
Partly for this reason, Sumner lost his fight to have unseg­
9The deletion of the no-discrimination clause of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1866 created considerable problems for 
the NAACP legal team during the Brown cases. The NAACP was 
looking for clear, unambigous evidence that the framers of 
the Civil Rights Act and the Fourteenth Amendment intended to 
outlaw all class discrimi- nation based on race. The striking 
of the no-discrimination clause was seized upon by the 
Southern attorneys general to argue that it could not have 
been the intention of Congress to ban all statutory 
classifications that were race-based.
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regated schools included in the public accommodations section 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1875. Therefore, because of these 
unresolved issues, the Supreme Court played a powerful role 
in interpreting the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Supreme Court's decision in The Slaughterhouse Cases 
(16 Wall. 36 [1873]) reaffirmed the fact that the protection 
of the rights of freed Negroes represented Congress' original 
purpose in crafting the Fourteenth Amendment.10 However, the 
Court's interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment would 
ultimately have the effect of stripping the black race of the 
very constitutional rights that the Amendment's designers had 
explicitly tried to protect. The Court zeroed in on the 
phrase "citizens of the United States" in the amendment. The 
majority concluded that the Fourteenth Amendment only 
prohibited state action abridging the rights of national 
citizenship; however, the "fundamental civil rights for the 
security and establishment of which organized society is 
instituted," the Court declared, "remain. . . under the care 
of state governments" (Ibid, 76) . In other words, the protec­
tions enshrined in the Bill of Rights (such as freedom of
10The Louisiana legislature in 1869 granted one 
corporation a twenty-five year monopoly over the entire 
butchering business in three of the state's parishes. Rival 
slaughterhouses sued, arguing that the Louisiana law deprived 
them of their natural right to practice the profession of 
their choice, creating a condition of slavery in violation of 
the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. By a 5-4 margin, 
the Supreme Court upheld the monopoly, declaring that the 
"pervading purpose" of the Civil Rights Amendments had been 
to protect the rights of blacks, not the rights of butchers 
to practice their profession (16 Wall. 36, 71).
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speech, a free press, the right to petition, right to a fair 
trial, right to sit on juries, etc.) properly, according to 
the Court's majority, resided under the jurisdiction of the 
several states. This view coincided with pre-Civil War 
jurisprudence which saw the national government, not the 
states, as the greatest menace to the protection of indivi­
dual liberties.11 Therefore, the Fourteenth Amendment, as far 
as the Court was concerned, had not fundamentally altered the 
relationship between the federal government and the states.
The ruling created considerable space for subsequent 
state governments to define the rights of citizenship in ways 
which effectively denied equal protection to black Americans. 
Moreover, the Supreme Court afforded blacks no defense from 
acts by private individuals which violated their constitu­
tional rights. With the return of "home rule" in the South, 
blacks experienced a gradual, yet systemmatic assault on the
“Perhaps in part to insulate themselves from the charge 
that they were doing away with the privileges and immunities 
clause, the Court felt compelled to cite some examples of 
rights protected by national citizenship: the right to vote 
in federal elections, the right to go to the seat of 
government and gain access to federal buildings, the right to 
petition the federal government for redress of grievances, 
and the right of access to seaports, the high seas, and 
navigable streams and the like. Kluger (1975) finds such an 
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment incredulous: "Was 
it possible that Congress and the nation had fought a great 
war and undergone agonizing recuperation with force-fed 
medicine to establish such rights as these - rights that were 
implicit in the supremacy clause of the Constitution" (1975, 
58)? Wilkinson adds: "But to the black South Carolina
sharecropper of 1873, bowed by debt and bound to the sod, 
protection when abroad or 'on the high seas' was not exactly 
the most precious gift" (1979, 14-15).
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gains of the Reconstruction period. Furthermore, Northern 
interest in the plight of the former slaves, save for 
phillanthropic organizations, steadily diminished. The 
withdrawal of federal troops from the South following the 
election of 1876 reflected a widespread resignation in the 
North with the "Southern problem." The Negro, in Horatio 
Alger terms, was left to fend for himself (Kluger, 1975, 55; 
Wilkinson, 1979, 20-23; Marable, 1982; Franklin and Moss,
1987; Quarles, 1987).
Considering the political tenor of the times, it is not 
surprising that a "states-rights" theory of jurisprudence 
pervaded Supreme Court decisions which interpreted the rights 
of African Americans under the Civil War Amendments. In a 
number of decisions, the Court rendered narrow interpre­
tations of these amendments that left the power to determine 
what constitutional rights blacks would enjoy in the hands of 
the states.12 Beginning in 1887, Southern states began to
12In United States v. Reese (92 U.S. 214 [1875]), the
Supreme Court declared that the Fifteenth Amendment had not 
conferred upon Negroes (or anyone else) the right to vote; 
suffrage was a right granted by the states. The Court held 
that the right to vote was "not a necessary attribute of 
national citizenship." in a companion case, the Court in 
United States v. Cruikshank (92 U.S. 542 [1875]), a case
involving the indictment of white rioters who broke up a 
black political rally, determined that the Fourteenth 
Amendment only provided protection against discriminatory 
actions on the part of the states; it offered no 
constitutional protection against actions committed by 
individuals that violated the civil rights of blacks. Using 
the same logic, the Court in The Civil Rights Cases (109 U.S. 
3 [1883]) declared the Civil Rights Act of 1875 which banned 
racial discrimination in public accommodations as unconsti- 
tional. Restaurants, inns, theaters, and businesses were
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enact a series of laws requiring the separation of the races 
in virtually every sphere of human activity - from schools, 
to the courts, parks, sidewalks, hotels, residential dis­
tricts, and even cemetaries (Woodward, 1951, 212). New laws 
like the poll tax, the grandfather clause, residency require­
ments, literacy tests, property ownership requirements, 
gerrymandering, intimidation, outright violence, and other 
devises were employed to disenfranchise black voters (Kluger, 
1975, 67-68) .
Thus, the stage was set for Plessv v. Ferouson (163 U.S. 
537 [1896]). Homer Plessy challenged a Louisiana law that
required separate accommodations on railway cars for white 
and black passengers. By an 8-1 margin, the Supreme Court 
upheld the Louisiana statute, concluding that separate 
facilities for the races were permissable under the Four­
teenth Amendment as long as the facilities were equal. It 
could not have been the object of the amendment, the majority 
insisted, "to abolish all distinctions based upon color, or 
to enforce social, as distinguished from political equality, 
or a commingling of the two races upon terms unsatisfactory 
to either" (Ibid, 544). In making their argument, they cited
private entities who could discriminate, and victims of such 
actions could not appeal to the Fourteenth Amendment for 
relief. Yet, not all of the decisions of this period were 
unfavorable to black plaintiffs. See Railroad Company v. 
Brown 84 U.S. 445 (1873), Strauder v. West Virginia 100 U.S. 
303 (1879), Ex-oarte Virginia 100 U.S. 339 (1879), Ex-parte 
Yarbrough 110 U.S. 651 (1883), and United States v. Waddell 
112 U.S. 76 (1884).
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state laws establishing separate public schools for whites 
and blacks under their police powers as examples of legiti­
mate uses of the concept of race to make legal distinctions 
among the citizenry.13 The Court denied the plaintiff's claim 
that enforced separation implied the inferiority of the 
colored race, countering that if blacks saw the statute in 
that fashion "it is not by reason of anything found in the 
act, but solely because the colored race chooses to put that 
construction upon it" (Ibid, 551).
Justice John Marshall Harlan, a former slaveholder, 
penned one of the most quoted dissenting opinions in the 
history of the Court. He charged that the Court's majority 
was simply being dishonest when it denied that the statute 
did not imply the inferiority of the Negro race. Of course, 
white Americans believed that they were superior to blacks, 
Harlan countered; such notions reflected the popular thinking 
of the day (DuBois, 1946; Kluger, 1975; Lofgren, 1987; 
Orfield, 1996). The Constitution, however, denied legitimacy 
to such rationalizations. "Our Constitution is color-blind, 
and neither knows nor tolerates classes among its citizens" 
(163 U.S. 537, 559 [J. Harlan, dissenting]). Plessy. in
Harlan's view, effectively destined African Americans for
13Specifically, the Court referred to Roberts v. City of 
Boston. 5 Cush. 198 (1849) in which the Supreme Judicial 
Court of Massachusetts determined that the general school 
committee of Boston did have power to provide separate 
schools for the instuc-tion of Negro children and to prohibit 
them from attending schools set aside for whites.
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second-class citizenship because it gave states the power to 
use race as a basis for placing blacks "in a condition of 
legal inferiority" with respect to other Americans (Ibid, 
563) .
Three years later, the case of Cummina v. Richmond 
County Board of Education (175 U.S. 528 [1899]) presented the 
Court with an opportunity to clarify the Plessv doctrine. In 
Cumming, the Supreme Court demonstrated that it seemed more 
interested in washing its hands of the problems of African 
Americans than in insuring that its "separate but equal" 
doctrine was actually honored. In response to increased 
demand on the existing school facilities set aside for black 
school children, a Georgia school board solved the problem by 
turning the only black high school into a grade school. Black 
taxpayers petitioned the courts to enjoin the operation of 
any white high school in the county in accordance with Plessv 
until one was provided for black children. True to its 
states-rights philosophy, the Court upheld the school board's 
action, declaring that authority over education rested with 
the states, not the federal government. A strict adherence to 
Plessv would have at least required the school board to 
provide an equal, though separate, high school for blacks. 
Instead, not only did the Court refuse to insist that this be 
done, the school board was not required to provide a high 
school for black students at all. Interestingly, the Supreme 
Court marshalled the example of school segregation to justify
Reproduced  with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
1 0 0
the "separate but equal" doctrine and an education case
served as the first test case for the Plessv regime. As it
turned out, Cummings was a sign of what was to come for
African Americans:
. . .  In time equal became a ghost word, a balm for 
for the nation's conscience, a token of the law's 
hollow symmetry and logic, but quite irrelevant in 
so far as the Negro was concerned. Signs of inequality 
sprouted everywhere. In the park was the separate water 
fountain that happened not to work; at the back of the 
restaurant was the black carry-out line; in the theatre 
was the Jim Crow balcony, unmaintained, because "they'd 
trash it up anyhow." Nor was there a separate-but-equal 
election to which blacks might be consigned when exclu­
ded from the white one (Wilkinson, 1979, 19).
There was no dissenting opinion in Cummings. In fact,
Justice Harlan spoke for a unanimous Court. Kluger (1975)
described this turn of events in the following manner:
By the close of the nineteenth century, then, the 
Supreme Court had nullified nearly every vestige of the 
federal protection that had been cast like a comforting 
cloak over the Negro upon his release from bondage. Even 
his sole demonstrated friend among the Justices was an 
unreliable champion. Once more, the black man seemed to 
have no rights that the white man was bound to honor 
(83) .
Thus, by the turn of the century, the words of the Civil 
War Amendments had, for all intents and purposes, become 
"dead letters" for black Americans. Plessv granted the states 
a "blank check" to apply segregation to every aspect of 
Southern society. As far as Northern public opinion was 
concerned, the Negro was "out of sight and out of mind." 
Thus, it is within this context of indifferent, and often 
violently hostile public sentiment toward African Americans 
that the National Association for the Advancement of Colored
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People (NAACP) emerged. The NAACP and its particular interest 
in equal educational opportunity for blacks, is the subject 
of the next section of this chapter.
The NAACP and the Crusade Against Segregated Education
The NAACP was founded in 1909 by a biracial group of 
Americans alarmed by the deterioration of the political and 
civil rights of blacks. Among their principal concerns were 
the increase in acts of violence - most notably, lynchings 
and race riots - committed by whites against African 
Americans.14 Also, the organization owed its beginnings to 
increasing disenchantment among influential blacks and 
sympathetic whites with strategies for black advancement that 
deemphasized, or ignored, the immediate quest for full 
political and civil equality for African Americans (DuBois, 
1903; Aptheker, 1951; Kellogg, 1967; Ross, 1972; Franklin and 
Moss, 1987; Tushnet, 1987). To achieve their aims, the NAACP 
opted for a strategy of agitation and protest that involved 
lobbying for desired legislation deemed beneficial to blacks, 
publicity campaigns, propoganda designed to counter negative 
public perceptions of blacks, and litigation to secure and 
protect the rights of African Americans.
14The story of the founding of the NAACP has been told so 
often, that it can only receive summary treatment here. Two 
general histories that I recommend are Charles Kellogg's 
NAACP (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1967) and B. Joyce
Ross's J. E. Sprinaarn and the Rise of the NAACP, 1911-1939 
(New York: Atheneum, 1972).
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From the outset, the NAACP chose to remain within the 
ideological orbit of eighteenth century liberal democratic 
traditions. This can be demonstrated in a variety of ways. 
The organization's tactics - lobbying, litigation, holding 
public meetings, and the like - assumed the legitimacy of the 
principles of the Declaration of Independence and the 
Constitution. The NAACP purposely appealed to these great 
documents to make the case for black equality. Moreover, 
their tactics represented a classic case of interest group 
pluralism, a cornerstone principle of democratic political 
theory. The fidelity of prominent blacks within the NAACP 
such as W.E.B. DuBois, James Weldon Johnson, William Pickens, 
and Robert Bagnall to American democracy was further attested 
to by their highly critical posture toward Marcus Garvey's 
"Back to Africa" movement during the 1920's. African Ameri­
cans, they argued, were better served channeling their 
efforts toward obtaining equality in America, rather than 
pursuing the dream of establishing a separate nation in 
Africa (Martin, 1976, 273-333).
Despite the fact that some of the founding leaders of 
the NAACP were economic leftists and/or socialists who advo­
cated the restructuring of the American economy, their 
program emphasized the attainment of full civil and political 
equality for blacks within the existing socioeconomic system. 
White socialists like Mary White Ovington and Charles Edward 
Russell felt that blacks must free themselves from the
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vestiges of chattel slavery before they could engage in any 
struggle for revolutionary change (Ross, 1972, 18-19). In the 
beginning, the founders of the NAACP contemplated linking the 
group to the burgeoning labor movement; however, the idea was 
abandoned for fear that few labor organizations would take up 
the Negro's cause.
Furthermore, the founding of the National Urban League 
in 1910, an organization with the stated goal of promoting 
the economic uplift of blacks, discouraged the development of 
an economic emphasis within the NAACP (Ibid, 19; 144). To be 
sure, in any movement where many organizations have a common 
goal, it is important for individual groups to stake out an 
area of focus as to avoid confusion of purpose, unnecessary 
competition for membership, and duplication of effort. The 
decision to blaze a path that tended to deemphasize economic 
solutions to the plight of African Americans would have 
important implications for the future development of the 
organization.
Further evidence for the NAACP's determination to pursue 
black equality through existing American political institu­
tions is found in its growing faith in the efficacy of 
litigation. This faith emanated, in large measure, from 
a string of highly-publicized legal victories for the 
association.15 These favorable rulings had the effect not
15These included the following: Buchanan v. War lev (245 
U.S. 60 [1917]) declared that municipal ordinances requiring 
residential segregation were unconstitutional. Six years
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only of enhancing the reputation of the association to 
outsiders and attracting new supporters (Tushnet, 1987, 1), 
but internally, it gave the NAACP confidence in its ability 
to mount additional assaults against racially discriminatory 
practices in the courts. The organization's sense that the 
pursuit of legal equality represented its specific area of 
expertise in the overall struggle for black advancement 
profoundly influenced the NAACP's response to criticism of 
its tactics during the 1930's, which will be explored later 
in this chapter. Coupled with the fact that it had rejected 
solutions calling for a fundamental restructuring of the 
capitalist order, many in the NAACP's hierarchy came to 
regard efforts by black insurgents in the 1930's for the 
association to adopt a greater economic emphasis not only as 
threatening, but as heretical.
Moreover, the NAACP, through its publicity, research, 
and propoganda efforts, revealed their commitment to another 
core American virtue: the inherent efficacy of education or 
"enlightenment." These efforts were premised on the assump­
tion that the American race problem was largely - though 
clearly not entirely - attributable to ignorance. Some of the 
NAACP's early leaders believed that by making the public
later, the Supreme Court in Moore v. Dempsey (2 61 U.S. 86 
[1923]) overturned the conviction of an Arkansas black on the 
grounds that the proceedings had occurred in a mob-like 
atmosphere. In Nixon v. Herndon (273 U.S. 536 [1927]) Texas' 
all-white Democratic primary was declared unconstitutional 
because it excluded blacks from participating.
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aware of abuses committed against African Americans while 
simultaneously pointing out the accomplishments of blacks 
that they might be able to improve whites' perceptions of 
Negroes. For example, The Crisis, the organization's monthly 
magazine, devoted a considerable amount of attention to 
celebrating black culture and accomplishments while 
explicitly debunking purportedly "scientific" theories of 
black inferiority. Advertisements from black educational 
institutions of all kinds appeared prominently in the pages 
of The Crisis, no doubt a reflection of how much DuBois 
believed that the black man needed education. Thus, the 
NAACP, by assembling the true facts concerning the Negro's 
condition and presenting them to the public, hoped to appeal 
to the nation's conscience and thereby effect change (Ross, 
1972, 45-46).
Not only did the organization value education in the 
abstract, but the NAACP expressed interest in improving the 
educational opportunities available to blacks from its 
earliest days. Despite the fact that Northern philanthropy 
had helped to raise the general level of education throughout 
the South, blacks increasingly were forced to settle for 
inferior schools. Southern states allocated considerably less 
money for facilities and teacher salaries for black schools 
than their white counterparts. Black students were taught by 
teachers with less training than white teachers; they 
attended shorter school terms, and had fewer course offerings
R eproduced  with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
1 0 6
than similarly situated whites. Similar patterns of 
discrimination existed in higher education (DuBois and Dill, 
1911; Harlan, 1958; Bullock, 1967; Kellogg, 1967; Kujovik, 
1987; Anderson, 1988). Consequently, the NAACP in its early 
years was an advocate of federal aid to education, hoping 
that the infusion of federal dollars would bolster black 
education.16 However, Southern states had established such a 
pattern of systemmatic underfunding and neglect of black 
schools that by the 1920's DuBois reversed his position on 
the subject of federal aid to education; he predicted that 
more aid would simply enable whites to become more effective 
racists (Tushnet, 1987, 6) . With the help of a grant from the 
American Fund for Public Service [also known as the Garland 
Fund],17 The Crisis published a series of articles from
16On this score, they were greatly disappointed. For 
example, the Smith-Lever Act of 1914 provided funds for 
agricultural extension programs. However, the law gave states 
the discretion in deciding which schools received the money; 
not surprisingly, black schools often received little, if 
any, funds for agricultural extension programs. This was the 
flaw of other federal education programs; for example, often 
black land-grant colleges were routinely denied their fair 
share of federal funds that they were entitled to under the 
Second Morrill Act of 189 0 because the states had the right 
to determine the division of the federal funds to the 
appropriate universities (Alexander and Alexander, 1985, 55- 
56; Kujovik, 1987; Christy and Williamson, 1992) .
17The Garland Fund derives its name from Charles Garland, 
a twenty-one year old Harvard undergraduate who inherited a 
fortune upon the death of his father, a Boston millionaire. 
Believing it wrong to claim a fortune he had done nothing to 
create, Garland gave some $800,000 to establish a fund to 
support liberal and radical causes. Roger Baldwin, director 
of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), became the 
fund's chief administrator. Among the organizations assisted 
during the nineteen year existence of the Garland Fund were
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September 19 26 to July 1928 that documented the disparities 
between black and white education in the South.18
Equal educational opportunity for blacks, thus, figured 
prominently among the goals of the association from its very 
beginning. This concern, combined with the NAACP's increased 
confidence both in litigation as an instrument to effect 
change and in its own capacity to successfully challenge 
racial discrimination set the stage for the organization's 
leaders to pursue a long-term strategy to confront Jim Crow 
segregation in the public schools. They also sensed an 
opportunity to gain a more substantial grant from the Garland 
Fund to support their efforts.
By this time, an interlocking relationship had emerged 
between the Garland Fund and the NAACP. James Weldon Johnson, 
general secretary of the NAACP, also sat on the board of 
directors that administered the fund, as did Morris Ernst, a 
member of the NAACP's Legal Committee. In 1929, Johnson and 
Ernst along with Lewis Gannett, a literary critic active with
the United Mine Workers of America, the Rand School of Social 
Science, the League for Industrial Democracy, the magazine 
The New Masses, the American Birth Control League, the Sacco- 
Vanzetti Defense League, Vanguard Press, the Brotherhood of 
Sleeping Car Porters, and the NAACP (Kluger, 1975, 132;
Tushnet, 1987, 2-20).
18The data revealed that South Carolina spent ten times 
more on the education of every white child as it did for 
every black child. No other Southern state approached the 
inbalance between black and white education that existed in 
South Carolina. Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, and Alabama 
spent five times as much on whites as it did on blacks; in 
North Carolina, Maryland, Virginia, Texas, and Oklahoma, the 
ratio was two to one (Kluger, 1975, 134).
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the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) formed the fund's 
Committee on Negro Work. Beginning in August, 1929 through 
May, 1930, the committee, in collaboration with the NAACP, 
drafted a proposal to give the NAACP a sizable grant from the 
Garland Fund (Kluger, 1975, 132; Tushnet, 1987, 6-7).
Noting that blacks were the largest group of unorganized 
workers in America, the proposal called for the Garland Fund 
to finance a massive legal campaign aimed not only at giving 
Southern blacks their constitutional rights but a "self- 
consciousness and self-respect which would inevitably tend to 
effect a revolution in the economic life of the country" 
(Kluger, 1975, 132). Included in the request was a memoranda 
of proposed legal strategy, particularly in the education 
arena. Taxpayers' suits were urged to assure equal as well as 
separate schools in the seven states that most blatantly 
discriminated against blacks - Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, 
Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina. The 
NAACP anticipated that the suits would make the costs of 
maintaining dual school systems so prohibitive that it would 
force Southern states to integrate their public schools 
(Ibid, 132).
This strategy was significantly modified when Nathan 
Margold, a legal consultant hired by the NAACP, weighed in on 
their deliberations. Because there were thousands of school 
districts in the South, the NAACP's original proposal would 
have required them to engage in an infinite number of suits
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that would have to be waged to equalize black schools. Such 
an approach, he argued, not only would be a waste of their 
material resources, but it offered no assurance that a legal 
victory in one district would have any governing effect in 
another. Instead, Margold noted that Plessv had endorsed 
racial segregation so long as facilities were equal. But what 
if facilities not only were unequal, but they were habitually 
operated in such a manner as to maintain racial inequality? 
Margold suggested that the NAACP should start by attacking 
the "equal" portion of the Plessv doctrine. Based on what the 
NAACP's investigations of Southern education had uncovered, 
he argued that it could be readily shown that neither the 
spirit nor the letter of the "separate but equal" doctrine 
actually existed for black people in the South (Ibid, 133-
135). The NAACP's early victories in University of Maryland 
v. Murray (169 Md. 478 [1936]) and Missouri ex. rel. Gaines 
v. Canada (305 U.S. 337 [1938]) reflected Margold's influence 
on their tactics.19
19The Murray and Gaines cases were very similar. Neither 
Maryland nor Missouri provided graduate or professional 
education of any kind to black students within the state. 
Both states, however, operated scholarship programs for 
qualified blacks to pursue postbaccalaureate studies out-of- 
state. The Maryland Supreme Court declared that the out-of- 
state tuition program to be unconstitutional. Two years 
later, the U.S. Supreme Court concurred, finding the program 
in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and did not meet its 
burden under Plessv to provide separate and equal education. 
Moreover, the Court wrote that "the provision for payment of 
tuition in another state did not remove the discrimination" 
because whites were not subject to the same treatment by the 
law. The Gaines ruling did not inspire repentence on the part 
of the South; on the contrary, other Southern states soon
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In summary, the NAACP's long-standing interest in 
eliminating segregated education and its faith in the 
legalistic approach came together in the school desegregation 
movement. Education, however, was only one component of a 
broad-based legal strategy to achieve political and civil, 
equality for blacks. The association did not stop pursuing 
legal equality for blacks on other fronts once the decision 
to attack segregated education was made.20 Therefore, the 
NAACP adapted the philosophy of classical liberalism in 
service to the goal of attaining equal opportunity under the 
law for black Americans.
The NAACP's proposed strategy, however, was not greeted 
with unanimous support. Moreover, the stock market crash of 
1929 and subsequent Great Depression presented the NAACP with 
the greatest challenge to its core convictions to date. The 
economic crisis touched off an intense debate, both inside 
and outside the NAACP, over the relevancy of the associa­
adopted their own unconstitutional versions of the Missouri 
out-of-state tuition program for blacks (Friedman, 1969, 523; 
Kluger, 1975, 187-194; Dorsey, 1981; Miller, 1982).
20The following cases are examples of legal victories for 
the NAACP on issues other than education: Hale v. Kentucky. 
(303 U.S. 613 [1938]) [right to a fair criminal trial where 
blacks have been habitually barred from juries]; Lane v. 
Wilson, (307 U.S. 268 [1939]) [racially discriminatory laws
denying blacks the right to vote]; Smith v. Alwriaht. 321 
U.S. 649 (1944) [white primary]; Morgan v. Virginia. 328 U.S. 
373 [laws requiring segregation of interstate passengers]; 
Henderson v. United States. 339 U.S. 816 (1950) [segregation 
in carrier regulation]; and Shelley v. Kraemer. 334 U.S. 1 
(1948) [racially restrictive covenants].
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tion's focus on legal equality for blacks. This exchange is 
the focus of the next, section.
The Triumph of Legalism
Not everyone within the Garland Fund's hierarchy was 
enthusiastic about the NAACP's strategy. Indeed, Baldwin - 
the one with the most hands-on experience with the legal 
approach - was perhaps the most skeptical. He believed that 
the legalistic approach was doomed to fail because "the 
forces that keep the Negro under subjection will find some 
way of accomplishing their purposes, law or no law" (Kluger, 
1975, 132). Drawing from his personal background of defending 
the rights of antiwar activists and conscientious objectors 
during World War I, Baldwin held that the law was to be used 
only as an instrument to a broader goal (and then defen­
sively) , not as an end in and of itself. Baldwin considered 
the black man's plight a subset of the struggles of working 
class people in America; the solution to the problem required 
the restructuring of the American economy, rather than simply 
guaranteeing legal rights. He felt the NAACP should devote 
its time toward effecting the unionization of black and white 
workers "against their common [capitalist] exploiters" 
(Kluger, 1975, 133).
Baldwin's views were not uncommon among those on the 
left during the 1920's and 1930's. More importantly, other 
members of the Garland Fund's Board of Directors shared his 
sentiments. The committee's initial proposal passed (though 
the vote was close) and $100,000 was approved for the NAACP's
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strategy.21 Nevertheless, this tension remained, and would 
serve as a chronic source of conflict between the fund and 
the NAACP. Many of the fund's directors were more interested 
in the unionization of workers, and did not readily see how 
the NAACP's focus on litigation served that end.
By contrast, the NAACP's draft proposal emphasized that 
voting rights, equal rights in schools, on juries, and in 
public accommodations must precede unionization and "real 
economic independence" for Negroes (Tushnet, 1987, 7). Their 
approach was in line with the NAACP's traditional stance that 
put civil and political equality for blacks over strategies 
for economic uplift of African Americans. When pressed to 
defend the relevancy of the proposed campaign, NAACP leaders 
insisted on the "obvious link" between what it saw as the 
attainment of civil and political equality for blacks and the 
fund's concern for the labor movement. Nevertheless, some of 
the fund's directors remained unconvinced. In fact, on more 
than one occasion, some of the members of the board attempted 
to divert funds from the NAACP to the American Negro Labor 
Congress and the International Labor Defense (ILD), organi­
zations that were more left-wing than the NAACP. Garland
21The NAACP received only slightly more than $20,000 of 
the original $100,000 that was promised. A number of factors 
contributed to this: in the first place, the stock market
disaster seriously depleted the capital the fund had at its 
disposal. Secondly, the Garland Fund's ideological 
commitments led them to support marginal political groups who 
had difficulty repaying their loans. Finally, there existed 
underlying tension between the fund and the NAACP over how 
the funds should be used (Tushnet, 1987 1-20).
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himself reportedly lamented the fund's decision to fund the 
NAACP's litigation drive because he felt the organization was 
not radical enough (Ibid, 14) .
The NAACP's tactics elicited criticism from prominent 
leftist intellectuals outside the Garland Fund, such as 
Ralph Bunche, a political scientist at Howard University. He 
scorned the legal approach, arguing that its proponents 
failed to appreciate that the law was merely an instrument of 
the capitalist class to exploit the working classes (Bunche, 
1935, 315). The NAACP, according to Bunche, had "conducted a 
militant fight under this illusory banner" (Ibid, 315). They 
had placed too much faith in the Constitution (and in 
particular, the Civil War Amendments), divorcing it from the 
real political and economic realities of life in America for 
African Americans. "This view," he continued, "ignores the 
quite significant fact that the Constitution. . . cannot be
anything more than what the controlling elements of American 
society want it to be" (Ibid) .
Furthermore, as the Depression deepened, pressure 
mounted, both within and without the NAACP, for the associa­
tion to rethink its traditional program of fighting for legal 
equality for blacks in favor of a greater emphasis on class- 
based approaches to addressing the problems faced by African 
Americans.22 The organization's critics failed to see the
22Blacks, an economically subordinate class even in boom 
times, were especially devastated by the Depression. By 1934, 
nearly 40 percent of working-age blacks were categorized as
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wisdom or the relevancy of an ambitious legal strategy in the 
midst of an unprecedented economic crisis (Ross, 1972, 144- 
185; Tushnet, 1987, 8). They reminded the NAACP that their
rather impressive legal victories had yet to translate into 
a fundamental transformation in the everyday lives of 
ordinary black Americans. Residential segregation reigned 
both in law and custom despite Buchanan; the state of Texas 
circumvented the Supreme Court's decision on white primaries 
by declaring the Democratic Party a private organization with 
the right to discriminate. Discrimination, they concluded, 
had continued despite favorable court decisions, either by 
nonenforcement, outright defiance, or ingenious circumvention 
of the law. Why should this campaign be any different?
W. T. B. Williams, in making the case that the courts 
were a "doubtful remedy," recalled the example of The 
Cherokee Nation v. The State of Georgia (5 Pet. 1 [1831]) 
where Chief Justice John Marshall's Supreme Court denied that 
Georgia had the right to forcibly remove the Cherokee Indians 
from the lands they occupied. Drawing an analogy to those who 
would likely oppose favorable court decisions on behalf of 
blacks, Williams writes, "They [opponents of black rights]
incapable of self-support. By 1935, some 65 percent of 
employable African Americans in Atlanta were in need of 
public assis-tance; the comparable figure in Norfolk was 
higher (Kluger, 1975, 140) .
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can easily say with President [Andrew] Jackson. . . 'Marshall 
has made this decision, now let him enforce it'" (1935, 439- 
440) .
Finally, even if one assumed that Southerners would 
honor judicial judgements that - for example, required them 
to equalize funding between black and white schools - where 
would the money come from? A proposal to extract increased 
appropriations for black schools in the poverty-striken South 
of the 1930's looked like a classic case of the proverbial 
attempt to "squeeze blood out of a turnip" (Kluger, 1975,
136) . Thus, the NAACP's strategy was criticized not only 
because of doubts about its relevancy to the times and its 
attention to economic issues, but also the efficacy of 
litigation itself was called into question.
To be sure, though the NAACP had consciously decided in 
its early years to relinquish the role of securing the 
economic advancement of American blacks to the National Urban 
League, it had not been able to avoid economic concerns 
altogether. Rather, its concern for the legal equality of 
blacks necessarily engaged them in skirmishes to insure equal 
economic opportunities for African Americans. As more blacks 
migrated to the cities from the rural South and encountered 
racial discrimination in areas such as housing and hiring, 
the NAACP made forays into the economic sphere. For example, 
it had sought admission of black workers into the American 
Federation of Labor (AFL), though with no success; the
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association had assisted in the unionization of black 
railroad workers, and fought against racial discrimination in 
wages and hiring under the New Deal programs (Ross, 1972, 
160). Thus, it simply was not true, as its critics charged, 
that the NAACP did not have an economic program. However, 
considering the way that the NAACP's critics defined the 
issues, it simply was not possible to accommodate those 
pushing for a heavier economic emphasis in the association's 
basic program without a fundamental restructuring of the 
mission, internal organization, and practices of the NAACP.
This, however, turned out to be precisely what the NAACP 
was not willing to do. During the 1930's, its board of direc­
tors continued to be dominated by those who believed that the 
association's historic role - the attainment of full civil 
and political equality for blacks - must take precedence over 
any program of economic uplift. Once equality under the law 
had been secured, blacks would be able to move into the main­
stream of American society. They continued to oppose the 
suggestion that a fundamental restructuring of the economy 
was a prerequisite for black liberation. Save for racial 
segregation, the NAACP's ideology affirmed the moral goodness 
of American capitalist and democratic institutions. This view 
was shared by both black and white board members. In fact, 
prominent blacks within the upper echelon of the NAACP, such 
as Walter White, Roy Wilkins, and Louis T. Wright proved to
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be just as committed to the NAACP's traditional mission as 
their older, white colleagues (Ibid, 172).
Its leaders and supporters defended their legalistic 
approach more broadly, and their choice to focus on 
segregated education specifically. For example, though they 
had not succeeded in securing a long-standing goal - a 
federal anti-lynching law - the association attributed the 
statistical decline in lynchings over the previous two 
decades to their efforts (Ibid, 157-158). Moreover, those who 
criticized the NAACP's legal program had the burden of 
demonstrating how this could be done - up to that time, the 
NAACP's efforts, as well as those of other groups, had proved 
largely unsuccessful in achieving this goal. Many of the 
NAACP/s leaders foresaw no change in this situation in the 
immediate future; therefore, they reasoned that a full-scale 
legal attack on segregated education promised more immediate 
results. Furthermore, many of the critics on the left failed 
to provide practical tactics or could not agree on the right 
approach to restructure the economy. As a result, many of the 
NAACP's leaders dismissed them as impractical. For example, 
Bunche (1935) severely criticized the NAACP's methodology 
while offering no solutions of his own. His logic implied 
that black liberation could not occur within the context of 
American capitalism, but he neglected to include any guidance 
for how blacks might construct a political and economic 
system more favorable to their interests. In addition, by
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attacking inequalities such as huge disparities in the pay of 
white and black teachers, the NAACP felt it could secure 
tangible economic benefits for black communities (like higher 
salaries) now in lieu of their larger goals. For them, this 
approach seemed more practical and natural, given the NAACP's 
roots, than venturing into the untried, untested waters of 
economic theories.
Charles Thompson, commenting on the litigation campaign 
against segregated schools, called the courts "the only 
reasonable alternative to remedy immediate abuses of the 
Negro separate school" (1935, 419-434). In response to fears 
of state defiance and circumvention of the law, he wrote, 
"The history of litigation in this country reveals only rare 
instances where the decisions of our higher courts are 
flouted to the extent of a direct refusal to act in accord 
with them" (Ibid, 425). He also hinted that litigation may 
actually improve the condition of public schools for blacks 
by drawing attention to the gross inequities perpetuated 
routinely by white school officials. Alain Locke (1935) 
doubted that if integrated education was firmly established 
as official policy that "few [white] parents would exercise 
their right to send their children to separate private 
schools and forego the advantages of public education on this 
account" (411). He hoped that mutual association of the races
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in public schools would provide the means for eradicating the 
most harmful stereotypes that whites harbored about blacks 
(Ibid, 411).
Intertwined with the debate raging between the legalists 
and the economic determinists was a controversy precipitated 
by an editorial submitted by DuBois in the January, 1934 
issue of The Crisis entitled, "Segregation." He declared that
. opposition to segregation is an opposition to dis­
crimination. . . But the two things do not necessarily go
together, and there should never be an opposition to segre­
gation pure and simple unless segregation does involve 
discrimination" (20). By this time, DuBois had began to lose 
hope in the realization of black incorporation into American 
capitalist democracy; his sympathies were shifting toward 
labor and the Communists and he thought blacks needed to move 
leftward also (DuBois, 1968, 289-307). His editorial ques­
tioned the validity of the stance that racial segregation in 
any form should be met with unmitigated opposition. Though 
recognizing that many of the association's leaders considered 
racial segregation inherently evil, DuBois exploited the fact 
that the NAACP had never formally rendered an overall policy 
statement to that effect. He urged the NAACP to analytically 
distinguish between segregation and discrimination.
In light of white antipathy toward the black man, DuBois 
reasoned that African Americans must work in the meantime to 
make their own institutions the best they could be. A policy
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of unqualified opposition to segregation, he maintained, 
implied that black institutions - whether they be schools, 
churches, fraternal associations, businesses, etc. - were 
inherently inferior because they were black. DuBois attempted 
to remind the association of examples from its history where, 
in his view, the NAACP had made practical concessions to the 
reality of segregation.23 Consequently, he concluded that an 
acknowledgement of a distinction between segregation and 
discrimination would not be inconsistent with the historical 
activities of the association.
DuBois' position placed him at odds with the prevailing 
philosophy of the association's leaders. They objected to his 
interpretation of the NAACP's mission and historical stance. 
J. E. Springarn, the last white chairman of the board 
quipped: "But we [the NAACP] were always against segregation, 
we always regarded it as evil, if sometimes as a necessary 
evil" (1934, 79). The fact that the organization had made
23 I will mention a few examples. He argued that though 
the Association had opposed the extension of segregation in 
public education, it had never undertaken to attack the 
separate schools where black children were already being 
educated. Secondly, once the United States entered World War 
I, the NAACP supported a Negro officers' training camp and 
otherwise encouraged black enlistment in the armed forces 
despite the fact that blacks would be relegated to segregated 
units. Thirdly, though the NAACP had originally opposed the 
establishment of a Negro hospital at Tuskegee, once it was 
established, it fought to provide for that hospital the 
widest opportunity. Finally, he pointed out that the 
association had never explicitly denied the necessity of 
black organizations for self-help and defense, though it had 
recognized them as a necessary evil that reminded them of the 
very color line of which they were struggling to overcome 
(DuBois, 1934, 52-53).
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practical concessions to segregation on occasion, Springarn 
replied, should not be construed as a generalization about 
the overall mission of the NAACP. David H. Pierce feared that 
any concession to segregation was tantamount to compromise 
with prejudice and, if continued, with slavery. DuBois' views 
could be used, he concluded, to provide aid and comfort to a 
"policy of extreme reaction" (80). Walter White expressed a 
similar sentiment:
To accept the status of separateness, which almost 
invariably in the case of sub-merged, exploited, and 
marginal groups means inferior accomodations and a 
distinctly inferior position in the national and 
communal life, means spiritual atrophy for the group 
segregated. . . Arbitrary segregation of this sort 
means almost without exception that less money will be 
expended for adequate sewerage, water, police and fire 
protection and for the building of a healthy community 
(80-81).
Because unequal treatment always followed segregation, White 
argued, the NAACP had always stubbornly resisted segregation 
in municipal ordinances, racially restrictive covenants, 
hospital services and "wherever it "shows its head" (81) . 
Thus, targeting segregation in schools did not depart from 
the association's traditions.
DuBois' position did not prevail. The Board passed a 
resolution in April, 1934 which read:
The National Association for the Advancement of 
Colored People is opposed both to the principle and 
the practice and the practice of enforced segregation 
of human beings on the basis of race and color.
Enforced segregation by its very existence carries 
with it the implication of a superior and inferior 
group and invariably results in the imposition of a 
lower status on the group deemed inferior. Thus both
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principle and practice necessitate unyielding oppo­
sition to any and every form of enforced segregation.
(149).
DuBois remained unsatisfied. What about black churches? 
How about black colleges? Did the NAACP believe in Negro 
newspapers and Negro businesses? Did it believe in Negro 
spirituals (149)? DuBois resented the implication that all­
black institutions, made necessary by the reality of white 
exclusion, were nothing more than inferior imitations of 
white institutions. In summary, he complained that the NAACP 
resolution was merely an abstract declaration of principle 
which did not wrestle with the hard issues. The rupture 
between DuBois and the association could not be bridged; in 
May, 1934 he resigned every post he held within the NAACP. 
Nevertheless, he continued his crusade, urging blacks to 
build their own institutions. Directly challenging the 
premise of the NAACP's campaign against segregated education, 
DuBois asked:
Does the Negro need separate schools? God knows 
he does. But what he needs more than separate schools 
is a firm and unshakable belief that twelve million 
Negroes have the inborn capacity to accomplish just 
as much as any nation of twelve million anywhere in the 
world ever accomplished, and this is not because 
they are Negroes but because they are human (1935,
333) .
DuBois' ideological opponents continued to press their 
case. Thompson (193 5) countered, "I think most of us would 
agree that to segregate is to stigmatize, however much we may 
try to rationalize it" (433) . Segregation was always precipi­
tated by the actions of whites; thus, he reasoned that if
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blacks acquiesce or rationalize the practice "they do some­
thing to their personalities which is infinitely worse than 
any of the discomforts some of them may experience in a mixed 
school" (433). Long (1935) wondered if segregation caused 
irreparable personality damage to black children. Both 
authors anticipated the psychological theories of Kenneth 
Clark which would be utilized by NAACP attorneys in the Brown 
cases.
Therefore, in the midst of the crisis of the 1930's, the 
NAACP hardened its belief in its historical convictions. 
Drawing on classical liberal sources, the NAACP envisioned a 
society whereby race could not be used for any reason to deny 
black Americans the full benefits of American citizenship. 
This view refused to entertain a distinction between volun­
tary segregation and compulsory segregation; instead, the 
NAACP regarded racial separation as it was then practiced as 
inherently evil and always harmful to the black race. 
Secondly, the association reaffirmed its commitment to the 
tactics of litigation and other forms of agitation within the 
confines of existing American institutions as the most 
reasonable method of attacking racial injustice. It rejected 
theories which suggested that the American economy needed to 
be radically restructured before black Americans could enjoy 
their full rights as citizens. Rather, the NAACP believed 
that once equal opportunity was guaranteed under the law, 
blacks would have equal footing with all other Americans in
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the Lockean race. Thus, legalism had triumphed. The prevai­
ling vision of the NAACP's leadership which consolidated 
itself as a result of the controversies of the 193 0 's not 
only profoundly shaped the association for decades to come, 
but it significantly influenced the course that the school 
desegregation campaign would take. The legacy of the contro­
versies of the 1930's constitute the subject of the final, 
upcoming section of this chapter.
The Legacy of the Thirties
To paraphrase Louis Hartz, once the question of "first 
principles" for the NAACP was settled, all subsequent issues 
became "matters of technique" (1955, 10) . The ideological
framework in which the litigation strategy against segregated 
education evolved was firmly established in the 1930's. The 
controversies both within the ranks of the NAACP and from 
outsiders served to harden the organization's commitment to 
its traditional program: (1) the pursuit of civil and
political equality of blacks took precedence over promoting 
the economic concerns of African Americans, and (2) racial 
segregation in any form constituted an inherent evil which 
must be categorically opposed. Therefore, the strategy 
ultimately decided upon reflected the conscious choice of the 
NAACP in the face of counterarguments that other ways of 
expending its resources might prove more fruitful (Tushnet, 
1987, 8).
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The NAACP's ideological framework shaped the subsequent 
course that the campaign took in a number of important ways. 
For example, since the NAACP equated segregation with 
discrimination, the organization in the end chose to attack 
the constitutionality of Plessv itself; no other alternative 
was possible without the NAACP breaking with, or altering its 
principles. As segregative practices designed to make black 
education more "equal" while preserving separation of the 
races were being struck down one by one, the issue proved to 
be unavoidable.24 Despite the fact that many Southern states 
were scrambling to improve previously neglected black schools 
in response to the barrage of legal attacks,25 settling for
MIn Gaines ex. rel. Missouri v. Canada (305 U.S. 337 
[1938]), the NAACP challenged the unequal application of 
Plessy without attacking the constitutionality of the 
separate but equal doctrine itself. By contrast, the graduate 
and professional education cases of the late 1940's and early 
1950's attacked the constitutionality of Plessv itself. Yet, 
the NAACP, while arguing that blacks be admitted into white 
institutions still had a fallback position: insisting that 
blacks be provided equal facilities of their own. See Sipuel 
v. Board of Regents. 332 U.S. 631 (1948); Sweatt v. Painterr 
339 U.S. 629 (1950); and McLaurin v. Oklahoma Board of
Regents. 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
25The 1940's was characterized by furious activity on the 
part of Southern state legislatures to upgrade black schools 
in the hope of discouraging integration. For example, when a 
black student applied for admission to LSU Law School in 
1946, the LSU Board of Supervisors and the State Board of 
Education moved quickly to establish a law school at 
historically black Southern University (Vincent, 1981, 166). 
The creation of Southern Law School, however, did not stop 
blacks from attempting to enter LSU's law school on an equal 
basis (Wilson v. Louisiana State University Board of Super­
visors . (92 F. Supp. 986 [1950]). Similar law suits were
filed in other parts of the country. See Johnson v. Board of 
Trustees 83 F. Supp. 707 (E.D. Ky. [1949]) State ex. rel.
Toliver v. Board of Education. (230 S.W. 2d 724 Mo. [1950]),
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the equalization of schools under Plessv ran counter to the
NAACP's vision that segregation itself was the evil that had
to be eradicated.. The Supreme Court vindicated the NAACP's
position in Sweatt v. Painter (339 U.S. 629 [1950]) when it
determined that Texas' frantic efforts to enhance black
education under the "separate but equal" doctrine did not
negate their constitutional duty to admit Herman Sweatt to
the University of Texas Law School on an equal basis.
Creating a separate black law school, in the Court's view,
failed to satisfy the state's constitutional mandate to
provide equal protection for black citizens because
The University of Texas Law School possesses to a far 
greater degree those qualities which are incapable of 
objective measurement but which make for greatness in a 
law school. Such qualities, to name but a few, include 
reputation of the faculty, experience of the admini­
stration, position and influence of the alumni, standing 
in the community, traditions and prestige (Ibid, 634).
Parker v. University of Delaware. (75 a. 2d 225 Del. [1950]), 
McKissick v. Carmichael. (187 F. 2d 949 [4th Cir. 1951]), 
cert, denied, 341 U.S. 951 (1951), Gebhart v. Belton. (91 A. 
2d 137 Del. [1952]) and Tureaud v. Board of Supervisors (116 
F. Supp. 248 [E.D. La. 1953]). This pattern of upgrading
black education as opposed to integration prevailed 
throughout the South. States, for example, adopted their own 
versions of out-of-state tuition plans (in defiance of the 
ruling in Gaines) rather than provide graduate education for 
blacks within their borders. Clarendon County, South 
Carolina, one of the Brown defendants, accepted a bid in 1951 
for a new $261,000 high school for blacks and had plans for 
two new grade schools for colored children on the drawing 
boards. Governor James Byrnes, who had successfully pushed a 
school equalization bond issue through the legislature, 
warned that if the federal courts ordered integration, he 
would order the public schools closed and converted to a 
private system (Kluger, 1975, 523, 531-532).
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Conversely, creating a new black school, even if the 
state of Texas provided it with state-of-the art facilities 
and equipment, did not meet the standards of equal protection 
because of these "intangible benefits" that the Court in 
Sweatt decision recognized. In other words, it was impossible 
for Sweatt to receive an equal legal education at an all­
black law school within the meaning of the Equal Protection 
Clause. While the Court's reasoning did not overturn Plessv 
outright, it seemed to indicate that the time had come to 
challenge directly the constitutionality of segregation 
itself. The Court's rationale that providing separate law 
schools for blacks denied them certain intangible benefits 
that would be theirs in an integrated setting lay at the 
heart of the NAACP's case in Brown. The NAACP applied the 
principle announced in Sweatt to elementary and secondary 
education.
Plessv had explicitly denied that statutory segregation 
imposed a badge of inferiority upon the segregated group, in 
blatant contradiction to the facts of how "separate but 
equal" was practiced. The reality of how Plessv was applied 
seemed to strengthen the determination of black lawyers to 
overturn the legality of segregation itself. Had the NAACP 
lawyers not believed so strongly that state-imposed segre­
gation created a sense of inferiority among African Americans 
(as well as a sense of superiority among whites), it is not 
likely they would have relied as heavily as they did on
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Kenneth Clark's famous doll tests which alleged that school 
segregation psychologically damaged black children.
These "facts of life" made DuBois' suggestion that all 
segregation may not in fact be harmful (but may in fact be 
necessary for survival) seem, to many leading black thinkers, 
impractical at best and racial treason at worst. During the 
heat of the controversy that DuBois' position had generated, 
Francis J. Grimke, a prominent black minister, sighed:
Why Dr. DuBois has reopened the question of segre­
gation in THE CRISIS I am at a loss to know. Can it 
be possible that in the remotest part of his brain 
he is beginning to think, after all, that it is a 
condition that ought to be accepted, a condition that 
we ought to stop fussing about? If so, then his 
leadership among us is at an end; we can follow no 
such leader (1934, 173) .
Grimke's remarks implied that the issue raised by DuBois 
did not need to be debated: the issue was settled. How could 
any self-respecting, thinking black American consider such a 
thought?
Thus, the NAACP's view that racial segregation was an 
inherent evil most clearly manifested itself in its legal 
arguments before the Supreme Court during the Brown cases.26 
They insisted that segregation in education was wrong because
26In Brown. the Supreme Court reviewed five school dese­
gregation cases originating in Kansas, South Carolina, 
Virginia, Delaware, and the District of Columbia. These cases 
were Brown v. Board of Education 98 F. Supp. 797 (D.Kan. 
[1951]), Briggs v. Elliot. 98 F. Supp. 529 (E.D. S.C.
[1951]), Davis v. County School Board of Prince Edward 
County. 103 F. Supp. 337 (E.D. Va. [1952]), Belton v.
Gebhart, 91 A.2d 137 (S. Ct. Del. [1952]), and Bolling v. 
Sharpe (344 U.S. 873 [1952]).
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the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment clearly intended to 
forbid the states from passing laws which applied to one race 
that did not apply likewise to another. The existence of 
school segregation in many states during the 1860's was not 
relevant; congressional and judicial authority under the 
Fourteenth Amendment was broad enough to outlaw the practice. 
Indeed, the NAACP exploited the fact that some of the 
congressional opponents of the civil rights measures cited 
school segregation as one of the areas the federal government 
should not be able to interfere with. These references, the 
NAACP's attorneys reasoned, proved that Congress understood 
the amendment as nullifying the existing Black Codes in the 
states and forbidding the enacting of race-based statutory 
distinctions in the future. Moreover, the NAACP maintained 
that whether or not separate facilities were equal or not was 
beside the point; the very act of segregation in and of 
itself denied blacks equal educational opportunities in vio­
lation of the Fourteenth Amendment (Friedman, 1969, 12) . It 
was here where the social science evidence became crucial to 
the NAACP's case.27 The NAACP's attorneys quoted a chorus
^Not coincidentally, the district court in Brown v. 
Board of Education (98 F. Supp. 797 [D.Kan. , 1951]) found the 
separate facilities provided for the races to be comparable. 
Nevertheless, the district court upheld the Kansas statute, 
declaring that as long as Plessv was the law of the land, the 
state was permitted to maintain segregated schools. The 
ruling, however, served the NAACP's purposes for two reasons. 
First, the district court acknow-ledged that the facilities 
were equal; thus, the Supreme Court would have to determine 
the constitutionality of segregation itself. Unlike previous 
cases, it could not require the defendants to address clear
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line of eminent social scientists who held that the very act 
of segregating black children from whites of similar age 
caused personality damage in black children, irrespective of 
whether or not the facilities were equal (Deutscher and 
Chein, 1948; Kurland and Casper, 1975). Thus, the NAACP 
concluded that Plessy stood in opposition to both the letter 
and the spirit of the Fourteenth Amendment (Friedman, 1969, 
180-206).
However, their interpretation of the framers' motives 
required them to skirt the significance of persistent racial 
discrimination in education in the states despite the 
amendment's passage. Public education during the 1860's was
inequalities within the school system rather than reexamining 
the separate but equal doctrine itself. Second, the district 
court, in Item VIII of its findings of fact, explicitly 
acknowledged the plaintiffs' claim that segregation damaged 
the personalities of black children:
Segregation of white and colored children in public 
schools has a detrimental effect upon the colored 
children. The impact is greater when it has the sanction 
of law; for the policy of separating the races is 
usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the 
negro group. A sense of inferiority affects the 
motivation of a child to learn. Segregation with the 
sanction of law, therefore, has a tendency to restrain 
the educational and mental development of negro children 
and to deprive them of some of the benefits they would 
receive in a racial integrated school system (Friedman, 
1969, 542; Kluger, 1975, 424).
This finding was quoted verbatim by the Supreme Court in 
Brown and formed the heart of the Court's decision. "Whatever 
may have been the state of psychological knowledge at the 
time of Plessv v. Ferguson, this finding is amply supported 
by modern authority. Any language in Plessv v. Ferguson 
contrary to this finding is rejected" (347 U.S. 494 [1954]).
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still in an embryonic stage; and in the South, it had been 
stubbornly resisted (Genovese, 1967; Kluger, 1975; Anderson, 
1988). Though there existed a long standing tradition of 
black agitation against compulsory racial segregation in 
public education dating to the antebellum period (Peterson, 
1935; Grant, 1968; Kluger, 1975; Dorsey, 1981; Vincent, 
1981) , the provision of any education for blacks - in the 
minds of those sympathetic to the ex-slaves and to many 
blacks themselves - was viewed as a sign of progress (Kluger, 
1975, 633) . Confronted with the problem of massive illiteracy 
among the ex-slaves, many blacks and liberal whites cared 
less about whether blacks received education on an integrated 
basis as much as whether they receive schooling at all. As a 
result, when Senator Sumner lost his fight to have the right 
to desegregated schools included in the public accommodations 
section of the Civil Rights Act of 1875, many observers did 
not think it was an important issue (Ibid, 50). In light of 
these facts, it was not surprising that Southern attorneys 
maintained that the existence of school segregation in the 
1860's (particularly in Northern and Western states), meant 
that Congress had never intended for school segregation to 
fall within the purview of the Fourteenth Amendment.28
28They cited the following examples as proof that 
Congress never intended to deny states the right to schools 
segregated by race: (1) the segregation of schools within the 
District of Columbia, (2) the establishment of all-black 
schools by the Freedman's Bureau, (3) federal enactments 
granting land allotments for the establishment of all-black 
schools, (4) the striking of a provision to the Civil Rights
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Southern attorneys recounted a vast array of historical 
evidence of school segregation during the period in question 
while conveniently ignoring the fact that the Supreme Court 
had on numerous occasions applied the Fourteenth Amendment to 
areas that the framers had clearly not contemplated.29 There­
fore, the crux of the South's argument rested on the premise 
that the Court must be bound not only by the prejudices of 
the present, but by the prejudices of the past.
The Supreme Court's decision was exactly what the NAACP 
had hoped for. When faced with the question of whether 
Congress intended to prohibit segregated schooling when it 
originally adopted the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court 
reached a startling conclusion: the intent of the framers of 
the Fourteenth Amendment "cannot be determined with any 
degree of certainty" (347 U.S. 483, 489). The Court's finding 
was, at best, curious in light of an abundance of historical 
evidence that Congress did not intend to eliminate segregated
Act of 1875 which would have included schools in the category 
of public accomodations which could not be provided on a 
segregated basis. Curiously, the Southern argument more 
faithfully adheres to the historical context of the 18 60's 
than the NAACP's version of events in one critical respect: 
it is more blatantly honest about the racial prejudices which 
existed in the country at large and in the halls of Congress. 
This is no doubt a function of their determination to prevent 
racial mixing in the schools. The historical context of post- 
Civil War America can be summoned by the South as an ally 
because it produces a fountainhead of examples of overtly 
racist policies and practices that continued in spite of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.
29See, for example, Lochner v. New York. 198 U.S. 45 
(1905) and Coppage v. Kansasr 236 U.S. 1 (1915).
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schooling when it passed the Fourteenth Amendment; indeed, 
Congress had passed up several opportunities to do just that. 
Rather, Chief Justice Warren wrote that public education, by 
modern standards, played a far less significant role in post- 
Civil War America, and in the South it was practically 
nonexistent. These facts, in the Court's view, explained the 
"paucity" of information that the history of the amendment 
produced with respect to the intent of the framers. There­
fore, the Warren Court insisted that the permissability of 
segregation in public education must be determined based on 
the role of public education in 1954, not 1868, or 1896. Cahn 
(1955) observed, "Never was Thomas Jefferson more clearly 
vindicated in his insistence that the Constitution belongs to 
the living generation of Americans" (152). By insisting that 
the historical record was too murky to provide any guidance 
in the present controversy, the Court's logic played directly 
into the NAACP's color-blind theory of the Fourteenth Amend­
ment.
Having judged the history of the Fourteenth Amendment as 
inconclusive, the Court turned to sociology. The justices 
cited several authors, most notably Kenneth Clark's study of 
sixteen black schoolchildren in a segregated South Carolina 
school. When asked to pick which of the dolls was the "nice" 
doll, ten children chose the white dolls, as opposed to the 
black dolls. He extrapolated that the tests demonstrated that 
segregated schooling created within black children a sense of
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inferiority. Clark testified that this result was consistent 
with evidence from a larger study that he and his wife had 
conducted as well as other related literature in the field.
The Court apparently agreed with Clark's conclusions, 
declaring that to separate black children from others of the 
same age and qualifications solely because of their race 
could potentially "affect their hearts and minds in a way 
unlikely ever to be undone" (347 U.S. 483, 494). Writing for 
a unanimous court, Chief Justice Earl Warren declared, "We 
conclude that in the field of public education, the doctrine 
of separate but equal has no place. Separate educational 
facilities are inherently unequal" (Ibid, 495). Recognizing 
the potentially sweeping nature of its decision, the Court 
directed all the parties to submit briefs in the following 
term on the question of remedy (Ibid, 495-496).
Curiously, the Court neglected to classify the right of 
blacks to integrated schools as a constitutional right; 
rather, Plessv was invalidated because segregation harmed 
African American children. In addition, the Court, without 
explaining why, determined that the fact that segregation 
violated the Equal Protection Clause "makes unnecessary any 
discussion whether such segregation also violates the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment" (Ibid). Chapter 
Five will explore in more detail the significance of the 
Court's failure to clarify these two points.
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In Bolling v. Sharpe (347 U.S. 497 [1954]), a companion 
case to Brown.30 the Supreme Court invalidated school 
segregation within the District of Columbia:
Classifications based solely upon race must be 
scrutinized with particular care, since they are con­
trary to our traditions and hence constitutionally 
suspect. . . . Segregation in public education is not 
reasonably related to any proper governmental objec­
tive, and thus it imposes on Negro children of the 
District of Columbia a burden that constitutes an 
arbitrary deprivation of their liberty in violation 
of the Due Process Clause (347 U.S. 497, 499-500).
Nevertheless, DuBois7 doubts about the NAACP's approach
would haunt the organization in the post-Brown era. The NAACP
appropriated the ideals of the Declaration of Independence in
support of a vision of American society where race was not
considered as a rational basis for the formulation of public
policy. However, they failed to resolve the tensions between
the atomistic individualism of the Lockian tradition and the
African American community's internal sense that it had a
unique historical experience that separated it from the rest
of American society. This element of black consciousness
implied that certain aspects of classical liberalism did not
apply to African Americans. Consequently, the NAACP's
integrationist philosophy left it wholly unprepared for the
difficult questions which lay ahead. Desegregation, in the
30Bolling is often separated from the other Brown cases 
because it involved segregation in the District of Columbia. 
The Fourteenth Amendment was directed at the states; 
therefore, segregation within the District of Columbia was 
challenged under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment.
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immediate aftermath of the Brown decision, was defined merely 
as insuring that blacks had legal access to public white 
institutions (Preer, 1982) . This interpretation reflected the 
belief that the tenets of atomistic individualism constituted 
universal principles which were specifically applicable to 
every aspect of the black man's struggle for eguality. As 
long as the issue revolved around the rights of individual 
blacks to attend all-white public schools or universities, 
then the matter seemed fairly clear-cut.
Once the problem shifted to defining what public school 
and state higher education systems needed to do to satisfy 
the constitutional requirements of Brown. the issues became 
exceedingly more complicated. Among the thorny institutional 
aspects of public higher education desegregation were 
questions about the future status of state supported black 
universities. Did these institutions have a future role to 
play in an integrated system of higher education, or were 
they to be the unfortunate, though necessary, casualties of 
the need to remedy a century of intentional discrimination in 
higher education? The ethos of the black power movement of 
the 1960's intensified the suspicion of many blacks that 
integration was the belief that the only way blacks could be 
effectively educated was in the same classrooms with whites 
(Wilkinson, 1979, 46-48; Preer, 1982; Kujovik, 1987). DuBois 
had warned the NAACP of this very possibility. As a result, 
significant elements within the black community came to view
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the NAACP' s agenda of integration to be out of step with 
their vision of what was in the best interests of black 
Americans. In fact, the attempt to apply the NAACP's 
integrationist model to higher education raised fundamental 
questions about the entire basis for the Court's decision in 
Brown. The problems associated with the application of Brown 
to higher education are the subject of Chapter Three.
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CHAPTER 3. APPLYING BROWN TO HIGHER EDUCATION
Brown and its Unanswered Questions
One way to evaluate the significance of the Supreme 
Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education is by 
contrasting it with the tide of American history since 1619, 
when the first Africans arrived in Jamestown. Viewed from the 
perspective of 3 35 years of slavery and Jim Crow segregation, 
the tide of American history can be justly interpreted as a 
tale of black exclusion from the bounty of America. It is 
precisely this burden of history which gives Brown its place 
in the annals of constitutional law. In a sense, Brown held 
out the hope of redemption - and this redemption had come 
from a most unlikely source. May 17, 1954 - the day the
Supreme Court handed down its decision in Brown - seemed like 
"A Day of Atonement" for an institution which could be viewed 
as one of the chief bastions of white power in America (Wil­
kinson, 1979, 4) .
Though there was much in the Court's traditions to give 
the black man hope that the Court might grant him a favorable 
hearing (After all, did not Madison believe that the true 
test of a democracy is how well it protects the rights of 
those in the minority?), there was nothing inevitable about 
a partnership between the Court and the black man. "Indeed," 
Wilkinson concludes, "its very lack of inevitability - the 
striking incongruity of it - lent Brown and events thereafter 
their magical and almost unprecedented power" (Ibid, 4-5).
138
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Brown became a watershed in the struggle for African American 
inclusion into the body politic precisely because Plessv had 
been the norm (Miller, 1982; Orfield, 1996).
Not only did Brown cut against the current of American 
history with respect to black Americans, it held out the hope 
of freeing the nation from the ugly details of its past. Ten 
years after Gunnar Myrdal's An American Dilemma reminded the 
country of the peculiar place of race and racism in American 
consciousness, Brown offered the nation an opportunity to 
chart a different course. Moreover, the Court in Brown 
appeared to place great faith in the power of education and 
the institution of the public school to lead the way toward 
this new dawn. To Justice Felix Frankfurther, the public 
school represented "the symbol of our democracy and the most 
pervasive means for promoting our common destiny" (McCullum 
v. Board of Education. 333 U.S. at 231, J. Frankfurther, 
concurring). After a century of compulsory public education 
in America, the public school as an agent of assimilation - 
that is, converting Irish, German, Polish, Italian, Greek, 
and Swedish immigrants into Americans - had been generally 
accepted (Bickel, 1978; Wilkinson, 1979). Integration could 
work, it was argued, and "the kids themselves would make it 
work" (Wilkinson, 1979, 41). Thurgood Marshall told the
Court:
These same kids in Virginia and South Carolina - 
and I have seen them [black and white children] do it - 
they play in the streets together, they play on their 
farms together, they go down the road together, they
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separate to go to school together, they come out of 
school and play ball together. They have to be sepa­
rated in school (Friedman, 1969, 239).
Thus, Brown spoke of education's promise and its potential, 
nothing of its problems. Education would point the way toward 
a new age envisioned by the reformers; after all, did not 
Horace Mann say "education is the great equalizer of the 
conditions of men?" Thus, Brown v. Board of Education stands 
out as a monumental victory in the struggle to incorporate 
black Americans into the mainstream of American life.
Despite the idealism which Brown inspired, implementing 
the Supreme Court's decision would prove to be extremely 
difficult. In the first place, -the South was not ready to 
abandon racial segregation in its schools without a fight. 
Thus, the NAACP's victory in Brown represented the beginning, 
not the end, of a new phase in the struggle to secure equal 
educational opportunities for blacks. More importantly, Brown 
failed to answer many critical questions. For example, if 
segregated schools were unconstitutional, then what kind of 
schools were? Was the evil segregation itself, or the state's 
imposition of it (Wilkinson, 1979, 29)? Did Brown mean that 
black colleges and universities were unconstitutional rem­
nants of Jim Crow systems of higher education that must now 
be eliminated (Miller, 1982)? This chapter concentrates on 
the difficulties that courts and federal agencies would have 
in attempting to apply the mandate of Brown in higher 
education.
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This chapter begins by arguing that the heart of the 
dilemma which Brown posed stemmed from the very framework 
which had been so successful in overturning the legality of 
"separate but equal" education: the belief that desegregation 
was a personal right to which each black citizen was enti­
tled. To deny blacks admission into schools and universities 
simply because of their race violated the principle of the 
fundamental equality of all men espoused in the Declaration 
of Independence. Once the issue was defined in that way, the 
political and legal battles over desegregation turned on the 
question of whose rights should prevail. In the initial 
phase, the predominate question was whether or not the right 
of blacks to attend integrated schools would outweigh the 
right of popular (mostly white) majorities to control their 
school systems.
Secondly, this chapter focuses on how the demise of the 
separate but equal doctrine forced public black colleges to 
justify their right to exist. It will be demonstrated that 
desegregation and the Black Power movement gave rise to a 
racial consciousness which came to view the NAACP's 
traditional integrationist ideology as a threat to one of the 
black community's most cherished institutions - the black 
public college. This fear intensified as the locus of 
desegregation efforts shifted from insuring the admission of 
individual black applicants to white schools to the need to 
dismantle "root and branch" (Green, 391 U.S. 430 [1968]) the
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vestiges of de jure segregation. Judges, lawyers, educators, 
legislators, and activists debated whether the application of 
Brown necessarily required the elimination of state-supported 
black colleges.
Thirdly, I discuss a number of significant higher 
education desegregation precedents which attempt to apply 
principles derived from elementary and secondary school 
desegregation cases. This chapter shows that these precedents 
leave many pertinent questions concerning the fate of black 
colleges unanswered. These cases situate the Mississippi case 
in a constitutional framework and present the range of 
alternatives that was available to the Supreme Court when it 
considered United States v. Fordice.
Desegregation as a Personal Right
From the very beginning, the NAACP had defined desegre­
gation as the right of blacks as individuals to have legal 
access to white institutions on the same basis as any other 
citizen. The 1955 rearguments in the remedial phase of Brown 
afforded the NAACP another opportunity to reiterate its core 
philosophy. Plessv. in their view, was wrong because it 
allowed states to use race as the rationale for denying black 
Americans certain constitutional rights that were freely 
exercised by other Americans. To use race in such a way was 
irrational, constitutionally suspect, and violated the spirit 
of liberty inherent in the Declaration of Independence. The 
NAACP's doctrine of individual rights undergirded its
R eproduced  with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
1 4 3
argument in 19 55 when it attempted to persuade the Supreme 
Court to mandate specific deadlines whereby Southern school 
districts would be required to demonstrate compliance with 
Brown. The right of blacks to attend integrated schools was 
"present and personal" and deserved to be protected without 
delay.
By contrast, the South urged the Court to proceed with 
caution, countering with a rights theory of its own. "The 
overwhelming majority of people regard that decision [Brown] 
as a serious blow which they did not expect" North Carolina's 
attorney general declared (Friedman, 1969, 448). The current 
system of segregated education in the South enjoyed wide­
spread public approval from Southern taxpayers. In addition, 
the Constitution did not grant explicit authority to the 
federal government with respect to education; therefore, 
education was a state matter. If federal judges presumed to 
dictate to local school boards how the schools should be run, 
they would be unjustly acting without the consent of the 
governed, thus undermining the basic contractual relationship 
between citizens and their rulers.31 Forced integration, Sou­
31Interestingly, other commentators noted that Brown 
presented a conflict between segregation's forced separation 
of the race and integration's forced imposition of associ­
ation. Ernest van den Haag (1957) complained that the Court 
attempted to solve the problem of forced segregation by 
restricting the right of disasso-ciation. Herbert Weschler 
(1959) suggested that the principle announced in Brown - that 
"separate educational facilities are inherently unequal" - 
lacked a principled foundation. The real dilemma which the 
segregation cases posed was whether the state had the power 
to restrict the right of association and, for that matter,
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thern attorneys argued, was tantamount to a deathknell for 
public education in the South. Integration, if implemented, 
had to proceed slowly in order to win public acceptance; they 
warned that Southerners would respond negatively to any 
attempt from without to forcibly impose integrated schools.32
The NAACP dismissed suggestions by Southern attorneys 
that their school districts should be granted flexible, open- 
ended timetables with which to convert segregated school 
systems to integrated ones. Thurgood Marshall retorted, "I 
don't believe any argument has ever been made to this Court 
to postpone the enforcement of a constitutional right. The 
argument is never made until Negroes are involved” (Friedman, 
1969, 525). The NAACP considered proposals for "gradual
integration" the equivalent of asking African Americans to 
wait until the South voluntarily conceded to them their
the right of disassociation. Neither of these men were 
apologists for the South; on the contrary, they agreed with 
the result in Brown but questioned the reasoning behind the 
decision.
32In this vein, Maryland's attorney general cited the 
fact that the state had discontinued its system of providing 
out-of-state tuition scholarship for black graduate students 
rather than providing graduate and professional educational 
opportunities for blacks within the state as proof that the 
South, if left to its own internal processes, would right 
itself. Thurgood Marshall replied that the state had only 
abolished this out-of-state program in 1954, sixteen years 
after the Supreme Court declared in Missouri v. Gaines and 
eighteen years after its own Court of Appeals in Uni­
versity of Maryland v. Murray (169 Md. 478 [1936]) had
declared such practices to be unconstitutional. "So that it 
took them six-teen years to catch up with the law of their 
own Court of Appeals and the law of this Court and use that 
as the basis for saying that because of their good faith we 
should work the problem out" (Fried-man, 19 69, 523).
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inalienable, antecedent rights under the Declaration of 
Independence and the Constitution. Though the NAACP did not 
use this precise language, it essentially argued that if the 
Court tolerated delay in the implementation of desegregation, 
it would be guilty of capitulating to what Tocqueville called 
the "tyranny of the majority" (1988) . In short, the 1955 
rearguments of Brown afforded the NAACP another occasion to 
reaffirm its faith in the American Creed.
The ruling in Brown II represented, in large measure, a 
victory for the South. Though the justices did not give the 
lower courts a "blank check," the ruling provided federal 
judges with great latitude in desegregation cases. The Court 
gave the following directives to lower courts:
1. Remember that school authorities, not the 
courts, have the primary duty for determining how and 
when schools are integrated.
2. Require the school board, however, to make a 
prompt and reasonable start toward full compliance with 
the May 17, 1954 ruling.
3. Once such a start is made, the board may be 
given additional time to complete integration.
4. The burden rests on the school board to esta­
blish the need for additional time. Do not grant a post­
ponement unless you are convinced the board is acting in 
good faith to bring about integration at the earliest 
practicable date. Among the factors which may be consi­
dered in deciding whether a school district may delay 
integration are necessary administrative rearrangements, 
adjustments of the transportation systems, revision of 
school district lines to accommodate the altered situ­
ation, revision of local laws and regulations.
5. Do not allow school boards to postpone inte­
gration merely because the board members or their 
community favor segregation.
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6. Plans calling for desegregation by steps are 
permissable provided authorities, acting in good faith, 
are proceeding with all deliberate speed.
7. Retain jurisdiction during the period of tran­
sition (Brown v. Board of Education. 349 U.S. 294, 300- 
301) .
Though Brown II placed local school districts under the 
scrutiny of federal judges, the Court made it clear that 
"school authorities, not the courts, have the primary duty 
for determining how and when schools are integrated" (349 
U.S. 294, 300). The justices directed local officials to make 
"a prompt and reasonable start" toward creating unitary 
systems and called for the development of plans to accomplish 
that end; federal judges were charged with making sure these 
efforts proceeded in "good faith." But the Court failed to 
elaborate on what it meant by phrases such as "with all 
deliberate speed," "a prompt and reasonable start," and "good 
faith." The Supreme Court issued no specific decrees, promul­
gated no minimum steps required to satisfy its mandate, and 
gave no timetables for the accomplishment of any of its 
directives. Lingering questions about what Brown II's 
implementation decree actually meant provided the opening 
that many Southerners had hoped for in order to delay 
integration indefinitely.33 The Brown decisions mobilized
33Largely as a result of the intense opposition to 
integration in the South and, with rare exceptions, a 
lackluster enforcement effort from the federal government, 
only 2.3 percent of southern blacks were enrolled in 
desegregated schools by 1964 - ten years after Brown (Note, 
19 67). A whole cluster of mechanisms were devised to obstruct 
Brown including "freedom of choice" plans, school closures,
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Southern congressmen, governors, state legislatures, 
educational officials, and citizens groups in a determined 
effort to ensure that the South's right to maintain 
segregated schools prevailed over the black man's right to 
education on an integrated basis.
One year later, the Supreme Court's decision in Florida 
ex. rel. Hawkins v. Board of Control (350 U.S. 413), a higher 
education case, further consolidated the view that desegre­
gation was the personal right of an African American student 
to attend white institutions on the same terms as every other 
citizen. Brown II 's implementation decree gave federal 
district judges wide discretion to grant delays to local 
school districts for administrative considerations related to 
the conversion of segregated school systems to integrated 
ones. The University of Florida Law School insisted that it 
should not be required to admit Virgil Hawkins until a 
systemmatic analysis of the likely impact of desegregation on 
both the Florida public school system and its colleges and 
universities could be conducted (Preer, 1982, 141-142). In
public aid to private schools, and optional attendance zones 
(which allowed white parents to send their children to all- 
white schools even if all-black schools were more proximate 
to their homes). Cases which involved tactics designed to 
evade desegregation include Cooper v. Aaron. 358 U.S. 1 
(1958), Hall v. St. Helena Parish School Board. 197 F. Supp. 
649 (E.D. La., 1961), Griffin v. County School Board of
Prince Edward Countv. 377 U.S. 218 (1964), Green v. School
Board of New Kent Countv. 391 U.S. 430 (1968), and Ranev v. 
Board of Education of Gould District. 391 U.S. 443 (1968). 
See also (Carter, 1959; Peltason, 1971; Wilkinson,
1979; Morris, 1984; Orfield, 1996).
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other words, the institutional impacts of desegregation had 
to be assessed before blacks as individuals could be inte­
grated into white universities. Brown II/s implementation 
decree, the state of Florida contended, must apply to higher 
education.
For the NAACP, Florida's argument was all too familiar: 
the rights of whites had to be taken into account before 
desegregation could proceed. What the state really wanted, 
the NAACP replied, was the right to delay the admission of 
blacks to its universities for as long as possible. The NAACP 
argued that this case was consistent with pre-Brown prece­
dents in graduate and professional education where the Court 
required immediate admission of black applicants to the 
schools in question. Brown II's "with all deliberate speed" 
decree, to the extent that it allowed for administrative 
complexities to delay the implementation of desegregation, 
did not apply to higher education.
The Supreme Court accepted the NAACP's premise. In a per 
curiam decision, the justices denied certiorari to the Haw­
kins case and then recalled and vacated its order of May 24, 
1954. In ordering the case remanded, the Court declared that 
the Brown implementation decree had no bearing on a case 
involving a black applicant to a state law school:
As this case involved the admission of a Negro to a 
graduate and professional school, there is no reason 
for delay. He is entitled to prompt and immediate 
admission under the rules and regulations applicable 
to other qualified candidates. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 
U.S. 629; Sipuel v. Board of Regents of the University
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of Oklahoma, 332 U.S. 631; c.f. McLaurin v. Oklahoma 
State Regents for Higher Education, 339 U.S. 637 (350 
U.S. 413 [1956]).
The Court's disposition of the Hawkins case indicated 
that it thought that the issues presented constituted no new 
legal questions that had not been resolved by Sweatt. Sipuel. 
and McLaurin. In rejecting Florida's arguments that the Brown 
implementation order did not apply in Hawkins, the Court, 
like the NAACP, refused to consider the institutional aspects 
of higher education desegregation. Subsequent per curiam 
decisions by the Supreme Court reiterated the same point: the 
"deliberate speed" principle was inapplicable to higher edu­
cation.34 By endorsing the NAACP's framework, the Hawkins 
case contributed to the prevailing notion that progress 
toward desegregation could be measured fairly easily; all one 
needed to do was to conduct a "head count" of the number of 
blacks who had reached the "promise land of white classrooms" 
(Wilkinson, 1979, 46). It would not be until United States v. 
Fordice in 1992 that the Supreme Court would render a full 
opinion focusing on the institutional aspects of desegrega­
tion in higher education.
^Examples include Frasier v. Board of Trustees. 134 F. 
Supp. 589 (M.D. N.C. 1955), aff'd per curiam, 350 U.S. 975 
(1956) , Lucy v. Adams. 134 F. Supp. 235 (N.D. Ala. 1955) ,
aff'd 228 F. 2d. 619 (5th Cir. 1955), cert, denied, 351 U.S. 
931 (1955), Booker v. Tennessee Board of Education. 240 F. 
2d. 689 (6th Cir. 1957), cert, denied, 353 U.S. 965 (1957), 
and Meredith v. Fair. 199 F. Supp. 754 (N.D. Miss. 1962), 305 
F. 2d. 343 (5th Cir. 1962), cert, denied, 371 U.S. 828
(1962) .
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The effect of the Supreme Court's decisions in Sipuel. 
Sweatt. McLaurin. Brown. and Hawkins hardened the view that 
desegregation was an individual right in two important 
aspects that this dissertation will concentrate on. In the 
first place, by defining desegregation in terms of a personal 
right, the courts left untouched the power of the state to 
alter admissions policies in "racially neutral" ways that had 
the effect of nullifying the hard-won legal rights of black 
Americans. The NAACP's legal thrust against segregated edu­
cation had only contemplated qualified black applicants who 
had been denied admission to white institutions merely 
because of their race. However, what if blacks either failed 
to meet the qualifications or if universities and state 
legislatures enacted policies and procedures which, for all 
intents and purposes, ensured that few blacks would meet the 
requirements for admission? Now that the "separate but equal" 
doctrine in education had been overturned, the burden had 
shifted to individual black applicants to prove that they 
could comply with whatever standards they would be required 
to meet (Preer, 1982, 144).
Starting in 1956 around the time of the Southern Mani­
festo,35 Southern states began changing their admissions
350n March 12, 1956, one hundred Southern congressmen and 
all but three of the region's senators issued the "Southern 
Manifesto," a document in which they pledged to overturn the 
Supreme Court's integration decisions. The resolution was 
apparently triggered by discussions within the Eisenhower 
administration concerning civil rights legislation pursuant 
to Brown. The manifesto was undoubtedly designed to
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policies in higher education. These practices were consistent 
with the general hardening of opposition to the Brown ruling 
throughout the South during this period. Some were openly 
racist in their purpose to prevent integration at any cost; 
however, others were couched in racially neutral language 
that in practice accomplished the same end. For example, the 
University of Florida Law School began to require a score of 
340 from all its applicants on its admissions examination. 
When Virgil Hawkins took the test, he scored only 200, 
effectively ending his efforts to enroll in the state's all- 
white law school (Ibid, 145) . In this case, the change in 
Florida's admissions criteria could be justified on educa­
tional grounds. The unfortunate conclusion to Hawkins' quest 
for admission to the University of Florida graphically illu­
strated the fact that the securing of legal rights by blacks 
and the ability to exercise them were two entirely different 
things.
Other states enacted new admissions policies which 
effectively put integrated higher education out of reach for 
most African Americans. Louisiana required each applicant to 
state-supported universities to submit certificates to the 
schools to which they sought admission attesting to his or
discourage the administration from pursuing any legislation 
which might aid the cause of integration and black rights. It 
represented but one example of an entire climate of Southern 
resistance to the Brown decisions (Carter, 1959; Wilkin- son, 
1979; Dorsey, 1981; Miller, 1982; Preer, 1982; Burk, 1984; 
Morris, 1984) .
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her eligibility and good moral character. The certificate had 
to be signed by the appropriate parish superintendent of 
education and high school principal. However, the state also 
passed laws which permitted the dismissal of any principal, 
teacher, or state employee who advocated integration. Not 
surprisingly, few people chose to sign the required certi­
ficates for fear of losing their jobs (Dorsey, 1981, 92;
Miller, 1982, 592; Preer, 1982, 145). Georgia required
applicants to submit certificates from alumni of the school 
they wished to attend; few alumni from white univer-sities 
wanted to endorse the application of a black student (Preer, 
1982, 145). In 1959, the Georgia General Assembly limited the 
age for undergraduate admission for its colleges to twenty- 
one and for graduate and professional education to twenty- 
five. Evidently, this law reflected the fact that black 
applicants, forced to endure a legal marathon in order to 
secure admission, tended to be older than their white 
counterparts (Ibid, 145). In 1963, Mississippi, recognizing 
that blacks generally scored signifiantly below the mean test 
scores of whites on the American College Test (ACT), began 
requiring minimum test scores on the ACT as a tactic to 
prevent blacks from enrolling in all-white universities. This 
new policy followed the controversy surrounding James Mere­
dith's petition to enter the University of Mississippi. This
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policy played a pivotal role in the adjudication of United 
States v. Fordice. More attention will be devoted to this 
subject in the next chapter.
Secondly, by minimizing the importance of institutional 
issues, the Hawkins case neglected to take seriously the 
impact that desegregation would have on public historically 
black universities. The NAACP's legal offensive in cases such 
as Sweatt, McLaurin. Brown. and Hawkins predicated themselves 
on the assumption that black applicants could not hope to 
receive education of a substantially equal quality in a 
segregated setting. Because segregated education represented 
in the minds of many observers an egregious violation of the 
individual rights of black Americans, the potential ramifica­
tions of integration on black colleges was hardly considered. 
Indeed, the Court, by declaring that "separate is inherently 
unequal," (347 U.S. 494) appeared to endorse the notion that 
separate education - meaning, black education - necessarily 
meant inferior education. This implication set in motion a 
debate about the future of black colleges which, among other 
things, led many black Americans to rethink the NAACP's 
integrationist ideology. The "opening rounds" of this debate 
are discussed in the next section.
Desegregation and the Future of Black Colleges
Kujovich (1987) captured very pointedly the paradox 
which the politics of desegregation forced upon historically 
black colleges:
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At midcentury the black public college was both 
a vestige of unconstitutional discrimination and a 
vestige of self-help and affirmative action by the black 
population. It was the product of segregation, but it 
also represented the achievements of a black academic 
community forced to develop in isolation while under­
taking the most difficult educational task in the 
history of the nation. With the demise of the separate 
but equal doctrine, the worst qualities of the colleges 
made them candidates for extinction while their best 
qualities made them essential institutions serving the 
needs of the black community - needs that white public 
colleges were not likely to serve (159).
Because the black public college was both an artifact of
segregation and a vehicle of self-help within the black
community, many African American leaders came to vastly
different conclusions as to what integration should mean for
the future of these institutions. Some black Americans viewed
these schools as obstacles that needed to be removed if the
goal of full integration into American society were to be
achieved. Lewis (1949) wrote:
In the final analysis, the system of higher edu­
cation for Negroes will remain relatively warped and 
inadequate no matter what happens short of elimination 
so long as the kingpin in the system - the publicly- 
supported college for Negroes only - continues (3 61).
The rapid upgrading of black colleges in the 1940's by
Southern states trying to discourage integration helped to
reinforce this view. Walter White, in a strategy conference
at Howard University prior to the Brown cases, complained:
Each time the NAACP wins a court case against a 
Southern state, new buildings spring up on the campuses 
of the colored land-grant colleges. We must make the 
public conscious of the fact this is a waste of tax 
payers money. It would be unjust to Northern states 
to require additional Federal expenditures to "equa­
lize" the funds for colored land-grant colleges 
because it is the Northern states that already bear
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the greatest burden of taxation (1952, 342).
Earlier in the same discourse, White clearly expressed 
his conviction that black colleges were not only inferior to 
white institutions; in addition, agitation on the part of 
blacks for additional funds for these schools (unless their 
programs were radically revised) was a waste of time:
In the field of higher education, the colored 
people of the United States must be willing to give 
up the little kingdoms that have been carved out in 
Southern states for so-called land-grant colleges. 
These schools do not begin to match the quality of 
white institutions that come under the same heading.
It is wasteful and a brake on progress to agitate 
for additional funds to run these schools unless 
their programs are radically revised. There is a 
place for the college that is currently charged with 
performing the land-grant function but this place 
must not be on a segregated basis. The colored land- 
grant colleges, as the figures I am about to quote 
will reveal, have never received their just share 
of Federal and state support (Ibid, 341).
White's remarks were consistent with a significant 
change in the NAACP strategy that had occurred since the 
Sipuel decision. In the wake of the Gaines case, the creation 
of new, separate academic programs on black campuses had been 
treated as gains in educational substance, though temporary 
setbacks for the cause of outlawing segregation. Black 
educational leaders, fully aware of the academic shortcomings 
of their institutions, often welcomed these new investments, 
even while recognizing that Southern states were more inte­
rested in preventing integration than they were concerned 
about the educational welfare of black students (Preer, 1982, 
86-87) . However, by the late 1940's the NAACP had decided to
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launch an all-out offensive on segregation in education. New 
programs at black colleges were henceforth seen as wasteful, 
duplicative efforts which impeded the goal of opening access 
to white universities. The new enhancements of black colleges 
were viewed as desperate attempts on the part of an unrepen­
tant South to make separate schools more equal in the hope of 
avoiding integration altogether. Thus, the NAACP's new legal 
strategy left no room for black colleges once the goal of 
obtaining legal access to white state universities had been 
achieved (Ibid, 87).
In this respect, White's views were reminiscent of the 
association's response to DuBois' doubts about the NAACP's 
legal strategy against segregation during the 1930's. White 
continued to believe, as he did in the 1930's, that racial 
segregation was inherently evil. The expansion of black 
colleges should not be encouraged because they would never be 
treated as the equal of white colleges. As far as the NAACP's 
earlier support of enhancements at black colleges was con­
cerned, White's position sounded very much like J. E. 
Springarn's rebuttal to DuBois: practical concessions to
segregation from time to time do not necessarily overturn our 
fundamental conviction that racial segregation must always be 
opposed.
James Nabrit, Jr. , a law professor at Howard University 
and a legal tactician for the NAACP, had expressed similar 
ideas in a conference of black college presidents two years
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earlier. However, Nabrit's tone not only was less threa­
tening, his perspective acknowledged that the coming of 
integration would plunge the black public college through a 
difficult period of soul searching:
The Negro Land Grant Colleges must resist political 
efforts to saddle courses and curricula upon them 
which they are not organizationally [or] financially 
eguipped to operate on a high level of efficiency.
They should resist efforts to use them to nullify 
recent Supreme Court decisions. . . [T]he Negro Land 
Grant College must adjust its program to an integrated 
system of education in the South, where segregation 
will no longer exist, where competition will be ter­
rific, where inferior plants, poorly trained teachers, 
weak administrators, curricula inadequate for a demo­
cratic society, and unsound educational policies will 
no longer be tolerated (1950, 79, 80-82).
Like White, Nabrit opposed enhancements at black schools
which he viewed as last-ditch attempts to preserve Jim Crow
segregation and encouraged black college presidents to resist
such efforts.36 However, Nabrit's remarks also reflected the
sense that if black colleges were to have a role to play in
a post-Plessv future, their leaders needed to be prepared for
changing social conditions. A number of black educational
leaders were pondering exactly what that future might mean
for black colleges (Thompson, 1952; Atwood, 1952; 1958;
Jenkins, 1952; Clark, 1958; Nabrit, 1958) . Charles Thompson
put the matter rather succintly: "the burden is upon the
36In light of the political disenfranchisement of most 
African Americans in the South and the fact that black 
college presidents had to answer to their state legislatures, 
it is not clear how the leaders of these institutions could 
have prevented their states from imposing new academic 
programs on their campuses designed to keep black students at 
black colleges.
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Negro publicly-supported college to justify its continued 
existence and future role" (1958, 129).
Other black educators responded to Thompson's challenge.
S.M. Nabrit, president of Texas Southern University, the uni­
versity created by Sweatt v. Painter, argued that the legacy 
of Jim Crow segregation in education meant that
the average Negro cannot compete on equal terms with 
the average white student in our society. This fact 
may be embarrassing to Negroes and to white people 
alike, but it is undeniable. It is this retardation 
which requires the continuation of Negro institutions 
of higher learning, and it certainly suggests one of 
their prime functions: remedial education and pro­
fessional education for persons with the potential 
but lacking many of the educative experiences and 
skills essential for first class competition (1958, 
415) .
F. D. Moon, president of Langston University, Oklahoma's 
black land grant school, agreed with Nabrit's assessment: 
"For a great many years to come, if Negro youth are to 
receive higher education, there will be a pressing need 
for the retention of the one-time Negro college" (19 62, 325) . 
Nabrit and Moon echoed the sentiments of many black educators 
who believed that the legacy of discrimination in segregated 
educational systems had ill-equipped most African Americans 
to compete on equal terms with their white counterparts. 
Therefore, they contended that legal access to white univer­
sities would not be an adequate remedy for black students who 
continued to be the victims of discrimination. In fact, they 
feared that a "desegregation only" remedy might actually
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decrease educational opportunities for most African American 
students (Kujovich, 1987, 160-161).
Moreover, the black college's struggle to justify its 
continuation found support in the educational profiles of 
many of its students. While the National Scholarship Service 
and Fund for Negro Students studied the success of the more 
capable black undergraduates enrolled in integrated universi­
ties (Ibid, 161), black colleges reported serious educational 
deficiencies in a substantial proportion of their student 
bodies. For example, both Jackson State College in Missis­
sippi and A & M and Normal College in Arkansas (now known as 
Arkansas-Pine Bluff) had instituted remedial programs for 
college freshmen for students who lacked basic reading skills 
(Troup, 1949; Stephan, 1962) . Maryland's Morgan State College 
operated a special remedial curriculum which included nearly 
half of the entering freshmen class during the 1950's because 
the students' performance on placement tests indicated that 
they were unprepared for college level work (Grant, 1958). At 
North Carolina's five black public colleges during the early 
19 60's, the average score on either the verbal or math por­
tions of the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) was below 3 00 
(Harris, 1962, 291-292). Therefore, though some black
students were prepared to excell in white universities, many 
others still had a vested interest in the perpetuation of
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black colleges. In the meantime, Southern states continued to 
improve black colleges in an effort to avoid the mandate of 
Brown.37
In addition, the prospect of the closure and/or merger of 
black colleges with white institutions jeopardized the status 
of another constituency that had a vested interest in the 
continuation of black colleges: black faculty and administra­
tors (Kujovich, 1987, 162-163). Black colleges had served as 
one of the two major employers for black academics under the 
separate but equal regime; integration presented the distinct 
possibility that black educators, themselves the victims of 
discrimination, might be displaced for failing to meet up to 
white standards. In a region which routinely refused to 
recognize black competence, even the most confident black 
academics could not be assured of employment.
Furthermore, events surrounding the integration of the 
University of Louisville in Kentucky fed to these fears. In 
1951, Louisville agreed to admit black students to all of 
their programs. As part of this action, Louisville Municipal 
College, a branch of the university reserved for black
37In 1951, Georgia provided $2 million for new buildings, 
increased operating expenses for its black colleges, and 
equalized faculty salaries at white and black campuses. 
Louisiana, under court order to desegregate the New Orleans 
campus of Louisiana State University (now University of New 
Orleans [UNO]), began construction of Southern University in 
New Orleans (SUNO). In 1960, the U.S. Civil Rights Commission 
specifically said that upgrading Negro colleges was not a 
proper remedy and assumed that equality of educational 
opportunity was only available at white colleges (Preer, 
1982, 147).
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students only, was discontinued. The faculty of the Municipal 
College included eighteen persons, including four with earned 
doctorates and at least seven persons who had served the 
college for eight or more years. However, the University 
Board of Trustees subsequently fired the entire college 
faculty. Subsequent negotiations led the university to hire 
one member of the college faculty (Atwood, 1951; Kujovich, 
1987, 162-163). The events at Louisville underscored the
fears of many African Americans that the implementation of 
Brown might force many qualified black academics out of the 
teaching profession.
Thus, the demise of the separate but equal doctrine pre­
sented black public higher education with a profound dilemma. 
Black educators were divided: some welcomed the opportunity 
for black colleges to compete with white institutions and to 
be judged by the same standards as their white brethren.38 
Others, while welcoming the demolition of legal barriers that 
prevent blacks from enrolling at white universities, still 
wanted to preserve the right of blacks to voluntarily choose
38A concrete example of this is seen in the decision of 
the Conference of Presidents of Negro Land-Grant Colleges in 
1955 to terminate its existence and accept the invitation to 
join the Association of Land-Grant Colleges and State 
Universities. In another example, the Southern Association of 
Colleges and Schools (SACS) discontinued its two-tiered 
method of accreditation whereby white universities either 
received an A rating or were not accre-dited and black 
universities were ranked either A, B, or C. From now on, the 
same policies would apply to both. Competing on an equal 
basis for the first time, about half of the sixty-five black 
colleges evaluated passed muster (Preer, 1982, 148-149).
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to attend predominately black colleges. Moreover, many felt 
that the reality of racial segregation in elementary and 
secondary schools made black colleges, at least in the short 
run, an absolutely essential link between blacks and access 
to higher education. Yet, at the same time, many of these 
same people predicted that integration would cause black 
colleges to lose their best students, athletes, and faculty 
to white institutions. These losses presented the prospect of 
heaping new burdens on black institutions in addition to 
their historic traditions of being underfunded and isolated 
from the academic mainstream (Preer, 1982, 149). These
traditional handicaps also suggested that black universities 
would face formidable obstacles in accomplishing the goal of 
desegregating their student bodies.39 While some blacks 
clearly believed that some black institutions would 
inevitably cease to exist, the slow pace of integration of
39The experience of West Virginia State and the 
enrollment of Bluefield State College in West Virginia and at 
Lincoln University in Missouri represented exceptions which 
illustrated the rule. Shortly after the Brown decision, these 
colleges attract substan-tial numbers of whites to their 
campuses. As part of its effort to shed its all-black 
identity, West Virginia State dropped out of its all-Negro 
athletic conference and joined the West Virginia Inter­
collegiate Conference. But the experience at West Virginia 
were atypical of most black colleges in practically every 
respect. The college was located in Charleston and had low 
tuition. Most black colleges were located in the rural 
hinterlands or in the same city with other white colleges. 
Furthermore, West Virginia's relatively small black 
population affected the pace of change in that state. The 
racial climate in other Southern states where the black 
population was substantially larger tended to be more 
politically charged and resistant to change (Preer, 1982, 
148) .
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white Southern universities meant that the wholesale 
disappearance of black colleges would not occur any time soon 
(Jenkins, 1952; Stephan, 1958; Moon, 1958; 1962; Henderson, 
1958) .
Therefore, despite the concerns voiced by many black 
educators, desegregation continued to be defined by many 
observers as simply the legal right of blacks as individuals 
to attend white institutions during the 1950's and early 
1960's. Though theoretically integration was a "two-way 
street," many black and white proponents of Brown appeared 
not to take the idea of whites entering black colleges very 
seriously. Thus, progress toward desegregation was measured 
largely in terms of how many black students had been admitted 
into white universities (Redding, 1958; Valien, 1958; 
Wilkinson, 1979; Preer, 1982).
However, the politics of desegregation radically changed 
in the mid-1960's. The passage of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, the 24th Amendment, and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 
(to the extent that these enactments represented the goal of 
securing the basic civil rights of African Americans that 
allowed blacks and whites with competing ideologies to 
organize around) shattered the civil rights policy consensus 
(Piven and Cloward, 1971). Without the goal of civil equality 
to unite them, genuine divisions emerged over the direction 
the movement should take. The collapse of the civil rights 
policy consensus during the mid-1960's and the ascendency of
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the Black Power movement created an opening for the 
supporters of black colleges to voice their trepidations 
about the implications of Brown more openly. Armed with a 
growing sense of race pride and consciousness, blacks not 
only became more defensive of black colleges (as well as 
black culture and black institutions generally), but many 
openly challenged one of the central assumptions on which the 
Brown decision was based - the presumed inferiority of black 
educational institutions. That is the subject of the next 
section.
Black Power, Black Colleges and Brown
Civil rights advocates were accustomed to resistance to 
integration from whites; however, the Black Power movement 
represented resistance to integration from blacks.40 Many 
within the civil rights establishment were caught off-guard 
by the new insurgency. Calls for "Black Power" replaced the 
singing of "We Shall Overcome;" peaceful, non-violent demon­
strations gave way to urban riots; civil rights stalwarts 
like Martin Luther King, Roy Wilkins, and Bayard Rustin were 
accused of "not being radical enough" by figures such as 
Stokely Carmichael, Huey Newton, and H. Rap Brown. In par­
ticular, the Black Power insurgency called into question the 
traditional civil rights establishment's conceptualization of 
the race problem:
40White racists bent on preserving segregation 
capitalized on the Black Power movement, maintaining that it 
was proof that integration was unpopular with both races.
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What we are discovering, in short, is that the 
United States— all of it, North as well as South, West 
as well as East— is a racist society in a sense and to 
a degree that we have refused so far to admit, much 
less face. . . . The tragedy of race relations in the 
United States is that there is no American Dilemma. 
White Americans are not torn and tortured between their 
devotion to the American creed and their actual beha­
vior. They are upset by the current state of race 
relations, to be sure. But what troubles them is not 
that justice is being denied but that their peace is 
being shattered and their business interrupted (Sil- 
berman, quoted in Carmichael and Hamilton, 1967, 5).
Black Power advocates rejected Gumnar Myrdal's view that 
Americans were inwardly torn between their ideals of equal 
justice for all and their actual treatment of African Ameri­
cans. Myrdal's conceptualization of the race problem had been 
enthusiastically embraced by the NAACP and other civil rights 
organizations and had been specifically acknowledged by the 
Supreme Court in footnote 11 of the Brown opinion. The Black 
Power critique asserted that the NAACP' s vision - and the 
vision of other integrationists as well - was naive. Rather, 
they maintained that America was fundamentally, and perhaps 
incurably, a racist society. The non-violent, "turn the other 
cheek" tactics of King, ultimately, were misguided; the only 
force that America respected was power. Some drew parallels 
between the plight of African Americans to that of colonized 
and newly independent peoples of Asia and Africa; blacks in 
America, it was argued, were not simply the victims of Jim 
Crow segregation but internal colonialism (Carmichael and 
Hamilton, 1967; Young, 1970). Often, their critiques 
suggested that the solution to the black man's plight could
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not be found within the confines of American democratic and
capitalist institutional arrangements.
Carmichael and Hamilton in Black Power: The Politics of
Liberation in America explicitly expressed utter contempt
for the goal of integration which had been pursued by civil
rights organizations such as the NAACP and the SCLC (Southern
Christian Leadership Conference):
. . . According to its advocates, social justice will 
be accomplished by "integrating the Negro into the main­
stream institutions of the society from which he has 
been traditionally excluded." This concept is based on 
the assumption that there is nothing of value in the 
black community and that little of value could be 
created by black people. . . We recall the conclusion 
of Killian and Grigg: "At the present time, integration 
as a solution to the race problem demands that the 
Negro foreswear his identity as a Negro." The fact is 
that integration, as traditionally articulated, would 
abolish the black community (1967, 53,55).
Carmichael and Hamilton implied that Brown, because of
its endorsement of integration, was a racist decision.41 Like
many Black Power advocates, they feared that integration
offered blacks entrance into white society but at the price
of cultural extinction. Moreover, Carmichael and Hamilton
41This same charge was repeated by Lewis M. Steel, an 
associate counsel for the NAACP, in a 19 68 article in The New 
York Times Magazine. It was entitled "Nine Men in Black Who 
Think White." Steel criticized the Court for failing to 
articulate the principle that equality before the law was an 
absolute right which all citizens were entitled to, and 
official efforts to hinder the exercise of inherent 
constitutional rights would no longer be tolerated. Instead, 
the Court compromised, meaning that the rights of blacks to 
equal protection would have to be balanced against the rights 
of the very whites who had denied them equality. Steel was 
summarily fired after the article appeared; several members 
of the NAACP's legal staff quit to protest the firing.
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doubted the relevancy of Brown in light of the fact that 
whites were abandoning the central cities in favor of the 
suburbs, leaving behind heavy concentrations of poor blacks 
in urban areas. ''Clearly 'integration'— even if it would 
solve the educational problem— has not proved feasible. . . 
. The real need at present is not integration but quality 
education" (Ibid, 157). Their analysis amounted to a rather 
stinging rebuke of those black students who had literally 
risked their lives in order to integrate the public schools 
and the colleges (Wilkinson, 1979, 47) . Blacks did not need 
integration as much as they needed the power to control their 
own schools, neighborhoods, politics, and economies, the 
proponents of Black Power countered. In short, the advocates 
of Black Power made DuBois a prophet.
Thus, pre-existing black misgivings about the ramifi­
cations of Brown. the growing political clout of blacks as a 
newly enfranchised class, and the rhetoric of Black Power 
combined to produce a climate of greater black assertiveness 
(Young, 1970; Wilkinson, 1979; Preer, 1982). The leaders and 
supporters of black colleges became more proactive in 
defending their institutional interests. While the Coleman 
report and the Commission on Civil Rights extoled the virtues 
of greater desegregation by linking it with increases in 
academic achievement, black educators busied themselves with 
carving out niches for black colleges within the context of 
desegregated education. LeRoy B. Allen, president of Cheyney
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State College in Pennsylvania, charged that events in West 
Virginia "proved once again that the constant tendency is to 
make Negro leadership expendable" (1966, 452). He envisioned 
desegregation as a process whereby "proportionately large 
numbers of Negro educators and administrators must be 
maintained" (Ibid, 452). He rejected the theory that blacks 
must be willing to surrender the educational benefits that 
black colleges afforded in order to gain the "greater 
blessings" that desegregation purportedly offered them. 
Rather than seeing traditionally black colleges as expendable 
now that Brown was the law of the land, Allen insisted that 
black universities were needed more than ever to meet the 
increasing demand for higher education.
This section makes no attempt to elucidate the multiple 
factors which contributed to the rise of the Black Power 
movement. However, in view of African American political 
history, a black backlash against Brown was not surprising. 
In Chapter One, it was argued that black nationalist thought 
in America has a long history. Thus, when Malcolm X (for whom 
many of the advocates of black power drew inspiration) urged 
blacks to pursue freedom "by any means necessary," he had 
said very little that David Walker had not already said in 
1829. Rather, Malcolm X built on a preexisting political 
tradition in the African American community. The same was 
true of black separtists in the 1960's who proposed creating 
a black nation out of several states (Brotz, 1966; Haley,
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1992; Wilkinson, 1979). In addition, those who argued that 
the black man's plight could not be solved until capitalism 
was either overthrown or radically restructured had said 
little that was new; Chapter Two discussed in detail the 
lively debate between the legalists (the NAACP and its 
allies) and those favoring economic redistribution during the 
1930's. While the Black Power movement per se did not command 
a mass following, it nevertheless articulated a broad ideo­
logical framework which was shared by many African Americans. 
Its militant emphasis on black pride and self-determination 
appealed to broad segments of the black community. Thus, many 
blacks sympathized with many of the broad goals articulated 
by the proponents of Black Power while rejecting some of the 
more specific positions and tactics of the movement (Young, 
1970, 329).
Thus, as black educators became more resentful of the 
notion of the "inherently unequal" nature of black education, 
Jencks and Reisman published an article in the Harvard 
Educational Review on the shortcomings of black colleges that 
proved to be the functional equivalent of the 1965 Moniyhan 
Report on black family life.42 The authors described black
42Daniel Patrick Moynihan (1965), among other things, 
stressed that rising rates of out-of-wedlock births, female­
headed homes, and welfare dependency were among the most 
central problems facing lower-class blacks. His suggestion 
that these problems stem from previous patterns of inequality 
that originated in slavery and that certain aspects of this 
legacy were pathological triggered an angry response from 
many corners of black academia and the civil rights community 
(Hare, 1969; Alkalimat, 1969; Staples, 1970; Hill, 1972;
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colleges as "academic disaster areas" (1967, 55), with little 
chances for successful integration (Ibid, 57). They listed a 
host of factors which would frustrate efforts to desegregate 
these institutions. These included the poor, rural locations 
of many of these schools, the competition of white public 
colleges in urban areas, the disparity of funding between 
white and black campuses, and the academic needs of poorly 
trained black students. They concluded, "Integrationists, 
both black and white, may disapprove of Negro institutions on 
principle, but it will be hard to demand that such institu­
tions be closed as long as Negroes are voluntarily choosing 
them" (57).
Jencks and Reisman were roundly denounced for their 
conclusions. Their observations were dismissed as inaccurate, 
impressionistic, and not based on the day-to-day realities of 
black colleges. Stephen Wright, head of the United Negro 
College Fund, took the authors to task for numerous factual 
errors in their article (1967, 451-455). Albert Dent of
Dillard University complained that Jencks and Reisman not 
only unfairly stereotyped these institutions, but that they 
ignored evidence related to the positive educational impacts 
of black colleges (Ibid, 461-464). Hugh M. Gloster of Hamp­
Ladner, 1973). William Julius Wilson wrote, "The vitriolic 
attacks on the 'Moynihan Report'. . . helped to create an
atmosphere that discouraged many scholars from exploring 
certain aspects of the lower-class black experience" (1984, 
77) .
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ton Institute took exception to the glossy terms with which
the authors spoke of white universities:
. . . It might interest Jencks and Riesman to know that 
some Negro students - after observing nonteaching 
professors, diverted graduate students, and stimulant- 
obsessed undergraduate students - feel that the large 
universities are also "academic disaster areas" (461).
The sense that smaller class sizes and more direct 
contact with professors made black colleges more conducive to 
black academic success manifested itself in the overwhelming 
opposition of African Americans to a 1967 proposal to phase 
out the law school at Texas Southern University. Between 1950 
and 1965, TSU had produced 95 percent of the black members of 
the Texas bar (Jones, 1969). Interestingly, Herman Sweatt had 
dropped out of the University of Texas Law School before the 
end of his first year, while Henry Doyle, TSU's first law 
student and a witness who testified at Sweatt's trial, 
graduated and became a member of the Texas bar (Preer, 1982, 
120) . Thus, the reasons cited for the school's academic 
inferiority during the 1940's - its small classes and its 
black student body - had by the late 19 60's provided the 
justification for TSU's continued existence (Ibid).
In summary, the Brown decision, far from being a "pana­
cea," left many critical questions about the future of black 
higher education unanswered. Many proponents of integration 
continued to embrace an interpretation of Brown that included 
little concern for its impact on black colleges. Partly for 
this reason, a black backlash against Brown was not particu­
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larly surprising. It is not argued here that all blacks who 
sought to preserve black institutions were proponents of 
Black power per se. Rather, the strength of the movement lay 
not in its numbers, but in its ideological appeal. Black 
Power had deep roots in the history of black nationalism, 
which was discussed in Chapter One. Second, black nationalism 
borrowed many of its core concepts - belief in inherent 
rights, the equality of all men, the right to self-deter­
mination, black self-help, and the social contract - from the 
Lockean tradition. Thus, certain aspects of the broad vision 
articulated by the advocates of Black Power resonated among 
a significant segment of the black community, even while the 
majority of blacks rejected the tactics of its most vocal 
practictioners.
The emerging vision of the defenders of black colleges 
amounted to a synthesis of certain aspects of the liberal 
tradition and the sense that black Americans had a unique 
historical experience which white society was obliged to take 
into account. Brown was intended to deal with compulsory 
racial segregation, it was argued; it had no bearing on the 
voluntary choices of blacks to attend colleges in which their 
race was in the majority. Black educators believed that the 
legacy of Jim Crow segregation left many prospective black 
college students unprepared to compete with white students on 
an equal basis; thus, if black institutions ceased to exist, 
many blacks would be denied the opportunity to pursue higher
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education altogether. While black students on white campuses 
often felt alienated from the academic community, black 
colleges served as "creditable models, psycho-socially conge­
nial settings, special-group-oriented enclaves, and as insu­
rance against a possible declining interest in educating 
Blacks" (Tollett, 1972, 207). Tuition costs at black schools 
tended to be considerably less than at their white counter­
parts, thereby making them an economic bargain for the poor, 
regardless of race.
Supporters of black colleges not only wanted to preserve 
the right of blacks as individuals to make the voluntary 
choice to attend black schools, but they asserted that the 
black community had the right to maintain these institutions. 
These institutions were necessary in light of the unique 
history of African Americans, it was maintained, and served 
a remedial role in integrating blacks into the mainstream of 
American society. Furthermore, because the Brown opinion did 
not expressly state whether it meant to eliminate compulsory 
segregation or segregation regardless of its purpose, black 
educators were able to extol the virtues of the black college 
without being required to repudiate the entire Brown 
decision.
At the same time, black college leaders articulated a 
vision of black colleges as institutions committed to provi­
ding quality education for all regardless of race. They 
recognized that in the wake of Brown. historically black
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schools needed non-racial justifications for their existence. 
Black educators often pointed out that African Americans had 
not established schools for the express purpose of racial 
segregation; thus, in a sense desegregation coincided with 
the historical traditions of black colleges.43 However, they 
believed that partly because of their legacy of underfunding, 
they were ill-equipped to compete on even footing with white 
schools for white students. Most whites perceived black 
schools as inferior institutions and did not see them as 
serious options for the pursuit of higher education. Thus, 
black college presidents during the late 1960's began to 
organize themselves in order i-n order to increase their 
political influence as well as their financial resources.44
43This point is illustrated by the position taken by the 
National Association for Equal Opportunity in Higher 
Education (NAFEO) during the Adams v. Richardson case, which 
will be discussed later in the chapter. In the NAFEO brief, 
the black colleges questioned whether public black colleges, 
established with specific state intent to separate whites 
from blacks, could be implicated as a collaborator in illegal 
segregation. Blacks, the NAFEO protested, were the victims of 
discrimination, not its perpetuators.
^The National Association for Equal Educational 
Opportunity in Higher Education (NAFEO) was formed in 1969 by 
the presidents of both public and private black colleges. 
Initially, the organization was formed to challenge the Nixon 
administration's lack of support for black higher education. 
The formation of NAFEO showed how black college leaders had 
come full circle since the Brown ruling in 1954. One year 
after Brown. the presidents of the black land-grant colleges 
had voluntarily disbanded their organization and merged into 
the Association of State Universities and Land-Grant 
Colleges.
By 1969, black college presidents saw the need of organizing 
all-black organizations in order to protect their interests. 
The NAFEO's agenda devoted very little attention to 
integration; instead, it focused on increasing the visibility
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Not only did black colleges more agressively pursue greater 
financial aid from philanthrophic sources (a traditional 
benefactor of black education), but these institutions sought 
to gain a larger share of federal aid as well (Ware, 1966). 
Taking note of the massive expansion of federal aid to 
education during the 1960's, blacks determined that they 
should have a more equitable share of these funds.45 
Furthermore, black educators insisted that black colleges 
needed to be financially compensated to remedy the effects of 
historical discrimination by the states in order to "catch 
up" with white universities. These enhancements, they 
maintained, were deemed essential for desegregation to occur 
on traditionally black campuses.
Meanwhile, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 
the expansion of federal spending in higher education had 
given the federal government greater power to prod states 
toward desegregation, either by filing lawsuits or withhol­
ding federal funds. However, in light of the unsettled state 
of the law in this area, it still remained unclear how 
federal authorities would interpret the mandate of Brown in 
higher education. This background set the context for the
of black colleges and attracting private financial support 
for black universities. The NAFEO stressed that black 
colleges were essential institutions that played a critical 
role in insuring access to higher education for black and 
poor students.
45In 197 0, black colleges received only 2 percent of all 
federal funds to higher education (U.S. Congress, cited in 
Preer, 1982, 194).
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landmark Supreme Court decision in Green v. School Board of 
New Kent County (391 U.S. 430 [1968]). Green initiated a new 
phase in public higher education desegregation: the require­
ment that states not only grant legal access to white 
institutions to blacks, but that they dismantle dual systems 
of higher education for the races. The next section discusses 
the impact of Green on higher education.
"The Affirmative Duty to Desegregate"
The Green decision in 1968 crystallized the Supreme 
Court's frustration with the snails-pace of public school 
desegregation as well as its determination to enforce Brown. 
In Green, the Court struck down a freedom of choice plan 
which required first and eight grade students to annually 
choose which school they wished to attend. In three years of 
operation, not a single white child had chosen the county's 
all-black school. Though 115 black children had selected the 
all-white school, 85% of the blacks still attended the all­
black school. The Court determined that the county's "freedom 
of choice" plan had been devised to delay integration 
indefinitely. School boards had the "affirmative duty," the 
Court wrote, to promulgate plans that "promise realistically 
to convert promptly to a system without a 'white' school and 
a 'Negro' school, but just schools" (391 U.S. 430, 442). This 
duty, the Court elaborated, was the school board's and could 
not be shifted either to parents or students.
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Green firmly established that school boards were not 
simply required to cease unconstitutional actions; rather, 
they had a proactive responsibility to enact policies and 
procedures that would transform segregated school systems 
into integrated ones (Crump, 1993, 769). Moreover, the Court 
indicated that it would tolerate no more delay on the part of 
local school districts. Furthermore, the Supreme Court made 
it clear that it was not only interested in affirming the 
right of black students to attend all-white schools; rather, 
states were required to destroy all the vestiges of dual 
systems of education "root and branch" (391 U.S. 430) . Green 
reflected the Court's growing impatience with the various 
ways state and local governments had manipulated Brown's 
implementation decree in order to prevent or to limit, as 
much as possible, the number of blacks able to attend 
integrated schools. In the wake of Green. future courts asked 
whether continued racial identifiability of schools resulted 
from state action or represented the voluntary choices of 
parents and students.
The Supreme Court's intent to eradicate dual systems of 
education "root and branch" increased the sense of urgency in 
the debate over the constitutionality of public black 
colleges (Note, 197 0; Tollett, 197 2). Up to this point, the 
Court had only concerned itself with the rights of African 
Americans to attend all-white public schools and state uni­
versities. Green forced future courts to grapple with the
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issue of defining the remedial measures necessary in order 
for a state to fulfill its "affirmative duty" to desegregate. 
Among the principal questions that courts would have to 
address was whether the rights of blacks to desegregated 
education could be reconciled with the desire of a signifi­
cant segment of the black community to maintain voluntary 
majority black public universities (Bickel, 1971, 239-240; 
Shimeall, 1980, 537-538).
It would not be until United States v. Fordice that the 
Supreme Court would render a full opinion on the nature of 
the state's "affirmative duty" to desegregate. Because of the 
Court's silence on this matter, the task fell to lower 
federal courts which, not surprisingly, came to conflicting 
conclusions. Alabama State Teachers Association v. Alabama 
Public School and College Authority46 (289 F. Supp. 13 68, 
M.D. Ala. [1968]), decided a few months after Green, 
represented the first attempt to tackle the problem. In this 
case, a black teachers' organization at Alabama State College 
in Montgomery challenged the constitutionality of an act of 
the Alabama legislature creating a branch of Auburn 
University in Montgomery. They argued that the expansion of 
Auburn served to perpetuate a dual system of education in 
Alabama in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and would 
undercut the efforts of Alabama State College to recruit 
white students. In rejecting the black plaintiffs' arguments,
46Hereinafter, this case will be referred to as ASTA.
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the district court drew a distinction between public school 
desegregation cases and those involving higher education. 
Public schools, the court stated, were "free and compulsory," 
giving school boards greater leverage in impacting the 
choices available to students. Colleges, on the other hand, 
were anything but "free and compulsory," and they differed 
widely in size, missions, course offerings, and other fac­
tors. States, the court concluded, did not have as many 
remedial options at its disposal to impact the choices of 
students as to which university they would attend. Given 
these differences, the court reasoned that
as long as the State and a particular institution 
are dealing with admissions, faculty and staff in good 
faith, the basic requirement of the affirmative duty 
to dismantle the dual schools system on the college 
level, to the extent that the system may be based on 
racial considerations, is satisfied (Ibid, 789-790) .
Because the district court perceived there to be stark 
differences between the contexts of public school cases and 
colleges, it believed its remedial options were more limited. 
The district court's opinion stood in marked contrast to the 
NAACP's interpretation of the Supreme Court's decision in 
Sweatt, mentioned in the last chapter. Sweatt declared that 
creating a separate law school for blacks denied them certain 
"intangible benefits" which they would receive in an inte­
grated setting. The NAACP reasoned that the benefits which 
integration would bring were similarly denied to students at 
the elementary and secondary levels of education. This view 
minimized the differences between the public schools and
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postsecondary education and seemed to assume that whatever 
remedial options applied in one context equally applied in 
the other. ASTA. however, recognized a fundamental difference 
between the two contexts. By defining the "affirmative duty" 
of Green strictly in terms of racially nondiscriminatory 
admissions and hiring policies, ASTA represented a rather 
restrictive interpretation of the remedial power of federal 
courts in higher education desegregation cases.
Other courts have defined the state's responsibility 
under Green more broadly. In Norris v. State Council of 
Higher Education (327 F. Supp. 1368 E.D. Va. [1971]), black 
plaintiffs sought the enjoining of plans to upgrade Richard 
Bland College, an all-white college in Richmond, from a two- 
year school to a four-year institution. The plaintiffs argued 
that this proposal served to perpetuate segregation by 
placing Richard Bland in direct competition with historically 
black Virginia State College (also located in Richmond) for 
white students. They charged that the Virginia legislature 
had knowingly and willfully passed this legislation in an 
effort to undercut Virginia State's efforts to attract 
whites.
The district court in Norris said the Green standard 
applied with "equal force" in higher education. While noting 
the differences between higher education and public school 
cases that the court recognized in ASTA. the court concluded 
that while the options available to the state may differ, its
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responsibility was just as exacting. Moreover, the court 
rejected the defendants' contention that ASTA standard should 
be the controlling law in this case. Instead, the judges 
declared that when the particular facts of the case were 
considered, ASTA simply did not expound principles which were 
generally applicable to higher education desegregation cases. 
Relying on the phraseology of Green, the court in Norris 
declared that the state had the obligation to "convert its 
white colleges and black colleges to just colleges" (Ibid, 
1373).
Consequently, ASTA and Norris announced two opposing 
views of the applicability of Green to higher education. ASTA 
defined the state's "affirmative duty to desegregate" very 
narrowly - its definition was restricted to the duty of the 
state to promulgate policies, practices, and procedures that 
did not discriminate on the basis of race. ASTA did not 
necessarily require the dismantlement of black schools to 
achieve desegregation; rather, it declared that state educa­
tional policies should not be predicated on race. In that 
respect, ASTA's logic served as a precedent which black 
colleges would appeal to resist attempts to merge and/or 
close their schools. But ASTA was a two-edged sword: for
black colleges seeking enhancement of their campuses to 
compensate for historical patterns of discrimination as well 
as to facilitate their attempts to adapt their missions to 
social change, the ASTA remedy did not require the states to
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do so; in fact, it could be argued that enhancing black 
schools constituted discrimination in favor of such insti­
tutions that violated the color-blind spirit of ASTA. On the 
other hand, supporters of black colleges were deeply troubled 
by Norris7 interpretation of the Green standard. The language 
of Norris, specifically the statement that the state's 
responsibility was to "convert its white colleges and black 
colleges to just colleges," raised the specter that desegre­
gation in higher education might mean the elimination of 
black public colleges.
The Supreme Court refused to grant either case a full 
hearing; instead, the Court summarily affirmed the decisions 
of the lower courts (393 U.S. 4 [1969]; 404 U.S. 907 [1971]). 
Apparently, the Court believed that the issues presented in 
ASTA and Norris were not fundamentally different from those 
the justices had already addressed in the public school 
context. Lower federal judges, lacking precedent from the 
Supreme Court, were forced to tackle the question of 
interpreting the mandate of Green in higher education alone. 
Thus, they continued to rely on precedents set in public 
school desegregation cases for guidance.
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburo Board of Education (402 
U.S. 1 [1971]) illustrated that the problem of applying
public school desegregation precedents to higher education 
was far from clear-cut. In Swann, the Supreme Court attempted 
to further clarify the "affirmative duty" announced in Green.
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Federal courts, the justices announced, had broad "equitable 
powers" to remedy constitutional violations, and they vali­
dated the use of a variety of methods (including certain 
types of racial quotas, majority-to-minority transfer 
programs, the rearrangement of attendence zones, and busing) 
to effectuate desegregation. In subsequent cases, the Supreme 
Court made it clear that the mandate of Brown also applied to 
Northern and Western school systems as well; despite the fact 
that many of these systems had no statutory history of racial 
discrimination in public education, the Court determined that 
the existence of de facto segregation made them subject to 
Brown.47
Nevertheless, the ambiguity of Brown's application to 
higher education persisted, despite the Court's more 
agressive and interventionist posture. For example, the Court 
in Swann made it clear that a school's identity should not be 
reflected in the racial composition of the faculty, the 
quality of its facilities and equipment, or the sports 
activities of the school (402 U.S. 1, 18 [1971]). Such a
situation, the Court warned, would consitute a prima facie 
case of violation of constitutional rights (Ibid, 18) . On 
this score, Swann harmonized the spirit of Green which set 
forth the goal of creating school systems that did not have
47Examples include Keyes v. School District No. 1. 413 
U.S. 189 (1973), Columbus Board of Education v. Penick. 443 
U.S. 449 (1979), and Davton Board of Education v. Brinkman. 
443 U.S. 326 (1979)
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"white schools" and "black schools" but "just schools." In 
essence, Swann declared that continued racial identifiability 
of public schools - and by extension, colleges - created the 
presumption of a constitutional violation. Therefore, the 
very fact that a college was "black" made it vulnerable to 
constitutional challenge. Secondly, the Court affirmed that 
federal judges had broad equity powers in desegregation 
cases. Concerns about the continued racial identif iability of 
universities and Swann's affirmation of the "broad equitable 
powers" of federal judges provided the rationale for Geier v. 
Blanton (427 F. Supp. 644 [M.D. Tenn. 1977]) and United
States v. Louisiana (718 F. Supp. 499 [E.D. La. 1989]) where 
district courts ordered the merger of black and white insti­
tutions after concluding that previous efforts had failed to 
produce significant progress toward integration.48
However, Swann disavowed a "substantive constitutional 
right" to a particular racial balance, making it unclear what
48In Geier. the district court ordered the merger of 
histo-rically black Tennessee State University (TSU) with the 
University of Tennessee-Nashville (UT-N), a cross-town white 
school, with TSU emerging as the surviving institution. 
Though conceding that merger was a "radical remedy," it felt 
that this option did not exceed the remedial power of the 
court. The Geier court relied on Swan's reasoning to justify 
merging the two institutions. The merger was upheld on appeal 
(579 F.2d. 1056 [6th Cir. 1979]), cert, denied, 444 U.S. 886 
(1979) . In the Louisiana case, the district court ordered, as 
part of a radical overhaul of the higher education system, 
the merger of Louisiana State University Law Center (97% 
white, 3% black) with Southern University Law Center (58% 
black, 42% white), with LSU as the surviving institution. 
However, the court was forced to reverse itself following a 
ruling by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals on the Missis­
sippi higher education case (914 F.2d. 676 [5th Cir. 1990]).
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an integrated school, or an integrated school system, should 
look like. Was 10 percent black enrollment enough? Or should 
it be twenty? Thirty? Swann's lack of clarity on this issue 
made it unclear how this precedent applied in the context of 
higher education, where federal judges, state legislatures, 
and educational officials had to figure out what to do with 
black colleges. Should Brown and its progeny be targeted only 
at state-enforced racial segregation? Or was racial separtism 
so invidious in and of itself that government was obligated 
to dismantle it, regardless of its cause?
Therefore, the status of the black public university, 
two decades after Brown. was far from clear. On one hand, 
these universities existed partly because, despite increasing 
black enrollments on white campuses, many African Americans 
still found white academic communities to be both unfriendly 
and uncomfortable. Hostility to integration, though often 
manifesting itself in less obvious forms than in the 1950 's 
and early 1960's, was still very real. On the other hand, the 
NAACP's integrationist ideology threatened the very existence 
of black institutions because it equated superior education 
with education in a mixed setting. Black college leaders by 
the 1970's were increasingly defining the goal of desegre­
gation in terms of enhancing black institutions whereby they 
could expand their missions in ways that would enable them to 
serve all students, regardless of race. These competing 
versions of the meaning of Brown for higher education finally
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led to a direct confrontation between the NAACP and the 
National Association for Equal Opportunity in Higher 
Education (NAFEO) in the case of Adams v. Richardson (356 F. 
Supp. 92 [D.C.D., 1973]). The Adams case is the subject of 
the concluding section of this chapter.
Adams and the Concept of Equal Educational Opportunity
The Adams case commenced in 1970 when the NAACP Legal 
Defense Fund (LDF) filed suit against the U.S. Department of 
Health, Education, and Welfare.49 The LDF accused the agency 
of failing to enforce Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 forbidding racial discrimination in programs receiving
49The NAACP Legal Defense Fund was established to 
coordinate the NAACP's legal campaign against segregation in 
1939. In its early years, it worked closely with the NAACP's 
leadership. Often, board members held joint memberships on 
the NAACP's Board of Direc-tors and the LDF's Board of 
Directors. This arrangement, in the wake of the Brown 
decision, became untenable, as the operations of the NAACP 
were subjected to intense scrutiny by the organization's 
enemies. Southern district attorneys and attorney generals 
accused LDF lawyers with "fermenting litigtion" (manufac­
turing legal business by advising or causing actions likely 
to produce lawsuits and then participating as the attorneys 
on record in the cases; in the legal profession, this is 
grounds for disbarrment.). In addition, Southern congressmen 
complained about the fact that board members sat on both the 
NAACP's Board and the LDF. They wanted the Bureau of Internal 
Revenue to investigate whether the NAACP and LDF were 
violating tax laws by accepting contributions as non-profit 
organi-zations and using them for political purposes. In the 
face of these pressures, many of the NAACP's leaders feared 
that their ability to bring test cases would be hampered 
without a formal severing of corporate ties between the NAACP 
and the Legal Defense Fund. Thus, in 1957, the NAACP and the 
NAACP Legal Defense Fund formally became two distinct 
corporate entities (Morris, 1984; Ware, 1994).
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federal financial assistance. The HEW had found ten states50 
operating dual systems of education in violation of the law; 
however, the agency had annnounced that it would not use 
threats of cutoffs in federal aid to prod state and local 
officials to desegregate. Since the threat of fund termina­
tions had been credited with encouraging states to speed up 
efforts to desegregate since 1964, the move was seen as a 
slowdown in enforcement efforts by the federal government to 
effect desegregation (Orfield, 1969; Preer, 1982, 198). The 
suit combined all levels of education and charged HEW with a 
"general and calculated neglect" to enforce the law (Preer, 
1982, 198) . HEW rebutted that it had upheld the provisions of 
the law by seeking voluntary compliance (Ibid, 201). The 
district court did not agree with HEW, and ordered the agency 
in Adams v. Richardson to commence enforcement actions within 
120 days (356 F. Supp. D.C.D. [1973]).
The Adams case signaled a fundamental shift in the Legal 
Defense Fund's approach to desegregation in higher education. 
Previous lawsuits concentrated on the rights of African 
Americans to attend specific universities. The suits had
50The Adams states were Louisiana, Mississippi, Oklahoma, 
North Carolina, Florida, Arkansas, Pennsylvania, Georgia, 
Maryland, and Virginia. The Adams case testified to the 
unevenness of federal enforcement efforts during the period. 
Not all the states with historically black colleges received 
notices nor were required to submit desegregation plans; 
Texas, South Carolina, and Alabama were not notified by HEW 
that they were in violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 until 1980 (356 F. Supp. 92, 100; Preer, 1982, 
196) .
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pursued integration on a school-by-school basis. The Adams 
lawsuit recognized the increasingly systemic organization of 
higher education and the need for systemic solutions to the 
problems of racial discrimination. Ironically, it was the 
NAACP that refused to consider systemic solutions fourteen 
years earlier in the Hawkins case; rather, it viewed Flo­
rida's insistence that an impact study of the effects that 
desegregation might have on the state's educational system 
merely as a stalling tactic. Invoking the letter of Green, 
the NAACP argued that states needed to dismantle segregated 
school systems "root and branch" and remedies which only 
focused on specific universities failed to meet the state's 
"affirmative duty" to desegregate. Now it was the NAACP that 
was advocating institutional remedies (Preer, 1982, 141-142; 
198-200) .
The fact that the LDF's lawsuit encompassed all levels 
of education (thus assuming that a single legal standard 
applied to all) caused great consternation among black 
college presidents, who feared the Adams ruling might lead to 
the dismantling of black public colleges.51 The NAFEO 
submitted an amicus curiae brief with the Court of Appeals
51Black college presidents and educators were not alone; 
while Adams v. Richardson navigated through the courts, the 
future of black colleges was widely debated in other social 
arenas. For example, the first National Black Convention, 
meeting in Gary, Indiana in March, 1972, took a stand against 
the merger of black and white state colleges. Rev. Jesse 
Jackson, leader of Operation PUSH, sponsored Black Expo, with 
the theme "Save the Black College" (Preer, 1982, 205).
R eproduced  with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
1 8 9
for the District of Columbia in April, 1973. The NAFEO's 
brief constituted a fundamental broadside on the NAACP's 
position. At the core of the NAFEO's argument was the 
contention that, contrary to the NAACP's reasoning, the Green 
standard did not apply in higher education. The NAFEO sought 
to refute three of the Legal Defense Fund's basic premises: 
(1) whether public school precedents provide suitable 
standards for higher education; (2) whether black colleges 
could be implicated in systemwide discrimination; (3) whether 
eliminating the racial identity of state colleges promised to 
enhance educational opportunities for black students (Ibid, 
202) . Black colleges, the NAFEO insisted, were not the 
perpetuators of discrimination; rather, they were its vic­
tims. It objected to the suggestion that black colleges were 
guilty of maintaining unnecessary program duplication and 
therefore should be merged into unitary systems of higher 
education. In other words, the NAFEO brief asserted that 
blacks should not be forced to abandon the tangible benefits 
of maintaining black colleges in favor of the hypothetical 
and uncertain advantages of an integrated system:
The Black Institutions of Higher Education have served 
and continue to serve as the bridge between a crippling 
and debilitating elementary and secondary educational 
system to which Brown itself was directed because of the 
experience with the equal education cases from Murray to 
Sweatt in the field of higher education. This experience 
demonstrated that equality of educational attainment 
could not be achieved until the feeder system of the 
secondary and elementary levels had been improved for 
black students. Eighteen years after Brown, with a 
general consensus that this feeder system has not been 
improved— and maybe has lost ground,. . . the assimi­
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lation of the Black Institutions of Higher Learning 
would be to remove the wooden beam in order to replace 
it with a steel or cement support before the new beam 
is in place, leaving the structure unsupported at all 
(NAFEO Motion to Intervene as Amicus Curiae, in Haynes 
III, 1978, C—23 - C—24).
The Court of Appeals upheld the decision of the district 
court, reaffirming the finding that HEW's enforcement efforts 
had been insufficient (480 F.2d. 1159 [1973]). It accepted 
the LDF's conception of the problem as systemic, requiring 
coordinated statewide efforts in order to remedy. However, 
the Court of Appeals suggested that states consider the role 
that historically black colleges have played in providing 
educational opportunities for black students:
A predicate for minority access to quality post­
graduate programs is viable, co-ordinated state-wide 
higher education policy that takes into account the 
special problems of minority students and of Black 
colleges. These Black institutions currently fulfill 
a crucial need and will continue to play an important 
role in Black higher education (Ibid, 1164).
The district court in Adams v. Califano52 was even more
emphatic about the role of black colleges:
The process of desegregation must not place a 
greater burden on Black institutions or Black students' 
opportunity to receive a quality higher education. The 
desegregation process should take into account the
52Following the Court of Appeals' decision in Adams v. 
Richardson, eight states submitted desegregation plans to 
HEW, and the Office of Civil Rights (OCR) accepted them. The 
NAACP Legal Defense Fund sued for further relief, charging 
that the plans accepted by HEW were deficient and failed to 
meet Title VI requirements. HEW contended that it was 
inexperienced in higher education matters; the district 
court, nevertheless, ordered HEW in Adams v. Califano (43 0 F. 
Supp. 118 [1977]) to develop criteria specifying the
components of acceptable desegregation plans for state 
systems of higher education.
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unequal status of the Black colleges and the real danger 
that desegregation will diminish higher educational 
opportunities for Blacks. Without suggesting the 
answer to this complex problem, it is the responsi­
bility of HEW to devise criteria for higher education 
desegregation plans which will take into account the 
unique importance of Black colleges and at the same 
time comply with the Congressional mandate (430 F. Supp. 
118, 120).
The Adams cases represented the first time that federal 
judges incorporated in their decisions special consideration 
for the impact that desegregation might have on black public 
colleges. Though not resolving the constitutional dilemma of 
black colleges by any means, the Adams decisions constituted 
a significant victory for black educators concerned that the 
price of desegregation would be the extermination of black 
colleges. Many of the black college presidents' concerns were 
reflected in HEW's higher education desegregation criteria, 
promulgated in 1978 pursuant to Adams v. Califano. The HEW 
Criteria required the following components to statewide 
desegregation plans: (1) the state would define the mission 
of each institution within the higher education system; (2) 
a description of planned improvements for black institutions, 
including the dollar amounts and timetables for these 
improvements; (3) the elimination of unnecessary program 
duplication in a way that is consistent with strengthening 
the mission of black institutions; (4) priority conside­
ration for the placement of new, high demand progams should 
be given to black institutions; and (5) the withholding of 
state approval from any changes within the higher education
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system which may thwart or undermine the goal of desegre­
gation (U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare,
1978).
Thus, the tension between ASTA, Norris. and Adams have 
formed the legal cornerstone of subsequent higher education 
desegregation battles in the absence of guidance from the 
Supreme Court. ASTA interpreted the Green standard very 
narrowly, restricting the "affirmative duty to desegregate" 
to the promulgation of nondiscriminatory admissions and 
hiring practices. Norris interpreted Green's mandate for 
higher education more broadly, insisting that though, remedial 
options may differ, the standard applied with equal force. 
Norris raised the question of whether the state's charge to 
transform its colleges to "just colleges" precluded the 
existence of black public universities. Adams cautioned 
states to consider the role of black public colleges when 
developing statewide desegregation plans. Adams suggested 
that Green's "just schools" standard, which did not consider 
if majority black public schools serve any beneficial 
societal roles, may be inappropriate in the context of higher 
education.
The Adams cases also illustrated the growing rift 
between the LDF's endorsement of integration at all costs and 
the reservations of other interest groups within the black 
community about the wisdom of this approach. The debate raged 
even within the NAACP itself. At the association's 1973
Reproduced  with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
1 9 3
annual meeting, the national leadership introduced a resolu­
tion calling for mergers to achieve desegregation. After much 
discussion, the title of the resolution was changed from 
"Merger of State Supported Colleges" to "Desegregation of 
State Colleges" (Preer, 1982, 205). The compromise reflected 
the lack of consensus within the NAACP's rank-and-file 
membership on the definition of desegregation.53 Though the 
revised wording represented a clear compromise in light of 
dissension within the ranks, Executive Secretary Roy Wilkins 
nevertheless insisted, "There is nothing at variance in 
association policy in calling for desegregation of state
^Nevertheless, despite their awareness of the opposition 
of many blacks to further desegregation efforts as well as 
dissension within their own ranks, the NAACP backed a 1974 
Louisiana plan that proposed the merger of Louisiana State 
University and Southern University and historically white 
Louisiana Tech with historically black Grambling College. Roy 
Wilkins declared that the issue of integration in higher 
education was no different than in the case of the public 
schools (Preer, 1982, 205). After the Supreme Court refused 
to stay the merger of Tennessee State University and the 
University of Tennessee-Nashville, the Legal Defense Fund 
announced its intention to seek the merger of black and white 
state colleges in other Southern cities (Ibid, 221). In 1979, 
on the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Brown decision, 
Kenneth Clark took an uncompromising stance on integration. 
He wrote:
There has been no evidence to refute what the Court 
said in Brown: "separate educational facilities are
inherently unequal." Whatever might have been the value 
of black colleges in the seventeenth century and up to 
World War II, their continuation - particularly state- 
supported, publicly funded colleges - is a flagrant 
violation of the letter, the spirit, and the goals of 
the Brown decision. It marks a return to Plessv v. Fer­
guson. Black colleges and white colleges are educational 
anachronisms (Clark, 1979, 8).
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supported systems. Under desegregation, any kind of operation 
that would desegregate those faciliies would be acceptable" 
(Ibid, 205).
However, many African Americans accused the NAACP of 
trying to exterminate black colleges. Because of the histo­
rical link between the NAACP and the NAACP Legal Defense 
Fund, many African Americans continued to view these two 
organizations as if they were synonymous, despite the fact 
that they had been formally separated for years. Thus, the 
very organization which had been synonymous with the fight 
for equal rights for African Americans stood accused, at 
least in some quarters of the black community, with racial 
treason. By endorsing remedies that threatened the existence 
of black colleges, their critics within the black community 
accused them of being out of step with what was in the best 
interests of African Americans.
Actually, the NAACP was internally divided. Those within 
the NAACP who believed that Brown was intended to eliminate 
all racial segregation (regardless of its cause or its pur­
ported benefits) did not take kindly to be portrayed in this 
manner. They held to the view that separate education would 
always be inferior education because white state legisla­
tures would never treat black schools equally (Clark, 1979; 
Wilkinson, 1979; Bell, 1979). While many pure integrationists 
recognized many of the problems associated with integration 
that their critics had identified, they nevertheless con-
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eluded that integration's benefits far outweighted its 
liabilities (Armor, 1995) . Conversely, many feared that 
integration might become an excuse for states to simply 
eliminate black colleges without improving black access to 
higher education. Some NAACP officials recognized that the 
organization was losing ground in the black community because 
of the Adams case. They pointed out that the LDF, not the 
NAACP, had initiated the Adams case, and accused the LDF of 
damaging the NAACP's reputation with the black community.54
Nonetheless, the criticism reflected the disillusionment 
felt by many blacks with legal efforts to enforce the Brown 
decision and the sense that integration itself had actually 
proved to be disastrous for the black population (Bell, 
1975) . It also served as an example of the tendency noted by 
Dawson (1995) of a public community censoring those seen as
^The Adams case became part of a long simmering feud 
that had been developing between the NAACP and the NAACP 
Legal Defense Fund for years. Though both organizations are 
viewed synonymously in the eyes of the public, they had 
actually been pursuing two different agendas for quite some 
time. However, because of that public per-ception, the NAACP 
was unable to compete financially with the NAACP Legal 
Defense Fund. Many donors assumed that giving to one of the 
organizations was as good as giving to the other. In 
addition, the the NAACP accused the LDF of initiating suits 
(including Adams) in the NAACP's name without consulting with 
the organization's leader-ship. For years, NAACP officials 
demanded that the LDF drop the NAACP initials in front of its 
name to avoid confusion in the public mind. Relations between 
the two organizations turned icy in the late 1970's and early 
1980's. Finally, the NAACP sued the NAACP Legal Defense Fund 
to try to force the LDF to relinquish its ini-tials; the suit 
was ultimately unsuccessful (Ware, 1994; NAACP v. NAACP Legal 
Defense and Educational Fund. 559 F. Supp. 1337 (D.C.D.C.
[1983]); rev'd 753 F. 2d. 131 (1985), cert, denied, 472 U.S. 
1021 (1985) .
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attacking perceived black interests. Ironically, Brown. aimed 
at eradicating separate but equal in education, failed to 
destroy the allure of Plessy; the very decision that had 
victimized blacks could now be summoned to support a new 
version of "separate but equal" (Bell, 1975; Wilkinson,
1979) .
The ambivalence in black America over integration, as 
well as the unsettled state of the law with respect to the 
requirements for desegregation in higher education, set the 
backdrop for the Mississippi case. The litigation, initiated 
in 1975 by the Black Mississippians' Council on Higher 
Education, stemmed from the frustration of black plaintiffs 
with the Legal Defense Fund's handling of the Adams case and 
their concern that the desegregation process would result in 
the elimination of black colleges. Chapter Four focuses on 
the history of United States v. Fordice.
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CHAPTER 4. UNITED STATES V. FORDICE
Public Education and Racial Politics
Knowledge unfits a child to be a slave (Douglass, 
1962, 79).
Gunnar Myrdal observed that education has played an 
especially significant role in American thought and culture. 
He wrote:
Education has always been the great hope for both indi­
vidual and society. In the American Creed it has been 
the main ground upon which "equality of opportunity for 
the individual" and "free outlet for ability" could be 
based. Education has also been considered as the best 
way - and the way most compatible with American indivi­
dualistic ideals - to improve society (1944, 882).
In Chapter One, I argued that the American faith in the 
power of education represents one of the most powerful deduc­
tions from the Lockean settlement. American education is 
premised on the idea that the United States is a meritocratic 
society where persons are free to rise and fall based on 
their own efforts. Thus, according to Allen and Jewell 
(1994), when one achieves educationally, it is presumed that 
he or she is adding to his or her "human, social and cultural 
capital" in a way that enhances his or her economic value 
(178) . At the same time, the public school represents one of 
the chief institutions charged with instilling democratic 
values to each succeeding generation; it is also assumed to 
play an instrumental role in "assimilating" new arrivals into 
mainstream American culture. Social reform movements typic­
ally appeal to education to effect change in American society
197
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(Myrdal 1944; Cremin, 1989; Reitman, 1992). Viewed in this 
light, the Brown decision should be seen as an example of the 
American tendency to use education as the instrument to bring 
about social change - in this case, in the area of race rela­
tions (Arendt, 1958; Wilkinson, 1979).
It was also argued that the existence of slavery in the 
Southern United States politicized the importance of educa­
tion for African Americans in a way that distinguishes them 
from the nation's majority population. "Education," Wendy 
Brown writes, "remains the essential element for liberation 
from social and economic subordination in the black commun­
ity" (1992, 121). Dr. Beverly Cole, the National Director of 
Education for the NAACP, concurs:
We [meaning African Americans] have always regarded 
education as our blueprint for survival. Since before 
the Civil War when every slave state had laws against 
blacks learning to read and write, those actions sig­
naled to the African American community the absolute 
importance of education, and we have been struggling 
to obtain access to a quality education ever since 
(1991, 23) .
Therefore, the struggle to obtain equal access to educational 
opportunities has occupied a central place in African Ameri­
can liberation movements in the United States. Education, for 
African Americans, should bring them closer to freedom. 
Conversely, because Southern planters viewed the education of 
slaves as a threat to the institution of slavery, the coming 
of tax-supported universal education in the South would have 
to wait until the end of the Civil War. If education "is the 
great equalizer of the conditions of men" (Mann, 1849, 59),
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Southern whites seemed determined to nullify its potential to 
make the ex-slaves the social equals of whites. Consequently, 
Southern aristocracy demonstrated their faith in education by 
their unwillingness to educate their slaves.
The South's defeat in the Civil War hardly softened the 
hostility of many Southerners toward public education, and 
perhaps no state better exemplified Southern antipathy toward 
public education than Mississippi. In fact, no state spent 
less on black education than Mississippi (McMillen, 1990, 
73) ; thus, it provides a classic case study of how racial 
considerations have profoundly shaped the politics of educa­
tion in America. Black Mississippians, like blacks elsewhere, 
have seen access to education as a crucial component in the 
struggle to equalize their life chances. Consequently, when 
a group of black plaintiffs initiated the lawsuit that ulti­
mately became United States v. Fordice. it represented the 
most recent chapter in the struggle of black Mississippians 
for equal educational opportunity.
This chapter begins by tracing the development of the 
"separate but equal" system of higher education in the state 
of Mississippi. This is followed by a discussion of the 
period between the state's campaign of massive resistance to 
the Brown decision to the filing of the Avers suit by the 
Black Mississippians Council of Higher Education. Third, this 
chapter locates the Mississippi case within the context of 
the increasing polarization of racial politics in America.
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Fourth, I examine the arguments raised by the parties in the 
suit and demonstrate how the opposing sides linked their 
cases to critical aspects of the American Creed. Finally, 
this chapter concludes with a discussion of the Court's deci­
sion in Fordice.
Mississippi Higher Education: Separate and Unequal
While Northern and Western states were moving toward 
tax-supported education, the Southern planter class remained 
either indifferent or openly hostile. Mississippi aristocrats 
were no different than the rest of their Southern brethren in 
their contempt for the common school movement. In general, 
opposition to the idea came from evangelical clergymen who 
regarded the "encroachment of scientific discoveries upon 
sacred mysteries with profound intolerance" and southern 
gentry who simply felt that education was a luxury, not a 
right, and one which should be indulged by those who could 
afford to pay for it (Sansing, 1990, 34).
Two factors broke the political gridlock that prevented 
the establishment of a public university in Mississippi: 
first, the Panic of 1837 eroded the financial base of pri­
vate-supported seminary education, thereby weakening the 
position of the evangelicals. Secondly, the growing sectional 
dispute over slavery increased the pressure on Southern 
states to "educate her sons at home." Thus, the state legis­
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lature chartered the University of Mississippi in Oxford in 
1844 and designated it by statute to serve whites only (Ibid, 
34-35).
The South's defeat in the Civil War forced white Missi­
ssippians to face the possibility that the former slaves - 
whom they deemed as their "social inferiors" - might now be 
able to enjoy the same rights that white men considered as 
their Lockian birthright. Perhaps nothing horrified white 
Mississippians more than the idea of blacks exercising the 
right to vote - especially in light of the fact that African 
Americans constituted 54 percent of the state's population in 
1870 (McMillen, 1990, 37). Provisional Governor William L.
Sharky declared in 18 65 that even if it were limited to the 
most educated and propertied blacks, enfranchisement was 
impossible in Mississippi; General William T. Sherman doubted 
that black suffrage could be imposed by force (Ibid, 36) . 
That same year, many whites were terrified when a group of 
Vicksburg blacks petitioned Congress for the right to vote 
(Ibid, 36-37) . An influential Democratic editor predicted 
that the enfranchisement of blacks would produce only one of 
two results: white exodus from the state or a race war (Ibid, 
37) .
However, despite their opposition, white Mississippians 
were unable to prevent blacks from entering the body politic, 
at least in the short run. The Reconstruction Act of 1867 
made black Mississippians eligible voters for the first time,
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and they helped to draft a new constitution. On the basis of 
this new constitution, Mississippi was readmitted to the 
Union in 1870 (Ibid, 37). In 1870, black legislators coalesed 
with northern Republicans and southern "scalawags" to create, 
for the first time, a public education system, albeit on a 
racially segregated basis (McMillen, 1990, 75; Sansing, 1990, 
56-62). The legislature agreed to provide stipends of $100 
each to college students who choose to teach in the new 
system and to reorganize the state university. Since the 
University of Mississippi had been set aside for whites, 
these efforts raised the question of state-supported higher 
education for blacks.
In 1870, there were two private colleges in Mississippi 
providing higher education for blacks: Shaw University and 
Tougaloo Normal and Manual Training School (Sansing, 199 0, 
61; Jenkins, 1983, 275-276; McMillen, 1990, 101). Shaw, 
established by the Misssissippi Conference of the Methodist 
Episcopal Church at Holly Springs in 18 66, included a commer­
cial institute and a medical school in addition to the 
traditional liberal arts curriculum (Sansing, 1990, 61). In 
1890, it changed its name to Rust University and subsequently 
to Rust College. Tougaloo55 was established in Jackson, Mis­
sissippi by the American Missionary Society and the Freed­
55Its name was changed to Tougaloo University in 1871. In 
1916, it was renamed Tougaloo College and in 1953, the 
school's name was changed to Tougaloo Southern Christian 
College (McMillen, 1990, 101).
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man's Bureau in 1869. Both schools received small state 
subsidies; thus, they were "quasi-public" institutions until 
the state's Constitution of 1890 banned the use of public 
funds for private institutions (Sansing, 1990, 62; Jenkins, 
1983, 275-276).
The ex-slaves' passion for learning made many white 
Mississippians uneasy. Judge Robert S. Hudson of Yazoo City, 
in an open letter to Chancellor John Newton Waddell of the 
University of Mississippi asked, "Will the faculty as now 
composed, receive or reject an appllicant for admission as a 
student on account of color?" Waddell and the faculty 
responded that they would be "governed by consideration of 
race and color" and would "instantly resign should the trus­
tees require them to receive negro students" (Sansing, 1990, 
62). Their exchange was widely circulated in the Mississippi 
press and stimulated numerous comments. The Jackson Clarion 
wrote of the faculty: "We warmly endorse their stand" (Ibid, 
62). However, Governor James Alcorn branded Hudson's letter 
as the "stuff of political hucksters" and chided the "obse­
quious faculty" for allowing "such a man as Judge Hudson" to 
intimidate them. He added that they were at liberty to resign 
at any time (Garner, quoted in Sansing, 1990, 62).
The controversy over educational equality gave a sense 
of urgency to establishing a state-supported university for 
blacks only. In May, 1871, Alcorn University was founded on 
the old campus of Oakland College, which ironically, had been
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an antebellum liberal arts school for the sons of planters 
(Sansing, 1990, 63; Jenkins, 1983, 278; Thompson, 1989;
McMillen, 1990, 103; Blake, 1991, 540). Alcorn was designated 
as the state's black land grant college - the first black 
institution so designated in the South.56 While black leaders 
initially preferred the integration of the University of 
Mississippi over the establishment of a separate black 
school, they were won over by the state's generous support 
for Alcorn during its early years (McMillen, 1990, 103). The 
legislature promised to appropriate a sum of $50,000 to 
Alcorn annually over the next ten years and the governor 
appointed an all-black board of trustees. In addition, the 
state was to provide the same number of scholarships for 
Alcorn that it provided for the University of Mississippi.
56The Morrill Act of 1862 providing for the establishment 
of land grant colleges marked a watershed in the history of 
American education. Before the Civil War, higher education in 
America had been restricted to private, sectarian institu­
tions serving only the wealthy and professional classes and 
offering a classical curri- culum to train the chilren of the 
privileged for leadership posi-tions in society. The land 
grant colleges represented a rejection of both purely clas­
sical education in favor of a scientific and practical 
curriculum and a democratization of American higher educa­
tion. By the turn of the century, these colleges had assumed 
a major role in making higher education more broadly acces­
sible to the working classes and in training the leaders of 
agriculture, industry, and science. Alcorn was only one of 
three black insti-tutions designated as a land grant college 
until the Second Morrill Act of 1890 extended the mandate to 
black schools. Though the new law required states to "equit­
ably" apportion federal funds to land grant schools, in 
reality, black land grant colleges were woefully underfunded 
in relation to their white counterparts throughout the Plessy 
era (Kujovik, 1987; Sansing, 1990, 62; K. Alexander and M. D. 
Alexander, 1985, 55-58; Presidents of 1890 Land-Grant
Colleges and Universities, 1980; McMillen, 1990, 103-106).
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Furthermore, the institution was to receive 60 percent of the 
state's land-grant appropriation funds pursuant to the First 
Morrill Act based on the fact that blacks were the majority 
of the state's population (Jenkins, 1983, 278; Sansing, 1990, 
64; McMillen, 1990, 103). As a testament to the importance
that black Mississippians attached to education, Hiram 
Revels, the black United States Senator from that state, 
resigned his seat in Congress to become the university's 
first president (Blake, 1991, 540-541).
Alcorn's political good fortunes, however, would not 
last very long. The waning of Republican commitment to 
educational parity for blacks and the reassertion of 
Democratic control of the legislature in 1874 would put black 
and white public higher education on two distinct paths. In 
1875, Alcorn University's state appropriation was drastically 
reduced to $15,000 annually, an omen of things to come 
(Jenkins, 1983, 278; McMillen, 1990, 103). In 1876, its all­
black board of trustees was replaced by one composed of 
whites only (McMillen, 199 0, 103). The Democratic legislature 
reduced Alcorn's share of the state's land-grant funds from 
three-fifths to one half; in that same year, the state also 
abolished the $100 stipends for scholarship students. Between 
1876 and 1890, Mississippi appropriated only $82,140 to 
Alcorn, an average of only $5,476 annually (Mayes, quoted in 
Jenkins, 1983, 280).
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By systemmatically undermining Alcorn's financial base 
and appointing an all-white board, the state of Mississippi 
made its purpose abundantly clear: it intended to provide an 
institution for blacks of inferior quality designed to frus­
trate the efforts of black Mississippians to compete for the 
same educational and economic opportunities that whites took 
as their Lockian birthrights. In 1878, the state revoked 
Alcorn University's original charter and a new charter 
reestablished the institution as Alcorn Agricultural and 
Mechanical College. The striking of the term "university" 
from Alcorn's name was deliberate; the state intended to 
relegate Alcorn to the status of a "vocational, agricultural, 
and trade-oriented curriculum of questionable collegiate 
quality" that could not compete with the University of 
Mississippi (Blake, 1991, 540) . The same statute changing
Alcorn's charter provided for the creation of Mississippi 
Agricultural and Mechanical College (now Mississippi State 
University) in Starkville. This new institution assumed the 
land-grant functions for the state previously provided by the 
University of Mississippi. Though the state technically had 
two land-grant institutions, it only funded one: as time
unfolded, Alcorn became a land-grant institution in name 
only. Finally, the state legislature allowed Alcorn's 
physical plant to deteriorate by official neglect (Sansing, 
1990, 64).
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Southern Democrats would not have been able to enact 
these reversals in black educational gains in the absence of 
a political climate characterized by growing disinterest in 
the plight of the ex-slave. As it was argued in Chapter Two, 
by the 1870's Northern public opinion had tired itself of the 
problems of the Negro, and many were content to let the South 
resolve the problems related to the future status of African 
Americans in its own way (Bullock, 1967; Woodward, 1974; Klu- 
ger, 1975; Marable, 1982; Quarles, 1987; McMillen, 1990). 
Following the return of "home rule" in Mississippi, some 
whites wanted to abolish public education altogether, viewing 
it as a "Yankee innovation" that had been imposed on them 
against their will (McMillen, 1990, 75) . However, "cooler
heads" prevailed; many conservative lawmakers determined that 
such drastic action would be imprudent in that it ran the 
risk of triggering massive black resistance and inviting 
northern intervention into their affairs (Anderson, 1988, 27; 
McMillen, 1990, 75) . Moreover, the ex-slaves' school cam­
paigns had ignited interest among the classes of poor whites 
for universal education (Anderson, 1988, 27). Practical
political concerns prevented the most extreme factions from 
wiping out public education altogether. However, the state 
did, significantly reduce support for public education and - 
to the extent that the state supported public schools, it was 
primarily directed toward benefiting whites at the black 
man's expense. At the turn of the century, African Americans
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represented 60 percent of the state's school aged population, 
but black schools only received 19 percent of the state's 
funds (McMillen, 1990, 73). In 1899, A. A. Kincannon, State 
Superintendent of Education, described state educational 
policy with respect to the black race rather succintly when 
he said:
It will be readily admitted by every white man in 
Mississippi that our public school system is designed 
primarily for the welfare of the white children of the 
state, and incidentally for the negro chidren (quoted in 
McMillen, 1990, 72).
Many white Mississippians believed (as whites elsewhere) 
that blacks were intellectually inferior to whites, and were 
skeptical that providing education would improve the plight 
of ex-slaves. Some whites resented the very idea of being 
taxed to support black education, countering that blacks 
should pay for their own schools. However, lurking behind the 
appeals to white supremacy were practical concerns that 
educating blacks would destabilize the racial status quo of 
the state. Mississippi Governor James Vardeman expressed 
white fears very well in 1899 when he said:
In educating the negro we implant in him all manner 
and ambitions which we then refuse to allow him to gra­
tify. It would be impossible for a negro in Mississippi 
to be elected as much as a justice of the peace. . . . 
Yet people talk about elevating the race by education! 
It is not only folly, but it comes pretty nearly being 
criminal folly. The negro isn't permitted to advance and 
their education only spoils a good field hand and makes 
a shyster lawyer or a fourth-rate teacher. It is money 
thrown away (quoted in McMillen, 1990, 72).
By limiting the quality of black education, the state's
white minority hoped to cripple the pollitical aspirations of
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African Americans, inhibit the ability of blacks to compete 
with whites economically, and to insure a low-skilled, menial 
labor force (Ibid, 73). When discussions about black educa­
tion took place among white Mississippians, one of the 
principal concerns was the "right kind of education for the 
Negro" - one that did not disturb the racial hierarchy of the 
state. For this reason, state lawmakers let a proposal to 
divide taxes along racial lines die for the purposes of 
public education. Under this proposal, taxes levied on white 
taxypayers for public education would be spent only on white 
schools; similarly, black schools would be financed only with 
taxes from black citizens. Supporters of the proposition 
maintained that it was consistent with the Plessv decision as 
well as white hostility toward being taxed for black schools. 
However, the proposal was defeated because of fears that 
expenditures to black schools might have actually increased 
(Ibid, 76-78). In the final analysis, black Mississippians 
ended up being taxed to support white public schools, despite 
the fact that they were legally barred from attending those 
very institutions (Ibid, 78-79). In summary, while white 
Mississipians were unable to completely eliminate the 
educational gains made by blacks as a result of Reconstruc­
tion, they nevertheless devoted themselves to efforts to 
direct the character of black education so that it would not 
disturb the settled nature of white hegemony in the state. 
They were determined to keep the former slaves, as well as
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their descendents, in a subordinate role in the state's 
postbellum political and economic order.
Nevertheless, Alcorn's black leadership persisted in the 
goal of creating the best liberal arts college and high 
school they could in spite of the state's intentions. McMil­
len (1990) noted:
Its first president, Hiram Revels (1871-1882), 
whatever his administrative shortcomings, was educated 
in the classical tradition and he staffed the institu- 
tution with black men much like himself, most of them 
graduates of Fisk University. Its first generation of 
students wrestled with Latin and Greek as well as with 
English literature, trigonometry, and chemistry. Its 
redesignation as an A&M college meant little; the pro­
fessors and the curriculum remained the same and when 
Revels retired he was followed by a succession of other 
liberally trained black educators who did not share 
white notions about black academic limitations (103).
Often this required the institution's administrators to
deliberately lie to state officials to avoid offending white
sensibilities. They emphasized that Alcorn was "primarily
industrial" and that its students were engaged in a "very
practical curriculum" appropriate for a black school.
However, despite the heroic efforts of Alcorn officials to
provide instruction that whites deemed blacks unworthy of,
the institution more closely approximated a high school than
a university until the 1940's. This pattern held true for
most public black colleges in the South (Blake, 1991, 543-
544). The fact that Alcorn's high school program continued
until after the Brown decision not only demonstrated the
state's determination to circumscribe the institution's
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development; it provided a stark commentary on the unequal 
nature of elementary and secondary education for blacks in 
Mississippi as well.57
The Supreme Court's ruling in Plessv and its application 
of the "separate but equal" principle to education in Cum­
mings only gave sanction to what the state of Mississippi was 
already doing. Between 1884 and 194 6, the state legislature 
authorized the establishment of five additional universities. 
In each case, the state's intent to keep the races apart 
guided their decisionmaking. Three of these new schools were 
reserved for whites only and the other two existed solely to 
serve blacks.58
57In 1950, only 25 percent of eligible blacks of high 
school age were enrolled in high school in Mississippi 
compared to 62 percent of the state's eligible white students 
(McMillen, 1990, 89).
58The white universities were Mississippi University for 
Women (1884), University of Southern Mississippi (1910), and 
Delta State University (1924). Jackson State University, 
established originally as a private school for the purpose of 
preparing black ministers and teachers, came under state 
control in 1940. It took ten years of petitioning by black 
Mississippians to convince the legislature to aquire the 
school, which was in serious financial trouble as a result of 
the Great Depression. On assuming control, the state changed 
the name of the school to Mississippi Negro Training School 
and cut its curriculum from four years to two. After four 
years of political pressure from Jackson State College 
alumni, the school's four-year curriculum was restored; 
however, its degree-granting authority was limited to teacher 
education (McMillen, 1990, 107-108). In 1946, the state
established Mississippi Valley State University as 
Mississippi Vocational College with the mission of "educating 
teachers primarily for rural and elementary schools and 
providing vocational training for Black students" 
(Petitioners' Brief, 1991, 4).
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By 1910, Mississippi's pattern of deliberately under- 
funding Alcorn in comparison to other state-supported white 
universities was well entrenched. Table 1 on page 213 illu­
strates the point. State funding policies reflected a 
deliberate effort to relegate Alcorn to an inferior status 
within the higher education system. Moreover, these patterns 
had no educational justification other than the perceived 
need to keep whites and blacks apart in institutions of 
separate and decidedly unequal educational quality.
As the state progressively increased its financial 
commitment to higher education, the gap in funding between 
Alcorn and the other institutions widened rather than 
narrowed. Table 2 on page 213 chronicles state appropriations 
for higher education during the 1928-1929 fiscal year.
What is significant about these figures is not simply 
the fact that the financial disparities between Alcorn and 
the white universities increased as the state's commitment to 
higher education increased. It is also interesting that when 
Mississippi established new all-white universities, these 
institutions began at a higher funding level than Alcorn even 
though it was the second oldest college in the state. For 
example, Delta State Teachers College, founded only in 1924, 
received slightly more revenues for its general fund than 
Alcorn for the 1928-29 year ($159,500 for Delta State and 
$155,185 for Alcorn); however, Delta State's capital outlay 
budget was a whopping 3 9 percent higher than Alcorn's.
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TABLE 1. LEGISLATIVE APPROPRIATIONS 
FOR MISSISSIPPI'S SENIOR COLLEGES (1910-1911)
General Capital
Institution Expenses Outlay Total
Univ. of Mississippi 
















*now Mississippi University for Women
SOURCE: Aubrev Keith Lucas. The Mississippi Leaislature and
Mississippi Public Hiaher Education. 1890-1960, (Ph.D. dis-
sertation, Florida State University) , 1966, p. 149.
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*now University of Southern Mississippi
SOURCE: Aubrey Keith Lucas, The Mississippi Legislature and 
Mississippi Public Higher Education. 18890-1960. (Ph.D. dis­
sertation, Florida State University), 1966, p. 152.
The state also systeinmatically discriminated against 
Alcorn in its disbursement of federal and state funding for 
land grant purposes. For example, a 1945 report submitted to 
the Mississippi Board of Trustees of State Institutions of 
Higher Learning described a well-developed School of Agri­
culture and College of Engineering at Mississippi State
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College; it also included recommendations for a new vete­
rinary school, graduate education in home economics, a 
forestry deapartment, and an engineering station. That same 
report, however, revealed that the state had not spent a cent 
for land grant activities at Alcorn, though it was legally 
obligated to do so (Mississippi Board of Trustees of State 
Institutions of Higher Learning, 1945). Because the experi­
ment stations played a critical role in developing scientific 
research methods in higher education, the state's funding 
policies retarded the development of the physical sciences at 
Alcorn.59 These practices were consistent with the overall 
intent of Jim Crow education. Black colleges existed mainly 
to produce teachers to serve in the segregated schools and 
graduates in the lowest vocational occupations. Graduate and 
professional education were deemed inappropriate for blacks.
The evidence suggested that Mississippi's system of 
higher education was more successful in its aim of frustra­
ting black college education than any other state in the 
South. In 1932, Mississippi, though it had the largest black
590ften, the experiment stations at white universities 
were staffed by university faculty; thus, the stations became 
the first form of graduate instruction at the white land 
grant institutions. Thus, the denial of Morrill land grant 
funding to black land grant colleges comparable to their 
white counterparts severely limited the curriculums of these 
institutions and made them land grant schools in name only. 
Not until the separate but equal doctrine began to be 
subjected to legal challenged in the 1940's did Southern 
states reluctantly began to expand the academic offerings at 
these institutions (Kujovik, 1987, 42-64; Christy and
Williamson, 1992).
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population of any state, had only 2.7 four-year college 
graduates per 10,000 blacks (Blake, 1991, 544). By compari­
son, Georgia, the only other southern state with over a 
million blacks, had almost four times the number of black 
four-year college graduates (10.7 per 10,000) in 1932 (Ibid, 
544). In 194 0, when 77% of the black high school age popu­
lation in the South were not enrolled in school, the figure 
for Mississippi was 89% - the highest black out-of-school 
population of any southern state (Anderson, quoted in Blake, 
1991, 545). Thus, despite the efforts of black public col­
leges to increase black college graduation rates, they 
operated in an environment where the odds were heavily 
stacked against them.
In 19 54, on the eve of Brown, Mississippi's system of 
higher education stood decidedly separate and unequal. In 
that year, H. M. Ivy, President of the Board of Trustees of 
State Institutions of Higher Learning, submitted a report to 
the full board documenting the inequalities between white and 
black education in the system. The report noted that while 
white students had the benefit of a variety of undergraduate 
programs and extensive offerings at the graduate and profes­
sional levels, the missions of black colleges had been cir­
cumscribed primarily to undergraduate training in teacher 
education, agricultural and mechanical arts and the teaching 
of various trades (Avers v. Allain. 674 F. Supp. 1523, 1528- 
1529) . Additionally, it commented that, in Alcorn's case, the
Reproduced  with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
2 1 6
institution's actual offerings did not match its stated 
mission: the report found that there was little evidence that 
Alcorn was in fact a land grant institution (McMillen, 1990, 
104) . The report also made reference to the inequitable 
funding patterns which favored white institutions over their 
black counterparts. For example, of the better than $10 mil­
lion that the state spent on higher education during the 
period of 1952-54, only 15.7% of those dollars were spent on 
black institutions (Avers v. Allain. 674 F. Supp 1523, 1529).
Like whites elsewhere in the South, white Mississippians 
defied the Brown decision, determined to maintain racial 
segregation in higher education. Nevertheless, black Missis- 
sipians, encouraged by the Court's ruling, would assert their 
rights to educational equality and challenge the status quo. 
Their challenge to the state's practices, which ultimately 
led blacks to take Mississippi to court, are the subject of 
the next section.
From Brown to Avers
The Brown decision was roundly denounced throughout the 
South as an affront to the entire Southern way of life (Car­
ter, 1959; Orfield, 1969; Bartley, 1969; Peltason, 1971; 
Martin, 1970; Wilkinson, 1979; Tabarlet, 1987). Criticism of 
the Court ranged from charges that the justices relied on 
"sociological reasoning" rather than time-honored traditions 
of constitutional law to charges that the Court, as well as 
anyone associated with or supportive of the Brown decision,
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was involved in a worldwide communist conspiracy to overthrow 
the government of the United States (Bartley, 1969; Wilkin­
son, 1979) .
The Supreme Court's decision in Brown did not come as a 
complete surprise to the state's political leadership. While 
the segregation cases were being argued before the Supreme 
Court, the state legislature began making provisions to 
either influence the Court's decision or to circumvent any 
ruling that jeopardized the continuation of segregation 
(Carter, 1959, 21-22). During a special session, the state 
legislature passed an equalization program for the public 
schools which called for equal salaries for black and white 
teachers, equal transportation, equal buildings, and equal 
school opportunities for all children - black and white. 
However, the program was not to go into effect until after 
the Supreme Court's ruling, and only if the state's position 
that segregation was constitutional was affirmed. Not sur­
prisingly, when the Supreme Court announced its decision in 
Brown. Mississippi's belated equalization program was never 
enacted (Ibid, 22). During the regular session in early 1954 
(prior to the Court's announcement), the legislature agreed 
to appropriate only enough funds for the public school system 
for a year, instead of two years as was its custom.60. State
60This ̂ is significant because in those days, the 
Mississippi legislatures convened its regular session only 
once every two years. Thus, it is clear that the state was 
bracing itself in anticipation of the Supreme Court's ruling 
and was preparing for whatever contingencies were deemed
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Lawmakers wanted the flexibility to make whatever adjustments 
might be made "necessary" by the Brown decision. They anti­
cipated that they might be called into special session before 
the next regular session in 1956.
Nevertheless, despite a climate of offical opposition, 
Medgar Evers, Field Director of the Mississippi State Con­
ference of the NAACP applied for admission to the University 
of Mississippi School of Law in January, 1954 (Adams, 1992, 
269) . His application was rejected on the grounds that he had 
failed to comply with the requirement that he submit two let­
ters of recommendation from prominent citizens of his county. 
While Evers did submit letters from two citizens in Newton 
County, where his family's homestead was and where he had 
lived most of his life, the State Board replied that his 
letters should have come from Bolivar County where he had 
lived the two years prior to his application (Ibid, 269) . 
After consulting with NAACP officials, Evers decided not to 
pursue the matter further.61
Once the Court's decision was announced, the state of 
Misssissippi, like her Southern neighbors, quickly mobilized 
in an effort to circumvent Brown. Mississippi Governor Hugh 
White called it "the most unfortunate thing that has ever
necessary.
61Instead, Evers went to work for the NAACP in Jackson 
investigatng racial incidents in Mississippi and the state­
wide activities of the White Citizens Councils (Adams, 1992, 
269-270).
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happened” and insisted that it was "impossible to mix the 
races together in the public schools of Mississippi" (Tabar- 
let, 1987, 33). The Jackson Clarion-Ledqer published an
editorial which said that "May 17, 1954, may be recorded as 
a black day of tragedy for the South" (Carter, 1959, 25). The 
Jackson Daily News' lead editorial was entitled "Blood on the 
Marble Steps" (Ibid, 25). In late May, Circuit Judge Tom P. 
Brady criticized the Court in a speech to the Sons of the 
American Revolution in Greenwood, Mississippi for abandoning 
over a half century of legal precedent in the Brown decision. 
Brady argued that the justices did not take into account the 
black man's basic inferiority to the white man (Ibid, 26). 
Organized leadership would be required if the South intended 
to successfully resist efforts by "outside agitators" to 
impose the Brown decision on the South. The speech was 
widely circulated, and Brady's words are considered as the 
inspiration for the formation of the Citizens' Council 
Movement throughout the South (Carter, 1959, 26-35; Bartley, 
1969, 85) . The first Citizens' Council62 was formed in July,
62The White Citizens' Councils (the term "White" was 
dropped from the name in the late 1950's) sprang up in 
reaction to the Brown decision. Prior to Brown. the Ku Klux 
Klan was the best known white supremacist organization; 
however, its influence was limited even in Mississippi. Many 
"respectable racists" disliked the "white trash" reputation 
of the Klan and feared that the Klan's reliance on terrorism 
and murder (as well as other extralegal tactics) would invite 
massive federal intervention in the South. The Citizens' 
Councils, sometimes referred to as "the country club Klan" 
drew their membership from business leaders, professionals, 
clergymen, and educators committed to the doctrine of white 
supremacy. They worked through existing political and legal
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1954, in Indianola, Mississippi, near the heart of the 
state's Delta region (Bartley, 1969, 85; Tabarlet, 1987, 34). 
The movement spread rapidly to Alabama, Louisiana, Texas, 
South Carolina, Florida, Arkansas, Tennessee, and Virginia 
(Bartley, 1969, 84). Mississippi boasted the largest
membership in the Citizens' Councils of any Southern state; 
by the end of 1954, the Mississippi Association of Citizens' 
Councils claimed chapters in more than thirty counties (Ibid, 
86) .
Meanwhile, the legislature created the Legal Education 
Advisory Committee in order to allow both black and whites to 
voice support for voluntary segregation (Ibid, 76) . The 
governor selected a few conservative blacks who supported the 
plan in order to demonstrate that black Mississippians did 
not want integration; rather, "outside agitators" with no 
appreciation for Southern mores were attempting to impose it 
against the will of both black and white citizens of the 
South. Held on July 30, 1954, the conference began with
speeches by whites insisting that the racial status quo 
remain the same. However, much to the chagrin of the 
organizers of the conference, the blacks who attended did not 
stick to their original bargain. With near unanamity, the 
black spokesmen urged the state to comply with the Supreme 
Court decision (Ibid, 76). Their much-publicized bi-racial
institutions in order to obstruct desegregation and hamper 
the activities of civil rights organizations (especially the 
N A A C P ) .
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conference a fiasco, the legislature subsequently passed a 
constitutional amendment that permitted the abolition of the 
entire public school system (or parts of it) , and provided 
for the payment of tuition grants to school children to 
attend private schools. (Ibid, 76) . These amendments passed 
with a solid majority of the popular vote in December, 1954, 
thanks largely to the efforts of the White Citizens' Councils 
(Ibid, 76, 85-86). The message was clear: the state would 
rather abolish the public school system than to integrate.
Meanwhile, the State Board of Institutions of Higher 
Learning announced a new regulation requiring applicants to 
the University of Mississippi to obtain character references 
from five alumni of the school, and decreed that any such 
references would have to have been acquainted with the appli­
cant for at least two years (Adams, 1992, 269). Since the new 
rule required black applicants to find white alumni who would 
write letters of recommendations for them, it served as an 
effective barrier to blacks entering white universities for 
nearly a decade. Mississippi's "character requirement" was 
copied by other Southern states that were searching for ways 
to discourage black applications to all-white universities 
(Dorsey, 1981; Preer, 1982; Samuels, 1991).
From the halls of the United States Senate, Mississippi 
Senator James Eastland emerged as perhaps the greatest 
champion of blatant white supremacy. He regularly denounced 
desegregation as a communist-inspired plot to undermine the
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foundation of Anglo-Saxon civilization. White supremacy, 
according to Eastland, was part of the immutable order of 
things, and segregation was consistent with "the Constitu­
tion, the laws of nature, and the laws of God" (Bartley, 
1969, 118). He specifically accused some of the key social 
scientists who were cited in footnote eleven of the Court's 
opinion of subversion. These included Theodore Brameld, E. 
Franklin Frazier, and Gunnar Myrdal. Brameld, according to 
Eastland, was "a member of no less than 10 organizations 
declared to be communistic, communist front, or communist 
dominated" (Wilkinson, 1979, 33). The House of Representa­
tives' Un-American Activities Committee had "18 citations of 
Frazier's connections with Communist causes in the United 
States," Eastland complained (Ibid, 33). Eastland dismissed 
Myrdal as an "alien" and a "socialist" who had dismissed the 
federal Constitution as unsuited for modern conditions (Bart- 
tley, 1969, 120; Wilkinson, 1979, 33). He also criticized
Myrdal for relying on sources that he considered to be sub­
versive, such as Frazier and DuBois (Bartley, 1969, 120;
Wilkinson, 1979, 33).
But opposition to the Brown decision was not simply a 
manifestation of the racial animosities of white men or a 
reflection of Southern-style McCarthyism. This became clear 
in 1956 when many Southern states (including Mississippi) 
broadened their attack on the Brown decision by enacting 
interposition resolutions. Basically, the interposition
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resolutions conceived of the Union as an interstate compact 
whereby the states had only surrendered to the national 
government those powers directly specified in the compact - 
in this case, the Constitution. All other powers, according 
to the South, belonged to the states. This included the power 
to regulate public schools. Brown v. Board of Education, in 
their view, did not overturn the state's sovereignty over its 
public schools according to the Tenth Amendment. While the 
Fourteenth Amendment did place certain limitations on the 
powers of the states, it did not fundamentally change the 
nature of the Union nor forbid the states from operating 
segregated schools. By supposing that the states had the 
right to declare null and void any law that, in their view, 
violated the original compact, the South set the Tenth Amend­
ment against the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Four­
teenth Amendment in Brown. Consequently, if the Fourteenth 
Amendment did not change the nature of the Union, any action 
on the part of the federal judiciary to implement the Brown 
decision would be illegal barring the enactment of a consti­
tutional amendment (Bartley, 1969, 126-134).
Thus, the South resurrected a constitutional debate over 
the relationship between the federal government and the 
states that could be traced back at least to the Virginia 
Resolution in 1798; similar arguments were relied on by John 
Calhoun during the nullification crisis in 1832. To be sure, 
there existed legitimate fears in the states about the growth
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of federal power in many nonracial areas: many of the inter­
position resolutions mentioned fields other than race where 
state lawmakers railed against alleged "federal usurpations 
of the sovereignty of the states" (Ibid, 133). Still, despite 
the claim of a spokesman for the Virginia Defenders that 
Brown was "the occasion, rather than the cause, for reasser­
ting the sovereignty of individual states within the Union" 
(Ibid, 133) , the timing of this reassertion, in the very 
least, made such claims suspicious. Rather, it looked like 
the South was fighting the Civil War all over again.
The South's determination to resist desegregation forced 
a confrontation between the national government and the 
states. Throughout the 1950's, the federal government seemed 
reluctant to take decisive action to enforce the Court's 
decision in Brown. It took a threat to law and order to push 
President Eisenhower into nationalizing the Arkansas National 
Guard during the Little Rock school crisis in 1958 to force 
the integration of Central High School. Thus, the slowness of 
the federal government's enforcement efforts made it possible 
for Mississippi to continue to defy the Brown decision 
outright throughout the decade of the 1950's. In 1958 and 
1959, the University of Mississippi Graduate School and 
Mississippi Southern College,63 in concert with other state 
officials not only denied admission to two black applicants
63It is now the University of Southern Mississippi.
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to their schools; state officials blatantly violated the 
rights of these applicants in the process.64
When James Meredith, an Air Force veteran, petitioned to 
enter the University of Mississippi in 1961, the university, 
the state college board, the governor, the lieutenant gover­
nor, and other state officials joined forces in order to 
prevent his admission. This time, however, the university 
lost its battle to deny Meredith admission, but only after 
the state exhausted all of its legal options (Meredith v. 
Fair. 305 F. 2d 341 [5th Cir. 1962]; cert, denied, 371 U.S. 
828 [1962]; enf'd, 313 F. 2d 532 [1962]). Nevertheless,
despite a federal court order requiring that Meredith be 
admitted, he had to be escorted by federal marshals and 
attorneys from the U.S. Justice Department in order to insure
MIn 1958, Clennon King, a professor at Alcorn College, 
sought to enroll in the University of Mississippi Graduate 
School. Unable to get any alumni to write letters for him, he 
nevertheless tried to register in person. Governor J.P. 
Coleman, Attorney General Joe Patterson, and Commissioner of 
Public Safety Tom Scarborough met him at the Registar's 
office to personally deny his petition. He was arrested and 
subsequently committed to the state's mental hospital for a 
short time. An NAACP spokesman remarked, "no other state has 
ruled that a man was crazy because he wanted an educa-tion" 
(Bartley, 1969, 212). He was declared sane, and he
subsequently left the state. The following year, Clyde 
Kennard's application to Mississippi Southern College was 
rejected. Upon leaving the campus after meeting with college 
officials, Kennard was immediately arrested for speeding and 
charged with illegal possession of alcohol (though he did not 
drink). Though the state Supreme Court overturned his 
conviction two years later, Kennard was convicted of theft 
and sentenced to seven years in prison in a case where much 
of the evidence was manufactured. Kennard developed cancer 
while in the state penitentiary and died in 1963 (Bartley, 
1969, 212; Adams, 1992, 270-271).
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his admission (Tabarlet, 1987, 35-36). Meredith's admission 
precipitated a riot which ultimately required 16,000 U.S. 
troops to put down. Two men were killed, hundreds were 
injured, and nearly 200 were arrested (Ibid, 36, 51-52).
Having lost the battle to prevent all blacks, regardless 
of their qualifications, from entering white universities, 
the state of Mississippi moved to circumscribe access to 
traditionally white schools by African American applicants. 
In 1963, the University of Mississippi, Southern Mississippi, 
and Mississippi State University all enacted admissions poli­
cies requiring a minimum score of 15 on the American College 
Test (ACT) for entering freshmen. At the time, the average 
ACT score for white Mississippians was 18 while the average 
score for blacks was 7 (Avers v. Allain. 893 F. 2d 732, 735). 
The gap between black and white performance on the ACT was a 
powerful testimony to the legacy of separate and unequal 
education for black Mississippians at the elementary and 
secondary level. The new policies fit a general pattern among 
Southern states that was mentioned in Chapter Three: the
strategy of altering admissions requirements in facially 
neutral ways in order to limit the number of blacks who would 
be able to meet the new standards as much as possible. The 
new admission standards at Mississippi's white universities 
manifested another form of the state's resistance to the 
Brown decision.
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Mississippi State University admitted its first black 
student in 1965; Mississippi University for Women and Delta 
State University followed suit in 1966. In 1967, the Uni­
versity of Southern Mississippi became the last all-white 
university to drop its color barrier to blacks (Davis, 1993, 
412-413). Alcorn State became the first black college in 
Mississippi to enroll white students in 1966; Whites first 
enrolled at Jackson State in 1969 and at Mississippi Valley 
State in 1970 (Ibid, 413) .
Nevertheless, while Mississippi's universities were 
technically "integrated," the racial designations of its 
schools still persisted. Though the state had made some 
improvements in the black colleges,65 a substantial gulf 
remained between the financial support and academic offerings 
for predominately white schools and black ones. Table 3 on 
page 228 summarizes the distribution of degree programs among 
Mississippi's institutions of higher learning as of 1974.
6SBetween 1966 and 1974, the state had appropriated 
$16,084,656 for new construction at Alcorn State University. 
The comparable figures for Jackson State and Mississippi 
Valley were $17,691,557 and $10,668,514 respectively. 
However, the state was still making substantial investments 
on the white campuses as well. Mississippi allocated 
$11,417,960 for new construction at Delta State Univer-sity, 
$13,989,528 at Mississippi State, $9,705,574, $17,206,793 at 
the University of Mississippi, and $12,412,978 at Southern 
Missis-sippi. Thus, while the new investments brought much 
needed improve-ments to black campuses, they did not 
substantially reverse the "cumulative defecit" that had 
amassed from a century of underfun-ding black higher 
education.
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TABLE 3. SUMMARY OF DEGREE PROGRAMS AT 
INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER LEARNING 
IN MISSISSIPPI
Institution B* M» D* S* P*
Alcorn State University 28
Delta State University 34 13 — 4 —
Jackson State University 32 22 — 1 —
Miss. University for Women 37 14 — 1 —
Mississippi Valley State 26 — — — —
Mississippi State University 94 68 38 18 —
University of Mississippi 62 45 28 7 1
Univ. of Miss. Med. Center 4 9 9 — 3
Southern Mississippi 106 73 37 27 — » « •
B* = bachelor degree programs 
M* = master's degree programs 
D* = doctoral degree programs
S* = specialist degree programs 
P* = professional degree programs
SOURCE: U.S. Exhibit 1, "State of Mississippi Modifications 
to the Plan of Compliance to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964," pp. 52-53, in United States v. Mabus. Docket No. 
90-1205, U.S. Supreme Court Records. Fall Term 1991.
In addition, the predominately black institutions con­
tinued to receive a substantially smaller share of overall 
state appropriations than the predominately white universi­
ties. Table 4 on page 229 documents the distribution of state 
dollars to its universities between 1970 and 1974.
Mathematically, these figures were computed based on the 
total number of student credit hours at the respective 
institutions. Formula funding was based on student enrollment 
at both the baccalaureate and postbaccalaureate levels. Since 
the predominately white universities offered a greater range 
of programs at both levels than the predominately black uni-
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TABLE 4. STATE APPROPRIATIONS FOR 
MISSISSIPPI UNIVERSITIES, 1970-1974*
Institution Total AoDrooriation
Alcorn State University $ 9,442,783
Delta State University 12,341,051
Jackson State University 19,804,944
Mississippi State University 41,414,924
Mississippi Univ. for Women 11,021,959
Mississippi Valley State Univ. 8,889,710
University of Mississippi 35,545,525
Univ. of Southern Mississippi 36,700,432
*These figures are based on student credit hour production. 
Funds for new construction at these universities are not 
included in these totals.
SOURCE: U.S. Exhibit 1, "State of Mississippi Modifications 
to the Plan of Compliance to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964," p. 97, in United States v. Mabus. Docket No. 90- 
1205, U.S. Supreme Court Records. Fall Term 1991.
versities, significant disparities between black and white
colleges continued to persist. The inequalities were even
more stark with respect to the land grant activities of the
state. For fiscal year 1970, Mississippi received $4,465,035
in federal funds under the Morrill Act to divide between its
two land grant universities. When the funds were divided, all
but $127,000 of those dollars went to Mississippi State
(Avers Complaint, January 28, 1975, 17).
Furthermore, the University of Mississippi, Mississippi 
State University, and the University of Southern Mississippi 
established several off-campus centers throughout the state, 
which further insured that few white students would attend 
predominately black schools. As black college presidents in
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Mississippi increasingly defined the missions of their 
institutions as places that provided low-cost education to 
all Mississipians, they viewed the existence of the off- 
campus centers as a deliberate effort on the part of the 
state to discourage white enrollment at black colleges. The 
black college presidents maintained that these branch 
campuses "unnecessary duplicated"66 the course offerings of 
their institutions and served to drain away funds, students, 
programs, resources, and facilities that might otherwise be 
invested in Jackson State, Alcorn State, and Mississippi 
Valley.67
“"Unnecessary duplication" refers to instances where two 
or more institutions offer the same nonessential or noncore 
program. Using this definition, the district court in Avers 
considered all duplication at the bachelor's level of 
nonbasic liberal arts and sciences course work and all 
duplication at the master's level and above to be unnecessary 
(United States v. Fordice. 505 U.S. 717, 738) . Implicit in 
the term is the lack of an educational rationale for such 
duplication and the fact that some, if not all, duplica-tion 
could be practically eliminated (Ibid, 739).
67In 1972, the state legislature passed a law which 
limited somewhat the universities' ability to establish 
branch campuses. Senate Bill No. 1527 prohibited the 
establishment of a degree granting branch or residence center 
within 40 miles of another Mississippi university. The new 
law was designed to end the "haphazard manner" in which these 
branch campuses were being created; many times, the 
universities were establishing off-campus centers in the same 
cities (Peoples, 1995, 258-259). However, the urban areas of 
Jackson and Natchez were specifically exempted from this 
provision. This exemption expressly protected the existence 
of The Universities Center (operated jointly by the 
University of Mississippi, Mississippi State, and Southern 
Mississippi) located in Jackson, and the University of 
Southern Mississippi Natchez Center. Nor did the new law 
require the closing of the Mississippi State University 
Branch Center in Vicksburg, which was less than 4 0 miles from 
Lorman, Mississippi, where Alcorn State is located. The
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Patterns of faculty employment continued to reflect the 
legacy of segregation in Mississippi higher education. It was 
not until the 1970-71 academic year that the state broke with 
its historic policy of not hiring black faculty at white 
universities. During that year, the University of Missi­
ssippi, Mississippi University for Women, and Southern Miss­
issippi hired blacks for the first time. Delta State hired 
its first black in 1973-74, and Mississippi State joined the 
crowd in 1974-75 (Davis, 1993, 413). Meanwhile, the black
universities hired whites at Alcorn State in 1966-67, Jackson 
State in 1967-68, and Mississippi Valley in 1968-69 (Ibid, 
413) .
In 1969, HEW's Office of Civil Rights found the state's 
higher education system to be in violation of Title VI of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Preer, 1982; Adams, 1993; Connell, 
1993; Davis, 1993; Kujovich, 1996). HEW requested that the 
state submit a desegregation plan to disestablish the dual 
system. However, four years passed before Mississippi deve­
loped any sort of plan to meet HEW's request. They were able 
to get away with negligence largely because HEW lacked clear 
definitions of desegregation in the higher education context, 
a point which will be further explored later in this chapter.
Universities Center offered the white population of Jackson 
an alternative to Jackson State; similarly, both the Natchez 
and Vicksburg branch campuses, located in close proximity to 
Alcorn State, competed for the same pool of white students 
that Alcorn was trying to attract to its campus (Avers 
Complaint, January 28, 1975, 15-17).
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Chapter Three discussed how dissatisfaction with HEW's record 
on securing compliance with Title VI of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964 prompted the NAACP Legal Defense Fund to bring the 
Adams suit. After the Adams court ruled against the federal 
government, the Office of Civil Rights (OCR) turned its focus 
to Adams states such as Mississippi.
Meanwhile, the Adams case motivated a group of black 
Mississippi activists who were dissatisfied with the state's 
progress toward desegregation to begin sharing information 
with each other concerning the state's response to HEW. They 
formed an organization called the Black Mississippians' 
Council on Higher Education (Davis, 1984, 243; Adams, 1993, 
277) . While the NAACP Legal Defense Fund was frustrated with 
the federal government's record of enforcing the provisions 
of Title VI, the Council was more concerned about the 
unequal status of black colleges within Mississippi's system 
of higher educa-tion. They feared that the process of 
desegregation would result in the further marginalization 
and/or the elimination of black colleges.
In a letter dated May 21, 1973, OCR renewed its request 
that the state submit a desegregation plan (Peoples, 1995, 
303). Hastily and without relying on any black input, the 
state submitted its first Plan of Compliance on June 7, 1973. 
Among other things, the plan operated as if Brown's mandate 
in higher education meant freedom of choice and little else, 
ignoring the potential ramifications of the Supreme Court's
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decision in Green for higher education. The plan was sum­
marily rejected by HEW on November 10, 1973 (Adeems, 1993,
276-277; Peoples, 1995, 303). After a period of negotiations 
and resubmissions, HEW approved the state's plan of May 28, 
1974 pertaining to its four-year institutions (Adams, 1993, 
277). Among other things, the black colleges complained that 
the state's Plan of Compliance left the branch campuses at 
Jackson, Natchez, and Vicksburg intact. Instead, the Plan 
called upon Jackson State to participate in the Universities 
Center in Jackson and for Alcorn to provide 25 percent of the 
teaching load at the bachelor's and master's level at the 
Natchez Center (U.S. Exhibit 1, "State of Mississippi Modifi­
cations to the Plan of Compliance to Title VI of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964," 82-83). While the Plan required the 
removal of programs at the Universities that were duplicative 
of Jackson State's course offerings,68 it permitted, with 
Board approval, the development of any "unique or profes­
sional programs which are not offered at Jackson State 
University" (Ibid, 82) . The Board of Trustees proposed that
68John Peoples, former president of Jackson State 
University, complained that the provision forbidding the off- 
campus centers to duplicate course offerings at Jackson State 
and Alcorn was routinely evaded for years. The off-campus 
centers would change the title of course offerings while 
leaving the course content essentially the same as 
corresponding courses at Jackson State or Alcorn; thus, a 
course at Jackson State entitled, "Modern European History" 
might be offered at the Universities Center as "The History 
of Europe After 1900" (U.S. Exhibit 14, Letter from John A.
Peoples to Dr. E. E. Thrash [July 25, 1975], United States v. 
Mabus, 1991, 144-145; Peoples, 1995, 309).
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it would seek a special appropriation from the legislature of 
slightly less than $3 million to implement the total plan 
(78) .
Still to be resolved was the status of the state's 
junior colleges.69 Since compliance with Title VI required an 
approved plan for the entire system of higher education, and 
since the junior colleges could not agree on a comprehensive 
plan, HEW referred Mississippi's case to the U.S. Justice 
Department in August, 1974 for enforcement action (Ibid, 
277) .
For several months after HEW's referral of Mississippi's 
case to the Department of Justice, no visible action was 
taken. The Justice Department did consider entering a pre­
existing case in Mississippi in order to attack the state's 
higher education system. In 1970, the Lawyers Committee for 
Civil Rights Under Law, a Washington based civil rights 
advocacy group, brought suit to force the U.S. Agricultural 
Extension Service to desegregate fWade v. Mississippi Coope­
rative Extension Service. 372 F. Supp. 126 [N.D. Miss.],
modified, 378 F. Supp. 1251 [N.D. Miss. 1974], vacated, 528
69This posed a problem because the state's college board 
had no constitutional authority over the junior colleges. 
Each public junior college in Mississippi had an independent 
governing board, while all fell under the authority of the 
Junior College Commission. This commission, however, had very 
little real authority over the fiercely independent, county 
based governing boards. Consequently, it is not surprising 
that the junior colleges could not come to a suitable 
settlement to the question of deseg-regation (Peoples, 1995, 
303) .
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F.2d. 508 [5th Cir. 1976]). The Extension Service was a
branch of both Mississippi State University and Alcorn State 
College, which were included as defendants. It was also 
partially funded by the U.S. Department of Agriculture, which 
was also named as a defendant (Adams, 1993, 278). Although 
the decision in Wade had been handed down in 1974, the case 
remained active in order that its implementation might be 
monitored. In January, 1975, the Justice Department announced 
its intention to enter the case as a plaintiff, creating the 
interesting situation of the federal government being on both 
sides of the case (Ibid, 278). The Justice Department sought 
to reopen the suit and expand its jurisdiction to include the 
entire higher education system, "thereby hoping to kill two 
unconstitutional birds with one judicial stone" (Ibid).
The Black Mississippians7 Council was displeased with 
HEW7s decision to accept the senior college portion of 
Mississippi7s higher education plan because it did not, in 
their judgement, fundamentally alter the unequal status of 
the state7s black institutions. Unwilling to allow the 
Justice Department to obtain judicial approval for the HEW7s 
accepted solution for Mississippi7s senior colleges, the 
Council on January 28, 1975 filed Avers v. Waller70 as a
70In Mississippi, the governor is the titular head of the 
higher education system, even though the Board of Trustees 
for State Institutions of Higher Learning has the 
constitutional authority to actually manage the system. 
Therefore, the suit has changed names with succeeding 
gubernatorial administrations. William Waller was governor in 
1975 when the suit was filed; subsequently, William Allain,
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class action suit and invoked a three-judge district court 
(Avers Complaint, January 28, 1975; Preer, 1982, 212; Adams, 
1993, 278). In their petition, they accused the state of
unconstitutionally violating the rights of African American 
citizens in the state by failing to maintaining a separate 
and inferior system of higher education for blacks. However, 
unlike the NAACP lawsuits which were geared primarily toward 
eliminating barriers to black admission at white universi­
ties, the Avers complaint charged Mississippi officials with 
systemmatically underdeveloping predominately black insti­
tutions. They aimed primarily to improve black universities, 
arguing that, these institutions still served a vital role in 
assuring access to higher education for African Americans. 
Leading the list of plaintiffs was Jake Ayers, Sr.,71 father 
of two of the minor plaintiffs in the Adams suit (Preer, 
1982, 212). The Justice Department subsequently filed a
motion to intervene as a plaintiff in the case (Motion to 
Intervene as Plaintiff, April 7, 1975).
The Avers suit not only signaled the beginning of a new 
phase in the history of Mississippi higher education; it com­
Roy Mabus, and Kirk Fordice (the current governor) have been 
named defendants in the Mississippi case.
71Jake Ayers, Sr. had been a longtime civil rights 
activist and a member of the Mississippi Freedom Democratic 
Party (MFDP), an all-black political party famous for 
challenging the legitimacy of the all-white Mississippi 
delegation to the 1964 Democratic National Convention in 
Atlantic City, NJ. Ayers died in 1986, but the suit which 
bears his name continues.
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menced a significant turning point in the debates about dese­
gregation in higher education more broadly. The next section 
attempts to place the litigation in Mississippi in a wider 
context of what was happening nationally with respect to 
desegregation and civil rights enforcement.
The Political, Judicial, and Regulatory Context of Avers
The Avers suit crystallized how the political landscape 
of desegregation in higher education had radically changed 
since the early pre-Brown lawsuits in the graduate and pro­
fessional school cases. Since Green. the Supreme Court had 
made it clear that it had lost patience with the deliberate 
tactics that state universities had utilized to escape the 
full weight of the Brown mandate in higher education; mere 
"freedom of choice" plans were not sufficient. States now 
were expected to demonstrate clear numerical progress toward 
desegregation. Moreover, the Court's insistence that dual 
systems be eradicated "root and branch" occurred in the 
context of the increasingly systemic organization of higher 
education in the states. As a consequence, the focus in 
desegregation enforcement shifted from not only insuring that 
individual blacks had access to white universities, but also 
to the creation of unitary systems of higher education, 
thereby exposing the vulnerability of public black colleges.
In Chapter Three, it was shown that the mid-1960's 
witnessed the collapse of the policy consensus on civil 
rights. The effort to apply the Green decision to higher
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education drove a wedge through an already deeply divided 
civil rights community which agreed on the issue of expanding 
black access to white universities, but disagreed about what 
should happen to public black colleges. With the goal of 
legal equality obtained, longstanding tensions between black 
integrationism and black separtism reemerged. The debate 
over the future of the black college in the post-Brown era 
represented but one facet of black America's schizophrenia 
between its desire to be fully integrated into the mainstream 
of American society and its desire to preserve its unique 
history and culture.
Thus, Avers represented the first time that blacks had 
challenged racially discriminatory practices in higher edu­
cation where the principal goal was not simply increased 
access to all-white institutions, but access defined as 
strengthening black universities. This stood in marked 
contrast to the Reconstruction period, where black acqui- 
esence to segregated schools reflected their recognition of 
the reality of the hostility of Southern whites to the 
concept of public education and to integrated education in 
particular. It also differed remarkably with the pre-Brown 
litigation of the NAACP against segregation in which benefits 
had accrued to black colleges as a byproduct of the efforts 
of Southern states to evade the full effect of integration. 
Unlike the past where the existence of all-black institutions 
was seen by some as illegitimate, dangerous, or contrary to
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American ideals, the Avers plaintiffs uncompromisingly defen­
ded the existence of public black colleges based on their 
vision of the Constitution.
In May, 1975, the Black Mississippians' Council adopted 
a position paper which attempted to forge a synthesis between 
the concepts of legal equality and equal educational oppor­
tunity (Preer, 1982, 212). They urged the courts to move away 
from preoccupation with educational form (which they defined 
as the racial identity of students, faculty, administrators, 
and institutions) to educational substance (the necessary 
requirements for quality education). The Council chastised 
both the Justice Department and the Legal Defense Fund for 
their obsession with eliminating the racial identifiability 
of institutions, arguing that both parties neither understood 
the ramifications that a desegregation-only remedy would have 
for the educational opportunities of black Mississippians. 
Black colleges, they asserted, were needed to preserve the 
full range of educational opportunities for black youth. The 
Ayers plaintiffs did not disavow the need to increase black 
access to historically white institutions in Mississippi; 
rather, they maintained that the goal of increasing black 
access to previously all-white universities should supple­
ment, not replace, the academic opportunities afforded to 
black Mississippians by black colleges (Ibid, 212) . In 
insisting that Mississippi's black colleges be preserved and 
enhanced in any desegregation remedy, the Council defined the
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goal of desegregation as making sure that black students 
would have equal educational opportunities regardless of what 
institution they chose to attend.
The concerns listed by the Avers plaintiffs tended to 
mirror the institutional aspirations of black colleges in 
Mississippi. Though Mississippi's black universities were not 
listed specifically as plaintiffs in Avers. the institutional 
heads of the black schools have had considerable input with 
regard to the framing of the arguments by attorneys for the 
plaintiffs (Peoples, 1995, 317-318) . In addition, the plain­
tiffs solicited and received financial support from The 
Alumni Association of Public Colleges, a black college 
advocacy group that had been formed with the cooperation of 
the presidents of Mississippi's black colleges.72 Because of
72The Alumni Association of Public Colleges is a 
collaboration of the alumni associations of Jackson State, 
Alcorn, and Missis-sippi Valley to advocate the cause of 
black colleges within the state of Mississippi. It was 
established in 1969 in Jackson in response of the refusal of 
all-white inter-alumni associations to accept black alumni 
associations. The formation of the association required the 
putting aside of past grievances that had served to divide 
the individual institutions in question. For example, Alcorn 
alumni had opposed the state's decision to take over Jackson 
State College in 1940, deeming it unnecessary. As time 
passed, enmity between the two schools intensified as Jackson 
State developed into an institution with more than twice the 
enrollment and academic scope as Alcorn. When the state 
established Mississippi Valley, both Jackson State and Alcorn 
alumni opposed the move, but they did not have anything 
resembling the political clout to prevent white 
Mississippians from creating another "separate but equal" 
black institution within the state. The alumni of the two 
older black schools saw the creation of a third black public 
college as an unwelcome competitior to them for the already 
measley allocation of state funds for black schools. Thus, 
the formation of the Alumni Association of Public Colleges
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the close relationship between the plaintiffs' aims and the 
aspirations of black universities, they had to fend off the 
charge by attorneys for the state of Mississippi that what 
they were in fact asserting were "institutional rights" not 
individual rights (Brief for Respondents, in Kurland and 
Casper, 1993, 379 [especially, footnote 30]). Title VI of the 
Civil Rights of Act of 1964 and the Fourteenth Amendment, the 
state argued, were designed to protect individuals from acts 
that infringe on their liberties (either by the state or by 
private individuals); it did not establish rights for insti­
tutions to recieve equal protection.73 The Avers plaintiffs 
accused the state of distorting their argument, insisting 
that the "examination of institutions is necessary in deter­
mining whether individuals (here, the plaintiff class) are 
afforded their constitutional and statutory rights" (Reply 
Brief of Private Petitioners, in Kurland and Casper, 1993, 
448-449). They countered that individuals can only receive 
higher education from institutions. Hence, if state policies
represented a definite break from the past: the black college 
alumni associations began to shift their focus from fueding 
against each other toward fighting their common foe: state 
educational policies that discriminated against all black 
colleges in Mississippi.
73The evidence shows that Mississippi's argument directly 
impacted at least one justice on the Supreme Court, albeit it 
the one justice, Antonin Scalia, who dissented in the state's 
favor in Fordice. Scalia interpreted the question of whether 
black colleges were entitled to enhancement as part of a 
desegregation remedy a question of institutional, not 
individual, rights. Quoting Gaines and Sweatt. he argued that 
"it is students and not schools who are guaranteed equal 
protection of the laws."
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unconstitutionally discriminate against certain institutions,
such actions would abridge the rights of the individuals
receiving an education in such settings.
In describing what motivated her late husband to bring
the suit, Mrs. Lillie Ayers said:
The underfunding and disparate funding of Black insti­
tutions amount to segregation. We as a Black race would 
love to go to our Black colleges, but on the other hand, 
we want the best education that this country has to 
offer. . . . We will pursue this issue until justice is 
done. . . . My husband was an avid reader. . . .  He knew 
that Alcorn existed a long time before Mississippi State 
and the University of Southern Mississippi. It angered 
him when the State Legislature made Alcorn a branch of 
MSU, for all practical purposes. . . . I am going on as 
long as it takes to get this matter settled because I 
feel that this is what he wanted me to do (Brown, 1992, 
122) .
The Avers plaintiffs, thus, saw their task as requiring 
them to take on not only the state educational establishment 
in Mississippi which had discriminated against the state's 
black colleges, but those civil rights liberals (black and 
white) who saw black colleges as obstacles that needed to be 
removed in order for blacks to obtain equal educational 
opportunities. Isaiah Madison, convenor of the Council and 
one of the attorneys for the plaintiffs wrote that while he 
did not oppose an increased black presence on white campuses, 
he did reject "any mode of educational integration or cul­
tural assimilation which Blacks have not freely chosen to 
undertake themselves" (Preer, 1982, 212-213). He believed
that the drive to merge black colleges into larger white 
universities to meet the "just schools" standard announced in
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Green represented the handiwork of an elitist corps of white 
social engineers (with the assistance of a few blacks) who 
had imposed their definition of desegregation on the black 
population (Ibid, 213). While not condemning Brown directly, 
Madison accused many liberals of racism by implying that 
black colleges were necessarily inferior because they were 
black. By implication, black leaders who favored the phasing 
out of black schools had internalized the racist assumptions 
of their white benefactors. Madison's views sounded the theme 
of a longstanding complaint voiced by African Americans that 
the Black Power movement had revived: black resentment of the 
perceived paternalism of the "benevolent whites" who were 
"helping" them. Avers represented a rebuke to liberal white 
elites and their black counterparts who felt, as many African 
Americans saw it, that they knew best what black people 
wanted or needed.74
74Some integration advocates not only denied that black 
schools had any educational value, but even if they did, it 
did not matter. One NAACP official said that his organization 
opposed segregated schools "no matter what is taught or how 
well it is taught" because the "existence of segregation 
teaches that racial separation is right and proper in 
American society." While the official acknow- ledged that 
thirty percent of all blacks college students were enrolled 
in mainly black colleges, he denied that these schools 
offered a unique educational experience. A black school board 
member in one of the nation's largest school districts 
remarked, "Of what value is it to teach black children to 
read and write in an all-black school?" Many black college 
officials reacted bitterly to such criticisms. For example, 
Dr. Samuel DuBois Cook, president of Dillard University 
scathingly referred to the liberal estab- lishment within the 
federal bureaucracy and many civil rights organizations as 
those who "masqueraded as friends" but are in fact the 
greatest threats to "the future and well-being of black
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For many integrationists who saw Brown as the incarna­
tion of America's long struggle to match its reality with its 
ideals with respect to race, efforts by African Americans to 
save black colleges smacked of heresy (Wilkinson, 1979) . How­
ever, contrary to the opinions of their critics, the Avers 
plaintiffs (and by extension, the supporters of black col­
leges generally) did not depart from the American Creed. 
First, as mentioned in the last chapter, Brown never speci­
fied whether it meant to eradicate compulsory segregation or 
every type of segregation, whether freely chosen or not. 
Thus, the Avers plaintiffs were able to embrace the ideals of 
Brown without having to directly repudiate some of its more 
troublesome assertions - particularly the notion that 
"separate facilities are inherently unequal." Because of 
Brown's ambiguity, supporters of black colleges were spared 
the unenviable task of explaining how a decision of such 
profound symbolic and historical significance to both black 
and white Americans could possibly be wrong - or, at the very 
least, naive and misguided. Brown seemed to epitomize 
American ideals at their best; indeed, the shrill tactics of 
Brown's critics only served to strengthen the conviction that 
the South was "on the wrong side of history." As Wilkinson 
has argued, "Those promoting an idea can do no better than to 
hire intemperate opponents. And the vindication of Brown owes
higher education, particularly black colleges" (Bell, 1979, 
957-959).
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much to them" (1979, 34). Supporters of black colleges, then, 
merely had to fashion an interpretation of Brown that suited 
their cause; thus, they claimed Brown's moral legacy as their 
own.
Secondly, the plaintiffs contended that segregation 
harmed blacks not simply because it denied them equality or 
damaged them psychologically, but because it denied them 
freedom. The end of legal segregation, the argument ran, left 
blacks free to choose from the full range of educational 
institutions for academic, vocational, cultural, social and 
economic reasons (Preer, 1982, 213). No longer would the
choices of an individual black person be predetermined simply 
because he or she happened to be an African American. The 
problem with defining integration as requiring the extinction 
of black colleges was that it served to restrict the range of 
legitimate choices that each individual black person could 
make concerning which type of institution to attend.
Third, it has already been demonstrated that the elimi­
nation of the racial identification of schools threatened the 
power of black educators and black adminstrators. It also 
posed a threat to black students who might not qualify for 
admission to white universities. Not only were black colleges 
important centers of black educational power, but they also 
represented key centers of black political power as well. Not 
surprisingly, the groups who resisted efforts to merge black 
colleges out of existence were motivated, at least in part,
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by self-interest. Since participation in politics by self- 
interested groups or parties is considered a foundational 
cornerstone of politics in a democracy, the Avers plaintiffs 
certainly did not depart from American democratic norms. This 
conclusion becomes even stronger in view of the fact that the 
original complaint was filed precisely because the plaintiffs 
feared that a solution to the Mississippi desegregation 
problem was being imposed on them that was not in their best 
interests.
Fourth, the Avers case provided strong evidence of black 
fidelity to another key American virtue: pragmatism. For 
African Americans, pragmatism had historically manifested 
itself in the proliferation of a vast array of black self- 
help programs, mutual aid societies, and social fraternities. 
Blacks had developed these institutions to provide needed 
services to their communities (such as education) in the face 
of a hostile, white-dominated world that had refused to grant 
them equal access to the public sphere. In the present case, 
Avers symbolized black pragmatism in the recognition that (1) 
racism would not be overcome as quickly as many had hoped and 
(2) the end of legal segregation left many blacks unprepared 
to compete with whites on the same terms. In view of these 
realities, the Avers plaintiffs argued that black colleges 
still constituted a critical link between disadvantaged 
blacks and a college education. At the same time, black 
colleges presented themselves as institutions representing
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the hope for a college education for all regardless of race 
and color (another pragmatic compromise); in a political 
climate where majority-black institutions were considered 
suspect at best, black colleges could ill afford to make 
naked appeals to black self-interest.75
In addition, the plaintiffs were motivated to act by two 
larger national trends: (1) the state of desegregation law in 
higher education was largely unclear, and (2) HEW, which was 
charged with the power to enforce Title VI of the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act, had yet to develop coherent enforcement stan­
dards. Green had established the principle that states had 
the "affirmative duty" to dismantle former de jure systems of 
segregated schools. However, it was unclear what the 
implications of that ruling were for higher education; nor
75At the same time, black colleges, while promoting an 
image of themselves as universities for all the people, 
struggled with the question of how to be schools which 
appealed to all while main-taining a black cultural ethos. 
Efforts by black colleges to attract a larger white clientele 
have often fueled criticism and resentment from black 
students and faculty, who feel that whites were now receiving 
preferential treatment at their expense (Preer, 1982). 
Nevertheless, despite the public stances of many black 
colleges that they are universities for all races, their 
critics have accused them of being only interested in 
preserving themselves as all-black enclaves. The criticisms 
of black colleges "ran the gamut": it was alleged that (1) 
black colleges have a vested interest in maintaining medio­
crity; (2) black colleges have difficulty retaining good 
faculty, and that bright students do not develop intellec­
tually there; (3) some have denounced the administrative 
leadership of black campuses as a clique of autocratic, 
incompetent, mismanagers who are more interested in protec­
ting their turf than in raising the academic standards of the 
institutions they purport to lead; and (4) black college 
students must be educated in an integrated setting if they 
are to compete in American society (Roebuck and Murty, 1993).
R eproduced  with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
2 4 8
was it clear what it should mean for elementary and secon­
dary education. Chapter Three noted that the Supreme Court in 
ASTA and Norris sidestepped two opportunities to clarify the 
meaning and scope of the state's "affirmative duty" to dese­
gregate in higher education. Federal courts, lacking guidance 
from the Supreme Court, were left struggling to define the 
appropriate constitutional remedies themselves; as a result, 
conflicting interpretations of the Green standard had emerged 
in the federal courts. Lacking judicial precedents in higher 
education, federal judges attempted to draw on the experience 
of elementary and secondary education, often with problem- 
matic results.
The unsettled state of higher education desegregation 
law complicated HEW's predicament. Federal regulators have 
wide discretion to promulgate rules based on their interpre­
tation of laws and judicial decisions. The problem for HEW in 
this case, however, was that it simply was not clear what the 
law was. Adding to their troubles was a lack of experience in 
higher education desegregation; HEW officials were accus­
tomed to the more familiar problems associated with affecting 
desegregation at the elementary and secondary levels (Ayers, 
1984, 134). Even in 1980, after a decade of experience, an 
OCR official said that the agency did not know what would be 
the effect of eliminating "unnecessary program duplication" 
on the states' systems of higher education (Bryson, quoted in 
Ayers, 1984, 134). In fact, during the Adams case, HEW had
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cited its inexperience in higher education as a justification 
for its failure to develop comprehensive desegregation cri­
teria; Judge Pratt, however, was not sympathetic to the 
government's plea and ordered the agency to commence enforce­
ment proceedings.
Not only was the law unclear and the federal government 
lacked experience in higher education, but the question of 
what should happen to black colleges in the desegregation 
process perplexed HEW's bureaucrats. Solomon Arbeiter, 
coordinator for higher education in OCR from 1967 to 1969 
recalled how confusion and ambivalence toward black colleges 
paralyzed the agency's efforts to develop coherent policies. 
Though he envisioned desegregation as a process that would 
bring about the elimination of the racial identifiability of 
educational institutions, he found within the agency a great 
deal of sympathy toward the plight of black colleges:
Even within the federal government there arose a great 
deal of honest concern about the future of black col­
leges. Should they be preserved as enclaves for the 
education of blacks or should they be blended into a 
total system for blacks and whites? At times I had the 
feeling that the same people who wanted to establish 
quantitative goals for minority enrollment and other 
aspects of desegregation also were most sympathetic 
toward arguments for minority self-determination.
These officials saw no moral or legal ambivalence in 
taking those positions. They wanted strong enforcement 
of desegregation and yet they maintained it was both 
morally and legally proper to have separate minority 
programs, activities and institutions (Arbeiter, quoted 
in Preer, 1982, 196).
In retrospect, Arbeiter marveled at how a policy matter 
of such high importance could essentially be allowed to go
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unaddressed for several years (Ibid, 196) . But desegregation 
policy in higher education at the federal level did exactly 
that - mainly because federal regulators had no clear idea of 
what integration or desegregation should mean. And the exis­
tence of publicly funded black colleges only complicated 
their dilemma. Nor did the Adams decisions simplify HEW's 
problem. Adams said that the desegregation process must take 
into account the important role that black colleges play in 
assuring access to higher education for blacks and the real 
possibility that desegregation might negatively impact black 
access to postsecondary educational opportunities. But the 
court gave HEW no guidelines of how to fulfill that charge. 
Also, HEW officials interpreted the adversary positions taken 
by the LDF and the NAFEO in the Adams litigation as evidence 
that African Americans - the intended beneficiaries of 
integration - were not of one mind as to what the correct 
policy should be. As a result, the task of crafting desegre­
gation remedies under Title VI involved HEW administrators in 
the "tug-of-war” between competing civil rights groups who 
had sharply contrasting visions of the appropriate goals and 
strategies that were appropriate in the desegregation process 
(Ayers, 1984, 130-131).
Furthermore, what passed for federal enforcement efforts 
during this period was a model of inconsistency. The track 
record of HEW and the Department of Justice demonstrated not 
only a clear definition of desegregation, but revealed how
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vulnerable the regulatory zeal of these agencies were to 
political pressures. For example, five of the ten original 
Adams states submitted desegregation plans, all of which were 
rejected on the grounds that they were not specific enough in 
detailing how the states proposed to transform their dual 
systems of higher education into unitary ones (Adams, 1993). 
Yet, at the same time that HEW was rejecting the plans from 
the states, it had established no desegregation criteria of 
its own. Pursuant to the Adams decisions in 1973, eight of 
the ten Adams states submitted desegregation plans which OCR 
subsequently accepted; however, the agency still had failed 
to develop any comprehensive guidelines. Even more revealing 
of the federal government's erratic compliance efforts was 
the case of Mandel v. HEW (411 F. Supp. 542 [D.C.D. 1976]) 
where the state of Maryland successfully obtained an 
injunction against further OCR involvement in the state's 
higher education system because the court found the agency 
guilty of "arbitrary and capricious" enforcement of the law.
Furthermore, the failure of HEW to formulate a coherent 
policy unvieled the vulnerability of the agency's enforcement 
efforts to political pressures. In some instances, federal 
agencies significantly modified, or failed to initiate 
entirely, enforcement efforts in order to avoid offending 
powerful politicians.76 At other times, federal policy
76For example, the government's decision not to challenge 
segregated higher education in Alabama was attributed to 
Governor George Wallace's political clout (Preer, 1982, 197) .
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vaccillated due to changes in who occupied the White House. 
New presidents designated political appointees in critical 
policymaking positions, and these new appointees often 
implemented new policies over the objections of career 
bureaucrats and agency lawyers who were more familiar with 
the cases in question.77 Thus, HEW's critics no longer simply 
charged the agency with failing to promulgate clear guide­
lines. They also accused the federal government of lacking 
the political will to enforce the standards that it had.78
The Reagan administration's 1981 decision to reverse OCR's 
threat to cut off federal funds to North Carolina was 
attributed to Senator Jesse Helms' political standing with 
the Reagan White (Dentler, Balzell, and Sullivan, 1984, 110; 
Ayers, 1984, 133).
^For example, OCR's decision in 1970 that it would no 
longer rely on threats to cutoff federal aid to states 
reflected the Nixon administration's fulfillment of a 
campaign promise to change the way the federal government 
approached desegregation (Preer, 1982, 198; Orfield, 1996). 
Similarly, when Ronald Reagan became president in 1981, the 
Reagan Justice Department accepted a consent decree settle­
ment in North Carolina that the Carter Justice Department had 
previously rejected (Miller, 1982; Dentler, Balzell, and 
Sullivan, 1984). The settlement ended a bitter struggle 
between North Carolina and the federal government in which 
HEW had initiated proceedings to cut off federal funds to the 
state. The consent decree reflected the administration's 
rejection of the use of threats to cut off federal aid to 
prod states to dismantle desegregation.
78 The agency approved consent decree settlements in 
North Carolina and Louisiana in 1981 (Miller, 1982; Prestage 
and Prestage, 1987; Samuels, 1991). Commentators accused the 
Reagan administration of accepting plans which did not meet 
the standards of the Revised Criteria adopted in 1978 
(Miller, 1982; Dentler, Baltzell, and Sullivan, 1984; Ayers, 
1984). They pointed out that the consent decrees fell short 
of the Criteria's guidelines with respect to enhancing black 
institutions by giving them priority consideration for high 
demand programs. The effect of such enhancements would bring 
icreased funding, prestige, and serve to equalize the
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The unsettled state of higher desegregation law and the 
uncertain regulatory environment heightened the anxieties of 
supporters of black colleges. Thus, the Avers plaintiffs were 
asserting a measure of self-determination when they filed the 
case. While federal intervention was welcomed in the case, 
policy vacillations at HEW and the Department of Justice made 
the federal government an uncertain and unreliable ally. From 
the very beginning, the Avers plaintiffs and the Department 
of Justice had different agendas. The Black Mississippians' 
Council was determined that the process of desegregation 
focus on expanding black access to white universities while 
strengthening black colleges at the same time. However, the
curriculums of black institutions, thereby providing program­
matic inducements to white students to consider black 
colleges at the same time. Thus, the two pressing concerns of 
black institutions - equalization and desegegation - could be 
satisfied in one stroke.
The Reagan administration refused to insist on these 
types of enhancements, and chose not to order the politically 
unpopular proposal of removing academic programs from white 
campuses to black ones. The administration's approach was 
consistent with its overarching conservative philosophy of 
government which, when applied to higher education desegre­
gation, sought to minimize judicial intervention in state 
educational matters. While both consent decrees mandated that 
the states spend extra monies on black colleges, critics 
charged that the majority of the new dollars were concen­
trated in programs which were unlikely to have any positive 
desegregative effect on black campuses. The effect of the 
Louisiana and North Carolina decrees, they concluded, would 
actually increase unnecessary program duplication rather than 
reduce it. Therefore, critics accused the Reagan Justice 
Department of approving plans that actually violated federal 
desegregation standards. The administration defended its 
approach, insisting that it simply had an opposing view of 
the legitimate role of the federal government than groups 
such as the NAACP Legal Defense Fund (Miller, 1982; Dentler, 
Baltzell, and Sullivan, 1984; Ayers, 1984).
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Justice Department was primarily concerned with enforcing the 
"just schools" standard in higher education, but it was not 
clear what the federal government meant by desegregation 
(Brown, 1993, 121-123).
Mississippi responded to the Avers complaint, as well as 
the federal government's intervention into the case, with 
determined opposition. The state proceeded to implement its 
own Plan of Compliance despite the federal government's 
objections. The college board partially financed the state's 
defense by assessing each of the universities in proportion 
to its state appropriation, creating the ironic situation of 
Mississippi's black colleges contributing financially to 
advance the cause of positions that they were opposed to 
(Peoples, 1995, 315).
However, state officials realized that a frontal attack 
on the Brown decision at this late date would be futile. 
Instead, Mississippi pursued a different strategy: the state 
insisted that compliance with Brown required the implementa­
tion of race-neutral, "colorblind" policies in higher educa­
tion. The effect of the Brown decision, the argument went, 
was to vindicate Justice Harlan's lonely dissent in Plessv 
when he argued that "our Constitution is colorblind." Hence­
forth, the state's obligation was to promulgate educational 
policies without regard to race. Remedies that suggested, for 
example, that traditionally black universities must now be 
enhanced to compensate for historical underfunding were in
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fact "race-conscious" policies that were impermissable under 
the Fourteenth Amendment and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964.
In this sense, the Mississippi case was one battlefront 
in a larger national debate over the meaning of the civil 
rights revolution of the 1960's. In Chapter One, it was 
argued that political conflicts concerning issues of racial 
policies between liberals and conservatives since the mid- 
1960' s have revolved primarily around the question of the 
best means to achieve racial justice. Mississippi's argu­
ments fell squarely within the conservative orbit: the state 
argued that race consciousness in the determination of public 
policy constituted a prima facie violation of the American 
principle that each citizen be judged based on his or her own 
merit. Conservatives increasingly began to object to policies 
such as busing, affirmative action, and minority set-aside 
programs because, in their view, these policies practiced the 
very evil the civil rights movement tried to eradicate. Libe­
rals were accused of abandoning an emphasis on affirming the 
worth of every individual (which represented the "best" in 
American traditions) to promoting policies which required 
"equality of results" or "proportional representation." These 
ideas, according to conservative critics, were "un-American" 
(Glazer, 1975, D'Souza, 1995). In the same way, the state of 
Mississippi asserted that the black plaintiffs in Avers. by 
insisting that the Equal Protection Clause required the
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enhancement of historically black colleges, had advanced two 
arguments which fundamentally violated the American Creed. In 
the first place, they asserted that African Americans were 
seeking proportional representation in college admissions, 
college graduation, faculty and administrative hiring, and in 
state appropriations to historically black colleges. Second, 
the remedies favored by the petitioners, in the state's view, 
were tantamount to assertions of "group rights." Mississippi 
denied that the African American community had a constitu­
tional right to educational institutions with equal resources 
as white institutions, arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment 
offered protection to individuals, not groups.
Furthermore, evidence began to mount that the more 
conservative vision of civil rights was gaining momentum. 
After a series of court decisions that expanded the courts' 
ability to foster desegregation, the Supreme Court in Milli- 
ken v. Bradley (418 U.S. 717 [1974]) struck down a Detroit 
metropolitan desegregation plan that involved the urban and 
suburban districts.79 Since whites had been moving in ever 
growing numbers to the suburbs since the end of World War II 
(J. Patterson, 1997), Milliken significantly reduced the
79The plaintiffs in Milliken argued that Detroit's public 
schools were already 65 percent black, and a Detroit-only 
remedy would not substantially alter the racial composition 
of the city's schools. However, in a 5-4 holding, the Supreme 
Court ruled that the district court had made no determination 
of liability in the suburban districts; therefore, an 
interdistrict remedy exceeded the remedial power of the 
court.
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desegregative effect of court-ordered busing plans in many 
Northern and Western metropolitan school districts 
(Wilkinson, 1979; Orfield, 1996; Smith, 1996). Milliken 
reflected the public mood: surveys indicated that close to 90 
percent of whites preferred neighborhoood schools over busing 
and (much to the chagrin of many civil rights activists) 
busing was opposed by a sizable segment of the black 
community.80
In another decision that would make it harder to effect 
desegregation in the suburbs, the Supreme Court in Pasadena 
Board of Education v. Spangler (427 U.S. 424 [1976]) ruled 
that school districts were not required by the Constitution 
to make annual adjustments of the racial composition of their 
student bodies if the changes were the result of shifting 
demographic patterns within their communities. The justices 
emphatically rejected the district court's insistence that 
there be no school "with a majority of any minority stu­
80As late as 1989, white opposition to busing still 
hovered near 80 percent (Rossell, 1994, 642). Even more
interestingly, a sizable number of African Americans 
preferred neighborhood schools over busing; Rossell (1994) 
reported that between 1972 and 1991, black support for busing 
never surpassed 60 percent, and dipped below 50 percent in 
nine of the twenty years surveyed (Ibid, 642). For example, 
in Boston bitter antagonisms emerged between the NAACP Legal 
Defense Fund, which supported court-mandated busing, and 
African American community activists who favored neighborhood 
schooling (Bell, 1980) . Louisville was characterized by a 
gradual buildup of black opposition to busing: a poll
conducted by the University of Louisville Urban Studies 
Center indicated that 63 percent of blacks approved busing in 
the first year of mandatory busing (1977-1978). By the next 
school year, the figure had dropped to 49 percent (Wilkinson, 
1979, 245).
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dents," setting aside the view that the absence of numerical 
parity among the races was prima facie evidence of violations 
of equal protection within the meaning of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. The demographic changes, the Court concluded, were 
due "to a normal pattern of people moving into, out of, and 
around the school system" (Ibid, 425) and were not related to 
policies enacted by school officials. Therefore, the district 
was not required to make policy adjustments in the absence of 
a finding that the racial imbalances resulted from state 
action.
Furthermore, the belief that race was an inherently 
illegitmate basis with which to ground public policy was 
receiving increasing support from the Supreme Court.81 While 
this argument had been traditionally advanced by the NAACP 
and other civil rights groups to challenge racial segrega­
tion, it left two questions unresolved. First, did compliance 
with the Equal Protection Clause require a showing that state 
policies were enacted without a discriminatory purpose or did 
plaintiffs merely need to demonstrate that the policies in 
question had "racially disparate effects" regardless of their 
intent? The Supreme Court in Washington v. Davis (42 6 U.S. 
229 [1976]) ruled that plaintiffs had to prove that it was
81Key cases include the following: Hirabavashi v. United 
States 320 U.S. 81 (1943); Korematsu v. United States. 323 
U.S. 214 (1944); Bolling v. Sharpe. 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954); 
Garner v. Louisiana. 368 U.S. 157 (1960); Bell v. Maryland. 
378 U.S. 226 (1964); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184
(1964); Loving v. Virginia. 388 U.S. 1 (1967); and Davis v. 
School Commissioners of Mobile County. 402 U.S. 33 (1971).
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the intent of defendants to subordinate them because of their 
race in order to prevail in racial discrimination suits.82 
Proving discriminatory intent presented African American 
plaintiffs with a substantially greater burden of proof than 
alleging discriminatory impact. Mississippi's defense in the 
higher education desegregation case relied on the doctrine of 
discriminatory intent. The state contended that its current 
policies governing college admissions, faculty and adminis­
trative hiring, institutional missions, and funding were 
based on nonracial considerations and indicated no evidence 
of discrimination.
Finally, in one of the most important civil rights cases 
in the post-Brown era, the Court in a 5-4 holding ruled in 
Regents of University of California v. Bakke (438 U.S. 265 
[1978]) that an admission policy which reserved a set number 
of slots for minority applicants at the University of Cali- 
fornia-Davis Medical School unconstitutionally discriminated 
against Allan Bakke, a white applicant. Bakke charged that he 
had been denied admission while minority applicants with 
inferior academic qualifications had been admitted. Justice
82In Washington. black applicants to the District of 
Columbia Police Department challenged the constitutionality 
of a verbal ability test required of all applicants. African 
American applicants failed the test at a rate four times that 
of whites. The plaintiffs alleged that such a racially 
disparate result was unconstitutional. The Court argued that 
only official conduct having a discriminatory purpose 
violated the Equal Protection Clause. Justice White wrote 
that simply the fact that blacks scored significantly lower 
on the test did not make it unconstitutional.
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Powell, writing for the majority, suggested that policies 
simply predicated on compensating African Americans for 
historical patterns of discrimination impermissibly made them 
"special wards" of the state, who were entitled to more equal 
protection than others (Ibid, 294-295). For many African 
Americans, Powell's words sounded chillingly similar to a 
memorable paragraph that succintly represented the essence of 
the Court's opinion in The Civil Rights Cases:
When a man has emerged from slavery, and by the 
aid of beneficient legislation has shaken off the 
inseparable concomitants of that state, there must 
be some stage in the progress of his elevation when 
he takes the rank of a mere citizen, and ceases to be 
the special favorite of the laws, and when his rights 
as a citizen, or a man, are to be protected in the 
ordinary modes by which other men's rights are protected 
(109 U.S. 3, 24 [1883]).
Powell wrote, "The guarantee of equal protection cannot 
mean one thing when applied to one individual and something 
else when applied to a person of another color" (438 U.S. 
265, 289-290). The majority opinion in Bakke implied that 
much of the cumulative effects of centuries of racial dis­
crimination was too remote to remedy. Plaintiffs had to prove 
how racial discrimination unconstitutionally abridged their 
liberties in the "here and now." Similarly, Mississippi main­
tained that a ruling requiring the state to make massive 
investments at the historically black colleges to compensate 
for past discriminatory policies would unconstitutionally 
punish the state for past, as opposed to present discrimina­
tion. Such remedies were not only beyond the scope of the
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Equal Protection Clause, they argued, but they violated a 
basic principle of fairness: in essence, the sons were being 
asked to suffer for the sins of the fathers.
Mississippi pointed largely tc two significant develop­
ments as evidence that its higher education system was in 
compliance with the spirit of the Brown decision: (1) the
revision of admissions requirements for the state's univer­
sities, and (2) the establishment of "mission designations" 
for the respective institutions.
The new admissions requirements relied almost exclu­
sively on ACT scores as the basis for automatic admission to 
the state's, universities. The new policies developed in 
response to concerns voiced by faculty and staff persons 
about high numbers of entering freshmen in state univerities 
who were unprepared for college-level work. Starting in the 
fall of 1977, no student would be admitted to the senior 
colleges with an ACT score of less than 9; however, schools 
were permitted to establish and maintain higher minimum 
requirements.83 High school grades were not to be considered
83Not surprisingly, the historically white institutions 
had higher ACT requirements than their black counterparts. 
Initially, all of the white institutions had a minimum ACT 
score of 15 for automatic admission. Later, the state 
authorized these institutions to admit a select number of 
"high risk" students who fell short of this "magic number;" 
the number of students admitted on this basis should not 
exceed 5% or 50 students (whichever number was greater). Some 
black critics particularly scorned this loophole, viewing it 
as a deliberate effort to subsidize the athletic programs of 
Ole Miss, Mississippi State, and Southern Mississippi, in 
1987, Mississippi University for Women received authorization 
to raise its ACT minimum to 18. Applicants to MUW could be
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as a factor in determining eligibility because of concerns 
about "grade inflation."
When the new requirements failed to significantly 
address the problems associated with the academic prepared­
ness of freshmen, the state implemented remedial studies 
programs in 1979. Three years later, in the midst of a down­
turn in the state's economy, Mississippi eliminated the 
program. Determining that the remedial programs were both 
ineffective and too costly in the face of anticipated budget 
cuts, the Board of Trustees in July, 1982 adopted a high 
school preparatory curriculum aimed at positively effecting 
the academic preparedness of incoming students.84
The state's refusal to include high school grades when 
making admissions decisions particularly incensed many black 
Mississippians. Recognizing that blacks did not perform as 
well on the ACT as whites, many African Americans believed 
that the new standards were directed at them (Petitioners' 
Brief, United States v. Fordice). They accused the state of
admitted if they scored between 15 and 17 on the ACT and had 
a cumulative grade point average of 3.0 on a 4.0 scale. Those 
who scored between 15, and 17 on the ACT, yet failed to earn 
a 3.0 could be admitted on an exceptional basis. In contrast, 
the black institutions all have a minimum ACT score of 13; 
however, they admit students who score between 9 and 12 on an 
exceptional basis. Students who score below 9 must attend a 
junior college before they can be eligible to transfer to a 
senior college (Avers v. Allain. 676 F. Supp. 1523, 1532-
1534).
MThe new curriculum was to consist of required courses 
in the sciences, math, and English. It was scheduled for 
implemenation in the fall of 198 6.
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setting up new, more sophisticated barriers to obstruct black 
access to higher education within the state. The state argued 
that the new policies were justified on educational grounds. 
Mississippi had a legitimate interest in enacting policies 
that sought to enhance the pool of qualified college appli­
cants. The state no longer forbade blacks from enrolling in 
white institutions by law; if African Americans failed to 
meet the admissions requirements of the state's universities, 
official policy was not to blame. Mississippi's argument 
echoed a familiar refrain: in the post-Brown era, blacks have 
no one to blame for "failing to make it" but themselves 
(Parent, 1985).
Secondly, in 1981, after an extensive review of the cur­
ricular offerings at each university, the Board of Trustees 
issued "mission designations" for each public institution. 
These missions were clustered in three categories: comprehen­
sive, urban, and regional universities. "Comprehensive" 
institutions were defined as those universities offering the 
widest variety of degree offerings and receiving the greatest 
levels of funding. The Board recognized the University of 
Mississippi, Mississippi State University, and Southern 
Mississippi as comprehensive universities. These institutions 
were authorized to continue offering doctoral programs and to 
assert leadership in various disciplines. Jackson State, the 
sole urban university, was assigned a more limited research 
and degree mission tailored toward its urban setting. Despite
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the university's requests, the Board denied Jackson State a 
leadership role in any particular field. The remaining uni­
versities - Mississippi University for Women, Delta State, 
Alcorn State, and Mississippi Valley - were classified as 
"regional" universities. These institutions were permitted to 
maintain their limited graduate offerings (provided some of 
them gain or retain accreditation), but were principally 
designed as baccalaureate-degree granting universities. No 
doctoral programs were to be offered by these institutions 
(U.S. Exhibit 683, "Mission Statements," 1991, 275-277; Avers 
v. Allain. 676 F. Supp. 1523, 1538-1542).
The black colleges and the Avers plaintiffs protested 
bitterly against the new missions designations. They argued 
that while the institutional missions appeared "race-neutral" 
on their face, the state's policies did not address a century 
of official neglect of black higher education. This past 
history, plaintiffs insisted, created a "cumulative deficit" 
which the state was now obliged to remedy. The new designa­
tions, they argued, served to "freeze in place" the unequal 
advantages that white institutions had enjoyed throughout the 
era of de jure segregation (Petitioners' Brief, United States 
v. Fordice in Kurland and Casper, 1993). State officials 
denied that the Equal Protection Clause required them to 
remedy the "cumulative deficit" that the Avers plaintiffs 
alleged existed. While acknowledging that previous state 
conduct had indeed discriminated against the rights of
Reproduced  with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
2 6 5
African Americans, Mississippi officials now argued that 
present policies had made a decisive break with the state's 
segregated past. Decisions regarding the missions of public 
universities were legitimate issues of state policy that were 
independent of any racial considerations. The state insisted 
that the decisions regarding missions designations were made 
for educational reasons and in view of Mississippi's limited 
resources (Respondents' Brief, United States v. Fordice in 
Kurland and Casper, 1993).
Twelve years of negotiations failed to break the impasse 
between the parties. In 1987, the case proceeded to trial. 
The litigation embarked on a course that would ultimately 
lead it to the Supreme Court. The journey of the Avers case 
through the federal courts is the subject of the next section 
of this chapter.
The Case Goes to Trial
Both the private petitioners and the Justice Department 
insisted that Mississippi had not done enough to eliminate 
the de jure segregated system. Specifically, they contended 
that the use of the ACT as the basis for automatic admission 
to the state's universities unconstitutionally discriminated 
against African Americans. The plaintiffs complained that 
"more inclusive" alternatives to primary reliance on the ACT 
were available, but the state had rejected them.85 They also
85In 1985, 72 percent of white students in Mississippi 
scored 15 or better on the ACT, whereas only 30 percent of 
black students achieved that mark, a difference of nearly two
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noted that even ACT officials had encouraged college adminis­
trators to not rely exclusively on the the results of one 
examination when making admissions decisions; rather, ACT 
officials advised universities to take into account a whole 
battery of factors (such as high school grades and faculty 
recommendations). The plaintiffs also railed against the 
institutional missions designations, arguing that they flowed 
out of the historical racial identities of the state's 
universities and served to perpetuate the unequal status of 
the predominately black institutions.
While both the private petitioners and the Justice 
Department contended that the state unnecessarily duplicated 
a high proportion of the academic programs at black and white 
universities, the United States emphasized this aspect of the 
case more than the Avers plaintiffs (United States' Brief, 
United States v. Fordice in Kurland and Casper, 1993). This 
reflected the fact that the "bottom line" of the federal 
government's case was that Mississippi's higher education 
system violated Green's mandate that dual systems of educa­
tion be eliminated "root and branch."86 By contrast, the
and a half times. However, the disparity between the high 
school grades of black and white Mississippians was not 
nearly as large: 43.8 percent of white high school students 
and 3 0.5 percent of black students earned at least a 3.0 
grade point average, and 62.2 percent of whites and 49.2 
percent of blacks earned at least a 2.5 (505 U.S. 717, 737).
86For example, the Justice Department cited Geier v. 
University of Tennessee (597 F.2d. 1056 [6th Cir. 1979])
where the court stated, "the Green requirement of an 
affirmative duty applies to public higher education as well
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Avers plaintiffs, while invoking Green, emphasized what they 
believed to be the state's remedial duty under HEW's Revised 
Criteria pursuant to Title VI. These guidelines, they main­
tained, supported their claim that the enhancement of black 
universities was necessary in order to "remove the badge of 
inferiority" from these institutions, and insure that every 
student's choice of which university be unhindered by state 
policies that racially discriminated against predominately 
black schools (Petitioners' Brief, United States v. Fordice. 
in Kurland and Casper, 1993). At any rate, the plaintiffs 
were in harmony on one fundamental point: compliance with 
Brown. Green, and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
required more than simply the enactment of nondiscriminatory 
policies. The ASTA standard, they contended, was not the 
controlling law in this case.
The state, while acknowledging that white universities 
had initially used the ACT to deny blacks access to their
as to education at the elementary and secondary school 
levels. . . it is only the means of elimina-ting segregation 
which differ" (Ibid, 1065). The United States stressed that 
Geier gave federal courts wide discretion to order even 
"radical" remedies to eliminate segregation in state systems 
of higher education. The Avers plaintiffs also utilize the 
Geier case in their arguments because it grants the courts 
greater latitude to craft remedies and it, like Green, 
imposes on the state the burden to implement remedies which 
"realistically promise to work. . . now" (391 U.S. 430, 441). 
However, this precedent is listed only as a footnote in their 
briefs because the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Geier 
upheld the merger of a black and white public institution. 
The Avers plaintiffs were determined to resist the merger of 
black and white institutions as a desegregation remedy at 
all costs.
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institutions, denied that the primary motive for the current 
use of the ACT was to impose barriers to black admission to 
predominately white institutions. Rather, the Board saw the 
need to address the academic preparedness of college fresh­
men. The state defended the missions designations as sound 
educational policies based on the reality of its limited 
resources. These policies, Mississippi concluded, met the 
"good faith" standards of ASTA, and therefore the state was 
obligated to go no further. They rejected the plaintiffs/ 
contention that the continued racial identifiability of the 
state's universities proved that the state had not meet its 
"affirmative duty" to desegregate under Green.87
In addition, the state relied on Bazemore v. Friday (478 
U.S. 385 (1986). Bazemore involved the persistence of racial 
identifiability within the 4-H and homemaker clubs of the 
North Carolina Extension Service. Pursuant to Title VI of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, the state's Extension Service 
discontinued its policy of assigning students to particular 
clubs based on race. However, despite the fact that students 
were free to choose any particular club, a great number of 
all-white and all-black clubs remained. The Supreme Court
87As of the 1985-8 6 academic year, over 99 percent of 
white undergraduate students attended a historically white 
institution; at the graduate level the figure was 9 6.6 
percent. Black students were concentrated primarily at the 
historically black institutions, though to a lesser extent; 
in 1985-86, 70.3% of black undergrad-uates attended a
historically black institution; at the graduate level, the 
figure was 63.7% (Petitioners' Brief for Writ of Cer-torari, 
United States v. Fordice. in Kurland and Jasper, 1993, 36).
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ruled that the mere existence of clubs of one race did not 
prove a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court's 
majority concluded that the Service had implemented nondis- 
criminatory admissions policy and that the racial composition 
of the clubs reflected the voluntary choices of the partici­
pants. Thus, the promulgation of racially neutral admissions 
policies, the Court declared, satisfied the Extension Ser­
vice's remedial duty under the Equal Protection Clause.
Mississippi analogized the Bazemore decision to higher 
education. In the first place, participation in the 4-H and 
homemaker clubs, like choosing to attend college, constituted 
a "voluntary" act. ASTA. which the state insisted was the 
proper remedial standard for desegregation in public higher 
education, had stressed the voluntary nature of attending 
college. Thus, where participation in programs operated by 
the state was noncompulsory (as opposed to the compulsory 
nature of elementary and secondary education), the Equal 
Protection Clause only required the state to implement non- 
discriminatory admissions and hiring practices. The continued 
racial identifiability of Mississippi's universities, the 
state continued, reflected the voluntary choices of students 
and parents and were not traceable to the state's segregated 
past (Respondents' Brief in Opposition to Writ of Certiorari, 
United States v. Fordice. in Kurland and Casper, 1993).
The district court in Avers accepted all of the state's 
contentions (Ayers v. Allain. 674 F. Supp. 1523 [N.D. Miss.
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1987]). The plaintiffs appealed to a three-judge panel of the 
Fifth Circuit Court Appeals. The three-judge panel reversed 
the district court's holding in February, 1990, declaring 
that the vestiges of Mississippi's de jure segregated system 
of higher education remained substantially intact (893 F.2d. 
732 [5th Cir. 1990]). However, the state appealed to the full 
Fifth Circuit and on September 28, 1990, the full court
affirmed the district court's decision (914 F.2d. 676 [5th 
Cir. 1990]). The plaintiffs filed for a writ of certiorari to 
the Supreme Court; on April 15, 1991, the Supreme Court
agreed to hear the appeals in the Avers case (Walton, 1997, 
162) .
The Supreme Court issued its ruling in United States v. 
Fordice on June 26, 1992. The next section discusses the
Court's decision and its rationale.
The Supreme Court Rules
In an 8-1 decision, the Supreme Court reversed the 
ruling of the full Fifth Circuit, declaring that the state of 
Mississippi had not done enough to meet its "affirmative 
duty" to desegregate as described in Green. Justice Byron 
White, writing for the majority, stated that though the state 
had enacted policies that were race-neutral on their face, 
these policies substantially restricted a student's choice as 
to which institution he or she would enter. The state, White 
went on, bore the responsibility of either justifying these 
policies or eliminating them.
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In particular, the Supreme Court made the following 
determinations in its decree:
(1) First of all, the Supreme Court rejected out of hand 
the state's contention that it had fulfilled its remedial 
duty to desegregate by implementing race-neutral admissions 
and hiring policies. While the majority accepted the view 
that the context of higher education afforded a measure of 
"freedom of choice" to students that made it fundamentally 
different from elementary and secondary education, the Court 
refused to accept ASTA's mandate that states adopt "good 
faith" race-neutral pollicies as the appropriate legal stan­
dard in higher education desegregation cases. White wrote:
Our decisions establish that a State does not 
discharge its constitutional obligations until it eradi­
cates policies and practices traceable to its prior de 
jure dual system that continue to foster segregation. 
Thus, we have consistently asked whether existing racial 
identifiability is attributable to the State. . . and 
examined a wide range of factors [emphasis added] to 
determine whether the State has perpetuated its formerly 
de jure segregation in any facet of its institutional 
system (505 U.S. 717, 728).
Thus, the Supreme Court held that the district court and the 
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, by relying on ASTA and Baze- 
more, had construed the state's "affirmative duty" too nar­
rowly.
(2) The majority concluded that the state's use of the 
ACT was "constitutionally suspect" despite Mississippi's 
denial that the policy had a discriminatory intent. They 
noted that the ACT policy originated in 1963 during a period 
of active resistance to integration by the state and argued
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that the change of the state's purpose for the requirement in 
"mid-stream" did not eliminate its discriminatory effects. 
The Court also rejected the state's premise that high school 
grades should not be considered as a predictor of college 
academic performance, noting that even ACT officials discou­
rage universities from relying solely on test scores when 
making admissions decisions (505 U.S. 717, 734-737).
(3) The Court accepted the United States' contention 
that the state of Mississippi unnecessarily duplicated a wide 
range of academic programs and that this practice served to 
perpetuate the "separate but equal" system of public insti­
tutions (505 U.S. 717, 738-739). The district court found
that 34.6 percent of the undergraduate programs at the 
historically black institutions were "unnecessarily dupli­
cated" by historically white universities; at the graduate 
level, 90 percent of the program offerings at black univer­
sities were unnecessarily duplicated by white universities. 
However, the district court declined to rule that these facts 
had anything to do with perpetuating the racial identities of 
these institutions. The Supreme Court ruled that the district 
court's reasoning ignored the fact that the very nature of 
the dual system required duplicative programs for two types 
of schools, and the "present unnecessary duplication is a 
continuation of this practice" (Ibid, 738). Brown II. White 
argued, placed the burden on the state to prove that these 
programs can be educationally justified; thus, the district
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court impermissibly shifted the burden of proof to the plain­
tiffs to demonstrate the constitutional defect of unnecessary 
duplication (Ibid, 739) .
(4) The Court's majority determined Mississippi's 1981 
mission designations, when linked with differential admis­
sions standards at black and white universities and the 
existence of unnecessary program duplication, probably 
"interfere with student choice and tend to perpetuate the 
segregated system" (Ibid, 741). The justices stressed that 
they did not mean to imply that the assignment of different 
admissions to institutions within a state higher education 
system would .raise constitutional questions if one or more of 
those institutions either became or remained predominately 
black. Rather, the issue was whether the state had engaged in 
discriminatory conduct and/or had sufficiently dismantled the 
remnants of its de jure dual system. Because the Court's 
majority was troubled by Mississippi's admissions policies 
and the widespread duplication of programs at the state's 
universities, they found it difficult to assume at face value 
that the mission designations were benign.
(5) The Court refused to address the question of whether 
the state would be required to upgrade Jackson State, Alcorn 
State, and Mississippi Valley as part of the desegregation 
remedy (Ibid, 743). Instead, the justices wondered if it was 
wise for a poor state such as Mississippi to maintain eight 
public universities. Citing United States v. Louisiana (718
with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
2 7 4
F. Supp. 499 [E.D. La. 1989]), White asserted that closure of 
one or more institutions would decrease the discriminatory 
effects of the current system in Mississippi (Ibid, 742). 
However, the Court declined to rule on whether the closure or 
merger of institutions was required, suggesting that the 
elimination of program duplication and the revision of admis­
sions criteria might eliminate the need for such a radical 
remedy (Ibid).
Because the Supreme Court believed that the district 
court and the Court of Appeals had utilized the wrong legal 
standards, it remanded the case bach to the district court 
with a series of instructions. First of all, the state had 
the burden of reconsidering all of its admissions policies 
with the goal of eliminating all discriminatory effects while 
at the same time maintaining "sound educational" practices. 
Secondly, the district court were to inquire as to the prac­
ticality of eliminating the discriminatory effects of the 
mission designations. Thirdly, the court was to consider a 
wide range of alternatives to reduce duplication and waste 
within the system, including, if deemed necessary, the merger 
of institutions. Finally, the issue of whether the enhance­
ment of historically black institutions is a necessary 
requirement for desegregation to occur was remanded to the 
lower courts (Ibid, 743).
Justice Clarence Thomas, the lone African American on 
the Court, wrote a concurring opinion which argued that the
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continued existence of historically black colleges was 
consistent with "sound educational" policies. Black colleges, 
he argued, had served many important educational, cultural, 
and psychological roles in preparing African Americans for 
the transition into the larger white society. "It would be 
ironic, to say the least," Thomas observed, "if the insti­
tutions that sustained blacks during segregation were them­
selves destroyed in an effort to combat its vestiges" (United 
States v. Fordice. 505 U.S. 717, 749 [J. Thomas, concurring, 
1992]).
Justice Antonin Scalia dissented, arguing that the 
Court's standard in Fordice placed an "unsustainable burden" 
on the states. He complained that the ruling resembled the 
Green standard which the Court had previously required for 
public schools. The Green mandate, Scalia contended, did not 
apply in the context of higher education. "The constitutional 
evil of the 'separate but equal' regime that we confronted in 
Brown I was that blacks were told to go to one set of 
schools, whites to another," he protested. Bazemore's stan­
dard for dismantling a dual system, Scalia argued, should 
have provided the controlling law in Fordice. Scalia also 
complained that the Fordice ruling was too vague and provided 
little in the way of guidance to the lower courts.
Furthermore, he hinted that Fordice. rather than serving 
the interests of African Americans, "is as likely to subvert 
as to promote the interests of those citizens on whose behalf
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the present suit was brought" (United States v. Fordice. 505 
U.S. 717, 749 [J. Scalia, dissenting]). While rejecting the 
private petitioners' claim that the Constitution required the 
state to equalize funding at the black institutions, Scalia 
maintained that the Constitution did not prevent a state from 
equalizing funding between traditionally black and white 
universities if it chose to. However, he charged that the 
Court's ruling in Fordice had effectively precluded states 
from adopting that very option. Fordice had extended the 
Green mandate to higher education; by implication, Scalia 
reasoned that the Court had endorsed the compulsory-inte- 
gration philosophy which formed the underpinnings of Green. 
The Fordice standard jeopardized all policies that have the 
effect of preserving the existence of historically black 
institutions, as well as any proposals that might enhance 
them. Such a result should not be surprising, he continued. 
It had always been the goal of Green to eliminate black 
schools. "While that may be good social policy," Scalia 
wrote, "the present petitioners, I suspect, would not agree" 
(505 U.S. 717, 750 [J. Scalia, dissenting, 1992]). He con­
cluded that an individual citizen is done a severe disser­
vice when the state, in the name of maximizing integration, 
minimizes diversity and "vitiates" his choices (Ibid, 750).
Scalia's final point was well taken by many African Ame­
ricans who were carefully following the Fordice case. The 
Supreme Court had adamantly rejected Mississippi's argument
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that nondiscriminatory policies sufficiently satisfied a 
state's duty to remedy past segregative practices in higher 
education. Rather, the justices accepted the plaintiffs' 
contention that facially neutral policies may be wholly 
inadequate to overcome the effects of years of separtism and 
may actually aid in perpetuating the vestiges of segregation. 
On this score, the supporters of black colleges were pleased 
with this portion of the Court's reasoning. But the Court 
refused to consider an equalization remedy favored by the 
black plaintiffs. Thus, Ware commented that "although the 
United States prevailed in Fordice. in reality Jake Ayers and 
the other private plaintiffs lost" (1994, 671). The Fordice 
ruling left the future of historically black colleges in 
considerable doubt. The Court questioned the economic feasi­
bility of the state of Mississippi's decision to maintain 
eight universities, raising fears that Fordice provided the 
legal justification for states to close black colleges in the 
name of fiscal responsibility.88 The Avers litigation had 
been initiated with the expressed purpose of improving the 
black institutions as black institutions. Fordice did not
88In Mississippi's case, those fears turned out to be 
justified. At a status and scheduling conference on October 
22, 1992, the Board of Trustees issued a one-hundred page
report which proposed, among other remedies, the closure of 
Mississippi Valley and the merger of Alcorn State University 
with Mississippi State University. The state's proposal 
generated a firestorm of protest from African Americans. 
However, because the proposal also recommended the merger of 
Mississippi University for Women with the University of 
Southern Mississippi, an unusual black-white political 
alliance was forged (Mercer, 1992; Fienberg, 1994).
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answer the question of whether African Americans had a con­
stitutional right to equally funded public colleges where 
they were in the majority.
Fordice failed to provide the lower courts with a frame­
work for what the Court would consider as an appropriate 
remedy to satisfy the requirements of Brown and Green. In 
essence, Fordice defined what desegregation in higher 
education was not, not what it was. While relying on prece­
dents established in public school desegregation cases, the 
Court neglected to clearly articulate the extent to which 
those principles apply in the context of higher education. 
This lack of specificity gives lower courts little direction, 
and promises to encourage more litigation in the future to 
sort out this legal dilemma. For the supporters of black 
colleges, the Fordice ruling provided no assurance that the 
desegregation process would not culminate in the elimination 
of these institutions (Brown, 1992; Weeden, 1992; Smith, 
1993; Brown-Scott, 1994; Washburn, 1994).
To further complicate matters, Fordice occurred in a 
context where many urban social districts in America were as 
segregated as ever (Wilson, 1987; Rossell, 1990; Chubb and 
Moe, 1990; Kozol, 1991; Reich, 1991; Massey and Denton, 1993; 
Armor, 1995) . At the same time, Supreme Court decisions were 
making it easier for local school districts to be released 
from longstanding desegregation orders, despite evidence that 
substantial levels of racial segregation continued to persist
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in many school districts.89 The Court's majority seemed to 
believe that the effects of the period of legal segregation 
were "too distant" to explain the persistence of racially 
identifiable schools. The further the nation moves from 1954, 
the Court appeared to say, the less likely that racial segre­
gation can be attributable to the vestiges of de jure racial 
discrimination. In the current climate, courts seem more 
willing to assume that high concentrations of racially segre­
gated schools reflect the voluntary choices of parents and 
students.
At the same time, the Fordice decision extended the 
Green principle from the elementary and secondary level to 
higher education. It has already been observed that federal 
judges tend to look to precedents from elementary and secon­
dary cases when deciding postsecondary desegregation cases.
89Those decisions included Missouri v. Jenkins. 110 S. 
Ct. 1651 (1990), Oklahoma City Public Schools v. Dowell. 498 
U.S. 237 (1991), and Freeman v. Pitts. 503 U.S. 467 (1992). 
In Dowell and Pitts. the Supreme Court held that court 
supervision of the school districts in question was no longer 
appropriate because the dis-tricts had effected desegregation 
compliance. The Court made these decisions despite evidence 
of substantial levels of racial segre-gation in both cases. 
The Court concluded that the continued racial identifiability 
of the schools reflected normal demographic shifts in the 
population and were unrelated to state policies. In Jenkins. 
the Court struck down a district court order imposing a tax 
on the Kansas City School District as part of a desegregation 
order. The majority argued that the federal court had 
exceeded its remedial authority by imposing a tax on the 
citizenry without their consent. For some liberals, these 
decisions signaled a decided shift of the Court toward the 
right and away from the mandate of Brown: Gary Orfield's new 
book, for example, is entitled Dismantling Desegre­
gation: The Quiet Reversal of Brown v. Board of Education
(1996).
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On one hand, Fordice. as an extension of Green, defined the 
remedial duties of states beyond the narrow interpretation of 
the ASTA standard; on the other hand, the most recent prece­
dents at the elementary and secondary level have limited the 
remedial powers of the courts to effect racial balance in the 
public schools. Given these contradictory trends, it is 
unclear how federal courts will apply the Fordice standard to 
future higher education desegregation cases. In short, For­
dice raised more questions than it answered.
Thus, thirty eight years after Brown. the state of the 
law in higher education desegregation remained unclear. The 
fact that such a result could still exist in the 1990's could 
not have been anticipated by those who fought to secure the 
Brown decision. The fact that the Fordice decision left the 
status of publicly-supported black universities unclear was 
seized upon by critical race theorists90 as an opportunity to 
indict the Court (Calmore, 1992; Johnson, 1993). Johnson 
(1993) argued that "Fordice is wrong because Brown v. Board 
of Education is wrong; both cases fail to distinguish between 
the goal of integration in an ideal society and the process
90Critical race theorists maintain that racism is a 
fundamen-tal feature of American political culture and the 
dominant values of the American Creed - particularly as they 
inform American legal jurisprudence - devalue or delegitimize 
critical aspects of African American culture. They reject 
interpretations of Brown that require the elimination of 
majority-black institutions as inherently racist. Critical 
race theorists support the continued existence of historic­
ally black colleges as part of their overarching worldview of 
multiculturalism.
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of integration” (Ibid, 1). Fordice. Johnson charged, did not 
fundamentally challenge any of the assumptions of Brown. 
including the notion that there were few, if any, redeeming 
qualities about African American culture that were worth 
preserving. "The ideal integrated society," Johnson conclu­
ded, "can only be achieved through a transitional stage in 
which racial differences are truly respected, a stage which 
requires the public maintenance of and support for predomi­
nately black colleges" (Ibid).
Others viewed the state of affairs as part of a social 
retreat on civil rights similar to the post-Reconstruction 
era (P. T. Smith, 1991; Kilmartin, 1992; Norwood, 1992; 
Orfield, 1996). These commentators interpreted the Brown 
decision as commiting the nation to the pursuit of racial 
justice; thus, they saw the conservative ascendency under the 
Reagan and Bush administrations as a repudiation of those 
ideals (Cruse, 1986) . Just as disturbing to some of these 
commentators was the fact that many African Americans them­
selves were taking the initiative to argue for majority black 
schools, Afrocentric curricula, and all-black male academies 
(Hacker, 1990; Steele, 1993; Orfield, 1996) . Orfield main­
tained that history was sadly repeating itself again: in the 
1990's, both prominent blacks and whites were arguing that 
segregation should be given a chance to work.
Is either interpretation correct? Has the Brown 
decision, in essence, been "quietly reversed" as Gary Orfield
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suggests? One hundred years after the reversal of black gains 
during the Reconstruction period, is history repeating 
itself? Or was the Brown decision fundamentally flawed to 
begin with - particularly as it related to the future of 
majority-black institutions? Were the assumptions of Brown 
inherently racist (as some suppose), thus producing the 
climate for an inevitable "black backlash?" Considering the 
opinion in Brown and the assumptions that informed it, should 
we not be surprised that, thirty eight years later, the state 
of the law in higher education desegregation (despite the 
Fordice decision) is still clouded? These questions form the 
basis for Chapter Five.
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CHAPTER FIVE. FROM BROWN TO FORDICE:
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Brown as a Cultural Icon
In Chapter One, it was argued that the Brown decision 
wedded the ethos of the American Creed with America's his­
toric treatment of African Americans as second-class 
citizens. Brown denied racial segregation constitutional 
sanction by appealing to the values of the American Creed. In 
effect, the civil rights movement did not raise "new" issues 
within the American context; rather, these were "old" issues 
(e.g., the meaning of "equality," "equal protection of the 
laws," etc.) that were being applied to modern conditions. 
Put another way, Brown. and the civil rights movement which 
followed, could be considered "the unfinished work of the 
American Revolution." The antidiscrimination principle of 
Brown triumphed, in large part, because it could be rather 
easily harmonized with the national narrative - that the 
individual is the basis for society and a just government was 
one which maximizes individual freedom (McCloskey and Zaller, 
1984). Indeed, Brown's status as a "cultural icon" (Peller, 
1997, 192) is largely because it is seen as a validation of 
the nation's first principles (Kluger, 1975; Wilkinson, 
1979). In time, Brown laid the groundwork for the expansion 
of the antidiscrimination principle to include gender, 
religion, national origin, sexual orientation, age, and 
disability (Gewirtz, 1997).
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However, as this dissertation has shown, the Supreme 
Court's pronouncement in Brown I that "separate educational 
facilities are inherently unequal" hardly settled the matter. 
What did it mean for higher education, and did it mean that 
state-supported black colleges were also unconstitutional? 
Or was Brown's target the state's imposition of segregation, 
and schools or colleges that are predominately of one race do 
not necessarily violate the Equal Protection Clause? Does 
Brown merely require that states enact racially nondiscrimi- 
natory policies or does it impose on them the burden to 
compensate individuals and institutions (such as black uni­
versities) that were systemmatically mistreated under the Jim 
Crow system? Also, how far may federal judges go to prod 
states to dismantle former de jure systems of higher educa­
tion? In short, while Brown has become an "American cultural 
icon," it is a highly contested one: Americans have had some 
very deep differences with respect to the public policy 
implications of Brown.
Fordice represents the first time that the Supreme 
Court ruled in a case involving desegregation of a state 
system of higher education. The Court ruled that while 
Mississippi's "race-neutral" policies do not satisfy the 
state's remedial duty to eliminate the vestiges of racial 
discrimination in higher education. But the justices did not 
specify what remedies would satisfy the state's mandate - 
meaning that one is left with as many questions as answers.
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In Chapter Five, it will be argued that the fundamental 
problem with Fordice is not simply that it is unclear or 
ambiguous; rather, it does not reexamine any of the suppo­
sitions of Brown v. Board of Education. The fact that Brown 
is an American cultural icon explains not only the fact that 
none of the parties involved questioned its moral authority; 
it also explains the hesitancy of the Court to revisit it. It 
will be argued that Brown is intimately intertwined with 
America's historic sense of mission and the fact that racial 
segregation violated the nation's highest principles. Second, 
it will be shown that Brown occurred in the context of the 
Cold War when the United States was consciously portraying 
itself as a moral example to the world. This period made 
America uniquely sensitive to moral appeals about the per­
sistence of legal segregation in the Southern United States. 
Third, it will be shown that Brown personifies the American 
Creed in the sense that its early critics were dismissed as 
"legalists" and "irrelevant." To Brown's defenders, it was as 
"self-evident" as the Declaration of Independence itself.
However, though the American Creed has provided a common 
rallying point for eliminating legal segregation, it has been 
less successful at building policy consensus since the civil 
rights legislative victories of the 1960's. Desegregation in 
higher education represents one of those policy domains where 
the liberal tradition leads to widely divergent policy prefe­
rences. It will be argued that the American Creed complicates
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the ability of federal courts to craft remedies in higher 
education desegregation because it is fundamentally a theory 
of a limited role for the state. Brown does not challenge the 
basic relationship between the American state and society; 
thus, remedies that might involve significant federal inter­
vention (such as busing or massive enhancement of black 
universities) are difficult to justify and maintain. In 
addition, the ease with which Brown was assimilated into the 
national narrative has turned out to be a "double-edged 
sword," because it has been attacked, revised, and reinter­
preted both from the black left and the conservative right. 
Finally, it will be argued that Fordice demonstrates that the 
Brown decision continues to tyrannize the debate of how best 
to expand educational opportunities for African Americans and 
other disadvantaged groups in American society.
America as a Symbol of Democratic Revolution
In Chapter One, it was argued that America seemed to be 
the practical fulfillment of the "state of nature" as concep­
tualized by Hobbes and Locke. European colonists found 
America to be a land unencumbered by the class and clerical 
oppressions that afflicted their native lands. How then, 
could a nation which never experienced a true feudalism, 
which theoretically represented an idyllic "state of nature" 
and had the historical luxury of being "born free" become a 
universal symbol of social emancipation during the eighteenth 
century? The power of Jefferson's words presupposed a vision
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of America as a creative and redemptive force in the world - 
a view which had taken deep roots in European thought long 
before the first shots were fired at Lexington and Concord. 
From the time of Columbus' voyages, European writers and 
thinkers romantically portrayed America as a "Garden of Eden" 
or as the "Adam of the West" (Davis, 1966) ; indeed, the fact 
that St. Thomas More chose the Western Hemisphere as the 
setting for his novel Utopia was no accident. As Davis wrote:
While a growing literature celebrated America as a 
symbol of nature, free from the avarice, luxury, and 
materialism of Europe, promoters and colonizers saw 
the virgin land as a place for solving problems and 
satisfying desires. This was true of the conquistadores 
who tried to recreate the age of chivalric romance; it 
was true of the Jesuits who followed Manuel da Nobrega 
to Brazil, determined to purify morals and spread the 
faith; it was true of the English Puritans who sought 
to build a New Jerusalem as a model of piety for the 
rest of the world; it was true of the drifters and 
ne'er-do-wells, the bankrupts and sleazy gentlemen, who 
fluttered to the New World like moths drawn to a light. 
In America things would be better, for America was the 
Promise Land (19 66, 6).
America offered Europe - and by extension, humankind - 
the hope of redemption, the opportunity to build anew, the 
chance to build a new civilization that had profited from her 
forefathers' mistakes. Indeed, the "state of nature" metaphor 
was the latest of a series of metaphors used to describe 
America as "a place of new beginnings." It was this vision of 
the New World which gave America its almost magical lure. By 
the time of the Declaration of Independence, this portrait 
was taken for granted. European liberals had come to view 
America as the hope for mankind, and the new political and
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social institutions in the fledgling republic appeared to be 
"clearly modeled on nature's simple plan" and seemed to have 
"fulfilled the ancient dream of a more perfect society" 
(Ibid, 7).
Hence, it was precisely this portrait which made slavery 
such a moral dilemma in America. In a land purportedly "free" 
of the oppressions found in Europe, American slavery took on 
the appearance of an "original sin." It could hardly be 
overlooked that the words of the Declaration of Independence 
were written by a slaveholder. One needed to explain how, in 
an age of "enlightenment," the institution of slavery had 
revived - especially considering the fact that it had disap­
peared in much of Europe (Davis, 1966) . Indeed, many colonial 
leaders conceded that unless the slaves were freed, the moral 
legitimacy of their revolution would be seriously compromised 
(Davis, 1966; Jordan, 1968; Berlin, 1975) . America's problem 
was complicated by the very intellectual boldness of the 
Declaration of Independence - specifically, its claims that 
its ethics were "self-evident." Jefferson emphasized the 
universality of the American experience. American notions of 
"inalienable rights" were portrayed as reflecting both "the 
laws of nature and the laws of God." This implied harmony 
between the American philosophy of government and the actual 
way human beings were best designed to behave; in other 
words, the Declaration of Independence spoke of the concept 
of inalienable rights as if they were empirical, scientific
R eproduced  with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
2 8 9
facts that reflected the wisdom of God Himself. The Revolu­
tion, then, would span the gap between the Creator's ideal of 
universal liberty and human usurpations of that divinely- 
ordained state through reason - an eighteenth century version 
of the "science of politics." If this were true, how could 
slavery be part of the perfect design of republican govern­
ment? Consequently, America's status as a moral example of 
democratic revolution has, from its beginning, inhered within 
it the ideological ammunition for black protest. This section 
elaborates on how the specifics of America's historical 
development have facilitated black political agitation in the 
United States. This understanding is essential to put the 
Brown decision in its proper context.
First of all, unlike the European liberal, the American 
was fortunate in that he did not have to directly implicate 
organized religion as an apologist for the aristocratic 
status quo. In the first place, the Protestant work ethic 
placed a premium on values such as self-control, frugality, 
achievement, hard work, and industry - values that harmonized 
well with the capitalist creed (Weber, 1976; Bell, 1976; 
McCullough, 1991). By giving the marketplace a spiritual 
mission, the American capitalist did not face the European 
problem of needing to attach morality to capitalist accumu­
lation (Hartz, 1955). Furthermore, the rather belated attempt 
of the British Parliament to establish Anglicanism and Roman 
Catholicism as the official religions of the colonies, in
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that it occurred on the eve of war, was almost providential 
in its timing. Genuinely outraged by these actions, ministers 
denounced the British king and interpreted the subsequent 
outbreak of hostilities in apocalytic terms (Sandoz, 1990). 
Thus, the Founding Fathers never needed to develop a "politi­
cal religion" to counter a religious orthodoxy which defined 
resistance to the structures of corporate society as sin. 
Partly for this reason, the Americans refused to join the 
French philosophes in their crusade to discredit organized 
religion entirely and to create a humanistic utopia (Hartz, 
1955; Voegelin, 1975) . Not only could the British monarch not 
rely on the ecclesiastical establishment to rally to his 
defense, but organized religion turned out to be a fairly 
useful ally for the rebellious Americans.
The fact that the American Revolution did not banish 
religion to the abyss meant that it could still be appealed 
to in the hope of making demands on the political system. It 
is well known that religion has played a central role in 
defining African American identity and shaping community 
culture (Kluger, 1975; Levine, 1977; Sobel, 1979; Lincoln, 
1984; Allen, Dawson, and Brown, 1989; 1990; Smith and Selt­
zer, 1990; Moses, 1993; Walton, 1997). Henry (1990) has shown 
that African American political culture is unique and dis­
tinct from the overarching American political culture because 
it is rooted in a black church tradition that blends sacred 
and secular vision, provides and endows African American
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people with a 'moral vision' that is not found in mainstream 
American politics. "This moral/religious tradition," Hanes 
Walton wrote, "affixes justice on a permanent rather than a 
relative basis" (1997, 87). Blacks and whites, thus, have
utilized the weapons of religion to draw attention to moral 
injustices meted out to African Americans because of their 
race.
Because the Founding Fathers did not need to directly 
confront organize religion in order to justify their revolu­
tion, they were never required to repudiate another concept 
which would help to ideologically underwrite African American 
protest movements: the belief in "natural law" that they had 
inherited from their European ancestors. In pre-Christian 
Europe, whenever the elected "lawman" explained the law to 
the people, "he was not assumed to make the law or invent it 
but to expound something which existed prior to and indepen­
dent of himself" (Myrdal, 1944, 15) . This tendency to believe 
in the idea of a "higher law" undergirding the entire legal 
system was reinforced by the influence of Christianity in the 
West. The English Parliament, which functioned largely as a 
high court than a legislature in the modern sense until the 
late 1600's, saw itself not as "creating law," but rather 
"declaring" or "explaining" the law that already existed 
(Myrdal, 1944, 15; Huntington, 1968, 112). Hence, the belief 
in a "higher law" to which all human laws are thus subject 
has created in America a peculiar respect for judicial
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institutions, law and order, and a cult of constitutional
worship (Myrdal, 1944, 12; Hartz, 1955, 9). As Corwin argues:
. . . .  The legality of the Constitution, its supremacy, 
and its claim to be worshipped [author's emphasis], 
alike find common standing ground on the belief in a 
law superior to the will of human governors (1929, 5).
Not only were the Americans not forced to repudiate 
natural law, they "breathed new life" into the concept at the 
same historical moment when European liberals were trying to 
annihilate it (Voegelin, 1975).
Moreover, the "higher law" background of the Constitu­
tion gave anti-slavery forces an ideological platform to 
challenge the "peculiar institution" (Stamp, 1957). America's 
natural law tradition allowed abolitionists to castigate the 
institution of slavery as a sinful human innovation opposed 
to the laws of God. Hence, William Lloyd Garrison could 
denounce the Constitution as a "compact with Hell" and remain 
within the American tradition. In addition, Americans tend 
not only to conclude that certain laws are "unjust," but also 
to feel morally obligated to disobey them. John Brown justi­
fied his ill-fated insurrection on these grounds. Martin 
Luther King defended the strategy of civil disobedience to 
oppose racial segregation by the same reasoning (King, 1963). 
Paradoxically, the belief that human law must be a reflection 
of "higher law" - a tradition which has helped to create a 
profound respect for law and order in America - also allows 
some Americans to disregard the law in service to what they 
perceive to be a higher principle (Myrdal, 1944, 16).
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America's lack of a feudal past allowed it to synthesize
Puritan piety, Enlightenment rationalism, and natural law
theory - ideals which would have been socially combustible in
much of Europe - into a comprehensive national identity.
While the absence of the identical social conditions that
existed in Europe did not eliminate all of the potential
conflicts between these competing worldviews (nor does it
today), America's revolutionary moment did not require an
all-out war of attrition between these ideologies. These
ideals, both separately and collectively, forged a sense of
America as a "chosen people" with an almost messianic mission
in the world. Jefferson expressed this sentiment during his
second inaugural address:
I shall need, too, the favor of that Being in whose 
hands we are, who led our forefathers, as Israel of 
old, from their native land, and planted them in a 
country flowing with all the necessaries and comforts 
of life; who has covered our infancy with his provi­
dence, and our riper years with his wisdom and power; 
and to whose goodness I ask you to join with me in 
supplications, that he will so enlighten the minds 
of your servants, guide their councils, and prosper 
their measures, that whatsoever they do, shall result 
in your good, and shall secure to you the peace, friend­
ship, and approbation of all nations (Jordan, 1968, 
573) .
In this passage, Jefferson explicitly compared the set­
tling of America with Israel's exodus from Egypt. Thus, from 
a variety of routes - New England Puritanism, Enlightenment 
rationalism, the material abundance of the American conti­
nent, millenial visions of utopia, or a combination of all of 
these - it was possible to conclude that America indeed was
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the Promise Land and Americans were the chosen people. Black 
and white Americans have exploited America's messianic self- 
concept to advance the cause of equality for African Ameri­
cans throughout the nation's history. Indeed, they have 
argued that America ran the risk of losing its "most favored 
nation" status with Providence if she failed to square the 
actual treatment of blacks with the nation's ideals (Davis, 
1966; Jordan, 1969; Moses, 1993; Walker, 1992).
But for African Americans, the nation's sense of "mani­
fest destiny" went deeper: blacks - and some whites - have 
tended to assume that their experience of oppression in the 
United States has endowed them with a "special righteousness" 
before God (Higgins, 1990; Moses, 1993). In other words, not 
only is America a chosen nation, but African Americans are a 
chosen people within that nation (Moses, 1993, 228). Black 
Christian tradition has self-consciously appropriated this 
imagery; hence, black Christians drew analogies between their 
enslavement and that of Israel, and the sufferings of Christ 
(as well as that of other Biblical heroes), were not unlike 
their own (Sobel, 1979; Moses, 1993). Consequently, Harriet 
Tubman was memoralized as the "Moses of her People," and 
leaders like Frederick Douglass, Marcus Garvey, and Martin 
Luther King were (and still are) treated like "black messi- 
ahs" (Moses, 1993). King's last speech before his assassina­
tion, in which he claimed to have "gone up to the mountain- 
top" evoked images of Moses leading the people of Israel to
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the Promise Land. This tendency is not confined to black 
Christianity; in fact, the Nation of Islam has borrowed the 
same imagery. Malcolm X and Louis Farrakhan have relied on 
the metaphor of America as Egypt and black Americans as 
Israel to buttress their moral/secular visions (Haley, 1992; 
Lincoln, 1984) . The pervasiveness of this view is evidenced 
by the prevalence of Biblical metaphors found in a number of 
popular books on the civil rights movement and the black 
experience; these include Bearing the Cross (Garrow, 1986), 
Parting the Waters (Branch, 1988), Pillar of Fire (Branch, 
1998), Roll. Jordan. Roll (Genovese, 1976), and And the Walls 
Came Tumbling Down (Abernathy, 1989) , to name a few. Thus, 
not only were African Americans struggling to secure their 
rights, they believed that they were right (Strickland, 1979, 
5) . Many black political and religious leaders maintained 
(though not always explicitly) that they spoke with a unique 
moral voice which America needed to listen to if she was to 
fulfilled her destiny.
Hence, the American Creed represented a synthesis of 
Enlightenment rationalism, Puritan piety, and the tradition 
of natural law - and these three strands of thought combined 
to produce America's concept of itself as a "light to the 
world. Not only have African Americans accepted key tenets of 
American messianism, but they have seen themselves as having 
a special role to play within the "chosen nation." The fact 
that America's national consciousness evolved as a "flight
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from the European struggle" has meant two things: not only 
was there not an indigenous aristocracy that counterrevolu­
tionaries could possibly restore, but it could not be argued 
that the march of capitalism had uprooted traditional shared 
understandings between lord and peasant, a point of departure 
for which socialism depends (Hartz, 1955; Moore, 1966). As a 
result, America's Creed assumes that its historical expe­
rience provides an objective model for the rest of the world. 
As Hartz writes:
This then is the mood of America's absolutism: the 
sober faith that its norms are self-evident. It is one 
of the most powerful absolutisms in the world, more 
powerful even than the messianic spirit of the continen­
tal liberals which. . . . the Americans were able to 
reject. That spirit arose out of contact with an oppo­
sing way of life, and its very intensity betrayed an 
inescapable element of doubt. But the American absolu­
tism, flowing from an honest experience with universa­
lity, lacked even the passion that doubt might give. It
was so sure of itself that it hardly needed to become 
articulate. . . .  it has refused to pay its critics the 
compliment of an argument (1955, 58-59).
Thus, the Lockian settlement provides the background for
the Brown decision. The end of World War II thrust the United
States on center stage in world affairs as leader of "The
Free World." Embroiled in an ideological war with communism,
the United States was consciously promoting its version of
democratic capitalism as the most enlightened pattern of
national development that the emerging nations of Asia,
Africa, and Latin America could adopt. In this context, the
nation's lingering problem of racial segregation stood out as
a profound embarrassment. Segregation had began to undermine
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American prestige in the world. Justice Department attorneys 
utilized this very argument in their amicus curiae brief 
before the Supreme Court in the Brown cases:
It is in the context of the present world struggle 
between freedom and tyranny that the problem of racial 
discrimination must be viewed. The United States is try­
ing to prove to the people of the world, of every natio­
nality, race, and color, that a free democracy is the 
most civilized and most secure form of government yet 
devised by man. We must set an example for others by 
showing firm determination to remove existing flaws in 
our democracy.
The existence of discrimination against minority 
groups in the United States has an adverse effect upon 
our relations with other countries. Racial discrimina­
tion furnishes grist for the Communist propoganda mills, 
and it raises doubts about even among friendly nations 
as to the intensity of our devotion to the democratic 
faith. . . . The segregation of school children on a 
racial basis is one of the practices in the United 
States that has been singled out for hostile foreign 
comment in the United Nations and elsewhere [italics 
added] . Other peoples cannot understand how such a prac­
tice can exist in a country which professes to be a 
staunch supporter of freedom, justice, and democracy. 
The sincerity of the United States in this respect will 
be judged by its deeds as well as by its words (Brief of 
the United States as Amicus Curiae, in Kurland and Cas­
per, 1975, 121; 123).
As we have seen, America's view of itself as a "City on 
a Hill" was not new - in fact, this metaphor had a long 
history. What was new was that the United States, in the 
ideological environment of the Cold War, was consciously 
exporting this vision to the rest of the world (Hartz, 1955; 
Huntington, 1968; Moses, 1993; Dudziak, 1995). As a conse­
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quence, black leaders capitalized on America's new role in 
the world to justify their claims against the state.91
Because African Americans and liberal whites have found 
the nation's first principles useful, revolutionary theory- 
building has been rendered less necessary. "Like most Ameri­
cans," Harold Cruse lamented, "Negroes are profoundly anti- 
theoretical" (1967, 92) . Black liberation movements have
concentrated primarily on pragmatic solutions to the problems 
faced by blacks. Brown illustrates the pragmatism of American 
liberals because it represents two tendencies which flow out 
of America's philosophical consensus: the belief in the power 
of law and science to solve major policy issues.
The resilience of the American Constitution after over 
two hundred years cannot be explained without reference to 
the nation's unanamity on first principles. The American 
concept of judicial review, for example, could only exist in 
a society with fundamental ideological consensus. As Hartz 
argues," the removal of high policy to the realm of adjudi­
cation implies a prior recognition of the principles to be 
legally interpreted" (1955, 9) . Having settled society's
fundamental moral problem, the American is free to concern
91For example, King compared the "jet-like speed" that 
the nations of Africa and Asia were moving toward 
independence with the "horse and buggy pace" that African 
Americans were moving toward gaining a cup of coffee at a 
lunch counter (King, 19 64). In another example, Malcolm X's 
threat to charge the United States with human rights 
violations before the United Nation was no doubt motivated in 
part by a desire to embarrass America in its new 
international role (Moses, 1993, 231-232).
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himself with concrete cases. Moreover, the natural law tra­
dition has further magnified the importance of law in America 
(Corwin, 1928; Myrdal, 1944). Thus, the reverence for law in 
America largely substituted for the Old World's preoccupation 
with political philosophy (Myrdal, 1944; Hartz, 1955).
Thus, when the NAACP opted for the legal approach to 
remedy the problem of racial discrimination (as opposed to 
other alternatives that could have been pursued) they testi­
fied to their basic faith in the legitimacy of the American 
constitutional order. As a result, when leftist critics 
challenged the NAACP's legal program during the 1930's, the 
organization countered by romanticizing the law. The NAACP 
and its allies conceived of the courts as "objective" and 
"dispassionate" arenas; hence, judicial interpretations of 
the law carried the same force as the laws of science. They 
reasoned court decisions that undermined the premises of 
Plessv could rise above tyrannical nature of public opinion 
(which tended to be very hostile to civil rights) because, 
unlike executive or legislative acts, judicial decrees were 
"above politics" (Thompson, 1935; Locke, 1935; Kluger, 1975; 
Tocqueville, 1988; Smith, 1996).
Not only does Brown reflect the NAACP's faith in the 
law, but it represented the faith in the power of science (in 
this case social psychology) as a legitimator of public 
policy. It also reflected the basic pragmatic orientation of 
the NAACP. Indeed, Thurgood Marshall invited the social sci­
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entists to participate in the deliberations for the Brown 
cases because he considered their testimony an effective way 
to demonstrate the harms of segregation (Kluger, 1975; Cross, 
1989) . Even more so than reliance on law, science is reputed 
as being "objective," "value-free," and "dispassionate" 
(Kuhn, 1962). What better way, the NAACP reasoned, to make 
a controversial legal argument than by appealing to an 
objective source? In doing so, the NAACP's lawyers were 
behaving like Americans. After all, America's reverence for 
science can be traced back at least to the bold claim of the 
Declaration of Independence that the new nation would build 
its political foundation on reason (as opposed to Old World 
"tradition").
In relying on the social sciences to buttress their 
legal arguments, the NAACP was helped immensely by the poli­
tical tenor of the times. In the first place, Roosevelt's New 
Deal, by relying on economic experts to shape economic poli­
cies geared to fight the Great Depression, legitimized the 
use of social science expertise in formulating matters of 
high policy. Second, World War II and the emerging Cold War 
witnessed the institutionalization of a "foreign policy 
establishment" which consisted of a class of experts which 
revolved between Wall Street, the Pentagon, and the nation's 
Ivy League universities (J. Patterson, 1997). In addition, 
America had just fought a war against the horrors of fascism, 
most vividly personified by Hitler's atrocities against the
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Jews. While Social Darwinism had once provided a rationale 
for Jim Crow segregation and the science of eugenics (and its 
racist implications), the horrors of Auschwitz made such 
theories appear intellectually and morally indefensible to 
many Americans. In short, the post-World War II period was an 
ideological boon for liberals: with the memories of Nazi 
concentration camps still fresh on American minds, they were 
able to discredit "scientific racism" and portray prejudice 
and discrimination as social problems that were rooted in 
ignorance and irrationality (Arendt, 1958; D /Souza, 1995).
With the nation exporting its version of Lockianism, the 
nation focused on the problem of legal segregation at home. 
This led many Northern whites to render a rather harsh cri­
tique of the South. Since America truly was "the light of the 
world," the South, according to this view, simply was on the 
"wrong side of history." Northern liberals conceived the 
South as a strange place in desparate need to be saved from 
itself. Peller (1997) makes this point rather forcefully:
Brown was part of a broad critique of and intervention 
into the status quo culture of southern life; in general 
terms, the trajectory of northern regulation was to 
replace the all-white, Old South patriarchial ruling 
class with a somewhat integrated, rationalist, and tech­
nocratic New South leadership, both literally in terms 
of political office, and more generally in terms of 
everyday cultural and ideological legitimacy in diverse 
institutions (199).
But this intervention went deeper than the sense that 
Northern culture was more "enlightened" than that of the 
South. Social science lent support to the notion that the
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experience of slavery and discrimination had psychologically 
damaged the black man's personality. The assumption that 
blacks had "low self-esteem" and/or actually "hated them­
selves" served as the dominant paradigm in social psychology 
until the mid-1960's (Cross, 1991) . The assumption that black 
children were "culturally deprived" not only served as an 
underlying rationale for integration, but for a host of 
enrichment programs that were instituted during the War on 
Poverty such as Head Start (Peller, 1997, 206).
As a consequence of slavery and segregation, African 
American culture, according to many social scientists, either 
did not exist at all, or to the extent that it did, merely 
represented a pathetic, dysfunctional imitation of white 
cultural norms (Frazier, 1939; Myrdal, 1944; Kardiner and 
Ovesey, 1951; Clark and Clark, 1939; 1947; 1950; Silberman, 
1964; Moynihan, 1965; Cruse, 1986; W. Cross, 1991; Peller, 
1997). At any rate, the "liberal party line" was that race 
and culture should make no difference: the sin of segregation 
lay in its refusal to treat African Americans as individuals.
Furthermore, since liberals defined racism as irratio­
nal, they reasoned that the problem could thereby be solved 
by education. If segregation caused personality damage in 
black children, as the doll tests alleged, the NAACP and 
other liberals reasoned that integration was the solution. 
Public school integration, by increasing interracial contact, 
would prove that racism was merely based on irrational fears
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that have no basis in fact (Arendt, 1958; Wilkinson, 1979; 
Cruse, 1986; Armor, 1995; D'Souza, 1995). Moreover, since 
education in America has historically embodied the hope for 
the future, the public schools seemed the natural place to 
start the process of confronting the nation's racial problem 
(Myrdal, 1944; Arendt, 1958; Reitman, 1992). Once it became 
abundantly clear that merely outlawing segregated public 
schools would not move the South to yield, liberals argued 
that activist government (legitimized by Franklin Roosevelt's 
New Deal), should now be applied to protect and expand the 
rights of southern blacks. As the civil rights movement 
gained momentum, some Northern elites and opinion makers 
treated the South (the "Great Perpetuator" of legal segre­
gation) as if it were not even part of America (Rowan, 1951; 
Wilkinson, 1979; Williams, 1987; Peller, 1997).
Thus, Brown united two of America's deities: its reve­
rence for law and its uncritical faith in science and reason. 
Because the Lockian settlement has weakened the American 
philosophical tradition, law and science are adhered to with 
religious-like conviction. This explains three characteris­
tics of Anglo-American legal jurisprudence that legal scholar 
Patricia Williams identifies: (1) the tendency to define
mutually exclusive categories that purport to simplify the 
complexities of life (e.g. rights/needs, moral/immoral, 
public/private, white/black); (2) the belief in the exis­
tence of transcendent, acontextual legal truths or pure
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procedures; and (3) the a priori assumption that there exist 
objective "unmediated" voices by which those transcendent, 
universalist truths find their expression, such as judges, 
lawyers, logicians, and scientists (1991, 8-9). Consequently, 
American law and science, in that their legitimacy is based 
on their claims to universality and neutrality, mutually 
reinforce each other. Thus, the belief that law and science 
provide an objective arbiter to settle morally troubling 
questions (such as the legitimacy of racial segregation) is 
another way of restating the basic faith of American liberals 
in the American Creed.
Finally, the legitmacy of integration was further under­
scored by the fact that the decision of the Court was 
unanimous. The unanimity of the Court reinforced the view 
among liberal integrationists that they were right and the 
South was wrong. Implementing the Brown decision became a 
moral crusade: the confrontation was between enlightened
integrationists and traditional, backward Southern racists.
In summary, Brown personified the American Creed itself. 
It incapsulated the ancient millenial visions of liberty and 
perfectibility that Europeans brought to the New World that 
allowed America to become the revolutionary symbol of the 
overthrow of the class and clerical tyrannies that had so 
bedeviled the Old World. It also recognized that, in marked 
contrast to Justice Roger Taney's infamous remark that the 
black man has "no rights a white man is bound to respect,"
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the Court affirmed that African Americans did have rights, 
and states could not arbitrarily abridge them. Brown. and the 
civil rights movement which followed it, was seen as both a 
reaffirmation of America's first principles and an extension 
of those principles to new contexts (McCloskey and Zaller, 
1984). Furthermore, America's new international role made it 
more difficult for the nation's long-standing racial divide 
to be put on "the back burner." Just as Cold War liberalism 
motivated American initiatives like the Alliance for Progress 
and the Peace Corps, it inspired Northern whites to join the 
"Freedom Rides" and to work side-by-side with Mississippi 
blacks during "Freedom Summer." Brown appealed to the reputa­
tion of law and science as "value-neutral arbiters of truth" 
to legitimize federal intervention aimed at overturning the 
South's system of legal segregation.
Nevertheless, despite the fact that supporters could 
easily interpret Brown as consistent with American princi­
ples, questions arose immediately about the Court's reasoning 
in the Brown decision. As Chapter Three noted, Brown left 
many significant questions unanswered, including whether the 
existence of state-supported black colleges and universities 
necessarily offended the Constitution. The fact that many of 
these criticisms were largely dismissed as "legalistic" and 
not taken seriously underscores the extent to which the Brown 
decision embodies the American Creed. However, it left many 
integrationists unprepared for the assault from the Black
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Power insurgency from the left as well as Nixon's "southern 
strategy" from the right. The next section discusses some of 
the shortcomings of Brown that were identified by many legal 
scholars and why these critiques were largely ignored.
Brown and its Critics
Not surprisingly, Southerners lambasted the Court's 
decision in Brown: however, criticism was not limited to 
simply die-hard segregationists determined to maintain 
"segregation now, segregation forever" (a slogan made famous 
by Alabama Governor George Wallace); on the contrary, many 
friendly critics also came forward who were sympathetic to 
the ruling in Brown but who nonetheless voiced grave doubts 
about the Court's reasoning. The critiques of Brown can be 
grouped in four categories: (1) the view that Brown's reading 
of the historical context of the Fourteenth Amendment was 
inaccurate; (2) serious questions about the social science 
evidence upon which the Court depended; (3) the view that the 
Court's legal reasoning in Brown left much to be desired; and 
(4) the sense that Brown's declaration that "separate educa­
tional facilities are inherently unequal" made black colleges 
constitutionally suspect at best, and ripe for extinction at 
worst.
Graham (1954) criticized the Court for concluding that 
the intent of the Fourteenth Amendment "could not be deter­
mined with any degree of certainty" (347 U.S. 483, 489),
maintaining that the justices interpreted the congressional
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debates in terms of the issues of the 1950's and not the 
1860 's . In Chapter Two, it was shown that while some Northern 
Republicans, most notably Charles Sumner, wanted to integrate 
the schools, that position never held a majority during the 
Reconstruction debates from 1865 to 1875 (Avins, 1967; Klu- 
ger, 1975; Kaczorowski, 1987) . Consequently, a strict adhe­
rence to "original intent" would have yielded a result 
unfavorable to the NAACP's position. Rather, he maintained 
that the Fourteenth Amendment was written in "declaratory" 
terms; in other words, rather than the government conferring 
rights on the freedmen (which meant conceivably that Congress 
could take those rights away if it wished) it had merely 
declared the rights that they already had. Graham argued that 
the "declaratory" nature of the Fourteenth Amendment had been 
modeled after the Declaration of Independence; thus, he con­
cluded that it was Congress' intent to extend the protections 
of the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution to 
the newly freed slaves. Had the Court chosen to emphasize the 
declaratory nature of the Fourteenth Amendment Court, Graham 
reasoned, it could have put forth a rationale for Brown that 
was more faithful to the facts as opposed to pondering about 
the differences between the role of education in the 18 60's 
as opposed to the 1950's.
Other commentators concentrated on Clark's study which 
appeared to provide much of the underpinnings for the Court's
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decision.92 Brown. by relying heavily on social science 
evidence seemed to imply that its legitimacy hinged on the 
quality of that testimony. Thus, if the findings of the 
NAACP's social scientists were later disproved, should the 
result in Brown be dismissed as well? Because Brown relied on 
social science evidence, it also followed that the opponents
^Cahn (1955) questioned the science behind Clark's 
study. He thought that the Court's conclusions in Brown were 
based on a common sense application of equal application of 
the laws rather than the social science evidence. He thought 
it rather silly to try to prove that segregation harms black 
children; Cahn likened it to theorizing about whether "fire 
burns." He wondered if the sample size was large enough to 
make the sweeping conclusions that the NAACP drew. Ernest van 
den Haag (1957; 1960) went much further in his criticism of 
the doll study. Like Cahn, he questioned the size of the 
sample, Clark's failure to account for sample bias, and the 
lack of a control group. However, he also pointed to an 
apparent contradiction between the results of the doll tests 
and an earlier study conducted by Clark and his wife Mamie 
which employed similar methods as the ones used in the 
segregation cases (Clark and Clark, 1952). The Clarks 
surveyed two sample populations of black children (one in 
Arkansas and one in Massachusetts) and found that the 
behavior which allegedly proved personality damage 
rejection of colored dolls by black children - actually 
occurred more often among northern-born children in 
nonsegregated schools than southern children attending 
segregated schools (165). More pointedly, van den Haag 
doubted whether Clark's studies reveal anything meaningful 
about the issue of personality damage anyway. If a child 
identified "white" with "nice," might he identify himself 
with white if he thought of himself as nice? Clark apparently 
did not consider that possibility. Furthermore, Western 
culture, as well as other cultures where the terms "black" 
and "white" do not have racial overtones, associate black 
with evil and white with purity. Though conceding that 
segregation may have reinforced those impressions, van den 
Haag maintained that Clark's findings simply did not prove 
that the reactions of the children were attributable to 
school segregation and not some other cause. His review of 
the social science testimony left him "disturbed about the 
disrepute his [Clark] 'evidence' could not fail to bring 
social science if it were taken seriously. And it seems to 
be" (1960, 69).
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of remedies hailed as the logical derivatives of Brown. such 
as mandatory busing orders, would enlist the tools of social 
science to determine if integration actually "delivered" the 
academic and social benefits that it promised. Therefore, by 
appealing to the social sciences, Brown served to further 
politicize scholarly discourse of the study of academic 
achievement, particularly as it related to minorities (Armor, 
1995; D'Souza, 1995; Orfield, 1996).
Some critics pointed out what they perceived to be as 
deficiencies in the legal reasoning itself that were distinct 
from its reliance on the doll tests. For example, why did the 
Court neglect to cite Harlan's dissent from the Plessv case? 
Brown's rationale implied that Plessv was based merely on 
"bad sociology" and not "bad law," as these critics main­
tained (Kluger, 1975; Wilkinson, 1979). In addition, Chief 
Justice Warren claimed that it was unnecessary to determine 
whether compulsory racial segregation also violates the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment because the issue of 
racial segregation in public schools was disposed on equal 
protections grounds. But why not? The Court did not say. The 
justices were also criticized because the Brown opinion made 
scant reference to legal precedents concerning the issue of 
racial discrimination; by 1954, a fairly impressive number of 
legal precedents had accumulated with respect to racial 
discrimination that the Court could have easily referred to 
as it set forth to explain Brown to the country. Weschler
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(1959) complained that the Warren Court failed both to 
articulate a neutral principle for its conclusion that 
racially segregated public schools were unconstitutional and 
a standard by which other types of statutory segregation 
could be judged.
They were also disturbed by what they saw as the Court's 
remedy to the problem of compulsory segregation: compulsory 
congregation (van den Haag, 1957; Weschler, 1959). Ernest van 
den Haag saw Brown as an attempt to compel whites to esteem 
blacks equally, an effort he predicted would never succeed. 
Instead, the Court's logic implied that segregation would 
become a privilege for the rich who would be able to enroll 
their children in private education whereas poor whites, 
lacking this option, would resent being forced to associate 
with blacks against their will (1957, 165). Weschler asserted 
that the only "neutral" principle which he could conceive of 
basing Brown on was the idea that racial segregation violated 
the individual's freedom of association. However, Weschler 
confessed his uncertainty about whether this position was 
logically consistent: the rights of African Americans to
associate with whomever they choose regardless of racial 
considerations had to be balanced against the rights of white 
Americans to refuse such associations. Hence, Weschler 
remained unclear about whether Brown could be sustained on
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freedom of association grounds; nevertheless, he was con­
vinced that Brown was the correct result but was incorrectly 
decided.
Taken together, these criticisms exposed significant
flaws in Brown's reasoning, some of which would continue to
haunt the effort to implement the Court's mandate for many
years to come. It appeared that the Court assumed that its
logic was "self-evident." Lengthy dissertations on the evils
of the segregated system of the South were not necessary;
everybody knew what the Court meant. The more the justices
elaborated, the more they would alienate; Chief Justice
Warren wanted to preserve the unanamity of the Court. Many of
the broader social implications of the decision, such as the
fate of majority-black institutions, were either avoided or
ignored. Hence, Brown. in opting for brevity, masked the
nature of the complicated issues that lay ahead:
. . . Brown never explained - indeed, never tried to 
explain - its crucial conclusion that segregated 
schools, however equal their facilities, still intan­
gibly harmed black children. True, Brown kept repeating 
this conclusion, at least five separate times. But the 
Court essentially asked the country to take it on faith: 
that because nine justices thought segregation wrong, 
it must be so (Wilkinson, 1979, 35).
The fact that many of these criticisms were dismissed as 
"legalistic" and not taken seriously was central to the 
entire history of the effort to implement Brown. After all, 
Brown represented the reaffirmation of the national faith in 
the dignity of the individual and his right to "pursue happi­
ness," a moral question that had been settled long ago. This
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"old principle" was simply being applied to an "old problem" 
- the issue of race. Thus, the ease with which Brown could be 
assimilated with the national narrative and American ideas of 
progress gave its advocates a much lower burden of proof. 
Brown was just as "self-evident" as the Declaration of Inde­
pendence itself. The Court could be forgiven if its logic was 
sloppy or inconsistent - the fact that the justices' opinion 
reaffirmed some of the nation's most cherished values over­
shadowed any shortcomings in Brown's prose. As a result, some 
of Brown's defenders behaved as if the Court's opinion - as 
well as their interpretations of its meaning - were logically 
self-evident and did not need to be defended at all.93
93A few examples will suffice to make the point. While 
conceding that Brown was not "tightly reasoned," Bender 
(1972) argued that the Court's decision was "right. . . .  if 
the Court had waited until an airtight opinion could be 
written (I still couldn't write one), it would have sadly 
failed the country and the Consti-tution" (26). Beiser (1976) 
took his Bender's pragmatism one step further: he suggested 
that racial segregation was such a grievous evil that the 
Court need not apologize for its ruling, so long as 
"desirable results" were achieved. Bender wrote, "Does anyone 
doubt today. . . . that legally enforced racial segregation 
in Southern public schools hurt blacks more than it did 
whites" (1976)? He typified the view that Brown represented 
the common sense prin-ciple that segregation 
unconstitutionally harmed African Americans and therefore 
hardly needed to be explicitly defended since it was so 
obvious (Wilkinson, 1979, 35). When asked whether segregation 
offended the American principle of equality, Black wrote:
I think we ought to exercise one of the sovereign 
prerogatives of philosophers - that of laughter. The 
only question remaining (after we get our laughter under 
control) is whether the segregation system [in the 
South] answers this description. Here I must confess 
a tendency to start laughing all over again (1960, 424) .
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In addition, it was demonstrated in Chapters Three and 
Chapter Four that the 1950's and 1960's were characterized by 
massive resistance to the Brown decision in the South. The 
images of nine frightened black students in Little Rock, 
Arkansas being escorted to class by National Guardsmen over 
the protests of an angry white mob simply made a much deeper 
impression on national consciousness than the dispassionate 
critiques of the Brown decision by legal academics. Indeed, 
the South's response to integration fortified the conviction 
of integrationists that they were right and white Southern 
segregationists were wrong. In the highly charged ideological 
climate of the 1950's and early 1960's, the high priests of 
academia probably never had a chance. Now was the time for 
action, not philosophying. The real question seemed to be how 
much political capital would the federal government and the 
political parties be willing to risk on behalf of civil 
rights.
Moreover, the fact that these critiques were dismissed 
by the NAACP and other civil rights activists as "technical" 
and "legalistic" is precisely the point - because that is 
what they were. Brown's early critics challenged its legal 
reasoning, its fidelity to the historical context of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, the social science testimony, and some 
of its practical implications. They failed to address its 
most basic assumption - whether the American Creed itself 
could adequately deal with the problem of race. As a conse­
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quence, Brown's belief in the universality of the American 
Creed was allowed to go unchallenged.
Not only did Brown's early critics not challenge the 
Creed, their "ivory tower critiques" revealed that they were 
trapped in an intellectual dungeon of their own making. Brown 
challenged an established view of liberal legal jurisprudence 
that began in the late nineteenth century and crystallized in 
19 05 with Lochner v. New York94 concerning the proper role of 
the courts. Liberals denounced Lochner. maintaining that the 
Court's "liberty of contract" doctrine presupposed that 
workers and capitalists had equal bargaining power. In a 
period when workers' strikes were often stamped out by the 
police and "company goons," such thinking was incredibly out 
of step with the reality of the labor market, liberals fumed. 
In dissent, Justice Brandeis wrote that Lochner was not based 
on a correct understanding of the law, but rather "upon an 
economic theory which a large part of the country does not 
entertain" (198 U.S. 45, 75). Accusing the Supreme Court of 
enacting its own economic and social preferences into law, 
liberals countered by developing the doctrine of judicial 
restraint - the view that courts should ordinarily defer to 
the policies of the legislature (Horwitz, 1979, 600; Peller, 
1997, 204) . Arguing that the Constitution created only one
^lOS U.S. 45 (1905). In Lochner. the Supreme Court
invalidated a New York minimum wage law, arguing that the 
state law violated the Fourteenth Amendment by abridging the 
rights of workers and capitalists to contract with respect to 
wages and working conditions.
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branch - the legislature - with the mandate to make political 
choices, the theory of judicial restraint became a staple of 
liberal theories of jurisprudence for half a century.
The consequence of the doctrine of judicial restraint 
was the loss of faith in the courts as a vehicle for social 
change. The post-Lochner era led many legal scholars to 
conclude that the law merely reflected social forces. Law had 
become too formalistic and legalistic, and had lost touch 
with social realities. By the 1920's, this thinking had given 
rise to the only native American school of legal jurispru­
dence - legal realism (Horwitz, 1979, 602). Legal realists 
assumed that since law reflected social forces, it was both 
impossible and undesirable for it to serve as a catalyst for 
social reform (Ibid, 602). Under the tutelage of the legal 
realists, law was stripped of its traditional moral content. 
Having rejected the natural law tradition, many liberals lost 
faith in the capacity of law to articulate the "dreams, 
hopes, and aspirations of a community" (Ibid). Indeed, one of 
the consequences of this view (which was discussed in Chapter 
Two) was that many leftist intellectuals considered the 
NAACP's proposed legal campaign against segregation as well- 
intentioned but doomed to fail. Taken together, the doctrine 
of judicial restraint and legal realism contributed to the 
view that the courts were an improper place to initiate any 
mass movement for social change.
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Brown. however, called into question matters that many 
liberal legal scholars thought were settled. To them, what 
was unforgivable about Lochner was that the Supreme Court had 
enacted its own social and economic preferences into law; 
now, the Brown court appeared to have done the same thing. 
Even worse, liberals based their opposition to decisions like 
Lochner on abstract theories about the proper role of the 
courts within American constitutionalism; what they failed to 
acknowledge was that the doctrine of judicial restraint and 
the school of legal realism emerged principally as a reaction 
to a series of judicial decisions that liberals opposed on 
political grounds.95 But Brown was a decision in which many 
liberals favored the result; however, the Court's ruling in 
the segregation decisions resembled the very brand of legal 
jurisprudence that they despised. Trapped in an intellectual 
web that they had spun themselves, some of the liberal legal 
scholars who criticized the Brown decision were, in reality,
9SFurther evidence that liberal arguments for judicial 
restraint emerged more as a result of the political context 
of the times than the Founders' original understanding of the 
courts' role lies in the fact that liberals such as Justices 
Holmes, Brandeis and Frankfurther considered Chief Justice 
John Marshall one of their heroes. Justice Marshall, however, 
could not be accused of modest uses of judicial power. 
"Heroic judges," the proponents of judicial restraint seemed 
to be saying, "should be confined to the mythic past when 
judges were larger than life" (Horwitz, 1979, 600). While
Marshall's exercises of judicial authority may have been 
necessary during those embryonic years to carve out a special 
role for the Supreme Court within America's constitutional 
order, many liberals acted as if "the age of heroic judges 
had passed and judicial modesty remained the only virtue" 
(Ibid, 600).
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"fighting the last war" (Ibid, 603) . Thus, it was no wonder 
that many of their criticisms centered on Brown's lack of a 
"neutral" principle or the search for an unambiguous purpose 
for the Fourteenth Amendment which ostensibly would have 
provided a better rationale for the Court's decision (Graham, 
1954; Weschler, 1959; Poliak, 1959).
Further, the sense that the South's determination to 
circumvent Brown had created a constitutional crisis also 
meant that for these "doubting Thomases" some of their best 
arguments would be used to justify a degree of judicial 
intervention in the South that their own theories of judicial 
restraint could not have tolerated. Indeed, in a climate of 
massive resistance to desegregation, strict adherence to a 
theory of judicial restraint seemed to make little sense to 
Brown's defenders. It soon became apparent that merely 
striking down Plessv in education and allowing blacks and 
whites to go to whatever schools they liked - the so-called 
"freedom of choice" plans - would not integrate the schools; 
this view was crystallized by the Supreme Court's opinion in 
Green when it announced that Brown did not simply require 
school districts to outlaw segregation, but it placed on them 
an "affirmative duty" to desegregate. Thus, the view that the 
state act as a neutral arbiter - neither unjustly favoring 
blacks or whites - was labeled as "naive" or "impractical" at 
best (Meuller and Schwartz, 1960; Miller and Howell, 1960) or 
"reactionary," "racist," at worst (Peller, 1997, 204).
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In addition, Green defined compliance with Brown in 
terms of whether states and school districts had made accep­
table, measurable progress toward integration (391 U.S. 430 
[1968]). Increasingly, the principle that Brown represented 
simply "color-blindness" - that Brown meant blacks and whites 
were equal before the law but race should not be taken into 
account - was rejected by many liberals. "Color-blindness" 
was linked with the equality that the Lochner court alleged 
existed between labor and capital; in theory, labor and 
capital might have equality, but the theory did not work in 
the real world (Peller, 1997, 204). Similarly, laws banning 
racial discrimination against African Americans made them the 
equals of whites in theory, but the consequences of slavery 
and segregation meant that they were not the equals of whites 
of whites in fact. Many liberals concluded that remedies to 
address racial discrimination had to be "color-conscious" in 
order to identify whether racism was still being practiced 
and thus avoid the Lochner problem (Ibid, 2 04). Moreover, the 
social science component of Brown represented the ideal for 
which the legal realists had strived for - the goal of making 
law conform to "the actual social conditions to which it was 
applied rather than to an abstract idealization of formal 
equality in the face of empirical inequality" (Ibid, 205) .
Thus, the period between 1954 and 1968 was characterized 
by a major transformation in the thinking of many liberals on 
civil rights. At the time of Brown. the NAACP and other
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liberals were arguing that racial segregation unconstitutio­
nally used color as a basis for denying African Americans 
equality under the law. The principle that blacks not be 
judged by the color of their skin, "but the content of their 
character" easily harmonized with traditional American under­
standings of individualism (McCloskey and Zaller, 1984) . By 
the time Green was decided in 1968, the country had witnessed 
more than a decade of Southern attempts to delay, circumvent, 
and outright defy Brown's mandate. Many liberals saw "color­
blindness" as naive and unrealistic in light of the diffi­
culties encountering in trying to make integration a reality. 
Rather than arguing that color should make no difference, as 
liberals had traditionally maintained, it would be necessary, 
at least in the short run, to take color into account in 
order to effectively monitor the process of redressing racial 
discrimination. Thus, they jettisoned theories of a limited 
role of the courts in favor of proactive government interven­
tion to bring about desegregation. The courts' more activist 
posture toward desegregation during the late 1960's and early 
1970's reflected the application of New Deal liberalism to 
civil rights (Carmines and Stinson, 1989; Edsall and Edsall, 
1991; Crump, 1993; Orfield, 1996; Smith, 1996; Peller, 1997).
However, this transformation in liberal civil rights 
advocacy sowed the seeds for the undoing of Brown. As libe­
rals began to steadily move away from "color-blindness" to 
"color-consciousness," conservatives accused them of aban­
Reproduced  with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
3 2 0
doning the American Creed. It was inappropriate for the 
government to take race into account, it was argued. As the 
images of nonviolent black demonstrators being beaten by 
racist white Southern policemen gave way to the urban riots 
of Watts, Detroit, Cleveland, and Newark, African Americans 
no longer appeared like sympathetic victims to many white 
Americans (Edsall and Edsall, 1991). The tumultuous combina­
tion of urban unrest and anti-Vietnam protest effectively 
weakened the New Deal coalition, paving the way for Richard 
Nixon's narrow victory in the presidential election of 1968. 
One of Nixon's campaign promises was to slow the pace of 
"forced desegregation"; though not rejecting Brown in prin­
ciple (as racist Southern politicians had), Nixon denied that 
the federal government should play an activist role in brin­
ging integration about. The "judicial restraint" arguments 
that an earlier generations of liberals had erected in 
response to an economically conservative Court were now being 
employed to curb judicial activism in school desegregation. 
Nixon's message of allowing desegregation "conforming to 
local conditions" was just what many Southerners wanted to 
hear (Preer, 1982; Carmines and Stinson, 1989; Edsall and 
Edsall, 1991; Orfield, 1996; Smith, 1996).
Second, the more activist posture of the federal courts 
raised the specter that the implementation of Brown would 
mean that historically black colleges had no place in the new 
dispensation. Chapter Three discussed the debate among many
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leading black educators during the 1950's and early 1960's, 
many of whom were gravely concerned that the implemenation of 
a desegregation-only remedy would have disastrous implica­
tions for African American students, faculty, and administra­
tors. However, the South's massive resistance to any kind of 
integration meant that the debate about the future of black 
colleges was largely confined to the intelligentsia until the 
mid-1960's. With the full force of Southern state governments 
united against integration of the public schools and the uni­
versities, bold assertions of "black autonomy" would have 
played into the hands of the segregationists. The political 
imperatives of the 1950's and early 1960's, thus, postponed 
the "black backlash" against integration until the late 
1960's . Even when black educators voiced fears about the 
implications of integration, they were very careful not to 
directly criticize Brown (Thompson, 1958; Nabrit, 1958; Moon, 
1962; Kujovich, 1987).
With the rise of the Black Power movement, many blacks 
began to have second thoughts about integration. The Supreme 
Court's statement that "separate is inherently unequal," as 
well as the efforts of the NAACP's social scientists and 
lawyers may have unwittingly injured the pride of African 
Americans. Brown asserted that even if school facilities were 
equal, racial segregation still intangibly harmed black 
children. Thus, the Court seemed to equate separate education 
with unequal education. The most militant advocates of Black
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Power equated integration with cultural genocide. However, as 
noted in Chapter Three, Brown failed to specify if the "harm" 
of segregation was caused by the state's imposition of it, or 
if racial segregation "harmed" blacks and offended the Con­
stitution irrespective of whether it was freely chosen or 
not. Thus, black college presidents interpreted Brown as not 
requiring the merger or elimination of black institutions but 
forbidding states from legally restricting the schools which 
African Americans could attend. At the same time, they 
coopted the liberal embrace of "color-consciousness" to argue 
that historically black colleges still served a critical need 
for black students during this critical period of transition 
from Jim Crow segregation to integration. In calling for 
states to enhance black colleges, they were not only trying 
to remedy past underfunding of black institutions; in addi­
tion, many African Americans were advocating an activist role 
for the government in remedying the "vestiges of segrega­
tion." However, by insisting that the desegregation process 
did not necessarily preclude the existence of black colleges, 
they were destined for a head-on collision with black and 
white liberals who saw black colleges as an artifact from the 
Jim Crow past that must now be eliminated.
Thus, the attempt to apply Brown to higher education 
raised doubts about whether the Supreme Court's decision was 
based on an adequate understanding of the problem of unequal 
educational opportunity in the first place. Furthermore, the
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fact that efforts to extend Green's "affirmative duty" to 
desegregate in higher education occurred in the midst of an 
increasingly conservative political and legal climate seemed 
to indicate that the old legal realists had been right all 
along - the courts indeed were the wrong place to attempt an 
effort at massive social reform. However, the journey from 
Brown and Fordice does more than merely confirm the doubts of 
the legal realists about efficacy of the courts. Because 
desegregation in higher education cannot avoid the issue of 
state-supported black universities, is Brown even relevant? 
Questioning the relevance of Brown to solving this major 
policy question is another way of asking if the American 
Creed provides an adequate analytical lens to remedy the 
problems associated with race. As noted earlier, Brown has 
become an American cultural icon precisely because it can be 
readily harmonized with the nation's traditional understan­
dings of liberty, equality, and individualism.
However, key aspects of America's historical development 
raise serious questions about the efficacy of the American 
Creed to deal with problems associated with race. The next 
section discusses these matters in greater detail.
The Limitations of the American Creed to the Black Experience
As noted in Chapter One, the American Creed, by proclai­
ming the "self-evident truth" of the fundamental equality of 
all men, unites African Americans and other historically 
"outgroups" into the American fold in a manner that is truly
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extraordinary (Myrdal, 194 4, 13). The beauty of the American 
Creed for African Americans is that it unites Protestant 
evangelical piety, Enlightenment rationalism, and natural law 
into a cohesive worldview. They were not forced to resolve 
any of the tensions between these frameworks; hence, blacks 
never needed to "import" a theory of revolution from abroad 
(such as Marxism) to justify their protest movements; a 
ready-made rationale was already available.
However, Tocqueville also noted that Americans have the 
luxury of living in a democratic society "without having to 
endure a democratic revolution" ([1835]: 1988), he had in
mind the revolutions in Europe, in particular, the most 
recent one in his native France. The Americans did not have 
to rebuild a new society on the ashes of an old one. The 
image of America as a redemptive force in the world and the 
sense that it was the carrying out of modernity's rejection 
of tradition in favor of reason as the basis for politics was 
so taken for granted that it was not hard to imagine why 
Jefferson could declare certain "truths" to be self-evident. 
Unlike Locke, Jefferson had no one comparable to a Filmer as 
an opponent; there simply was not an entrenched aristocracy 
in America which had to be demolished. Neither was there an 
ancient social order which counterrevolutionaries could
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nostalgically point to in the event that America's democratic 
experiment encountered a serious crisis.96
Agreeing with Tocqueville's observation, Hartz asked, 
"Can a people that is born equal ever understand peoples 
elsewhere that have become so? Can it ever lead them?. . . .  
Can it understand itself" (1955, 66, 3 09)? Hartz' question
cuts to the core of the dilemma which Brown presents because 
it challenges the presupposition that the American Creed has 
universal applicability. In addition, it must be recalled 
that Brown occurred in a political climate when the United 
States was evangelistically spreading the gospel of demo­
cratic capitalism as if its institutions could be applied 
universally all over the world. If America's social norms are 
not as "self-evident" as the Creed implies, then not only may 
it not necessarily inhere within it universal lessons for the 
world, but it may have difficulty addressing some of Ameri­
ca's own problems. Therefore, to the extent that the Brown 
decision was partly motivated as an "object lesson" for the
96Hartz argues that the lack of an "old regime" in 
America was precisely the intellectual problem that Southern 
apologists for slavery from 183 0 onward had, a problem that 
they never solved. Lacking a true American feudalism, some 
Southern aristocrats turned to Europe as a model - which, 
from the standpoint of the dogmatism of the American Creed, 
was a fruitless exercise. Trying to defend slavery as a 
"right to property" while pointing to European feu-dalism 
could not work because America theoretically personified what 
Europe was not - particularly freedom. The fact that the 
arguments of the Southern apologists have largely been 
forgotten, Hartz concludes, is a powerful testament to the 
tyrannical hold that the liberal tradition has on the 
American mind (1955, 145-200).
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rest of the world, it may be an inadequate instrument to 
address the problem of unequal educational opportunities for 
African Americans (depending on how it is interpreted and 
implemented). More fundamentally, Hartz implied that it is 
America's absolute moral certainty that its historical 
experience inheres within it universal lessons for the 
nations of the world that is precisely the problem.
While this dissertation has argued throughout that 
African Americans subscribe to the same American Creed that 
white Americans do, both groups have been conditioned by 
different historical experiences. These experiences have 
produced distinct differences in cultural perspective between 
whites and blacks. Thus, the belief that the Creed is "self- 
evident" poses three specific problems which have handicapped 
the effort to implement desegregation which will be explored 
in the remainder of this chapter:
(1) America's historical experience has given rise to 
the view that "the government that governs best is the one 
which governs least." However, African Americans associate 
their greatest political, social, and economic gains with 
histo-rical periods characterized by significantly more 
interventionist government than traditional understandings of 
the American Creed idealize. These differences in historical 
perspective often cause whites and blacks to have starkly 
different views about the proper role of government.
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(2) The fact that the American Creed idealizes the 
limited state (without adequately justifying its legitimate 
role) particularly weakens the courts, which is inherently 
the weakest branch of government. Courts must ultimately 
depend on the cooperation of the other branches of government 
as well as the willingness of the populace in order to 
implement its decisions. They have little power to enforce 
decisions on their own, particularly politically unpopular 
ones (such as school desegregation) . Consequently, because 
African Americans have concentrated a disproportionate amount 
of their energies trying to achieve desegregation through the 
courts, the institutional weaknesses of the judicial branch 
become especially problemmatic.
(3) Liberals based their support for integration in the 
1940's and 1950's on the reputed "objective" and "value- 
neutral" pillars of law and science, two of the major deri­
vatives of the Creed. By assuming the universality of the 
American Creed, the liberal consensus of the late 1940's and 
1950's failed to consider if its so-called "value-neutral" 
consensus about race was rooted in Eurocentric (and even 
racist) assumptions. Viewed in this light, it begs the 
question of whether the Supreme Court in Brown adequately 
considered the distinctive nature of African American 
political culture when it made its decision.
The next section focuses on the historical origins of 
America's limited view of the state and the formidable
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obstacles that it poses for implementing what are perceived 
as "big government" solutions (such as desegregation).
The American Creed and the Role of the State
For the purposes of this study, what is especially note­
worthy about the American Revolution is its uniqueness, not 
its universality. What distinguished America from Europe was 
its lack of a feudal past, and this fact profoundly shaped 
the nature of its revolution and political culture (Hartz, 
1955; Huntington, 1968). The distinction betweem America and 
Europe implies that certain aspects of the American case 
either cannot be applied to other contexts, or if it can, it 
cannot be applied in the exact same manner. Moreover, it also 
means that the details of America's historical development do 
not necessarily inhere within them a blueprint for solving 
contemporary domestic issues, such as the problems that the 
modern civil rights movement confronted the nation with in 
the 1950's (some of which remain largely unsolved). In this 
section, it will be argued that America's lack of a feudal 
past has caused Americans to ascribe a significantly more 
limited role for the state than in other countries - and this 
predisposition directly affects racial politics in America.
Without a feudal order to destroy, the American was free 
to define his revolution as a struggle to limit government. 
Indeed, the American republic premised itself upon a profound 
distrust of government. The separation of powers between the 
executive, legislative, and judicial branches and the divi­
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sion of sovereignty between the central government and the 
states stood out as a monument to the Founders' distrust of 
centralized authority. At the heart of the colonists' dispute 
with Britain was their rejection of Parliament's claim to 
absolute sovereignty, particularly in the area of taxation. 
British policies during the 1760's and 1770's were viewed by 
their subjects as "usurpations" of the powers traditionally 
exercised by their local assemblies (Hartz, 1955; Huntington, 
1968; Peterson, 1976).
By contrast, the European liberal faced the dual problem 
of checking the arbitrary use of power by government while 
simultaneously preserving democratic reforms against any 
potential restoration of the old regime by the aristocratic 
classes. The American only needed to limit power; the Euro­
pean liberal had to both limit power and keep it at the same 
time. Thus, they could not challenge the absolute monarchies 
of their day without dreaming of centralizing power them­
selves (Tocqueville, 1988; Hartz, 1955). European liberals 
talked about "enlightened despots" who would "reorder society 
along rational lines" (Hartz, 1955, 44), language which many 
Americans would have found to be "dishonest doubletalk." 
While Americans praised Montesquieu's scheme of checks and 
balances because it divided sovereignty, European liberals 
blasted him for precisely that reason - that is, it shattered 
the very unity of power upon which liberals had placed their 
hope.
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Therefore, the absence of a preexisting feudal order 
caused Americans and Europeans to define the role of the 
state in a liberal society very differently:
There are two sides to the Lockian argument: a 
defense of the state that is implicit, and a limitation 
on the state that is explicit. The first is found in 
in Locke's basic social norm, the concept of free indi­
viduals in a state of nature. This idea untangled men 
from the myriad associations of class, church, guild, 
and place, in terms of which feudal society defined 
their lives; and by doing so, it automatically gave the 
state a much higher rank in relation to them than ever 
before. The state became the only association that might 
legitimately coerce them at all. . . .When Locke came to 
America, however, a change appeared. Because the basic 
feudal oppressions of Europe had not taken root, the 
fundamental social norm of Locke ceased in large part 
to look like a norm and began, of all things, to look 
like a sober description of fact. When the Americans 
moved from that concept to the contractual idea of 
organizing the state, they were not conscious of doing 
anything to fortify the state, but were conscious only 
that they were about to limit it. One side of Locke 
became virtually all of him [author's emphasis] (Hartz, 
1955, 60).
In other words, the European liberal needed to expli­
citly defend the legitimacy of the state's role in society 
while simultaneously limiting its role in certain areas in 
order to make his case against absolute monarchies. The 
American version of Lockianism, by contrast, has only been 
concerned with limiting the state. The American revolutionary 
never bothered to defend the legitimacy of the state because 
he considered it a necessary evil that must be limited. The 
Founders' preoccupation with designing a political system 
which renders swift political change virtually impossible was 
a testament to their desire to weaken government. Moreover,
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this framework could not have worked in a society where there 
existed fundamental disagreement on the notion of limited 
government.
Having defined their revolution in this manner, slogans 
such as "less government," "states' rights," and "laissez- 
faire economics" have become, for some Americans, the 
National Holy Writ. However, rather than seeing this view of 
the state as the product of the political struggles of the 
17 60's and 1770's, the American view of the limited state is 
defined in universal, transcendent terms. The Creed is lifted 
out of its political and historical context and becomes one 
of the "laws of nature and the laws of God."
This aspect of the American Creed creates significant 
political obstacles for the majority of African American 
political leaders, who tend to favor more activist government 
intervention on issues pertaining to civil rights. Blacks 
have consistently given the Democratic party, which tends to 
favor more activist government than Republicans on civil 
rights, approximately 90 percent of their vote since 1964 
(Cross, 1987; Carmines and Stinson, 1989; Edsall and Edsall, 
1991) . When conservatives argue against affirmative action, 
minority set-asides, busing to achieve desegregation, court 
orders reguiring school districts to equalize funding between 
rich and poor schools, and the requirement that states make 
massive investments in historically underfunded black univer­
sities, they appeal to the nation's ancient distrust of the
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federal government. African Americans and liberal whites, on 
the other hand, interpret the hard-fought struggles to secure 
the civil rights victories of the 1950's and 1960's as evi­
dence that the rights of minorities cannot be left to the 
states and the private market. Hence, African Americans, firm 
believers in the American Creed, find themselves appealing to 
the very federal government that the Creed says cannot be 
trusted.
However, the problem for African Americans is deeper 
than merely the fact that they tend to be politically more 
left-of-center than the majority of the nation's population. 
Given America's predisposition toward defining the whole of 
Locke as limiting the state (without defending its legitimate 
role), political gains by African Americans that are based on 
expansions of federal power rest on an unstable foundation. 
This is because the liberal rationale for "activist govern­
ment" has been based on a pragmatic response to specific 
shortcomings of laissez-faire capitalism and the doctrine of 
"states' rights," rather than on a philosophical defense of 
the state. Hence, the fundamental problem with Brown. and by 
extension, for the civil rights movement, is that it appealed 
to the American Creed for intellectual and moral support in 
order to expand the role of the federal government in 
protecting the rights of blacks; however, the civil rights 
community has largely failed to understand that the Creed 
itself is a theory of limited government. It must be recalled
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that many of the civil rights victories of the 1950's and the 
1960's represent the redefinition of New Deal liberalism to 
encompass African American concerns (Carmines and Stinson, 
1989; Edsall and Edsall, 1991). Consequently, it also follows 
that the collapse of the traditional Democratic New Deal 
coalition means that policies predicated on the civil rights 
consensus of the mid-19 60's might have trouble sustaining 
themselves as the American political pendulum swings back to 
its more natural position. Viewed in this light, the conser­
vative assault on affirmative action is not simply an example 
of "white backlash" as many liberals insist (Curry, 1996), 
but stands as a testament to the failure of the left to 
ground its agenda in a philosophical defense of the state.
Liberals have neglected to defend the state for one 
basic reason: they are Americans. As the intellectual hiers 
of Jefferson, Americans have a tendency to view the American 
Revolution not as an event, but as a "process" that had "only 
fairly begun in 1776, nor had it ended in 1783" (Peterson, 
1976, 27). Consequently, the principles of the American 
Revolution in need of constant reinterpretation by each 
succeeding generation. This dynamic dimension of the Ameri­
can Creed allows politicians, activists, and social reformers 
of various ideological stripes to rationalize their agendas 
as consistent with either the "true intent" or a "modern 
construction" of the American Dream or both. Brown consti­
tuted this very type of reinterpretation; in effect, the
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Court said that it did not matter what the framers intended 
the Fourteenth Amendment to mean in 1868. What mattered was 
what the Court thought in 1954. As a consequence, civil 
rights liberals portrayed themselves as carriers of the "spi­
rit" of the American Revolution (Cahn, 1955; McCloskey and 
Zaller, 1984). In addition, the Cold War atmosphere of the 
1950's encouraged Americans to think that they, not the 
Soviets, were "the most revolutionary society in the world" 
(Hartz, 1955, 305-306). Thus, the nation's historic spirit of 
social experimentation embodied in the American Creed com­
bined with the politics of the times to "sanctify" the 
mission of implementing the Brown decision and discouraged a 
thorough critique of the American view of the state and its 
relationship to society.
Moreover, when American liberals (like their conserva­
tive counterparts) start from the premise that their system 
is already the best in the world, why would they be expected 
to attack one of the "sacred cows" of American politics - the 
limited view of the state? When one conceives of his country 
as the example the world should follow, even the most zealous 
of reformers (regardless of whether they are from the left or 
the right), would not propose a fundamental restructuring of 
the American house. Instead, they would rather remodel it, 
add an extra room or put on a "fresh coat of paint" on it. 
The New Deal liberal has been a reformist, not a revolutio­
nary. With that thought in mind, the New Deal liberal objects
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to "laissez-faire economics" because the stock market crash 
of 192 9 reveals the excesses of unregulated capitalism, not 
because it is a distortion of the Lockian theory of the 
state. In America, the greatest expansions in federal power 
have been in response to crises: the Civil War, the Great 
Depression, World War II, and the civil rights movement. On 
one score, these crises reveal that the pragmatic nature of 
the American Creed gives it a unique advantage over European 
ideological systems; that is, it allows the American Creed to 
"reinvent itself" to respond to changed circumstances that 
those trapped in more rigid ideological categories cannot 
possibly do.-97
However, when the crises begin to fade from the nation's 
collective memory, policies which were legitimized by those 
circumstances can sometimes fall out of favor as the public
^Hartz argues that the New Deal constitutes a shining 
example of American pragmatism and the ability of the Creed 
to reinvent itself conveniently to deal with political and 
economic crises. He points out that the New Deal shows the 
dogmatism of America's devotion to Locke. Not only was 
Roosevelt able to coopt much of the agenda of the socialists 
and the communists, he was able to do it without acknowled­
ging the leftists' critique of his program at all. Had 
Roosevelt been in Europe, he could not brought about an 
unprecedented increase in the size of the federal bureaucracy 
without qualifying himself. For example, Roosevelt would have 
had to say that though the New Deal was increasing the size 
of the state, he still believed in the sanctity of private 
property and opposed government collectivization of major 
industries. True enough, many of his conservative opponents 
branded his proposals as "socialist" and "un-American," but 
Roosevelt was hardly a spokesperson for the socialist themes 
of "class solidarity." Indeed, his demonization by conser­
vatives and the weakness of the radical left made Roosevelt's 
New Deal program "the only game in town" for the practical 
liberal (1955, 259-283).
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shifts its attention to other matters. This fact partially 
explains Northern lack of political will to vigorously 
intervene in the South on behalf of civil rights during the 
1880's and 1890's, which helped to create the judicial- 
political climate for Plessv (Kluger, 1975; Wilkinson, 1979; 
Cruse, 1986; Lofgren, 1987; Franklin and Moss, 1987; Kousser, 
1990; Orfield, 1996). But the shift in public opinion points 
to the more basic problem: the reforms enacted during the 
Reconstruction debates presumed that the freed slaves could 
be fully incorporated as citizens without fundamentally 
redefining the role of the American state.
African Americans, the one ethnic group with the 
greatest potential to pose a revolutionary threat to American 
democracy (as well as the greatest need to think beyond the 
Creed's view of the state) have historically been among the 
greatest apostles of the American version of Lockianism. Even 
when African American thinkers have bitterly protested the 
treatment of their people in America, they have found it 
difficult to think beyond the American frame of reference; 
indeed, it has been the inability, in the main, of African 
American intellectuals to think beyond the American perspec­
tive that is for Cruse "the crisis of the Negro intellectual" 
(1984) . Moreover, African Americans have been the most faith­
ful members of the New Deal liberal constituency (T. Cross, 
1987; Carmines and Stinson, 1989; Edsall and Edsall, 1991;
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Smith, 1996); hence, their political strategies suffer from 
the same liabilities that have afflicted American liberals 
more generally.
Fundamentally, the only grievance that the majority of 
black Americans have against America is racism; thus, rather 
than challenging the relationship the Creed expouses between 
the state and society, African Americans leaders have princi­
pally concerned themselves with the practical consequences of 
racial discrimination against their people. Those few black 
leaders who have espoused revolutionary theories have been no 
more successful than white radicals at attracting a large 
following to their cause because the black masses have been 
largely uninterested in programs calling for the revolutio­
nary restructuring of American society; rather, they simply 
want what they believe is their "fair share" of the American 
Dream of economic and social mobility (Cruse, 1984; Hochs- 
child, 1995; R. Smith, 1996).
In summary, the facts of America's historical develop­
ment have given rise to a limited view of the state that is 
uniguely American. The uniqueness of the American experience 
raises doubts about the ability of America's past to instruct 
not only other nations of the world - which is precisely what 
America's Cold War ideology was attempting to do - but her­
self. The Lockian settlement, because of its predisposition 
toward viewing the state as a "necessary evil" rather than a 
"positive good," only illustrates the critical need for a
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philosophical defense of the state by liberals. However, this 
has been precisely what liberals have failed to do. Because 
black and white liberals adhere to the faith of the same 
American Creed as their political adversaries, they have 
largely failed to see the need for a fundamental critique of 
the American version of Lockianism. Since America's ascent to 
the apex of world power has "validated" American Lockianism, 
strategies favored by the left have the highest burden of 
proof. Yet, as the largely pragmatic justification for Brown 
illustrates, the political groups in America with the grea­
test need for political philosophy seem to be the very ones 
least interested in it.
The failure of African Americans and their white liberal 
allies to ground Brown in a philosophical defense of the role 
of the state draws attention to the efficacy of one of the 
principal tactics employed by the left: the reliance by
liberals on the courts and the tools of social science to 
affect broad social change. Brown. as noted earlier, is an 
example of the American tendency to appeal to law and science 
- which are purportedly "value-free" and "objective" - as a 
substitute for political philosophy. But if the American 
Creed itself is not universal (but is, in fact, the product 
of a particular historical experience), then it raises the 
question of whether two of the concrete ways the Creed mani­
fests itself (America's reverence for law and science) are 
also problemmatic. That is the subject of the next section.
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Brown and the Relationship Between Science, Law, and Culture
Since the American Creed itself has legitimized the view 
that the state's role should be limited, then it follows that 
this orthodoxy weakens the power of the courts, which must 
depend on the other branches of government to enforce its 
decisions. Rosenberg (1991) has shown that the courts are an 
especially blunt instrument with which to effect social 
change. Courts, he explained, generally lack effective tools 
(whether they include positive inducements to encourage com­
pliance or punitive measures to punish parties who refuse to 
cooperate) to force compliance in the absence of the willing­
ness of the parties to honor judicial decrees. Because courts 
depend on the other branches of government for enforcement, 
they do not propose radical social reforms very often; hence, 
the Supreme Court is an inherently conservative institution. 
Also, the judicial system affords the opportunity for consi­
derable delay of social reform through endless motions, 
appeals, motions, and other measures (18). Using desegrega­
tion in education, abortion, and environmentalism as case 
studies, Rosenberg concludes that the courts are actually 
better at mobilizing those opposed to major social reforms 
than they are at promoting social reform.98
98In his examination of the Brown decision, Rosenberg 
found that the period between 1954 and 1964 - when the
Supreme Court was the principal arm of the federal government 
that was squarely on the side of desegregation - little 
actual integration occurred. He attributed the rapid progress 
of desegregation in the South after 1964 to massive infusions 
of federal aid to education, the threat of federal aid cut-
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Not only does Rosenberg's account raise serious ques­
tions about Brown's significance (as popularized by the media 
and legal scholars), but it calls into question the long-term 
efficacy of relying on legal strategies to expand the rights 
of African Americans since Brown. The basic difference 
between the Black Mississippians' Council for Higher Educa­
tion and the NAACP Legal Defense Fund during the 1970's was 
on the role of black colleges; both organizations believe 
that the courts offer a promising avenue for pursuing their 
agendas. While many African American activists regretted that 
the Court refused to order the state of Mississippi to make 
dramatic improvements at the state's black universities, the 
real question is whether a court decision more to their 
liking, in and of itself, would have actually mattered. As
offs to school districts that refused to desegregate, and 
Southern business interests who saw integrated schools as a 
means of attracting out-of-state industries to their communi­
ties. These changes, Rosenberg reasoned, should be attributed 
to the convergence of the coercive power of the legislative 
and executive branches of the federal government and Southern 
business interests (in response to the direct action cam­
paigns in the South by blacks). The courts, he concluded, 
were largely ineffective at overcoming the deep-seated racial 
prejudices that were at the heart of school segregation. In 
fact, he pointed out that Brown was more effective at mobi­
lizing Southern opposition than it was at bringing about 
positive change. Rosenberg added that there is little evi­
dence to support the commonly held belief that the Brown 
decision served as an inspiration for black civil rights 
workers; he countered that the Montgomery bus boycott, the 
charismatic leadership of Martin Luther King, the sit-ins, 
the demonstrations, and the Freedom Rides exerted a far 
greater influence on the decisions of African Americans to 
participate in the movement than the symbolism of Brown. 
(131-142).
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the history of Brown has made abundantly clear, judicial 
decision and judicial implementation are two fundamentally 
different things.
Tocqueville (1988) noted the tendency in America for 
political problems to be transformed into legal ones. How­
ever, there is evidence that the "legalization" of political 
problems carries with it its own set of difficulties. Hor- 
witz (1979) has argued persuasively that Brown. by judicia- 
lizing the problem of race relations, has also distorted the 
nature of the dilemma and frustrated efforts toward finding 
equitable remedies. First of all, he points out that the 
American legal system is "overwhelmingly geared to a concep­
tion of redressing individual grievances, not of vindicating 
group rights or generalized patterns of injustice" (610). 
This perspective, flowing from the atomistic individualism of 
Locke, strips minority plaintiffs of their group identity. As 
a result, they have little basis with which to raise claims 
that have resulted from injustices that society has inflicted 
on their ancestors. Viewed from this angle, the decision in 
Bakke makes perfect sense. Thus, it was not surprising that 
the state of Mississippi accused the Avers plaintiffs of 
claiming "group rights" for advocating that the state be 
required to financially and programmatically compenstate 
black universities for its unconstitutional actions in the 
past. The plaintiffs had no choice but to try to demonstrate 
that their claims were not inconsistent with a traditional
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American conception of individual rights. Constrained by the 
premises of American constitutionalism, the Avers plaintiffs 
were forced to portray black Mississippians as an abstract 
collection of individuals, divorced from their context of 
historical oppression, but who nevertheless have constitu­
tional grievances against the state. By insisting on a 
radical distinction between individual identity and group 
identity (and extending constitutional sanction to the former 
and not the latter), the liberal tradition often has immense 
difficulty conceptualizing the social consequences of racial 
discrimination.
Secondly, Williams (1991) contends that the ability of 
African Americans to combat racial discrimination through the 
courts is hampered by another basic tenet of Anglo-American 
jurisprudence: its search for, and the assumption that there 
exist "transcendent, acontextual, universal truths or pure 
procedures" (8) . This perspective helps explain the American 
reverence for "the rule of law" (Myrdal, 1944) . This world 
view is problemmatic, Williams argues, because of it tends 
"to disparage anything that is nontranscendent (temporal, 
historical), or nonuniversal (specific) as 'emotional,' 
'literary,''personal,' or just Not True" (9). Coupled with 
the orientation of courts to conceptualize rights only in 
individualistic terms, the penchant of courts to search for 
universalistic principles implies that judges need not 
necessarily take the special history of African Americans
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into account. Thus, Justice Powell could write the majority 
opinion in Bakke as if the Fourteenth Amendment had no 
special historical meaning for African Americans. Claims 
rooted in history have a more difficult burden of proof in 
the courts. Therefore, this bias represents a significant 
challenge for the Avers plaintiffs because they have based 
their case for enhancements of black universities largely on 
the state of Mississippi's past conduct.
Third, courts, by nature, tend to limit the nature and 
scope of conflicts based on fundamental disagreements over 
principle (Horwitz, 1979, 610). In some cases where such
basic disagreement exist, courts may even struggle to define 
the problem - such as the problems that federal courts have 
had in defining desegregation as well as specifying the 
remedial measures necessary to eradicate the remnants of de 
jure discrimination. The tendency of courts to constrict the 
nature of controversial political and legal questions is 
further aggravated by the proclivity of judges to decide 
issues on the narrowest possible grounds for decisionmaking 
(Ibid). In Fordice. the Supreme Court, while finding Missis­
sippi's policies governing higher education constitutionally 
suspect, avoided one of the most contentious issues - whether 
the state was constitutionally required to make substantial 
improvements at the black universities. Because courts often 
decide deeply divisive issues based on narrow principles, 
this not only prolongs legal controversies for years; it
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creates the paradoxical situation where parties can "win" on 
principle but "lose" in reality if the court ultimately 
rejects the remedies that the parties favor. Thus, it took 
seventeen years for the Avers plaintiffs to win a judgment by 
the nation's highest court against the state; however, the 
goal which motivated the suit in the first place - the desire 
to enhance Mississippi's black universities as black univer­
sities - remains incomplete. Fordice illustrates how parties 
involved in a lawsuit can "win" and "lose" at the same time 
because of the way judges makes decisions.
Brown and its progeny points to a fourth problem that 
the legalization of racial problems presents: by concen­
trating on public schools and state universities, the legal 
battles over desegregation have discouraged a more systemic 
approach to educational policymaking. Segregation in the 
public schools since Brown is highly correlated with 
segregated housing patterns (Horwitz, 1979; Massey and 
Denton, 1993; Armor, 1995; Orfield, 1996; Patterson, 1997), 
which may be related to job discrimination. By defining 
desegregation as principally a legal problem, the fact that 
African Americans disproportionately are more likely to have 
inferior educational opportunities than whites is not seen as 
one of the consequences of social and economic inequality 
more broadly. Educational problems are confused with legal 
ones, problems which ultimately have political and economic 
origins (Preer, 1982; Armor, 1995).
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Nonetheless, because public schools and state univer­
sities are "public," judicial scrutiny is seen as more 
legitimate; whereas, housing and job discrimination involves 
areas considered "private" and best left to the free choices 
of individuals (Horwitz, 1979, 612). This "public-private" 
distinction discourages courts from taking a more systemic 
view of the problem of unequal educational opportunities. 
Instead, courts focus on those institutions for which they 
can more readily exercise judicial control - in this case, 
public schools and state universities. Brown presents no 
basic challenge America's traditional attachment to capita­
lism and the belief that government should intervene in the 
marketplace as little as possible. Since American capitalist 
ideology accepts inequality as not only inevitable but a 
necessary incentive for industry and hard work, courts are 
reluctant to be involved in directly attacking social and 
economic inequality. Thus, by concentrating on public schools 
and state universities, courts merely address the symptoms 
and not the sources of the inequalities that Brown was osten­
sibly meant to remedy.
The irony of Brown, then, is that it targets the public 
schools, "the weakest and most vulnerable of American insti­
tutions" (Horwitz, 1979, 612) with the weakest branch (the 
judiciary) of an American state which is also weak (because 
of the American Creed, the fragmenation of American political 
institutions, and federalism). As a result of Brown, the
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public schools and the state universities have been called 
upon to shoulder the greatest burden for solving the problem 
of racial injustice.
This is a hope which the public schools and the state 
universities never had a possibility of fulfilling. Brown not 
only embodied the historic faith in education that was shared 
by black and white Americans, but occurred in an age where 
the post-World War II economic boom had generated the grea­
test expansion in educational opportunities in the nation's 
history. Communities across the nation were building new 
schools and improving existing ones to meet demand. The G.I. 
bill had made a college education accessible to many working 
class Americans for the first time. Even the international 
climate served to strengthen public education; when, the 
Soviets launched Sputnik, Americans panicked at the thought 
that the Soviet Union might have technological superiority 
over the United States (K. Alexander and M. Alexander, 1985; 
Cremin, 1989; Patterson, 1997).
However, Arendt (1958) observed that while faith in the 
power of education generally characterized Western democra­
cies, no nation more literally believed in the culturally 
redemptive power of education than the United States. She 
warned that the Brown decision reflected an American over­
confidence in the power of education or "enlightenment" to 
solve difficult social problems such as racism. The faith in 
"enlightenment" manifests itself in the Court's reliance on
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arguments rooted in social science reasoning for its ruling 
in Brown. Embodied in the Court's rationale is the Enlighten­
ment's confidence that the vices of human civilization (such 
as racism) must eventually crumble under the weight of 
advances in scientific knowledge.
Arendt predicts that desegregation as a solution to the 
race problem could never work, no matter how well intended. 
Forcing black and white children to attend the same schools, 
she continued, could not solve the race problem because the 
children would have to grow up in a world with the very 
adults who could not solve the problem in the first place. 
Arendt's criticism directly contradicts the traditional view 
of the efficacy of public education - most explicitly 
expoused by Dewey, and the use of the courts to bring about 
the desired end. Cruse (198 6) agrees: "As an institution, a 
public school is created by and reflects the dominant values 
of the surrounding adult society, not the other way around" 
(73) .
Nevertheless, the view that integration has an inherent 
"social enlightenment benefit" has profoundly influenced the 
debate over desegregation. Similar arguments are relied upon 
to justify affirmative action in the workplace and at state 
universities." Associate Justice Thurgood Marshall expressed
"Proponents insist that "diversity" has an inherent 
educational and economic benefit. However, these arguments 
"do not fly" with many Americans because the practical and 
scientific orientation of the American Creed gives greater 
legitimacy to positions which can be easily quantified or
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this viewpoint in his dissent in Milliken when he wrote, ".
. . . unless our children begin to learn together, there is
little hope that our people will ever learn to live together" 
(418 U.S. 717, 783 J. Marshall, dissenting). Arendt suggests 
that the American faith in the power of education, which is 
clearly reflected in Brown. is tragically misplaced. Reitman 
(1992) echoes Arendt's assessment of American culture, 
arguing that America suffers from an "educational messiah 
complex" - the belief that every social problem, ranging from 
racism, to environmental degradation, to teenage promiscuity, 
to AIDS - can be solved by the schools.100
explained in "cost-benefit" terms. It is difficult to 
"quantify" the educational benefits of diversity when African 
Americans score significantly below whites and Asians on 
standardized tests. Government policies which appear to favor 
individuals or groups seen as "less qualified," according to 
the American Creed, come to be seen as abuses of state power. 
However, it usually does not occur to many Americans that the 
standards themselves which are used to decide who is "quali­
fied" may actually be culturally biased (Gardner, 1993; 
D'Souza, 1995; Delpit, 1995).
100But Reitman carries his analysis even further. He 
concludes that the American cultural tendency to "dump 
problems on the schools" not only has the effect of poli­
ticizing education - but rather, it is actually a form of 
social avoidance whereby one generation "passes the buck" for 
dealing with difficult political issues to its children. Not 
only do Americans fail to tackle these issues, Reitman 
continues, but they convince themselves that by placing ever- 
increasing demands on the schools that they are in reality 
handling their problems. Thus, engaging in bruising battles 
over educational reform, sex education, after school pro­
grams, censorship of books, and the content of the curriculum 
substitute for the irreplacable activity of citizens and 
other social institutions in confronting pressing issues. 
Moreover, the schools offer a convenient "scapegoat" for 
nearly every social problem. For example, the Education 
Department's "Nation at Risk" report on the status of public 
education in 1983 blamed the schools for the fact that the
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The tendency to divorce the problem of educational 
inequality from its social and economic context affects not 
only federal judges. For example, many liberals who favor the 
continuation of mandatory busing to achieve desegregation 
emphasize its purported social and educational benefits.101 
Advocates of busing maintain that the problem with segregated 
schools is one of poverty and not race (Orfield, 1996). But 
if the root of the problem is poverty, then it does not 
necessarily follow that the solution is a one-hour ride on a 
school bus to an entirely different neighborhood. It might 
actually be more reasonable to argue that remedies which 
attack the underlying economic inequalities of inner-city
United States appeared to be losing its economic supremacy to 
Germany and Japan. However, while the 1990's have witnessed 
an economic expansion in the United States (while other 
Western economies have not performed nearly as well) it is 
interesting that public education gets none of the credit for 
the good economy. Americans seem to have a love-hate rela­
tionship with the public schools; on one hand, they are 
supposed to save us and conversely, they are the source of 
all of our problems.
101Liberals such as Gary Orfield (1996) maintain that 
mandatory busing that involve the more affluent suburban 
districts should be continued (and expanded in some areas). 
Busing is needed not because black or Latino-majority schools 
are inferior not because of their racial composition; rather, 
integration exposes minority students to a superior "oppor­
tunity structure." That is, desegregated schools tend to have 
better resources, a stronger curriculum, and produce gra­
duates who are more likely to go to college. Segregated 
schools are "inherently unequal" because race is highly 
correlated with poverty. Similar arguments are advanced to 
discourage blacks from enrolling in black universities: 
predominately white universities have better facilities, 
superior resources, a stronger curriculum, and graduates of 
these institutions are more likely to get a job or admitted 
to graduate or professional school.
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neighborhoods vis-a-vis the suburbs may be more fruitful than 
concentrating on the schools alone. As recent judicial trends 
have placed busing on an increasingly slippery foundation, 
many African Americans have become more vocal in insisting 
that their neighborhood schools should be strengthened and 
enhanced, even if they are segregated (Steele, 1993; Shujaa,
1996). However, many of the remedies proposed (such as Afro- 
centric curricula, all-black male schools, increased funding 
for inner-city schools) are no more systemic than the busing 
remedies that they would like to replace. Thus, the tendency 
to overemphasize the virtue of the public school, histori­
cally an American problem, has been further aggravated by 
Brown.
When the NAACP rejected DuBois' argument that some forms 
of segregation are not only not harmful, but may even be 
necessary for African American advancement, the organization 
was also rejecting a systemic approach to the problem of 
racial inequality. DuBois felt that what African Americans 
really needed were independent bases of political and 
economic power. However, the dispute with DuBois seved only 
to harden the NAACP's belief in the rightness of the legal 
approach. However, the danger of the legal approach is that 
it provides a tempting alternative to the democratic process. 
Thayer (quoted in Rosenberg, 1991, 12) warned long ago
against the "tendency of the common and easy resort" to the 
courts, particularly to invalidate acts of the democratically
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accountable branches would "dwarf the political capacity of 
the people" (Ibid, 12). More recently, McCann, in studying 
litigation-prone activists has found that the "legal rights 
approach to expanding democracy has significantly narrowed 
their conception of political action itself" (quoted in 
Rosenberg, 1991, 12). The legal approach, when linked with 
New Deal liberalism, further institutionalized the protest 
tradition in black America. Consequently, African Americans, 
by appealing to the federal government (and particularly the 
courts) are saying, implicitly, that the solutions to their 
grievances lie outside their community. Furthermore, the 
sense that white America has "wronged" black people implies 
that it is the larger society that needs to change. In 
choosing the legal approach, the NAACP unwittingly tilled the 
soil for the "system-blame" mentality of the 19 60's, much of 
which is still present today (0. Patterson, 1997).
By the mid-1930's, DuBois believed that it was humili­
ating for blacks to continue to try to force themselves into 
institutions where they were not wanted. DuBois' detractors 
portrayed him as a bitter old man who had become disillu­
sioned. Still fighting the last war, DuBois' views were 
branded as "Washingtonism"102 and the worst sort of "Uncle
102DuBois' call in the mid-1930's for black self­
segregation evoked memories of Booker T. Washington's program 
of economic uplift for blacks at the turn of the century. 
Because Washington did not place the struggle for political 
and social equality on the same plane as other black acti­
vists (like DuBois) , he was accused of "selling out" the 
black race. Washington's famous "Atlanta Exposition" speech
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Tomism" (Cruse, 1986; Moses, 1993) . The speed with which the 
NAACP dispensed with DuBois revealed its fidelity to the 
liberal tradition.
However, at the same time, the NAACP also rejected two 
components of the American Creed with a long tradition in the 
African American community - pragmatism and self-determina­
tion. DuBois' call for voluntary segregation implied that 
African Americans could not afford to wait for "the hearts of 
white men to change" before they developed their own strategy 
for economic survival. The Great Depression, in DuBois' mind, 
had made it crushingly apparent that African Americans had no 
viable strategy of economic survival in America. As the 
history of African American churches and schools indicated, 
the black self-help tradition could be traced back to the 
antebellum period. In summary, it was not necessary to con­
clude, as the NAACP's leadership did, that racial segregation 
was inherently harmful.
However, DuBois represented a viewpoint which the NAACP 
had rejected as heresy: that race does and should matter. 
Moreover's Hitler's atrocities and liberal social science 
opinion seemed to vindicate them: the belief that race makes
in 1895 was dubbed the "Atlanta Compromise" by his detrac­
tors. Dissastifaction with Washington's program led DuBois 
and others to found the Niagara Movement, and eventually the 
NAACP. Thus, by 193 5, a generation of black civil rights 
leaders had grown up with a derisive view of Booker T. 
Washington. Consequently, when DuBois himself argued for 
black self-segregation in the 1930's, he was accused of high 
treason. In a sense, DuBois was "reaping what he had sown" 
(Cruse, 1986).
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a difference was inherently racist, irrational, ignorant, 
opposed to American notions of individual equality, and 
ultimately dangerous. Anyone who thought that race did matter 
was no better than a Southern racist (Wilkinson, 1979; 
D'Souza, 1995; Peller, 1997).
Thus, Brown created the very dilemma which DuBois pro- 
phesized: the belief among many African Americans that inte­
gration, supposedly a strategy for their liberation, was 
itself inherently racist. Brown assumed that educational 
equality would be achieved by a legal remedy. It apparently 
had not occurred to many of the liberal lawyers and social 
scientists who concluded that racially segregated schools 
were inherently unequal that this conviction had any racial 
connotations. Brown. as well as the Coleman report and other 
studies afterwards, was based on a rational interpretation of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, and was supported by value-neutral, 
dispassionate social science, or so it was argued. Thus, by 
defining the issue in "legal" and "sociological" terms, 
liberals did not see themselves acting as "racists." White 
public schools and state universities were superior to black 
ones on neutral, acultural grounds.
This view was premised, in part, on the mistaken notion 
that the Constitution "usually provides clear, self-executing 
commands" (Horwitz, 1979, 603). But the very nature of con­
stitutional provisions and laws is that their meaning is 
subject to interpretation, debate, and reinterpretation. Most
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searches for a clear and unambigous "intent of the framers" 
prove to be inconclusive, especially when the focus is on 
intentionally ambiguous terms such as "due process" or "equal 
protection under the laws" (Ibid, 603) . Moreover, the process 
of crafting laws and constitutional amendments, because it is 
inherently a political one, requires compromises and conces­
sions in order to be accomplished; therefore, attempts to 
discover the "clear intent of the framers" are usually 
futile. This fallacy encourages litigants to emphasize the 
parts of the historical record that seem to strengthen their 
case and minimize or explain way contradictory evidence. For 
this reason, the NAACP's lawyers focused on evidence that 
seemed to imply that the framers envisioned the Fourteenth 
Amendment would give Congress broad discretion to strike down 
state laws that treated the ex-slaves as a separate and 
unequal caste. The South's attorneys, on the other hand, 
emphasized those parts of the record that could be construed 
to mean that Congress could have never intended the Four­
teenth Amendment to forbid states from establishing racially 
segregated schools (including the prejudices of members of 
the 39th Congress).
Any system of judicial review ultimately involves judges 
making choices among competing values. Moreover, the choices 
made by judges are not necessarily "the last wrord;" rather, 
their meaning and their validity are interpreted, debated, 
reinterpreted, or even rejected. The conservative and black
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nationalist critiques of desegregation are excellent examples 
of this process at work. Therefore, it is not surprising that 
Brown is a cultural icon that sometimes means radically 
different things to different people. The basic fallacy of 
the NAACP' s reliance on the courts is that it overlooked the 
fact that the judicial branch is, in the final analysis, a 
political institution. The ideological and policy prefe­
rences of federal judges can never be "neutral principles of 
constitutional law" (Weschler, 1959); instead, they are 
inherently political with political consequences. Also, fede­
ral judges are not immune from the political pressures which 
affect the other branches of government. Therefore, the 
belief that the courts represent a neutral forum for the 
redress of grievances is a myth.103 It was the Supreme 
Court's narrow interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment in
103Smith (1996) recounts an incident which illustrates 
that how this view manifested itself politically. Between 
1969 and 1974, Presidents Nixon and Ford introduced several 
resolutions designed to restrict the power of federal courts 
to order mandatory busing as a means of achieving school 
desegregation. Several bills and amendments were passed by 
the House but were either defeated or significantly watered 
down by the Senate. All of these measures were vigorously 
opposed by the NAACP and other traditional civil rights 
organizations. During the controversy, several members of the 
Congressional Black Caucus proposed a compromise whereby, in 
exchange for restrictions on court-imposed busing orders, 
that Congress would substantially increase funding for urban 
school districts with high minority populations. However, the 
NAACP and other traditional civil rights leaders successfully 
blocked these initiatives, arguing that such remedies should 
not be pursued in Congress. Rather, blacks should rely on the 
courts to protect their rights for fear that it would set a 
precedent that legitimized the interference with the 
constitutional rights of African Americans by the so-called 
"political branches" of government (168-169).
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The Slaughterhouse Cases which paved the road for the doc­
trine of "separate but equal;" similarly, the same Supreme 
Court, in Milliken v. Bradley made desegregation of Northern 
metropolitan school districts practically impossible to 
achieve. The courts, far from being a neutral tribunal, 
represent temporay political majorities that are subject to 
change.
Moreover, this perspective did not account for the fact 
that the social science paradigms which they relied on for 
their "unbiased" conclusions about black culture and the 
white South were themselves Eurocentric and culturally biased 
(Blassingame, 1972; Wilkinson, 1979; Preer, 1989; W. Cross, 
1991; Peller, 1997). Even worse, Brown was premised on "bad 
science." William Cross (1991), in a devastating critique, 
showed that Kenneth Clark committed serious methodological 
errors.104 More recent scholarship has found little evidence 
that African Americans have more psychologically damaged 
personalities than whites; in fact, African Americans often 
score higher than whites on measures of personal self-esteem
104Three fundamental errors the Clarks (as well as other 
social scientists made during similiar studies) are 
identified by Cross. First, the subjects in the studies are 
small children (ranging from ages three to seven), yet 
conclusions are drawn about the psychological health of 
African American adults. Second, although only one attitude 
was measured (racial preference), conclusions are drawn about 
the personalities of the subject, as if both racial prefe­
rence and personality development had been measured. Third, 
anecdotal evidence from the children's behavior and speech 
was interpreted as "proof" of "mental health," or more 
precisely, "psychological damage" (Cross, 1991, 10).
R eproduced  with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
3 5 7
(Armor, 1995; 0. Patterson, 1997). Brown argued that racial 
segregation was wrong partly because it made blacks feel bad 
about themselves; however, recent studies demonstrating no 
significant self-esteem gap between black and white Ameri­
cans undermines one of the basic premises of Brown. In 
addition, a number of scholars have found that black uni­
versities serve many beneficial psychosocial roles for their 
predominately black clientele; indeed, some African Americans 
exhibited higher academic performance in a majority-black 
setting (Fleming, 1981; Allen, 1987; 1991; 1992; Harvey and 
Williams, 1989; Rosenwald and Murty, 1993).
Consequently, though there was no specific language in 
the Brown opinion which required that desegregation be imple­
mented by closing all-black schools and firing black teachers 
and black administrators, many liberals pressed forward 
without recognizing how these actions might be interpreted in 
the African American community. Moreover, even if one assumes 
that these policies were the "right" ones to pursue at the 
elementary and secondary level, that did not mean that they 
necessarily applied to higher education. Yet, the NAACP Legal 
Defense Fund in the early 1970's seemed determined to imple­
ment desegregation in higher education, even if it meant the 
elimination of black universities. Often, many liberals acted 
as if either African American culture did not exist at all, 
or if it did, there were few if any redemptive qualities of 
black culture that were worth preserving. Consequently, the
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fears that many blacks expressed about the implications of 
eliminating black colleges were not seen as legitimate 
(Frazier, 1939; Myrdal, 1944; Stamp, 1956; Moynihan, 1965; 
Cruse, 1986; Cross, 1991; Shujaa, 1996; Peller, 1997). The 
failure of many liberals to understand or appreciate African 
American culture was partly a function of their tendency to 
condemn Southern culture generally as inconsistent with the 
American Creed and an embarrassment to the nation's inter­
national image (Wilkinson, 1979; Cruse, 1986; Rosenberg, 
1991; Moses, 1993; Dudziak, 1995; Peller, 1997). Convinced of 
their own objectivity, many liberals insisted that their 
interpretation of Brown was the only correct one and 
dismissed the concerns voiced by some blacks about the manner 
in which Brown was being implemented. Thus, liberals unwit­
tingly created the circumstances for the"black backlash" 
against integration of the late sixties and the seventies.
Furthermore, this view also acted as if schools them­
selves were acultural institutions and a policy of inte­
grating black children into all-white schools did not raise 
significant issues of cultural assimilation (Peller, 1997, 
2 06). A number of scholars have demonstrated that there are 
significant cultural differences between African Americans 
and whites which must be taken into account in a classroom 
setting (Smitherman, 1977; Kochman, 1981; Heath, 1983; Shade, 
1981; 1982; 1997; Delpit, 1995). But the orthodox view of 
liberal social scientists in the 1950's (which still has many
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adherents) is that, even if cultural differences do exist 
between whites and other minorities, it is illegitimate to 
take them into account. All students, after all, should be 
held to the same standard. This tendency is further rein­
forced by the increasing confidence in the efficacy of 
"universal methods" such as standardized testing105 to 
measure academic achievement and "hold schools accountable 
for results" (Chubb and Moe, 1990; Fiske, 1991; Gardner, 
1993; Murray and Herrstein, 1994; D' Souza, 1995; Orfield,
1996).
Fordice is the product of the "black backlash" to inte­
gration, as -defined by the NAACP Legal Defense Fund in the 
seventies. The LDF in Adams seemed to assume that the Green 
standard, announced in elementary and secondary education, 
should be applied to higher education. In fact, the LDF's 
lawyers pursued the extension of the Green mandate to higher
losSince the national scare generated by the Education 
Department's "A Nation at Risk" report on the status of 
public education, the use of standardized testing as a means 
of measuring academic progress has intensified. The premise 
behind testing is that "academic progress" of all students, 
regardless of race, can be readily quantified in ways which 
are objective and nondiscriminatory. Those subjects which 
lend themselves readily to this type of assessment, such as 
science and mathematics, are seen as accu-rate barometers of 
what students actually know; with respect to other subjects, 
"value is assigned to those aspects which can be efficiently 
assessed (grammar rather than "voice" in writing; facts 
rather than interpretation in history)" (Gardner, 1993, 165) . 
What is usually ignored, however, is the rather arbitrary 
nature of what is considered "useful knowledge" and whether 
the content of these assessments (as well as the skills these 
instruments claim to measure) tell us anything meaningful 
about what children know anyway (Ibid, 161-183).
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education before its effects on elementary and secondary 
education could be assessed and without consulting black 
educators in the planning of the suit (Preer, 1982, 199). The 
LDF seemed unable to adequately distinguish between legal 
issues and questions of educational substance. The NAFEO 
countered that the LDF had not considered whether the con­
text of higher education warranted different solutions than 
the remedies that had been tried in elementary and secondary 
education (especially as they related to historically black 
colleges). The Black Power ethos, which has persisted long 
after the movement itself has fallen out of vogue, had 
encouraged many blacks to believe that the schools were being 
desegregated on white terms (Wilkinson, 1979; Dempsey and 
Noblit, 1996) . Many African Americans who were not satisfied 
with the way desegregation was implemented in the public 
schools were determined that historically black universities 
not undergo the same experience (Bell, 1979; Preer, 1982).
Hence, an ironic confluence of forces has coalesced to 
preserve historically black universities. Many conservatives 
viewed HEW's attempts to enforce Title VI of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 during the 1970'as an example of "unwarranted 
federal intervention in the affairs of the states." Thus, 
they have tended to endorse a less agressive approach to 
desegregation enforcement from the federal level. Therefore, 
if significant levels of segregation persist in the univer­
sities, s<? be it. The mere fact that universities are predo­
R eproduced  with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
3 6 1
minately of one race does not constitute prlma facie evidence 
of a constitutional violation, the Fordice court declared. 
The issue is whether the state has fettered the choices of 
individuals in such a manner that produces racial segrega­
tion (505 U.S. 717; United States v. Fordice. 505 U.S. 717, 
745 J. Thomas, concurring; United States v. Fordice. 505 U.S. 
717, 749 J. Scalia, dissenting). Hence, conservative notions 
of individual freedom end up supporting the continuation of 
historically black universities. This is the identical argu­
ment that Isiah Madison, convenor of the Black Mississip- 
pians' Council on Higher Education made pursuant to the 
filing of the Avers lawsuit, though from a completely diffe­
rent political persuasion. Brown. Madison argued, freed 
African Americans to choose whatever institutions of higher 
education they wished. If that meant historically black 
universities, then so be it.
The Court's decision in Fordice is a clear reaffirmation 
of Brown. In fact, the legitimacy of Brown was never in dis­
pute by any of the parties. What is in dispute is what Brown 
means in higher education - and specifically, how much power 
do federal judges (as representatives of the state) have and 
what remedies satisfy a state's constitutional duty to elimi­
nate the vestiges of segregation in higher education. How­
ever, Fordice applies the Green standard to higher education 
without specifying whether remedies developed at the elemen­
tary and secondary level fit the postsecondary context. Also,
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the Supreme Court, during the same term, continued the trend 
of restricting the power of federal courts in public school 
desegregation cases (Freeman v. Pitts. 503 U.S. 467 [1992]). 
Thus, the Court failed to consider colleges and universities 
on their own terms, and how (or if) Brown even applies to the 
question of desegregating state systems of higher education 
at all.
Furthermore, the Avers plaintiffs, by insisting on the 
enhancement of black universities, are arguing for the very 
type of "big government" solution that conservatives adhor. 
Justices Thomas and Scalia, the two most conservative members 
of the Court, express sympathy for the plight of black uni­
versities. However, they argue that there is no authority 
under the Constitution to require the state of Mississippi to 
enhance Jackson State, Alcorn, and Mississippi Valley. True 
to their conservative philosophy, education is primarily a 
state matter. Thus, if a state chose to remedy past funding 
inequities at black colleges, it would have that right. But 
the federal courts do not have the power to order states to 
do so. Considering the fairly conservative mood of the 
courts, Fordice implies that there might be considerable 
state-by-state variation on this question, and a precedent in 
one state may not necessarily be binding on another. In light 
of the "track record" of Southern states with respect for 
providing for black higher education, it remains to be seen
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whether Fordice's implicit trust of the states can resolve 
the thorny issues that continue to characterize desegregation 
in higher education.
The American Creed as a Double Edged Sword
This dissertation has argued throughout that African 
Americans and whites share the same American Creed but for 
different reasons. For the white majority, the Creed captures 
the essential meaning of the American Revolution - the dig­
nity of the individual human being, the fundamental equality 
of all men, certain unalienable rights to freedom, justice, 
and, and equal opportunity. These values represent the high­
est law of the land. The fact that the Declaration of Inde­
pendence was written and signed by slaveholders - especially 
in view of America's image in the European mind as the "hope 
for the world" - constituted the greatest moral problem of 
American democracy. However, African Americans have endorsed 
this same creed, and have coopted its values to struggle for 
political, social, and economic equality in the United 
States. Thus, in one of history's greatest ironies, the very 
population with the greatest interest in debunking American 
democracy has been among the most ardent apostles of Ame­
rica's version of Lockianism.
It has also been argued that American faith in the 
central importance in education represents one of the most 
powerful deductions from the Lockian settlement. Education in 
America is deemed essential to foster the values of citizen­
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ship consistent with democratic self-government and to equip 
students to successful compete in a market economy. For Afri­
can Americans, education takes on an additional significance: 
historically it had been denied them. Education, in the black 
community, has been intimately connected with freedom. The 
legal struggle for desegregation represents a chapter in that 
struggle.
Brown v. Board of Education embodies the American Creed 
and the sense that its principles had not been extended to 
African Americans on the same basis. Four decades later, 
Brown is now considered one of the heroic moments in American 
history. Its principles are endorsed across the political 
spectrum. However, as our study of desegregation in higher 
education has shown, Brown is a highly contested political 
icon which means different things to different people, depen­
ding on their political persuasion. The attempt to apply 
Brown to higher education unavoidably raising the question of 
the constitutional status of historically black universities. 
The resolution of this issue is intertwined with a deeper 
debate about the role of government and whether the ideal of 
"color-blindness" can be reconciled with policies which 
explicitly take race into account.
It is at this point where the historical experiences of 
whites and blacks radically diverge. The American Creed is 
fundamentally a theory of a limited state; Locke in America 
has been about limiting the state rather than defining its
Reproduced  with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
3 6 5
legitimate role. African Americans associate their greatest 
gains with a more interventionist state; however, because 
they adhere to the same liberal tradition, they tend to 
neglect to philosophically defend the state's role. Hence, as 
the period of legal segregation recedes further and further 
into the past, policies premised on past discrimination 
against African Americans have been more difficult to justify 
politically.
This is one of the fundamental problems with Brown. The 
Court, in a sense, could almost be forgiven for assuming that 
everyone knew what it meant. After all, segregation was still 
a very pervasive reality in the 1950's. The supporters of 
Brown could easily say: of course, separate schools are bad 
under all circumstances. Therefore, Brown is inherently 
logical. However, the problem of defining the appropriate 
remedies to implement Brown. particularly in higher educa­
tion, remains. Brown implied that the problem of racism could 
be solved without any fundamental changes in the American 
view of the state's legitimate role. Consequently, the 
struggle to remedy past racial discrimination has occurred in 
a legal context of individualism which has no conception of 
"group rights" and is, in the long term, biased against 
claims rooted in history. This predisposition of the American 
Creed raises the question of whether Bellah is right: despite 
considerable "lip service" to toleration for individual and 
cultural differences, the American Creed does not provide its
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citizens with adequate analytical tools to understand those 
who are historically, economically, and socially different 
(1985, 206).
Thus, though African Americans share the same belief in
the Creed as white Americans, it frequently leads to quite
different policy preferences and ideological positions. But
the fact that whites and blacks adhere to the liberal
tradition does not necessarily mean that a solution to the
problem is easy. This point is illustrated by an analogy from
Hartz' comparison of the differences between the American and
European perspective on democratic revolution:
This is not a problem of antitheses such, for example, 
as we find in Locke and Filmer. It is a problem of 
different perspectives on the same ideal [my emphasis]. 
But we must not for that reason assume that it is any 
less difficult of solution; it may in the end be more 
difficult since antitheses define each other and hence 
can understand one another, but different perspectives 
on a single value may, ironically enough, lack this 
common ground of definition [my emphasis] (1955, 66).
In other words, the fact that white and African Ameri­
cans share the liberal tradition may be precisely the pro­
blem. By the 1980's, nearly all whites agreed that blacks 
"should be able to attend the same schools as whites, have 
the same chanes for jobs as whites, live where they choose, 
and otherwise have the same freedom of movement and personal 
choice" (Hochschild, 1995, 56) . This represents a significant 
change in public opinion from the 1950's, when less than a 
majority of white Americans believed these same things (Hoch­
schild, 19 95; D'Souza, 1995; S. Thernstrom and A. Thernstrom,
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1997). However, as the period of legal segregation recedes 
further into the past, white Americans see racial discrimi­
nation steadily decreasing in America; consequently, whites 
sometimes ask "what's all the fuss about" (Hochschild, 1995, 
61) .
Black Americans, on the other hand, see considerably 
more racial inequality (Hochschild, 1995, 60-61). Blacks have 
tended to favor policies that proactively intervene in the 
marketplace to help them "catch up" with whites in the 
Lockian race, insisting that policies outlawing racially 
discriminatory practices are insufficient to remedy the 
cumulative effects of slavery and segregation. In doing so, 
the majority of black political leaders has "bucked the tide" 
of a conservative political climate which emphasizes tra­
ditional American notions of limited government intervention 
in the economy and society. However, by largely failing to 
philosophically defend the state, liberals, in effect, assume 
that, in light of America's racial past, that their policy 
preferences are self-evident. Therefore, when conservative 
disagree with them, liberals ("still fighting the last war") 
find it easy to label their political opponents as "racists" 
or "intolerant." However, many conservatives also believe 
that African Americans should be treated as the equals of 
whites; they disagree with liberals about the best way to 
achieve a racially just society. Conservatives charge libe­
rals with deserting the American Creed by embracing policies
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that favor "special groups," require "proportional represen­
tation," and "undermine merit." Thus, all sides lay claim to 
the American Creed, but each group insists that its inter­
pretation - and its alone - is the only morally correct one.
Thus, the American Creed is a mixed blessing for African 
Americans: on one hand, it has been a very useful ideological 
underpinning for black protest. At the same time, it avails 
their political opponents powerful ammunition to delegitimize 
black political movements. Consequently, the same arguments 
that the NAACP relied on to strike down state laws requiring 
segregation of the public schools have been appropriated by 
the state of Mississippi to argue that the Constitution does 
not require it to make massive investments at its black 
universities to compensate them for its past conduct during 
the Jim Crow era.
Another development which raises questions about the 
efficacy of the American Creed to deal with race is the 
secularization of American culture (Hunter, 1990; McCullough, 
1991; Moses, 1993; Whitehead, 1994). Tocqueville (1988) 
observed that religion acted as an important bulwark for 
American democracy (287-301). Indeed, America's historic 
sense of Divine Providence has provided the moral ammunition 
to challenge the nation's treatment of African Americans 
(Davis, 1966; King, 1986; Moses, 1993; Walker, 1992). 
However, American individualism encourages each citizen to 
develop his own morality; the result, McCullough concludes,
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is that ethical questions in American politics become excee­
dingly problematic in an environment with no shared moral 
consensus. This breakdown of moral consensus, McCullough 
argues, along with a loss of a sense of community, erodes the 
basis for both rational political discourse and collective 
action on the part of citizens. Moreover, atomistic indivi­
dualism, the presupposition of American political life, 
undermines the society's capacity to critique itself. This is 
true, McCullough argues, whether the specific social criti­
cisms originate on the political left or right:
Liberals who undertake to go beyond description 
to prescription are at a loss for conceptual categories 
adequate to the task, for their dependence on the 
unstable combination of the assumptions of economic 
individualism and welfare statism give them no grounds 
for critical transcendence of the society as it exists. 
Indeed, the problem is more fundamental: They have no 
grounds for value judgements at all. By assuming a 
separation between description ("fact") and prescrip­
tion ("value"), they undercut any basis for anything 
they would say in prescription.
Conservatives can denounce society from the per­
spective of the ideal of moral community, but without 
breaking with classical economic liberalism (the core 
of modern conservatism), they are unable to offer much 
more than a utopian appeal to adopt a pure form of 
laissez-faire capitalism. Radicals attack capitalism 
with moral fervor; their critique of institutional 
structures and processes is often penetrating and 
difficult to refute. In "unmasking" morality, however, 
they cannot account for their own moral passion or 
give more than an ideological (class-interest bound) 
explanation of society, which must include the critics 
themselves (42-43).
The implications of McCullough's analysis on black 
politics in general and the politics of desegregation in 
general are quite serious. First of all, a culture of
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individualism lacks the conceptual tools to discern the moral 
legitimacy of competing claims on the political system; in 
the absence of such criteria, only the most powerful and 
influential prevail in the political game. African Americans, 
who tend to have less political influence, have relied 
heavily on morally-based political appeals; indeed, under­
neath the legal and social scientific arguments put forth in 
desegregation lawsuits are moral appeals to the values of the 
American Creed. However, a climate that either lacks the 
interpretive skills to process such appeals or assigns them 
to the "trash bin of interest group liberalism" severely 
diminishes the effectiveness of moral suasion as a political 
strategy.
Yet, the "saving grace" of the American Creed may be its 
pragmatic orientation. The New Deal, as was argued earlier, 
illustrates the unique ability of the American Creed to 
"reinvent itself" to deal with a national emergency. The 
Creed's fundamental pragmatism means that it inheres within 
it a dynamism that enables its values to be appropriated to 
meet new exigencies. And the changes in the global economy 
may provide those very circumstances for a reinvention of the 
American Creed.
The Information Age, with the revolutionary changes it 
is bringing about in the workplace, requires a more educated 
and highly-skilled population than at any time in history 
(Wilson, 1978; Johnston and Packer, 1987; Reich, 1991; Fiske,
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1991; Gill, 1992; Obiakor and Barker, 1993; 0. Patterson,
1997) . At the same time, income inequality between the rich 
and poor of all races has been growing since the 1970's 
(Harrington, 1984; Phillips, 1990; Reich, 1991; Edsall and 
Edsall, 1991; Schwartz and Volgy, 1992). In addition, African 
Americans, Latinos, and immigrant groups represent the 
fastest growing sectors of the labor force, but are more 
likely to be at the bottom of the socioeconomic ladder. The 
new information economy represents a historic opportunity to 
redefine the role of the federal government in a twenty-first 
century capitalist economy. As part of this larger debate, 
the supporters of historically black universities could argue 
for the existence and strengthening of their institutions as 
a valuable source of integrating African Americans and others 
into the mainstream of the global economy. The future of 
black colleges could be linked to the exponential rise in the 
importance of education in the new economy. Chief Justice 
Warren's observation in Brown that a child denied the right 
to an education cannot "reasonably be expected to succeed in 
life" (347 U.S. 483, 494) is more true now than when it was 
written in 1954. For this reason, the view that Brown was, or 
is, inherently flawed (Johnson, 1993) is an unnecessarily 
harsh judgment. Brown. because it embodies the American 
Creed, can be reinterpreted to fit realities not contemplated 
by the Court or the NAACP's lawyers and social scientists.
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However, though the pragmatism of the Creed constantly 
keeps the door open for an expansion and redefinition of the 
state's role, it is not inevitable that it will do so. 
Indeed, there are other developments which suggest just the 
opposite. The collapse of the Soviet Union has been occa­
sioned with a chorus of celebration - a vindication of 
America's Cold War strategy and even the declaration of "the 
end of history." The spread of democratic regimes throughout 
Latin America, Eastern Europe, and in some parts of Asia and 
Africa only confirm this confidence. Furthermore, the fact 
that America's economy in the 1990's has significantly out­
performed those of Western Europe and Japan only strengthen 
America's self-confidence: it is hard not to notice that
America's economic competitors have significantly greater 
social entitlement programs, which make it more difficult for 
them to compete with the United States in the new environ­
ment. The recent economic downturns in Asia only reinforce 
the age-old American tendency of believing that the world's 
problems would be solved if other countries would be more 
like America. The United States' position vis-a-vis its major 
economic rivals only strengthens the hand of those who 
believe in the further devolution of power from the federal 
government to the states - particularly as it relates to 
education. Fordice is an example of the faith in devolution 
of power to the states. Furthermore, while macroeconomic 
change affects all Americans regardless of race (and creates
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the potential for multi-racial political coalitions), there 
still remain powerful incentives to emphasize the "politics 
of racial identity" and to use race as a wedge-issue in 
American politics,106 even if some of these tactics corrode 
political discourse (Edsall and Edsall, 1991; D'Souza, 1995; 
Curry, 1996; 0. Patterson, 1997; S. Thernstrom and A. Thern­
strom, 1997).
Thus, as Louis Hartz observes, a "liberal society analy­
sis" of American politics, in contrast to the Progressive 
scholarship that dominated the first half of the twentieth 
century, cannot guarantee a "happy ending" to the American 
story:
The Progressives, for one thing, always had an American 
hero available to match any American villian they found,
106The fact that race is intimately intertwined with the 
philo-sophical dispute between conservatives and liberals 
about the role of government sometimes give rise to perverse 
political incentives on both sides. Liberals sometimes feel 
compelled to deny the fact that considerable racial progress 
has occurred since the 1950's and 1960's; listening to the 
rhetoric of many liberal intellectuals, one would sometimes 
think almost no progress has been made in American race 
relations at all (D'Souza, 1995; S. Thernstrom and A. 
Thernstrom, 1997; 0. Patterson, 1997) . Liberals emphasize 
what they see as the continued effects of racial inequality 
as the rationale for more government programs. Conservative 
intellectuals, on the other hand, emphasize race because it 
provides an effective way of demonstrating the failure of 
Great Society programs of which they are ideologically 
opposed to (Murray, 1984; Steele, 1986; Edsall and Edsall, 
1991; Murray and Herrstein, 1994; D'Souza, 1995; S. Thern­
strom and A. Thernstrom, 1997; O. Patterson, 1997). However, 
some versions of the conservative critique of New Deal 
liberalism overemphasizethe failure of government programs 
and come close to outright denying that government inter­
vention on issues related to race has had any positive effect 
at all (Harrington, 1984; Jones, 1987).
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a Jefferson for every Hamilton. Which meant in their 
demonology the nation never really sinned: only its 
inferior self did, its particular will, to use the lan­
guage of Rousseau. The analyst of American liberalism 
is not in so happy a spot, for concentrating on unities 
as well as conflict, he is likely to discover on occa­
sion a national villian, the tyrannical force of Loc- 
kian sentiment, whose treatment requires a new experi­
ence for the whole country rather than the insurgence 
of part of it. . . .So that the liberal society ana­
lyst is destined in two ways to be a less pleasing 
scholar than the Progressive: he finds national weak­
nesses and can offer no assurances on the basis of 
the past that they will be remedied (1955, 31-32).
The American Creed provides a powerful source of natio­
nal unity for black and white Americans. However, fundamental 
differences rooted in history create an ideological gulf as 
to what its practical implications are for the role of the 
state in American society. There is a tendency to appeal to 
the past to answer questions about the present - either 
because it represents some ideal state of equality or because 
the shortcomings of the past have policy implications in the 
present. But the key test for the American Creed's ability to 
deal with race may be whether or not it enables blacks and 
whites to transcend the limitations of their national experi­
ence. As Hartz concludes, " . . .  instead of recapturing our 
past, we have got to transcend it. As for a child who is lea­
ving adolescence, there is no going home again for America" 
(1955, 32). Whether twenty-first century America is "up for 
the task" remains, of course, an open question.
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